

21st-Century Narratives of World History

Global and Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Edited by R. Charles Weller



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Editor

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Editor

R. Charles Weller
Department of History
Washington State University
Pullman, WA, USA

and

Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding
Georgetown University
Washington, DC, USA

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EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

About the Editor

R. Charles Weller (Ph.D., al-Farabi Kazakh National University) is Clinical Assistant Professor in the Roots of Contemporary Issues World History & Asia Programs at Washington State University and a non-residential Visiting Researcher at Georgetown University's Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (2014–2018). He specializes in history and identity in Tsarist Central Asia and the Islamic world, Western–Islamic relations, Western Imperialism and Asian/Islamic reform movements, and world history and historiography.

Contributors

Tamim Ansary is an Afghan-American writer and speaker. His *Destiny Disrupted, A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes* won a Northern California Book Award and his memoir *West of Kabul, East of New York* was San Francisco's 2008 One-City-One-Book pick while also being used as common freshman reading by many colleges.

David Christian (D.Phil. Oxford, 1974) is a Distinguished Professor of History and Director of the Big History Institute at Macquarie University. Along with expertise in Russia and the Soviet Union, he has, since the 1980s, helped pioneer the emerging field of 'Big History'.

He was founding President of the *International Big History Association*, and co-founder with Bill Gates, of the *Big History Project*. He has written books on 19th and 20th century Russia, on the deep history of Inner Eurasia, and on big history.

Felipe Fernández-Armesto occupies the William P. Reynolds Chair for Mission in Arts and Letters at Notre Dame, Indiana. His books include *Millennium* (1995), *Pathfinders* (World History Association Book Prize, 2007), *The World: a History* (2014), *A Foot in the River* (2015), and, as editor, the forthcoming *Oxford Illustrated History of the World*.

Tursin Hafizuhli Gabitov is Professor of Cultural History and Philosophy at al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, Kazakhstan. He has numerous publications in both Kazakh and Russian, some of which have also been translated into English. He served three years as visiting professor at Shahid Beheshti University in Iran and was co-editor of UNESCO's Russian-Kazakh version of *Culture of Peace*.

Candice Goucher is Professor of History at Washington State University Vancouver and recipient of the WHA Pioneer in World History award. Among her publications are *World History: Journeys from Past to Present*, (London: Routledge, 2008, 2012) and *The Cambridge World History, Volume II: A World with Agriculture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Patrick Manning is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of World History, Emeritus, at the University of Pittsburgh. His publications include “Inequality: Historical and Disciplinary Approaches” (*American Historical Review*, 2017); *Big Data in History* (2013); *Migration in World History* (2nd edn, 2012); *The African Diaspora* (2009); and *Navigating World History* (2003).

Gotelind Müller is Professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Her most recent books are *Documentary, World History, and National Power in the PRC: Global Rise in Chinese Eyes* (2013, pb. 2015); and *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations* (2011, pb. 2013).

Diego Olstein (Ph.D., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003) is Associate Professor at the University of Pittsburgh. His first book, *La Era Mozárabe* (1085–1315) analyzes the economic conflicts and acculturation processes that followed the Castilian conquest of Toledo in

1085. His *Thinking History Globally* discusses four strategies (and their twelve historical branches) for moving beyond national borders, language barriers, and enclosed regions—comparing, connecting, conceptualizing, and contextualizing.

Peter N. Stearns is University Professor at George Mason University. He has written widely on world history and emotions history. He has taught world history for many years, and helped shaped the initial Advanced Placement world history program. He has also promoted a thematic approach to world history, as in his own recent works on the ‘industrial turn’ and on toleration in a global context.

Leonid Trofimov is a native of Russia. He completed his undergraduate work at Novosibirsk State University and his Ph.D. at University of Illinois at Chicago. He is now Senior Lecturer in Russian history at Bentley University. His research interests focus on cultural interactions between 20th-century Russia and the world. His co-edited volume on the global impact of the Russian revolution is scheduled for publication by Hackett Press in 2017.

Merry Wiesner-Hanks is Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She is the editor-in-chief of the nine-volume *Cambridge World History* (2015), and an author or editor of more than 30 books and nearly 100 articles that have appeared in English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, Chinese, Turkish, and Korean.

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PART I

Historical Background

‘Grand Narrative’ and ‘New’ World Histories: Their Historical Challenges and Contributions in Western Scholarship

R. Charles Weller

Certain debatable assumptions are already evident in the main title of this volume: *21st-Century Narratives* assumes a Western Christian (Gregorian) calendar, as opposed to Chinese, Japanese, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, Mayan or other approaches to mapping time.¹ If following the Islamic calendar, the book should have been titled *14th-Century Narratives of World History*, if the Jewish, *57th-Century Narratives*, the Japanese, *Esei-Era Narratives*, and so on. Whichever frame of reference

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R.C. Weller (✉)

Department of History, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA

R.C. Weller

Georgetown University (ACMCU), Washington D.C., USA

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we use, the intended focus is on narratives of world history that both reveal and continue to shape *present* understandings of the world and its history, with a view to the context of debate in which these present narratives have been forged.

The most immediate context of debate, and not unrelatedly the one most recently reinvigorating the ongoing reception of world/global histories in our own day, is that paradigmatic buzzword of late—globalization. Growing recognition—enthusiastic or otherwise—of the interconnectedness and interdependence of the ‘global village’ we all now (supposedly) inhabit has given the task of world history new significance and vitality, not to mention new shapes and approaches. Of course, as Lynn Hunt has highlighted in her reflections on *Writing History in the Global Era* (2015), “globalization did not suddenly attract attention in the 1990s because it arose then.”² Interest was rather stimulated by what Francis Fukuyama and other Western democratic capitalist advocates prematurely interpreted to be “the end of history,” that is, the implosion of the Soviet Union between roughly 1985–1991.³ This left ‘globalization’ (as well as the later ‘War on Terror’) to fill “the ideological vacuum created by the end of the Cold War division between capitalism and communism.”⁴ To be sure though, numerous competing interpretations of world/global history have arisen, in close connection with older schools,⁵ including revamped democratic-capitalist, Marxian-communist, dependency and world-system theory, Christian and ecological apocalyptic, and more. Along with these older schools however, and certainly drawing, with significant revision, from them, come newer schools, or more precisely, ‘new world histories’. In many (though certainly not all) ways, it is precisely these new world histories which *21st-Century Narratives of World History* is all about.

But are the so-called new world histories really all that new? Jerry Bentley asserts that, “[a]s it has developed since the 1960s and particularly since the 1980s, the new world history has focused attention on comparisons, connections, networks, and systems rather than the experiences of individual communities or discreet societies.”⁶ The study of world history in relation to many of these themes and issues is, however, closely linked to ideas of ‘cosmopolitanism’⁷ and ‘internationalism’ (as well as concern for humans and the environment expressed through ‘anti-modernism’ and ‘anti-technocracy’) as they have taken shape historically across ‘the long 20th century’ (c. 1870–2000). Interest in various themes and foci has coincided with key historical phases along the way: the era of nineteenth-century globalization and corresponding ‘Great

Game' between the 'Great Powers' (1870–1914),⁸ the post-World War I and subsequent interwar epoch (1918–1939), the post-World War II (Cold War) period (1945–1991),⁹ and, more recently, the post-Cold War and now post-9/11 era. Similarities along the lines Bentley suggests can even be discerned between the new world histories and some of the initial (as opposed to later) universal histories of the late Enlightenment period, because as Hans Erich Bödeker highlights, “the publication of many works on universal history...tried to present the history of mankind in its total chronological as well as global-spatial extent, and, finally, also in all its cultural diversity.” He goes on to note that

[f]or Schläözer, who expressed the principles of Enlightenment universal history most concisely, ‘to study world history means thinking connections between the main changes on the earth and within the human race in order to recognize how conditions today derive from both causes’. Thus Schläözer identified the two criteria which distinguished the new universal history: spatially, it related to the whole globe, and temporally, to the whole of the human race, whose interrelations were to be recognized and explained in relation to the present.¹⁰

Even beyond this, some of the new world history themes (and a related interest in broader human history) could, in fact, be traced back to the cosmopolitan ideas espoused in Classical and post-Classical city-states and empires.¹¹ None are static, each taking on new meaning in relation to each new historical context, but neither are they entirely novel; they, like the new world histories, all have historical roots.¹²

One thing is clear: well before the new world histories emerged, the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) and its journal, *Numen*, established in 1950 and 1953 respectively, began focusing on topics of comparative and cross-cultural history. Likewise, the journal *Comparative Studies in Society and History* took up a similar task in 1958, while the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC) was founded in 1961.¹³ The IAHR can be traced back to the ‘comparative origins and history of religion(s)’ school(s) which took shape in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as reflected in the work of F. Max Müller, James Frazer, E.B. Tylor, and others.¹⁴ Along with a primary focus on comparative religious traditions across the world both historically and geographically, studies have embraced cultural, economic, social, and political

factors transcending singular communities and/or states. ISCSC is very similar in this respect, though each has their own distinct angle of approach and emphasis. Along with both comparative religious-cultural and civilizational studies, the fields of international relations and diplomatic history as well as the later emerging world-systems school should also be noted here.¹⁵ All of these by their very nature “transcend single states, regions, and cultures” and treat various aspects of “cultural contact and exchange,” focusing ultimately on subjects which “have had a global or at least a transregional impact.”¹⁶ Even before these though, and integrating many of them, was *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale*, known by its English title *Journal of World History*. It was published under the auspices of UNESCO from 1953 to 1972. Indeed, as Poul Duedahl makes plain in his treatment of “UNESCO and the Invention of Global History, 1945–1976,” it was in fact UNESCO’s vision for world/global history, taking shape as early as UNESCO’s inception in November 1945, which first began “emphasizing the mutual indebtedness and interdependence of the peoples of the world” by “stressing cultural interchange” via “‘culture contacts,’ ‘interrelations of cultures,’ ‘interchange between peoples,’ and ‘cultural exchanges and transmissions’.”¹⁷ Duedahl is correct, therefore, to “regard the project as the earliest expression of a new trend of writing, so-called global history—the history of globalization—that came in the wake of World War II.”¹⁸ UNESCO’s *Journal of World History* was published to that end.

Along with these prior organizations and journals, a list of various articles and books could be compiled from multiple languages across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and even earlier, to show that most, if not all, of the transnational, cross-cultural, comparative and even gender and environmental themes and foci of the new world histories are not all that new.¹⁹ To the point: *if* all there is to practicing ‘world’ or ‘global history’ is to undertake any *one* study according to any *one* of the specified themes or approaches, then certainly advances have been made in terms of comprehensiveness and complexity as well as the unearthing of new threads and topics, but there is nothing really startlingly new about world/global history studies in the post-1960s or post-1980s/1990s phase of globalization, at least not in terms of the identified themes and approaches.²⁰ One argument I wish, then, to make here is this: world history must preserve an *explicit* commitment in both theory and practice to grand narrative as the overarching frame and ultimate goal of all these various themes and approaches, otherwise

it loses its distinctiveness as a field. Indeed, these historical predecessors and shared approaches are fundamental to why a debate continues over properly defining 'world history' as well as 'global history', especially in relation to overlapping fields and disciplines.

While the attempts to respond to essential challenges raised by Eurocentrism and globalization are entirely valid and integral to the field, this blurring of definitional boundaries and resulting confusion has also arisen as part of a two-pronged strategy by world historians to respond to increasing criticism in the post-colonial, post-modern era against world history as grand narrative.²¹ The six main interrelated yet distinct arguments against (Western) grand narrative world histories can be summarized as follows:

1. Existentialists and Nihilists critique Christian, Enlightenment, Social Scientific and other 'confused dreams of humankind' (i.e., grand narrative world histories) for allegedly extinguishing common, individual existence and thus its significance. They also allegedly strait-jacket individual human freedom, through alleged grand schemes governed by strict teleological, rational-philosophical or scientific 'laws of history' (cf. 3 and 4)²²;
2. 'Guild' historians²³ tend to reject the allegedly over-generalized nature of world histories, looking down upon them as too broad, i.e., not specialized enough, and thus not conducive to sufficient depth and focus of research evidenced by a(n alleged) lack of grounding in archival and primary and/or over-dependence on secondary sources; at best, world history *as grand narrative* has come to be viewed as the almost exclusive domain of non-specialist undergraduate survey courses and their typically graduate student, post-doctoral or non-tenured instructors, with a possible trend over the last several years to consider grand narrative approaches to world history unnecessary (cf. 5 and 6)²⁴;
3. Post-colonialist scholars critique 'hegemonic' Christian, Enlightenment, Social Scientific, Western Democratic Capitalist, Modernization, or Multiculturalist, Soviet Marxist Communist, and post-Soviet Multiculturalist grand narratives for assigning, in various ways, dominant roles to Western and subordinate roles to non-Western peoples, thereby promoting and justifying Western 'world conquest', or for promoting agendas of 'multiculturalism' and 'pluralism' via globalization as a means, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to justify ongoing Western penetration

- (cf. access via multicultural and pluralistic openness) and thus dominance of non-Western peoples and nations, including the imposition of *Western* multicultural and pluralist norms in the form of ‘international’ or ‘universal human rights’ (cf. 1, 4 and 5).
4. Edward Said-type critiques of ‘orientalist’ Western constructions of non-Western civilizations, which have been typically comparative using ‘the West’ as the standard against which the non-Western civilizations are judged. This implicitly critiques Western attempts to write and teach about comparative world civilizations properly and adequately (cf. 3 and 5);
 5. Post-modernist, deconstructionist (cf. post-structuralist) scholars critique modernist scientific order, meaning, structure, purpose, and direction (cf. scientific and social diachronic progress, especially linear evolutionary progressive development), with Western grand narratives representing the most all-encompassing, totalizing expressions of these; such critics advocate instead more personal (cf. intersubjective) and synchronically focused micro-histories (cf. 1, 2, 3 and 4);
 6. ‘Western (including at times ‘white nationalist’) Civilization’ advocates oppose new, that is, post-colonial, non-Eurocentric multicultural world history narratives because they are considered too critical in their representation of the West as well as too inclusive and affirming in their representation of the non-West,²⁵ thus undercutting Western Civilization narratives, whether explicitly packaged as such or disguised as ‘world’ histories which are predominantly Eurocentric (i.e., ‘Western Civ. plus’ approaches; Chap. 2 is devoted almost entirely to this point of debate).²⁶

In response to this ongoing “siege,”²⁷ the field of world history in the West (1) has—to borrow language from my financial advisor—sought to “diversify its portfolio in order to maximize as well as protect its assets”, that is, it has expanded and multiplied its definitional boundaries, providing numerous options for understanding world history; with multiple ships in its navy, it cannot be sunk through one direct hit; at the same time, the more narrowly focused themes and clarified methodologies offer greater support for recognition of world history as a field of specialists (as opposed to generalists)²⁸; and (2) it has also sought to break away from Eurocentric or European nation-state-centered approaches, particularly avoiding historical narratives which smack of teleological, Enlightenment, Social Scientific or Cold War progressivist (i.e., Christian, Western Democratic Capitalist and Modernization as well

as Soviet and Chinese Marxist) philosophies of history or are, likewise, based on alleged 'laws of history'.²⁹ The second strategy applies to the broader discipline of history as a profession, since much of the critique is aimed at Western historiography and method in general. In world history specifically, the aim has been to transform the overarching narrative from one recounting the history of each nation successively to one emphasizing connections and interactions which transcend national boundaries.

The summaries above are, of course, simplified, not only in the amount of detail provided, but their separation into distinct categories. They dynamically interact, providing mutual reinforcement and even fusing together within various individual positions. Varying degrees of intensity may also exist. And all these factors can shift across time, at individual as well as broader social levels. They should rather be viewed, therefore, in dynamic, complex relation to one another (as indicated in the parenthetical references provided), distinguished here only for purposes of analysis.

Against this background, the remainder of chapter one as well as chapter two will *not* address each of the six criticisms one by one, point by point. They will instead attempt to place these critiques and related matters in historical, social and political context.³⁰ While all of the critiques will be touched upon, special emphasis will be given to the tension between Eurocentric and nationalist versus more inclusive humanistic (i.e., multicultural, peace-oriented and/or global citizenship-oriented) world histories.

First then, a number of themes embedded within these critiques can be traced out and linked across historical periods. Criticism of European colonialism, for example, can be traced back as far as Bartolomé de las Casas, *Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies* (1542).³¹ Within later Enlightenment visions of human history, Condorcet (1743–1794), writing in 1793–1794 while in hiding during the French Revolution, offers the following comments in a treatise titled *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*:

Survey the history of settlements and commercial undertakings in Africa or Asia, and you will see how our trade monopolies, our treachery, our murderous contempt for men of another colour or creed, the insolence of our usurpations, the intrigues or the exaggerated proselytic zeal of our priests, have destroyed the respect and goodwill that the superiority of our knowledge and the benefits of our commerce at first won for us in the eyes of

the inhabitants. But doubtless the moment approaches when, no longer presenting ourselves as always either tyrants or corrupters, we shall become for them the beneficent instruments of their freedom.³²

Like Casas, Condorcet thus sorely criticizes *the means and methods* of European colonial expansion in Africa and Asia though he retains a belief in the superiority of European ways and the necessity of their spread among non-European peoples.³³ Similar criticisms of European colonialism were voiced by other Enlightenment thinkers such as Diderot and Kant and, later, the German romantic Herder.³⁴ Herder, himself religious, was also joined by nineteenth-century German Protestant missionaries who protested, saying: “Nowhere has a European colony come into being without grave injustice. Portuguese and Spaniards, Dutchmen and Britishers have been more or less alike in this respect. The Germans will hardly be any better.”³⁵

Meanwhile, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italian, Spanish, pre-Napoleonic French and English merchants, missionaries and emissaries as well as Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Benjamin Franklin and others expressed admiration for the non-European civilizations of China, India, Persia, the Ottomans, Mali and Peruvian South America, among others, placing them at times comparatively on a par with or, in some cases, even above Europe.³⁶

What we have here in various fragments within European thought itself between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries are thematic concerns which would eventually surface in anti-colonialist critiques of the West, including late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Asian and African reformers (e.g., al-Afghani, Gasprali, Iqbal, Tagore, Gandhi, and Nehru)³⁷ as well as later subaltern and post-colonialist scholars such as Chakrabarty, who emerged in the post-1960s period.³⁸ They are likewise threads of concern woven into many historical, anthropological, sociological and other studies published by Western scholars in the post-1960s, including some of the ‘new world histories’. In spite of having a long history of precedence among well-known and highly respected European figures within the Western Civilization tradition, such approaches would, by virtue of sharing many of their thematic points of concern with later anti-colonial reformist and post-colonialist (cf. non-Western) critiques, elicit a reaction from defenders of Western Civilization (see Chap. 2).³⁹

Another theme which can be traced out and directly related to ideas of safeguarding Western civilization is the tension between inclusive humanistic and/or global-multicultural world histories on the one hand and Eurocentric or national-centric (world) histories on the other. With this tension in view, three broad types of world history within Western historiographical traditions may be identified: (1) humanistic world history, as defined here, is concern with all known social, cultural, religious, ethnic and other human groups and their relation to both one another and their ecological environments, undertaken with an aim to learn from one another and about one another for mutual betterment of our shared world and peaceful and mutually prosperous coexistence within it; (2) ethnocentric-nationalistic world history, within a broader Eurocentric frame, is concerned with situating one's own *contemporary* ethnic or national group in an exceptionalist manner within the history of the world, highlighting its place of importance and inculcating nationalist (cf. patriotic) allegiance; (3) colonialist-imperialist world history, within a broader Eurocentric frame, is concerned with what can be learned about 'others' and their environments (cf. natural resources) across the globe in the present, by way of historical study, in order to maintain superiority and world domination, often resulting in exploitation and/or subjugation of those 'others'.⁴⁰ In both of the latter forms, which often work hand in hand, the nation or empire must be favorably contrasted through comparative means with the 'others' in relation to whom it situates itself.⁴¹ Viewed from this angle, humanistic world history poses a threat to both ethnocentric-nationalistic and colonialist-imperialist world history agendas. As the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, this appears as a recurring tension across the centuries, from at least the Renaissance down to the present.

Within the Florentine Renaissance, Manning, drawing from Bartlett, contrasts the approaches of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) and historian Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540). Guicciardini was ready to reconceptualize the past by including the newly discovered native peoples of the Americas, while Machiavelli “centered on the issues and values of the classical era.” Manning thus suggests that, “[i]n a sense, Machiavelli took the Western Civilization approach to the world, and Guicciardini took the world historians' approach. Jacob Burckhardt,... whose *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* crystallized the historical vision of the Renaissance (and also the canons of modern cultural history), adopted the same humanistic vision as Machiavelli.”⁴² Several decades after Guicciardini and Machiavelli, from within the Spanish imperial

context, a similar tension can be detected in the debate between Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490–1573), with Casas wishing to integrate, in relatively respectable fashion, the newly discovered peoples of the Americas into his historical account, whereas for Sepúlveda “the growth of Spanish world monarchy was most important and the Indians, never fully human, were irrelevant.”⁴³

Some two centuries later, spurred on by the emergence of Enlightenment progressivist narratives of human history in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,⁴⁴ a debate over universal versus national history arose among German scholars.⁴⁵ Eschewing “traditional historiography as a history of kings and dynasties,” world historians in the German context, working in the latter part of the eighteenth century, based their broader, inclusive human histories on travel reports supplemented by anthropological and ethnographical studies.⁴⁶ But as Bödeker demonstrates in analyzing the debate, “[t]he change in theory from universal to national history...was not only the result of methodological or intra-disciplinary consistency, but reflected nationalisation.” Nationalist “‘patriotic history’ came about as a form of specialist history under the specific conditions of the Holy Roman Empire and the particular processes of nationalisation which emerged after the end of the eighteenth century.”⁴⁷ Indeed, Christian Friedrich Rühs, who first drew attention to the challenge which these inclusive humanist histories posed to German national history and identity, was professor of history and historiographer of the Prussian state. In working to define that state after Napoleon’s defeat, Rühs opposed political and civil rights for Jews, arguing that they did not qualify for citizenship by virtue of their foreign language, religion and allegiance. In formulating his argument, Rühs appropriated much of the medieval European rhetoric against Jews, helping sustain and even revive a tradition which would later inspire Nazi Germany.⁴⁸ His stance against inclusive humanist world history seems, likewise, to have carried nationalist, even racist, overtones.

With this nationalist reaction,⁴⁹ the stage was set for the eventual convergence across the nineteenth century of the emerging ‘science’ of historical studies. These included not only European Christian and secular nationalist agendas, but white racist ideologies, with both social Darwinian theories and the founders of comparative philology helping forge those ties.⁵⁰ This convergence deepened through emphasis, between the 1840s and 1920s, on alleged varieties of ‘whiteness’ among various European nations, that is, their historically-based ethnonational

distinctions framed in relation to the two main white lineages, Aryan and Caucasian.⁵¹ This was the same era that white nationalist/racist immigration laws were put into effect within the U.S., namely the late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century (c. 1880–1965). Those laws—ultimately codified as the Immigration Act, the National Origins Act and the Asian Exclusion Act (1924–1925)—aimed explicitly at preserving a white European majority demographically within the U.S. in order to preserve white American/Western values, ideals, and identity. Similar immigration laws were enacted in various European nations during the same period. European or Western civilizational history became grounded in and inseparably linked to the history of white Europe or America and then made central to world history.⁵²

Johann Gottfried Herder had already begun moving the debate in this direction as early as the 1780s by interpreting history as a story line ultimately leading to “the splendor of Europe.” One of his chief questions, therefore, was: “How...did Europe attain its civilization and the rank due to it above other peoples?” Therein he asserted in typical Eurocentric fashion that “there is no other region of the world other than Greece and Rome that has invented and prepared as much for Europe and through it for all nations on earth.”⁵³ Likewise, in the 1822 revised expansion of Alexander F. Tytler Woodhouselee’s *Elements of General History*, Edward Nares, regius professor of modern history at Oxford, claimed: “Civilised Europe is the only part of the world that can claim the credit of all that has been done towards the advancement of knowledge since the commencement of the eighteenth century, and only a few parts after all of civilized Europe itself.”⁵⁴ But perhaps as Teshale Tibebe highlights in *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History*,

Hegel, more than any other modern Western philosopher, produced the most systematic case for the superiority of Western white Protestant bourgeois modernity. He established a racially structured ladder of gradation of the peoples of the world, putting Germanic people at the top of the racial pyramid, people of Asia in the middle, and Africans and indigenous peoples of the Americas and Pacific Islands at the bottom.⁵⁵

Thus, while world history projects continued, amid ongoing debate, to be pursued across the nineteenth century in Germany as well as the broader Euro-American world,⁵⁶ there was a shift from broader humanist to more narrowly focused Eurocentric narratives, with various white

European national histories featured as the ‘cultured, civilized peoples’ providing the primary content and scope of ‘world civilization’.⁵⁷ In their most extreme forms were the explicitly white supremacist histories exemplified by J.A. de Gobineau, *The Inequality of the Human Races* (1853), Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899)—officially commissioned as it was by future Nazi leaders—and Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race: The Racial Basis of European History* (1916).⁵⁸ However, less conspicuous European and world histories were still often grounded in notions of white European race linked closely to ideas of European or Western civilization.⁵⁹ This proved the case for both the world history and Western Civilization models developed in the U.S. in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, for example, William Swinton, in his *Outlines of the World’s History: Ancient, Medieval and Modern, with special relation to the History of Civilization and the Progress of Mankind* (1874), argues that

far more valuable and more lasting results can be secured by giving scholars a vivid general view of the institutions and civilization of the greater nations than by cramming the memory with ever so imposing an array of isolated facts and dates. ...It is of interest to know that the race to which we belong, the Aryan, has always played the leading part in the great drama of the world’s progress. ...If we trace back the present civilization of the advanced nations of the world, – our own [American] civilization, and that of England, Germany, France, Italy, etc., – we shall find that much of it is connected by direct and unbroken line with the Roman. The Romans, in turn, were heirs of the Greeks. Now, all this is *Aryan*; ...Thus we are fully authorized to say that the Aryans are peculiarly the race of progress; and a very large part of the story of the world must be taken up with an account of the contributions which the Aryan nations have made to the common stock of civilization.⁶⁰

In like manner, Philip V.N. Myers, *A General History for Colleges and High Schools* (1889), “continued the racial theme that gave justification to the old preoccupation with European history. ‘Of all the races,’ he explained, ‘the White, or Caucasian, exhibits by far the most perfect type, physically, intellectually, and morally.’”⁶¹ True, in the face of increasing liberal internationalism and black identity movements such as those spearheaded by W.E.B. Du Bois, Myers excised most references to race from his 1906 edition. But the white racial underpinning remained implicit as the main source of Western civilization which was central to his narrative.

Both white as well as other voices of protest were certainly raised, but white racial-civilizational theories of varying shape and degree—whether overt or covert—remained the socially and politically dominant discourses undergirding imperialist European nationalisms and their corresponding versions of world or European/western civilizational history.⁶² “World history became relevant to the imperial policies of the great powers, and the colonial empires needed knowledge about their colonized people.”⁶³ The second wave of the Industrial Revolution only confirmed these ‘advanced, progressive and salvific’ narratives and, with them, ongoing subjugation of non-white, non-Western peoples in ‘the struggle for Asia’ and ‘scramble for Africa’, leading to a new, intensified phase of globalization between approximately 1870 and 1914.⁶⁴

It is within this atmosphere of not only European world dominance, but social scientific evolutionary theory, scientific history, scientific philology, and scientific advances in industrial technology—all providing clear scientific structure, order and certainty to the progressivist claims delineated in the predominating Eurocentric world histories—that existentialist and nihilist critiques of these well-packaged interpretations were given voice by figures such as A. Schopenhauer (1788–1860), S. Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and F. Nietzsche (1844–1900).⁶⁵ Their critiques arose in tandem with anti-colonial reform movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Another debate between Eurocentric-national versus broader inclusive world history also arose at this time within the post-unification German context.⁶⁶ While Germans thus debated national versus world history and non-Western reformers produced anti-colonial independence narratives of (world) history from within their respective colonial contexts, the existentialist response would, true to its name, emphasize defining our identity not through history and science, but in the present moment of our existence, ‘being’ and not ‘becoming’, subjectively determining our own meaning for our own individual lives. And just as the early anti-colonial critiques served as forerunners to later post-colonialist critiques, late nineteenth-century existentialist and nihilist critiques would share much in common with post-modernist existentialist deconstructionism and its very similar assault on the scientifically undergirded Western democratic capitalist and modernization, as well as Soviet Marxist, histories. This would hold true for those histories which were nationally-oriented, but even more so for ‘totalizing’ world history narratives.

Meanwhile, between 1890 and 1920, the newly formed Conference on History, Civil Government, and Political Economy and the American Historical Association (AHA) both joined the rising chorus against world history by expressing their official opposition to the teaching of even standard Eurocentric versions of world history in U.S. high schools. By the end of World War I the course had all but disappeared from the high school curriculum. Ostensibly it was labeled disorderly, ineffectual, and unprofessional, lacking in archival and documentary specialization. But the close association which had been forged between national agendas and professional history within the Western tradition factored significantly into the opposition.⁶⁷

The professional historical establishment was equally opposed to internationalist-cosmopolitan interpretations of world history which gained credence in the aftermath of the Great War. Of the internationalist-cosmopolitan variety, H.G. Wells, *Outline of World History*, stands out as the most popular. It was originally published in 1919, immediately following World War I, but the AHA, among others, turned a deaf ear to Wells' call for such an approach to world history to be incorporated into the secondary educational curriculum.⁶⁸ It was not just the AHA that stood against such a vision of world history, however. Wells' argument for a world state as the basis for world peace and unity prefigured and even helped shape, through direct correspondence, Woodrow Wilson's idea for the League of Nations.⁶⁹ As is well known though, the U.S. voted against joining the League of Nations. Among other factors, one major debate underlying this shift in U.S. perspective was the liberal-fundamentalist controversy taking shape among American Christians. It is here that M. Ruotsila exposes *The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism: Conservative Evangelicals and the League of Nations*.⁷⁰ Although Ruotsila does not explicitly treat fundamentalist Christian rejection of universally inclusivist world histories like those of Wells, the implications are clear. The fundamentalist doctrine of a world state founded on promises of world peace and unity under the leadership of the anti-Christ in 'the end times' serves, in their eyes, as due grounds for opposing any vision of inclusive world peace, unity and cooperation, particularly when seen as somehow supporting or linked to ideas of a world governing body such as the League of Nations. This is not to suggest that humanistic world histories all espouse such visions, but even the (perceived) resemblance was (and remains) sufficient to evoke deep suspicion, if not outright rejection. All in all, both Christian and secular

anti-internationalist sentiment which solidified in the post-World War I period—in connection to fears of potentially undermining U.S. political sovereignty and emerging world super-power status or facilitating the prophesied rise of the anti-Christ's one world government—contributed notably to resisting internationalist-cosmopolitan global histories within the U.S. context in particular.

But if world history within the American educational system was, between the late 1800s and early 1900s, “[s]wept from the schools during the rise of history professionals, the course returned with the rise of professional educators” and their defined break with those history professionals in the 1920s. Thus while “the passing of General History marked the rise of AHA influence in secondary education, this second coming of world history was a sign of its decline.” World history’s successful reinstatement into the high school curriculum—with enrollments among all high school students increasing from 12% in 1934 to 16% in 1949, and among 10th graders specifically from 59% in 1949 to 69% by 1961—did not, however, indicate its popularity or success as an effective course. “Students declared it to be too aimless; teachers, too boundless; educators, too stale. In 1949, NCSS president Dorothy McClure identified the course as the sick man of the social studies curriculum. ... James Bryant Conant in 1958 reported ‘widespread disappointment’ with the class.” This would provide the background for attempted reform efforts led by Leften Stravinos and William H. McNeill from the late 1950s onward, giving birth to the World History Association in 1982.⁷¹

Meanwhile, the mid-twentieth century would also witness the protracted, calculated production of Arnold J. Toynbee’s magnum opus, a 12-volume *Study of History* appearing between 1934 and 1961. In 1956, following publication of the 10th and final main volume in the series, M.F. Ashley Montagu edited a work entitled *Toynbee and History: Critical Essays and Reviews*. He therein asserted: “It is scarcely possible that there is anyone living who, from the matrix of his own knowledge, could deliver an authoritative verdict on the work as a whole—such polymaths are no longer among us.”⁷² G.J. Renier, one of Toynbee’s sharpest antagonists, likewise noted that “the first really critical reviews of the system of Mr. Toynbee appeared when a less forbidding abridgment of the work was published in 1947.” Renier’s own critique of Toynbee was that “he remains superficial and approximate, when he is not actually ill-informed.” He added elsewhere: “I condemn his condemnation of the treatment of problems of nationhood by historians because it is illiberal.” Indeed, he

considered Toynbee's entire undertaking "the supreme embodiment of what I call 'left-wing deviationism'."⁷³ As reflected in Renier's condemnation of Toynbee's critique of "problems of nationhood," Toynbee's post-war internationalist cosmopolitanism did not sufficiently toe the white Eurocentric-nationalist line. Thus H. Michell saw "Mr. Toynbee's reference to the hope of civilization resting upon some presently 'backward' people" so that "[o]ur civilization is doomed, and in his despair he turns from his own peoples, the nations of the Western world who have brought mankind to its present desperate state."⁷⁴ Toynbee himself was well aware that his non-Eurocentric interpretation of world history made his "whole scheme...wrong" in the eyes of many of his Western colleagues who were, in Toynbee's own assessment, "apt to see History mainly as the documentary history of Western national states" or Western civilization.⁷⁵ Thus, the British philosopher and historian of ancient Greek civilization, Edwyn Bevan, wrote personally to Toynbee sometime between his third and fifth volumes (1934–39) to counter Toynbee's narrative, arguing that,

while your attention and interest is directed mainly to the common characteristics, it is the uniqueness which impresses me. ...behind our modern world in time is the ancient Greco-Roman Civilization, the 'Hellenic Civilization', as you call it, which I see not simply as *a* civilization, but as the unique beginning of something new in the history of Mankind. Yet rationalist civilization in its first embodiment came to grief and was overrun by primitive barbarians. Then, when it had gradually worked its way up again through the barbarian mass, it got a fresh embodiment in our modern 'Western' Civilization.⁷⁶

Toynbee held it was inconsistent to write off all other offshoots of ancient Hellenic civilization—such as Byzantine, Russian and, by extension of his argument, Islamic—as being 'dead' and static, attributing dynamic life to Western Civilization alone.

According to Allardyce, the work of Toynbee (as well as Spengler) not only elicited critical responses from multiple European and American historians, but made "universities hostile ground for world history in the United States."⁷⁷ Part of this was no doubt a reaction to the decentering of Europe in both men's work. Toynbee's take on the matter was that

[o]ne cannot be a historian without both taking general views and verifying particular facts. But each individual and each generation is apt to throw

more weight into one of these two complementary [sic.] scales of the historian's balance than the other. The balance is always fluctuating and is therefore always needing to be readjusted; and, in the generation in which I happen to have been born, most Western historians have been throwing most of their weight into the study of details. They have been exploring the vast surviving archives of the local governments of our Western World, and they have therefore been apt to see History mainly as the documentary history of Western national states. ...[a world] historian...can help his fellow men of different civilizations to become more familiar with one another, and, in consequence, less afraid of one another and less hostile to one another, by helping them to understand and appreciate one another's histories and to see in these local and partial stories a common achievement and common possession of the whole human family. In an age of atomic weapons and supersonic guided missiles, Mankind must become one family or destroy itself. And it is one family; it always has been one family in the making. This is the vision which one sees when one focuses one's gaze on the whole world today. I do believe that synoptic view of History is one of the World's present practical needs.⁷⁸

Despite Toynbee's efforts, various strands of Christian and secular history in the West would continue to follow Eurocentric models across the twentieth century, both in and out of the educational system.⁷⁹ In the U.S., this held true for both the Western Civilization and world history courses, remaining closely linked as they originally had been to white-dominated national agendas and related government funding.⁸⁰ In a chapter entitled "The Defense of the West," Peter Novick highlights how, "[b]oth in its remote and immediate origins, 'Western civ' was a war baby," taking shape within the U.S. educational context in the immediate aftermath of World War I. Originating at Columbia University in 1919, variations of it appeared at the University of Chicago in 1931 and Stanford in 1935. Though initially slow to spread, "it became the most widely taught history course on American campuses" in the post-World War II period, at least until protests against it reached insurmountable levels in the 1960s. Among others, a prime motivation for offering such courses, as expressed by Harvard's General Education Committee in 1945, was "to fortify the heritage of Western civilization," namely, "the traditions of the West...for which the Allies had fought." Much of what they came to reflect were "the values of cold war America" defined culturally and historically via Greece, Rome, Western Europe and North America, particularly the United States.⁸¹ These

narratives were reflected, for example, even in the speeches of the great leader of the Black Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr., who had received his education in 1940–1950s America. In the final speech of his life given on April 3, 1968 in Memphis, Tennessee—alternatively titled “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” or “I See the Promised Land”—King rehearsed the standard Western Civ approach to world history as follows:

As you know, if I were standing at the beginning of time, with the possibility of general and panoramic view of the whole human history up to now, and the Almighty said to me, “Martin Luther King, which age would you like to live in?”—I would take my mental flight by Egypt through, or rather across the Red Sea, through the wilderness on toward the promised land. And in spite of its magnificence, I wouldn’t stop there. I would move on by Greece, and take my mind to Mount Olympus. And I would see Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Euripides and Aristophanes assembled around the Parthenon as they discussed the great and eternal issues of reality. But I wouldn’t stop there. I would go on, even to the great heyday of the Roman Empire. And I would see developments around there, through various emperors and leaders. But I wouldn’t stop there. I would even come up to the day of the Renaissance, and get a quick picture of all that the Renaissance did for the cultural and esthetic life of man. But I wouldn’t stop there. I would even go by the way that the man for whom I’m named had his habitat. And I would watch Martin Luther as he tacked his ninety-five theses on the door at the church in Wittenberg. But I wouldn’t stop there. I would come on up even to 1863, and watch a vacillating president by the name of Abraham Lincoln finally come to the conclusion that he had to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. But I wouldn’t stop there. I would even come up to the early thirties, and see a man grappling with the problems of the bankruptcy of his nation. And come with an eloquent cry that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. But I wouldn’t stop there. Strangely enough, I would turn to the Almighty, and say, “If you allow me to live just a few years in the second half of the twentieth century, I will be happy.”⁸²

But not all great anti-colonial reform leaders across the globe viewed world history in these terms. Continuing the tradition begun in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Muhammad Iqbal, Jawaharlal Nehru and other Middle Eastern secular and Islamic as well as broader Asian and African reform leaders of the interwar and then post-World War II period offered critiques of these Eurocentric and nationalist world history narratives by producing counter-narratives of their own. These served to

critique Western interpretations while also affirming the importance and validity of world history as a means of shaping global perspective and fostering global dialogue. Grand narratives of 'advanced (white) Western peoples' and their 'civilizational progress' in the mid-twentieth century Nazi German⁸³ as well as U.S. Segregationist and Apartheid South African contexts would drive not only Asian and other post-colonialist critics, but advocates such as Karl Popper to argue against grand narrative approaches altogether.⁸⁴ They came under sharp criticism for their totalizing, hegemonic tendencies. In tandem, it is not surprising that post-modernist deconstructionism arose, like its original inherited tradition *a la* Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, amid not only rising protest against Western domination of the new world order and the threat of impending nuclear annihilation, but in response to heavy-handed Cold War propaganda promoting Eurocentric and nationalistic interpretations of both Western and world history in and beyond the McCarthy era. Indeed, world history became dominated by modernization theory built upon Western national models, particularly the U.S., in the 1950–1960s.⁸⁵ Post-modernist deconstructionism opposed both Eurocentric and cosmopolitan-internationalist versions of world history. This would eventually give rise to 'micro-history', which would form a curious, if uneasy, alliance with more nationally-focused 'area studies' and other fields of 'specialization' against ideas of grand narrative.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, the development of area studies coincided with opposition to cosmopolitan-internationalist 'cultural relativism', espousing instead Western civilization as the fountainhead of universal human rights and values. Thus, as Novick lays bare, "[c]ultural relativists were on the defensive within anthropology during the postwar decades," though "on the whole, after 1945, explicit attacks on moral relativism in scholarship came only from the conservative fringe of the academic world."⁸⁷ Indeed, as the following chapter reveals, this would prove to be the case among those defending Western Civilization over against multiculturalism and diversity in the ensuing 'culture wars' in the post-1960s period and beyond.

NOTES

1. See esp. Jörn Rüsen, *Time and History: The Variety of Cultures* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008). For a post-Classical (i.e., Medieval) treatment of various world cultural calendars, see Albiruni, *The Chronology of Ancient Nations (Vestiges of the Past)*, tr. C. Edward Sachau

- (London: W.H. Allen & Co for The Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain & Ireland, 1879).
2. Given that works were already being published to explicitly address ‘globalization’ as early as 1990, then the 1980s should be included as marking the upsurge of interest; cf. e.g., M. Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London and Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990). A brief, advanced search for works published in or prior to 1990 with ‘globalization’ or ‘globalisation’ explicitly in the title reveals a number of them appearing as early as 1987. One of the earliest uses of the term “globalisation” (placed in quotation marks in the original) occurs in the article “Shock Therapy For The Peseta,” *Economist* (1 July 1961): 60, where it is defined as “(freeing from bilateral quotas).”
 3. Cf. 1985 as the beginning of Gorbachev’s *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reform, restructuring), with those developments of course having their own historical roots. See V.M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Charlotte, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and R. Strayer, *Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change* (New York and London: Routledge, 1998).
 4. Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2015), pp. 45–46.
 5. See esp. W.H. McNeill and J.R. McNeill, *The Human Web: A Bird’s Eye View of World History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003), which interprets world history in terms of globalization history: “It is the career and development of the various webs of communication and interaction emerging from an original loose, widespread, and occasionally interactive worldwide web forming into a deeply integrated, interdependent, and continuously interactive ‘globalized’ web which comprises the overarching structure of human history” (p. 5). Tamim Ansary’s contribution to this volume in Section Two takes a similar approach.
 6. Jerry H. Bentley, “The Task of World History,” in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. J.H. Bentley (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 2. According to the World History Association (WHA)—“founded in 1982 by a group of teachers and academics,” including Bentley, “to address the needs and interests of what was then a newly emerging historical sub-discipline and teaching field”—“the world historian studies phenomena that transcend single states, regions, and cultures, such as cultural contact and exchange and movements that have had a global or at least a transregional impact. The world historian...focuses on the big picture of cultural interchange and/or comparative history” (World History Association website, URLs: <http://www.thewha.org/about-wha/history-mission-and-vision-of-the-wha/>

- and <http://www.thewha.org/about-wha/what-is-world-history/>; last accessed: July 31, 2016 and Jan 2, 2017, respectively). If we go by the official website of the *Journal of World History* (JWH), which was launched in 1990 as the official journal of the WHA, it deals with “historical questions requiring the investigation of evidence on a global, comparative, cross-cultural, or transnational scale. ... phenomena that transcend the boundaries of single states, regions, or cultures, such as large-scale population movements, long-distance trade, cross-cultural technology transfers, and the transnational spread of ideas” (*Journal of World History* website, URL: <http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/t-journal-of-world-history.aspx>; last accessed: July 31, 2016). The European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH), founded in 2002, “welcomes all who are engaged in transcending national history” (The European Network in Universal and Global History (UNIUGH) website, URL: <http://research.uni-leipzig.de/eniugh/>; last accessed: Jan 2, 2017). The *Journal of Global History*, introduced in 2006, “addresses the main problems of global change over time, together with the diverse histories of globalization,” seeking also, among other things, to “straddle traditional regional boundaries” (*Journal of Global History* website, URL: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JGH>; last accessed: July 31, 2016). The Asian Association of World Historians (AAWH), founded in 2008, together with its journal *The Asian Review of World Histories* (ARWH), promotes the work of “‘global’, ‘world’, ‘transregional’, ‘comparative’, ‘international’, and ‘big’ historians, and all others with interest in ‘connected’ study of the past” (*The Asian Review of World Histories* website, URL: <http://www.thearwh.org/>; last accessed: Jan 2, 2017). The Network of World and Global History Organizations (NOGWHISTO), founded in 2008, is concerned with “the global dimensions of the past, be it by researching humanity’s tradition at large or by reconstructing the entanglement of various scales of human action” (The Network of World and Global History Organizations (NOGWHISTO) website, URL: <http://research.uni-leipzig.de/~gwhisto/home/>; last accessed: Jan 2, 2017). *Entremons: UPF Journal of World History*, a digital journal of Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona first issued in 2011, traces “the historical networks between the global human community” (*Entremons: UPF Journal of World History* English website, URL: <https://www.upf.edu/entremons/en/>; last accessed: Jan 2, 2017).
7. Cf. Bentley’s use of this term in “Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History,” *Journal of World History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar 2005): 51–82.

8. For the close connection between the 19th-century Great Game (Russia vs. Britain) and 20th-century Cold War (Russia vs. the US), see esp. David Gillard, *Struggle for Asia, 1828–1914: A Study in British and Russian Imperialism* (London: Methuen, 1977). See also Evgeny Sergeev, *The Great Game, 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) and my extended critical review of Sergeev’s work, R. Charles Weller, “Review of *The Great Game, 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia*,” *Reviews in History*, June 2014 (URL: <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1611>); last accessed: July 27, 2016).
9. On world history addressing many of these themes and issues across the 20th century, see esp. Paul Costello, *World Historians and Their Goals: Twentieth-Century Answers to Modernism* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994).
10. Hans Erich Bödeker, “The Debates about Universal History and National History, c. 1800: A Problem-oriented Historical Attempt,” in *Unity and Diversity in European Culture c.1800*, ed. Tim Blanning and Hagen Schulze, pp. 135–170 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2006); quote from pp. 138–139, citing from August Ludwig Schlözer, *Weltgeschichte nach ihren Haupttheilen im Auszug und Zusammenhang*, 2 parts (Göttingen, 1785/89), i, pt 1, p. 70. Cf. Diego Olstein, “Eight World Historians,” in Chapter 13 of this volume, who says: “Three commonalities stand out in [the Section Two] essays [of this volume] that make them very indicative of the new world history that emerged in tandem with the global turn. These are: the adoption of the world as the ultimate space unit, attention to humankind at large as its agency, and the inclusion of the entire span of its existence as the chronological framework.”
11. See A. Pagden, “Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism,” *Constellations*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar 2000): 3–22 and J.H. Marks, *Visions of One World: Legacy of Alexander* (Guilford, CT: Four Quarters Publishing Co., 1985).
12. On this overall point, see esp. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Cf. also G. Sluga and J. Horne, “Cosmopolitanism: Its Pasts and Practices” and G. Sluga, “UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley,” Special Issue: “Cosmopolitanism in World History,” ed. Sluga and Horne, *Journal of World History*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2010): 369–373 and 393–418; also R. Wolin, “The Idea of Cosmopolitanism: from Kant to the Iraq War and beyond,” *Ethics & Global Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010): 143–153.

13. See: the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) website (URL: <http://www.iahr.dk/>) and their journal *Numen* (URL: <http://www.brill.com/numen>), *Comparative Studies in Society and History* journal website (URL: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CSS>), and the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC) website (URL: <http://www.iscsc.org/>), with a link to their publication, *Comparative Civilizations Review* (CCR). (All URLs last accessed: July 31, 2016.)
14. See J.M. Kitagawa, ed., *The History of Religions: Retrospect and Prospect* (New York: Macmillan and London: Collier Macmillan, 1985) and E.J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religions: A History*, 2nd edn (Bristol, England: Bristol Classical Press, 1994).
15. See esp. B. Buzan, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16. For in-depth discussion of the '12 branches' of global historical study and the history behind them, see ch. 2 "Thinking History Globally: 12 Branches in Their Singularities, Overlaps, and Clusters," in Diego Olstein, *Thinking History Globally* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
17. Poul Duedahl, "Selling Mankind: UNESCO and the Invention of Global History, 1945–1976," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar 2011): 101–133, quoting from pp. 102, 104, 112–113. Duedahl contrasts this point with that of Allardyce (cf. also Bentley), who "ended up giving a few American historians of a slightly later period credit for the postwar showdown with Eurocentrism and the introduction of global history as a discipline" (see Gilbert Allardyce, "Toward World History: American Historians and the Coming of the World History Course," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 23–76); cf. Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era*, p. 46. See also Paul Betts, "Humanity's New Heritage: UNESCO and the Rewriting of World History," *Past and Present*, No. 228 (Aug 2015): 249–285 and Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley."
18. Duedahl, "Selling Mankind," pp. 101–102.
19. Cf. Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): "it would be far too simplistic to treat the Anglo-American academic world or any other part of 'the West' as the main originator of the current wave of transnational scholarship. At a closer look it turns out that the main forces behind the growing weight of translocal historical thinking did not emanate from a clearly recognizable epicenter" (p. 4).

20. On world history from a gender perspective, see e.g., Nina Baym, "Onward Christian Women: Sarah J. Hale's History of the World," in *New England Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1990): 249–270. Baym discusses how, "[a]s the editor (from 1837 to 1877) of Godey's Lady's Book, Sarah Hale exercised considerable power over emergent middle class American culture. Her vision of world history conflated the progress of Christianity with that of women" (quoted from article abstract). On world environmental history, Iggers, Wang and Mukherjee suggest, in relation to W.H. McNeill's *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976), that "[h]ere, for almost the first time, a theme was addressed involving biological and environmental factors that had been largely neglected by historians" (Georg G. Iggers, Q. Edward Wang, and Supriya Mukherjee, *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, Harlow and New York: Pearson Education, 2008, p. 388). What, then, about prior studies such as: G. Fleming, *Animal Plagues: Their History, Nature, and Prevention* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1871), which is world historical in scope, covering 1490 BCE to 1800 CE; the journal *Public Health Reports* published 1896–1970, featuring, among other 'transnational comparative' studies, "Germany: Report from Berlin. Plague and Cholera in Various Countries. ...Comparative. Plague in Central Asia," Vol. 18, No. 10 (1903); *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, published since 1948, including issues such as R. Pollitzer, "Plague Studies: A Summary of the History and Survey of the Present Distribution of the Disease," Vol. 4, No. 4 (1951): 475–533; E.W. Ackerknecht, *History and Geography of the Most Important Diseases* (New York: Hafner, 1965), a translation of his original German work *Geschichte und Geographie der wichtigsten Krankheiten* (Enke, 1963); M.A. Machado, "*Aftosa: A Historical Survey of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Inter-American Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1969).
21. Cf. R.J. Evans, *Rereading German History: From Unification to Reunification 1800–1996* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1–2.
22. See esp. H. Rayment-Pickard, "Suprahistory," in *Philosophies of History: From Enlightenment to Postmodernity*, ed. R. Burns & H. Rayment-Pickard (Oxford, UK and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 131–54, p. 131 in particular. The chapter discusses A. Schopenhauer (1788–1860), S. Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and F. Nietzsche (1844–1900). The phrase 'confused dreams of humankind' is adapted from A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), Vol. 2, pp. 442, 444, cited by Rayment-Pickard, p. 142.
23. Following other authors, I distinguish 'guild (i.e., professional) historians' from 'post-colonialist' and 'post-modernist' only for purposes of

highlighting particular issues. In fact, many 'guild historians' are 'post-colonialists' and/or 'post-modernists', so the distinction is not intended to suggest they should always be separated so conveniently.

24. See in this volume, "Concluding Reflections."
25. Cf. Arif Dirlik, "Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies)," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2005): 391–410. See also discussion in Chap. 2 of this volume.
26. Cf. Stuchtey and Fuchs, "Introduction: Problems of Writing World History: Western and Non-Western Experiences, 1800–2000," in *Writing World History, 1800–2000* (London: German Historical Institute London, 2003), p. 37.
27. Cf. Bentley, "World History and Grand Narrative," p. 47.
28. Cf. Peter Claus and John Marriott, *History: An Introduction to Its Theory, Method, and Practice* (Harlow, England: Pearson, 2012) who say: "Less concerned with broad synthesising narratives covering long historical periods, or with the articulation of overarching themes such as progress, spirituality and reason, its [the new world histories] protagonists chose rather to focus on more discrete historical problems within a global context, using as evidence fairly conventional documentary sources" (p. 243).
29. Cf. Costello, *World Historians and Their Goals*, p. 222–224, on the progressive underpinning of world-system theory approaches.
30. See also Michael Bentley, "Theories of World History since the Enlightenment," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. J.H. Bentley, pp. 19–36. Cf. Dominic Sachsenmaier, "The Evolution of World Histories," in *The Cambridge World History: Volume One: Introducing World History, to 10,000 BCE*, ed. David Christian, 41–55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
31. B. de la Casas, *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, ed. and tr. N. Griffin (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1992). Cf. Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval and Modern*, 3rd edn (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 179.
32. Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet, *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*, tr. J. Baraclough (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1955), p. 175, cited in *Philosophies of History*, p. 49; cf. E.M. Wood, *Liberty and Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from the Renaissance to Enlightenment* (New York: Verso, 2012), p. 303.
33. Condorcet's views differ little here from those of, say, Thomas Jefferson during the same period in the U.S., who decried slavery and looked to a future day of its demise, but justified its ongoing practice in his own day, even on his own plantation, believing that *in spite* of such cruelties and oppression, the benefits of white European civilization would be brought

- to the still 'less advanced' black slaves. He held much the same view toward the Native Americans. See L.C. Stanton, *Those Who Labor for My Happiness: Slavery at Thomas Jefferson's Monticello* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2012).
34. See S. Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
 35. H.W. Gensichen, "German Protestant Missions," in *Missionary Ideologies in the Imperialist Era, 1880–1920*, ed. T. Christensen and W.R. Hutchinson (Aarhus: Aros, 1982), p. 183.
 36. See R. Murphey, "The Shape of the World: Eurasia," in *Asia in Western and World History: A Guide for Teaching*, ed. A.T. Embree and C. Gluck (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 11–12; J. Daly, *Historians Debate the Rise of the West* (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1–12; and R.A. Stack, *Dead Wrong: Violence, Vengeance, and the Victims of Capital Punishment* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 113. De la Casas, *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, offers elevated treatment of Native American peoples; Breisach highlights Voltaire's *Essay on the Manners, Customs, and the Spirit of Nations* (1754) for "sympathetically treating the Chinese, Indian, Persian, and Islamic civilizations," though "he nevertheless held fast to a universal human progress, thereby affirming, for him, the obvious contemporary superiority of the West" (*Historiography*, p. 206).
 37. For primary source material with roots as far back as the 1857 Sepoy Uprising, see N.R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani'* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983); see also C. Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) and P. Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals who Remade Asia* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012).
 38. D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, new edn (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007, originally published 2000).
 39. For the most recent resurgence of opposition, see J. Pincince, "Jerry Bentley, World History, and the Decline of the West," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec 2014): 631–643. Chapter two in this volume discusses this topic at length.
 40. These three types reflect Edward Said's observation that "there is a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external dominion" ("Preface to the 25th Anniversary Edition," in *Orientalism*, 25th Anniversary edn, New York: Vintage Books, 2003, p. xix).

60. W. Swinton, *Outlines of the World's History: Ancient, Medieval and Modern, with special relation to the History of Civilization and the Progress of Mankind* (New York and Chicago: Ivison, Blakeman & Co., 1874), pp. iv, 3–4, original emphasis; cf. Allardyce, "Toward World History," pp. 45–46.
61. Allardyce, "Toward World History," pp. 46–47, citing Philip V.N. Myers, *A General History for Colleges and High Schools* (Boston, MA: Ginn & Company, 1889), p. 2.
62. Cf. Clif Stratton, *Education for Empire: American Schools, Race, and the Paths of Good Citizenship* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016).
63. Stuchtey and Fuchs, "Introduction," in *Writing World History*, p. 5.
64. Among other things, scientific and technological advance helped reinvigorate progressivist 'post-millennial' world history interpretations among American Christians in particular.
65. See Burns and Rayment-Pickard, *Philosophies of History*, pp. 131–154; Paul Gottfried, "Arthur Schopenhauer as a Critic of History," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr–Jun 1975): 331–338; Harry J. Ausmus, "Schopenhauer's View of History: A Note," *History and Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1976): 141–145; Georgias Patios, *Kierkegaard on the Philosophy of History* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, tr. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1980); Anthony K Jensen, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
66. On the debate over national versus broader inclusive world history within the post-unification German context, cf. John Borneman, "Uniting the German Nation: Law, Narrative, and Historicity," *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1993): 288–311, esp. p. 292; cf. also Evans, "Part 1: Parade of the Grand Narratives," in *Rereading German History*, pp. 1–64.
67. Allardyce, "Toward World History," pp. 47–48.
68. Allardyce, "Toward World History," pp. 48–49.
69. See J.S. Partington, "H.G. Wells and the World State: A Liberal Cosmopolitan in a Totalitarian Age," *International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2003): 233–246.
70. M. Ruotsila, *The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism: Conservative Evangelicals and the League of Nations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).
71. Allardyce, "Toward World History," pp. 53–55.
72. M.F. Ashley Montagu, ed., *Toynbee and History: Critical Essays and Reviews* (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956), p. viii.

73. All quotes from: G.J. Renier, *History: Its Purpose and Method* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), pp. 216–218, reprinted in Montagu, ed., *Toynbee and History*, pp. 73–75.
74. H. Michell, “Herr Spengler and Mr. Toynbee,” in *Toynbee and History*, ed. Montagu, pp. 79, 81.
75. A.J. Toynbee, “A Study of History: What the Book is For, How the Book Took Shape,” in *Toynbee and History*, ed. Montagu, p. 10.
76. A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History: Vol V: The Disintegrations of Civilizations*, Part One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 5–7; cf. G.J. Renier, *History: Its Purpose and Method*, p. 217. Toynbee himself, in fact, had served as a professor of Byzantine and Greek studies in his earlier days. However, in A.J. Toynbee, *Greek Civilization and Character: The Self-Revelation of Ancient Greek Society* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd and New York: Mentor Books, 1953), he made no suggestion to the effect that Greek civilization was superior, although he recognized its contribution, both positive and negative, to Western culture.
77. Allardyce, “Toward World History,” p. 25.
78. Toynbee, “A Study of History: What the Book is For, How the Book Took Shape,” in *Toynbee and History*, ed. Montagu, pp. 10–11.
79. See esp. James M. Blaut, *Eight Eurocentric Historians* (New York: Guilford Press, 2000).
80. See esp. Roxann Prazniak, “Is World History Possible: An Inquiry,” in *History after the Three Worlds: Post-Eurocentric Historiographies*, ed. Arif Dirlik, Vinay Bahl and Peter Gran, 221–239 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
81. P. Novick, “The Defense of the West,” in *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 312–313 and Herbert Lindenberger, “On the Sacrality of Reading Lists: The Western Culture Debate at Stanford University,” in *The History in Literature: On Value, Genre, Institutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). (Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/shattering/lindenberger.html>; last accessed: Dec 28, 2016).
82. See Martin Luther King, Jr., *I Have a Dream: Writings & Speeches That Changed the World*, ed. James M. Washington (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2003), pp. 194–195. Also available on the Stanford University *Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Global Freedom Struggle* website (URL: http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/ive_been_to_the_mountaintop/; last accessed: Jan 21, 2017).

83. Cf. R.J. Evans, *Rereading German History*, p. 120, who highlights Hitler's view of world history as "a struggle for survival between the races," particularly between the German 'Aryan race', the Jews and the Slavs.
84. See Ernst Breisach, "The Metanarrative Controversy," in *On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and Its Aftermath* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 125; cf. Philip Pomper, "Introduction: The Theory and Practice of World History," in *World History: Ideologies, Structures, and Identities*, ed. P. Pomper, R.H. Elphick and R.T. Vann (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 2.
85. See esp. Jerry Bentley, *Shapes of World History in Twentieth-Century Scholarship* (Washington DC: American Historical Association, 1996).
86. See esp. Breisach, "The Metanarrative Controversy," pp. 122ff.
87. Novick, "The Defense of the West," pp. 283–287.

‘Western’ and ‘White Civilization’: White Nationalism and Eurocentrism at the Crossroads

R. Charles Weller

Eurocentric and nationalist interpretations of world history continued to prevail over internationalist–cosmopolitan and globalist–multiculturalist visions and their respective aspirations for world peace in the post-World War II era. This was witnessed most vividly in French, U.S. and other nationalist rejection of UNESCO’s attempts to rewrite both national histories and the overall history of humanity from a ‘multicultural global connections’ point of view in the post-World War II, post-colonial setting. With respect to UNESCO’s world history project, the

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R.C. Weller (✉)

Department of History, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA

R.C. Weller

Georgetown University (ACMCU), Washington D.C., USA

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explicit aim “was to distinguish it from the ethnocentric and especially the Eurocentric world histories of the past” in order to overcome “the obstinacy with which so many representatives of so-called ‘European’ or ‘Western’ civilization regard the latter – their own – as the only true civilization.”¹ Much the same applied to UNESCO’s efforts to rewrite various national histories from a cross-cultural and transnational point of view. As Hunt highlights however, the UNESCO history of France written from this vantage in the 1950s was not published until 2012 due to French nationalist opposition.² Likewise, the only American historian appointed to write a volume for the UNESCO *History of Humanity* series, Louis Gottschalk, having finally overcome his own Eurocentric bias, was criticized by not only American counterparts and reviewers, but the French Sorbonne historian Roland Mousnier, who “objected that this kind of separate-but-equal approach obscured the most significant world development of the period 1300 to 1775 – the rise of the west.”³

And so we come full circle back to the so-called ‘new world histories’, emerging as they did from out of this post-World War II, post-colonialist trend. Like Gottschalk and Stravinos before him, William H. McNeill, one of the chief pioneers and inspirations of the new world history movement, himself modeled the called-for transformation by shifting his focus across the span of his career from *The Rise of the West* (1963) to a more nuanced and balanced view of *The Human Web: A Bird’s-Eye View of World History* (2003).⁴ Global, multicultural, transnational approaches to world history, and to history in general, were on the rise. But while McNeill and others were embracing this trajectory, disparate voices were lamenting and fighting to save *The Vanishing West: 1964–2010: The Disappearance of Western Civilization from the American Undergraduate Curriculum*.⁵ They faced major obstacles, however. One of the most formidable was the ongoing conflation of Western/European Civilization with white civilization and accompanying charges that Western Civilization was inherently racist. Indeed, the Nazi and other fascist-nationalist atrocities had, on top of the nationalist violence of World War I, placed increasing strain upon Eurocentric, nationalist and racist interpretations of both Western and world history (not to mention European, American, Japanese and multiple other national histories). But it would be naïve to suppose that the mere absence of explicit references to white racist ideas within the continuing narratives of ‘advanced Western civilization’ in the post-World War II, post-colonialist era indicated a complete

In opposition to yet another newly proposed replacement course on Culture, Ideas, Values (CIV), he immediately went on to assert:

As a historian of the United States I would be the last person to deny the ethnic, racial, and cultural complexity of American society. But, from the same perspective, I find it puzzling, if not troubling, to learn that some of the dominant and influential ideas in modern America are to be seen in CIV as originating outside the West. Few historians of the United States believe that the culture of this country has been seriously influenced by ideas from Africa, China, Japan, or indigenous North America, to name the more prominent non-Western sources of the present population of the United States.¹³

Such a view leaves few other options than white Americans to serve as the sole sources for “the dominant and influential ideas in modern America.” And this was precisely the complaint of Bill King, President of Stanford’s Black Student Union, who raised the original objection to the Western Culture course. He suggested instead courses which would make clear “that they [the white Europeans] were just as indebted to my [black] ancestors as they were to their own.”¹⁴ In this, King was in essential agreement with Malcolm X, who said: “once you see that the condition that we’re in is directly related to our lack of knowledge concerning the history of the Black man, only then can you realize the importance of knowing something about the history of the Black man.”¹⁵ George Reisman therefore recognized that “[i]n these statements, Western civilization is clearly identified with people of a certain type, namely, the West Europeans and their descendants, who are white.” Attempting to shift the focus from race to intellect however, he continued to contend that “the intellectual substance of Western civilization is nothing other than the highest level of knowledge attained anywhere on earth, in virtually every aspect of every field, and if the purpose of education is to impart knowledge, then its purpose is to impart Western civilization.”¹⁶ In making this argument, Reisman neglected, however, to address the historically problematic association of alleged ‘white superiority’ with ‘intellectual superiority’. Meanwhile, associate professor of English Barbara Gelpi believed the aim should be “laying bare the racist and sexist assumptions within the very foundations of Western culture.”¹⁷ Attempting to shift the focus from a racially oriented to a ‘culturally heterogeneous’ perspective, Herbert Lindenberger, reflecting back on “On the Sacrality of Reading

Lists: The Western Culture Debate at Stanford University,” summed up the Stanford decision to do away with its Western Culture curriculum and institute the new CIV curriculum as follows:

The institution of Western civilization courses in America in the wake of the First World War responded not only to the European sense of cultural crisis, but, coming as it did precisely at the time that the United States first felt itself a world power, served to portray this power as heir to that whole tradition we came to call Western. Stanford’s recent move toward a more globally oriented [CIV] course recognizes at once the increasingly heterogeneous make-up of the country’s college-student population and America’s entanglement in a world economy over which it can no longer exercise the control it once enjoyed.¹⁸

In the midst of it all, William J. Bennett, appointed chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, made a national issue of the Stanford case. He put together a ‘study group’ made up of 31 scholars, most of whom were white,¹⁹ to inquire into “the State of Learning in the Humanities in Higher Education.” In 1984 he thus published *To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Humanities in Higher Education* in which he made the following impassioned plea:

We are a part and a product of Western civilization. That our society was founded upon such principles as justice, liberty, government with the consent of the governed, and equality under the law is the result of ideas descended directly from great epochs of Western civilization – Enlightenment England and France, Renaissance Florence, and Periclean Athens. These ideas...are the glue that binds our pluralistic nation. The fact that we as Americans – whether black or white, Asian or Hispanic, rich or poor – share these beliefs aligns us with other cultures of the Western tradition. It is not ethnocentric or chauvinistic to acknowledge this. No student citizen of our civilization should be denied access to the best that tradition has to offer.

Ours is not, of course, the only great cultural tradition the world has seen. There are others, and we should expect an educated person to be familiar with them because they have produced art, literature, and thought that are compelling monuments to the human spirit and because they have made significant contributions to our history. Those who know nothing of these other traditions can neither appreciate the uniqueness of their own nor understand how their own fits with the larger world. They are less able to

understand the world in which they live. The college curriculum must take the non-Western world into account, not out of political expediency or to appease interest groups, but out of respect for its importance in human history. But the core of the American college curriculum—its heart and soul—should be the civilization of the West, source of the most powerful and persuasive influences on America and its people.²⁰

The report thus reflected an appreciable measure of balance, especially in its genuine respect for the non-Western world and its “significant contributions to our [world’s] history.” Like Degler, the report even acknowledged “our pluralistic nation...black or white, Asian or Hispanic, rich or poor,” but it nowhere affirmed any contribution on the part of such peoples to ‘the Western tradition’. Indeed, the author of the report, Bennett, had coauthored a book in 1979 entitled *Counting by Race* which spoke out against Affirmative Action, i.e., against foundational Civil Rights legislation.²¹ Bennett’s racially-colored views also found expression elsewhere over the years, as seen for example in his genocidal comment in 2006 that “you could abort every black baby in this country, and your crime rate would go down.” He was condemned for his ‘racial’ statement by both President Bush and New York Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg.²²

Allan Bloom then took up the matter in his 1987 best-seller, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students*. He mocked the idea that “Black students are second-class...because they are being forced to imitate white culture,” suggesting that “[r]elativism and Marxism made some of this claim believable.” He implied instead that it was “because they are academically poor.”²³ He likewise “wrote a letter to the *Wall Street Journal* editor in 1989,” making “a rigorous if eccentric case for a classic liberal education rooted in the Western canon – in which he argued that the Stanford revisions were a travesty.”²⁴

Following closely behind, the February 1988 U.S. edition of *Newsweek* magazine carried an article by David Gates and Tony Clifton titled “Say Goodnight, Socrates: Stanford University and the decline of the West.”²⁵ Six years later, in 1993, Bernard Knox published *The Oldest Dead White European Males and Other Reflections on the Classics*. There he argued that

the Greeks and the heritage they have handed down to our Western Civilization...is today a controversial theme, as the deliberately provocative title of the first essay [“Homer is Dead”] suggests. Advocates of

multiculturalism and militant feminists, among others, have denounced the traditional canon of literature that has so long served as the educational base for Western societies, repudiating it not only as sexist and racist but even as an instrument of ideological *Gleichschaltung* [standardized authoritarianism] used by a ruling class to impose conformity.²⁶

David Sacks and Peter Thiel—the latter a former speech writer for William J. Bennett—followed in 1996 by publishing *The Diversity Myth: ‘Multiculturalism’ and the Politics of Intolerance at Stanford*. The title was slightly revised and broadened for the paperback edition, appearing in 1998 as *The Diversity Myth: ‘Multiculturalism’ and Political Intolerance on Campus*. Both authors were graduates of Stanford now working together at a conservative think-tank, the Independent Institute, in Oakland, California. Chapter 1, “The West Rejected,” started with an italicized quote from columnist Charles Krauthammer: “*First, Stanford capitulated to separatist know-nothings and abandoned its ‘Western Civilization’ course because of [the course’s] bias toward white males (you know: narrow-minded ethnics like Socrates, Jesus, and Jefferson).*” In polemical overstatement of the case, they went on to portray the curriculum change at Stanford as

an unqualified denunciation of the West. ...It referred not just to a single class at Stanford, but to the West itself – to its history and achievements, to its institutions of free-market capitalism and constitutional democracy, to Christianity and Judaism, to the complex of values and judgments that help shape who we are.²⁷

In defense of classical Western Civilization, they argued against emerging ideas of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity’, condemning them as neo-liberal covers for anti-right-wing political intolerance.

In 1997, Gary Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross Dunn intervened in the debate with *History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past*. They advocated in defense of multiculturalism and diversity, decrying what they considered to be a “right-wing assault” in the course of attempting to set national history standards. All of them had participated in a two-year effort (1992–1994) to establish recommended standards, only to watch the U.S. Senate vote in early 1995 to “condemn” them.²⁸

Meanwhile, two other graduates of Stanford, Victor Davis Hanson and John Heath, added their voices to the debate in 1998 with a book

entitled *Who Killed Homer? The Demise of Classical Education and the Recovery of Greek Wisdom*. From their vantage,

every American should care. The demise of classics means more than the implosion of an inbred academic discipline, more than the disappearance of one more bookosaurus here and there. For chained to this sinking academic bureaucracy called classics are the ideas, the values, the vision of classical Greece and Rome. These are the ideas and values that have shaped and defined Western civilization, a vision of life that has ironically come under increasing attack here in the elite universities of the West just as its mutated form is metastasizing throughout the globe.²⁹

But the U.S. was not the only place where Eurocentric visions of the preeminence of Western civilization continued to vie for interpretational merit while retaining implicit or, in more extreme form, explicit association with white civilization. The British historian J.M. Roberts maintained a classic Western Civ plus approach to his *History of the World* without essential revision from 1976 until his death in 2003. There he argued that, “as a way out of their troubles,” peoples everywhere across the world “look...to the West” as “the master-source of the modern world.” Surely a historian of the caliber of Roberts must have been aware just how closely his latter reference resembled historically white supremacist ideas of a ‘master race’. Whatever the case, he was clear in asserting that “no other tradition has shown the same vigour and attractiveness in alien settings as the European: it has no competitors as a world shaper.” Against this background, he contends, in support of his thesis, that “[o]ne reason why so many black men clamour vociferously against the white-dominated societies they live in is” not because they have been so oppressed and violated, but “that they in fact wish to realize the ideals of human rights and dignity evolved by European civilization.” Not only does his choice of descriptive language here—clamour vociferously—cast ‘black men’ in a less than positive light; European civilization is, in his eyes, exclusively associated with and ‘evolved by’ the white societies which ‘dominate’ them. Indeed, Roberts’ singling out of ‘black men’ here in juxtaposition to white Europeans indicates that he views them, within the larger context of his argument, as one of the ‘alien settings’ (cf. African heritage as non-European) in which his white-dominated European tradition serves to provide them “a way out of their troubles,” namely the troubles they “clamour vociferously” about.³⁰

primary aim of countering “the multicultural effort to ‘provincialize’ the history of Western civilization.”⁴³ Earlier in a 2005 chapter titled “Centres and Margins: the Fall of Universal World History and the Rise of Multicultural World History,” Duchesne explained that

this emphasis on the interactions of communities and cultures in the past has produced indispensable insights about the worldwide impact of not only modern but premodern forces and movements. The trend toward a more even-handed evaluation of non-European voices and the history of women and minority groups also deserves to be celebrated. ...But it is my view that a narrow-minded, anti-Western ideology has taken hold of much of world history writing in recent decades, a new orthodoxy...[which] encourages students to place the intellectual achievements of all cultures on the same moral and rational level, and discourages the so-called ‘triumphalist’ idea that Western civilization has made the major contributions to the ideals of freedom, democracy and reason. ...This discursive shift away from the great themes of freedom and rationality which students learned from traditional Western Civ courses and which world historians still accepted in the 1960s was perhaps the most important event in twentieth-century historiography.⁴⁴

Under attack in all Duchesne’s works were figures such as Franz Boas and Immanuel Wallerstein as well as William H. McNeill, Ross Dunn, Jerry Bentley, Patrick Manning, David Christian “and others who took over the cause of world history in the 1980s.” For Duchesne, “the main question [of history remained] why the great accomplishments in the sciences and arts have been overwhelmingly European.” This, for him, constituted a ‘higher cultural legacy’ in comparison with all other cultures and civilizations within the world historical record. Never mind that he, by his own confession, “risked making arguments about areas of history I know little about,” ‘the uniqueness of the West’ was to be defended at all costs.⁴⁵

Part of this defense, it turns out, includes an anti-immigration stance which bears an uncanny resemblance to white nationalist and racist anti-immigration laws of the interwar period aimed at maintaining a white majority, such as those enacted by the U.S. between 1880 and 1965 (see Chap. 1). Indeed, along with his publication and teaching work, Duchesne is co-founder of the Council of European Canadians (CEC). In its vision statement, the group declares that it “oppose[s] all efforts to deny or weaken the European character of Canada, [that] Canada should

remain majority, not exclusively, European in its ethnic composition and cultural character [because] Canada is a nation created by individuals with an Anglo/French/European heritage, not by individuals from diverse races and cultures."⁴⁶ For Duchesne, therefore, "[t]he incoming in Vancouver of Asians and Chinese was too fast, too quick. ...within a matter of a few years, a very British city, a beautiful British city, took on a strongly Asian character." These comments sparked national controversy. In spite of Duchesne being condemned by a number of public officials and university colleagues for racism, his university defended his right to 'freedom of speech'.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, his own brother made clear that

[a]s a member of the Duchesne family, I totally repudiate my brother's white supremacist crypto-Nazi positions. We are a family of Puerto Rican, Caribbean heritage. Our father is Puerto Rican, our grandfather was of mixed Afro-Puerto Rican and French descent, our mother was a British citizen of Anglo-Indian descent, born in Calcuta [sic]. Ricky was born and raised in Puerto Rico with us. We are proud of our cosmopolitan, plural ethnic heritage. ...We cannot explain our brother's absurd racist politics except as a form of the typical self-hatred or wannabe White anxiety provoked by colonial prejudice suffered by Puerto Ricans who have been historically racialized by U.S. colonialism.⁴⁸

Duchesne became a hero, however, to white nationalist and racist groups sharing his commitment to protect and defend predominantly white Western civilization. Thus Kevin MacDonald, one of the founders of *The Occidental Observer* (TOO), which publishes "original content touching on the themes of white identity, white interests, and the culture of the West,"⁴⁹ published an article in another white nationalist mouthpiece, *The Daily Stormer*, entitled: "Council of European Canadians: An Excellent Website in Defense of the [White] People and Culture of the West." Therein he noted that Duchesne and his work were "well-known to TOO readers." He understood Duchesne to promote "ethnic homogeneity within Western societies [as] a key antecedent for Western endorsement of moral universalism and individual rights," thus opposing "the current push for multiculturalism [as] a disaster for European Canadians."⁵⁰

A number of similar groups have arisen in response to the multicultural surge of globalization. In addressing the issue of "Immigration and the Demographic Transformation," American Renaissance, founded in 1990, claims that "[t]he single greatest threat facing whites is mass immigration of non-whites into white homelands. If it continues, ...[t]he culture of the

West will not survive the disappearance of the [white] people who created it.” Their “Philosophy of Race Realism” holds that “it is entirely normal for whites (or for people of any other race) to want to be the majority race in their own homeland. If whites permit themselves to become a minority population, they will lose their civilization, their heritage, and even their existence as a distinct people.” The language here echoes not only that of the KKK, but Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race: The Racial Basis of European History* (1916). Accordingly, Christopher De La Viña, in an American Renaissance article titled “White Man: Why Are You Giving Away Your Country?” (2015), recounted how

[a]s a child in public schools and now as a graduate student in history, I have learned one thing to be true about the United States: It is a white country. The founders were white, white men established its core principles and political system, and white men and women built the nation into what it is today. ...America has always been a white country and always should be.⁵¹

From the opposite angle, one of their founders and chief spokespersons, Jared Taylor, in a piece entitled “Africa in Our Midst” (under the topic of ‘Crime and Disorder’), argues that “[w]hen blacks are left entirely to their own devices, Western Civilization—any kind of civilization—disappears.” Blacks thus remain ‘uncivilized’, presumably primitive and barbaric, in his view.⁵²

The New Moderate shares the view that “[w]hite people of European stock have a right to look after their interests, especially in light of current demographic trends in the U.S. and Western Europe.” They lamented, however, that “[u]nfortunately, virtually every ‘white rights’ movement has been laden with racism” (italics in original). While ostensibly disavowing such a racist view themselves, they summarized the perspective of what they called ‘Righty’ in terms very similar to those described by De La Viña, namely that

[w]hite people created Western Civilization and all its wonders. We built everything of note from the Parthenon to the personal computer. We explored the world from top to bottom, delivered most of it from ignorance and savagery, spread the Gospel, advanced the frontiers of science, discovered cures for dreaded diseases, and founded numerous great nations, including, of course, the United States. White people were designed by nature to rule.⁵³

Preserving Western Civilization was a group founded in the mid-2000s by Michael Hart because “our glorious Western civilization is under assault from many directions.” The three main threats identified are: “the massive influx to the United States and Europe of Third-World immigrants who do not share our fundamental political and cultural values, ...the threat from Islam, a militant ideology that is hostile to our society and, in principle, committed to destroying it, [and] the persistent disappointing performance of blacks (which many whites mistakenly blame on themselves), [so that] many whites have guilt feelings that undermine Western morale and deter us from dealing sensibly with the other threats.”⁵⁴ With such ‘threats’ in view, Hart, a Ph.D. in astronomy, has published several white supremacist books, including *Understanding Human History* (2009) and *Restoring America* (2015).⁵⁵ The group does not seem to be very active, however, as its last conference appears to have been in 2009 when the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported that “Racists Gather[ed] in Maryland to ‘Preserve’ Western Civilization.” Speakers at the time included “Patricia Richardson, a member of the far-right British National Party (BNP), whose leader, Nick Griffin, has traveled to the United States to speak at a conference convened by American Renaissance. Richardson spoke about the ‘Colonization of Britain,’ which focused on Muslim immigration to that country.” Others were Steve Farron, formerly a professor of Classics at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa; Lino Graglia, a professor of law at the University of Texas in Austin; Henry Harpending, an anthropologist at the University of Utah; and “J. Philippe Rushton, a Canadian professor of psychology, who has, for many years, been one of the primary voices arguing that races differ biologically in intelligence.” Another speaker, Peter Brimelow, founder of the white nationalist VDare which published Hart’s *Restoring America*, “argued that the influx of ‘non-traditional’ immigration is a problem all over the Western world and that the loss of control over the country by ‘white Protestants’ will mean a collapse of the American political system.” The solution, he urged, was “that whites respond by creating an explicitly white nationalist political party.” Richard Spencer was not mentioned, though he is president of the National Policy Institute as well as Washington Summit Publishers, both of which promote white nationalist views, including the publication of Hart’s book *Restoring America*.⁵⁶ The ADL article did, however, reference “white supremacists on forums like *Stormfront* and the *Vanguard News Network*” in connection with the conference and its speakers.⁵⁷

Students for Western Civilization is “based out of Toronto and is composed primarily of students and alumni of Toronto universities,” but invites all “young people across North America” to join them. According to their mission statement, the goals of the organization include: “To organize for and advance the interests of Western peoples” and “To promote and celebrate Western Civilisation.” In order to accomplish these goals, they urge that “York [University] Needs a White Students Union!” This, they insist, “would serve to promote and celebrate the culture of Western Civilisation [and] advance the political interests of Western peoples.”⁵⁸

Youth for Western Civilization was a trans-Atlantic student organization seeking to influence college and university campuses across the Western world. Their Facebook page has been removed and they appeared to have no website presence in 2017.⁵⁹ However, their influence has, as intended, extended beyond campuses into political realms. Thus in October 2016, during Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, David Neiwert reported how “Montana Republicans Warmly Embrace a White Nationalist’s Legislative Candidacy.” Neiwert is referring to Taylor Rose, who “first came to enter the movement in 2011 when his activities on behalf of the white nationalist Youth for Western Civilization were reported by the Center for New Community.”⁶⁰ Rose’ views were well-known to Montana Republicans because he had authored a book in 2012 on the *Return of the Right: How the Political Right Is Taking Back Western Civilization*. The heart of the book aims to expose and counter a “very aggressive and dedicated” neo-liberal utopian “vision to destroy the nation-state, eliminate religion, [and] break down all defined barriers in society [so as] to eliminate western civilization from the face of the earth in the attempt to institute a radical, multicultural, New World Order agenda.” It is a “radical Leftist, post-modern philosophy”—elsewhere called Fabian Socialism—“emanating from Hegelian and Marxist belief systems.” The three key American presidential figures who have promoted this leftist downfall of Western Civilization are Woodrow Wilson and his internationalist League of Nations, Franklin Roosevelt and his socialist New Deal, and Barack Obama. This ‘crisis’ is “the great expression of the consequences of the abandonment of traditionalist, Christian, and Enlightenment principles being applied in the West.” He thus calls for a return to “the traditional institutions of the Western Christian society: God/church, family and country.” His vision for “all members...working together for the common interest of

Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy (1920), was an out-and-out racist, a firm believer in “Aryan” racial superiority, an opponent of unrestricted immigration and a Nazi sympathiser. Mishra describes my book *The Pity of War* as “Stoddardesque”. He goes on to say that my 2003 book *Empire* “belonged recognisably to the tradition of ... ‘white people’s histories’.”⁷¹

Ferguson flatly rejected Mishra’s depiction of him as a racist of any sort, demanding an apology in the process. The two went back and forth in several exchanges. Mishra replied: “Hardly anyone is a racist in the Stoddardian sense today, even if they raise the alarm against Muslim ‘colonisers’ of a ‘senescent’ Europe, or fret about feckless white Americans being outpaced by hard-working Asian-Americans. Ferguson is no racist, in part because he lacks the steady convictions of racialist ideologues like Stoddard.” Indeed, Mishra never explicitly or directly labeled Ferguson a ‘racist’, he simply said his writings were “Stoddardesque.” What he meant by that was made clear in what immediately followed within the review, namely a critique of Ferguson’s pro-Western imperialist and supremacist position which, Hegelian style, leaves Asian, African and other non-Western peoples ‘historyless’:

This wistful vision of an empire on which the sun need never have set had an immediately obvious defect. It grossly underestimated – in fact, ignored altogether – the growing strength of anti-colonial movements across Asia, which, whatever happened in Europe, would have undermined Britain’s dwindling capacity to manage its vast overseas holdings.

In his later reply, Mishra likewise cited Ferguson’s comments in the April 2003 edition of the *New York Times Magazine*—“Let me come clean, I am a fully paid-up member of the neoimperialist gang”—which was published “a few weeks after the shock-and-awe campaign began in Iraq.” To this Mishra added another comment by Ferguson, appearing in *The Guardian* just before his *LRB* review was published, where Ferguson suggested of Native Americans that, “had they been left to their own devices, I don’t think we’d have anything remotely resembling the civilisation we’ve had in North America.” All this, in Mishra’s eyes, constituted Ferguson’s “views on the innate superiority, indeed indispensability, of Western civilization [which] can be easily ascertained from his published writings and statements.” Mishra then added