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A HISTORY OF CLASSICAL CHINESE THOUGHT

Li Zehou

Translated, with a philosophical introduction,
by Andrew Lambert

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Foreword

Translator's Introduction

Li Zehou has been described as "the most creative living Chinese philosopher as well as the most controversial."[1] Born in Hunan province in 1930, he graduated from Peking University in 1954. Although an active scholar since the 1950s, he attained much greater prominence after the Cultural Revolution in China with the publication of several works in the late 1970s. Before he left China in 1992 and settled in the United States, Li was credited with providing inspiration for the Chinese democracy movement of the 1980s. He has published over 30 books and has the distinction of serving as a Fellow of the International Institute of Philosophy (IIP) in Paris, an honor also granted to Feng Youlan.[2]

Li is best known in the English-speaking world for his work on aesthetics, with three of his books available in English (*The Path of Beauty, Four Essays on Aesthetics: Towards a Global View*, and *The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition*). His work addresses a great variety of topics in Chinese thought. However, this volume offers an introduction to Li's scholarship beyond aesthetics. The essays, written separately at various points in Li's career, address a variety of topics in Chinese philosophical thought, covering thinkers from Confucius to the Song and Ming Neo-Confucians. Five of the first six essays feature the pre-Qin thinkers Confucius, Mozi, Laozi, Sunzi, Hanfeizi, and Zhuangzi. These essays not only discuss these historical figures and their ideas but also consider their historical significance, and how key themes from these early schools reappeared in and shaped later periods and later thinkers. There are also studies of Qin and Han thought (Chapter 5) and Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism (Chapter 7). The final two chapters in this volume focus on core themes in Chinese thought and their influence on thinkers in the modern era.

Li's work is distinguished by the breadth of his scholarly interest and his syncretic approach—his explanations of prominent thinkers and key periods in Chinese intellectual history blend ideas from both the Chinese and Western canons, while also drawing on contemporary thinkers in both traditions. Given the boundary-defying nature of Li's account of the development of Chinese thought, the reader is best prepared by considering some of the philosophical assumptions and theoretical perspectives that Li draws upon.

Li Zehou and the Articulation of a Chinese Modernity

A useful starting point for approaching Li's work is to locate it within a shared concern of twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals: the struggle to find an intellectual foundation for a Chinese modernity. The collapse of the dynastic system in China after approximately two millennia prompted intense debates, partly fueled by the shock of defeat to Western powers in the Opium Wars, about what forms of social political order should undergird a modern China. Some blamed the Confucian tradition for China's contemporary woes, viewing it as unscientific and oppressive, and favored reform by adopting Western institutions and social ideals. One manifestation of this movement was known as *quanpan xihua* or 'wholesale Westernization,' and its best-known representatives were Chen Xujing (1903–67) and Hu Shi (1891–1962). On the opposite side, conservatives such as Xu Tong (1819–1900) staunchly defended traditional culture and opposed liberalization. A more moderate view also emerged, favored by reform-minded Confucian literati, such as Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), and captured by the slogan *zhongti xiyong*: Chinese root with Western applications. This approach favored making use of Western science and learning where possible, while preserving the roots of Chinese culture. It was against this cultural and intellectual backdrop that Li's own philosophical response emerged.

Li's response was not to simply adopt one or more of these approaches—wholesale Westernization, conservatism, or the grafting of Western learning onto Chinese culture—but instead developed his own novel theoretical framework. Broadly speaking, three strands of thought were relevant to Li's understanding of Chinese modernity: the Chinese intellectual tradition, rooted in a past dominated by Confucian thought and culture; the prospects for a Marxism with Chinese characteristics; and Western learning and science, to which China had been so dramatically exposed to during the decline of the imperial system. Li's thought can be read as offering, albeit often indirectly, an account of how these intellectual currents are tied together within a single, evolving and living tradition. Collectively, these three interlinked strands reveal a philosophical and social vision rooted in Chinese history, culture, and thought, but which often proceeds using Western terms and theoretical constructs. To highlight the originality and contemporary relevance of this vision, let us consider each of the three strands, starting with Li's treatment of traditional Chinese thought.

The task of finding value in Chinese thought was made more difficult by the dim view of traditional culture taken by Chinese reformers in the early twentieth century, and further criticisms followed in the Communist era. The 'Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius' campaign of the 1970s, for example, partly drew on a Maoist interpretation of Chinese history. In the face of such challenges, Li resisted premature or sweeping dismissals of China's rich heritage, while selectively highlighting the

value of elements of traditional Chinese thought and its canonical figures. An additional layer of difficulty arose from the need at that time to be sensitive to political issues, and to be mindful of tones and wording.

One of Li's most impressive feats was the rehabilitation of the Confucian school, which is articulated in this volume's first chapter, "Reevaluating Confucius." Li acknowledged the flaws and failings in the classical Confucian view of society, thereby avoiding open disagreement with the official doctrine of the time, but also emphasized the unduly neglected strengths of the Confucian social vision. The weaknesses included the conservative nature of Confucian social thought, its excessive recourse to the perspective of the nobility, and the failure to adequately describe and theorize the economic and technological progress that followed the collapse of the Zhou Empire. The strengths of the Confucian system lay in its primitive democratic spirit, which sought to preserve unity between the different roles and layers of society, by finding a place for different voices in a single ritual-governed polity. As part of an analysis of this social order, Li also offers a detailed analysis of the meaning of *ren*, often translated as humaneness.

This nuanced and evenhanded reading of the early Confucians made credible Li's assertion of the importance of traditional Chinese thought to a Chinese modernity. He did this by pointing out the value in classical Confucianism, and then linking it strongly to the present. Specifically, Li identified a distinctively Chinese 'cultural-psychological formation' (*Wenhua-xinli jiegou*), which could be traced back to the early Confucians.[3] This term expresses the idea that there are certain concepts, modes of thought, and ways of experiencing whose influence persisted through history and served to fashion a distinctive Chinese outlook or form of life. Describing this theory, Li wrote:

> The history of ideas should investigate how culture and traditions are sedimented in people's psychological formations; it should also investigate the connection between classical thought and the formation and shaping of the characteristics of the Chinese nation.
>
> (Ch. 9)

In this way, the idea of a discrete Chinese tradition emerged, one distinct from a Western tradition and with its own modes of thought and approaches to experience. Furthermore, the theory's implied determinism and historicism meant that Chinese modernity could not but be an extension of the Chinese past. This did not mean that China could or should resist all forms of outside influence, but that external influences would have to be grafted onto existing values, cultural norms, and ingrained ways of seeing the world. More concretely, this approach cast doubt on the claims of those who advocated the wholesale adoption of Western modes of learning, science, and democracy; they were ignoring a deeper historically constituted reality—a nebulous cultural unity that, however vague its boundaries and terms, carried with it its own logic and implications for modern life.

The idea of a *cultural-psychological formation*, so central to Li's account of

Chinese history and modernity, draws deeply upon Marxist and Hegelian thought, and this is the second starting point for contextualizing Li's work. One concern about Li's use of Marxist thought and analysis should be addressed at the beginning. Academic work on Marx done in mainland China in the 1970s and 80s is sometimes treated with skepticism, conducted under the shadow of the Marxist orthodoxy prevalent at the time. The more ideologically driven forms of Marxism featured dogmatic assertions and dubious generalizations regarding economics, history, or society, which fell out of favor in the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union if not before. Those wary of such politicized Marxism might therefore wonder whether Li's social analysis relies on misguided assumptions. This worry might be allied to concerns about the political pressures and limited scope for academic expression in China in the mid 1980s when *A History of Classical Chinese Thought* was first published, thereby raising questions about the book's contemporary relevance and value.

This concern about the use of Marxist ideas in Li's work is misplaced, however, for several reasons. First, Li's use of Marxist theory is highly selective. He does not appeal to the economic determinism of the later Marx, or to false consciousness, and his analysis is not class-based; nor does he present a highly teleological or deterministic theory of history—the kind that grinds toward revolution and millenarianism. Rather, Li focuses on the earlier Marx's work, such as the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, and the interest in human nature and its shaping by social, political, and economic forces. These issues raise meaningful philosophical questions, which continue to invoke discussion today.

Second, it is precisely because Li makes creative use of Marxist and Hegelian thought that he is worth reading. His work forms an interesting contrast with approaches currently prevalent in English language work on Chinese thought—such as a focus on Confucian role ethics or possible forms of contemporary Confucian democracy. English translations of Li's writings arrive at a time when Marxist thought, long neglected, is considered to be of only minor relevance to the field.[4] This makes Li's approach striking and thought-provoking, opening up new vistas for thought rather than presenting minor tweaks to familiar and well-worn lines of argument. Furthermore, as the zeitgeist in public debate and social theory move back toward a concern with social polarization and economic inequality as accoutrements of globalization, so some of Marx's ideas once again provide a focal point for discussion. Given this, Li's work can be considered timely, as a contribution to this renewed debate about the role of economic and political forces in shaping the human subject and its values.

Li's use of Marxist ideas was also well suited to a particular historical moment in China. The influence of older Marxists had diminished, with the Maoist peasant-centric revolution and centralized economic control producing questionable results, and China was looking for new philosophical foundations for society in the 1970s. In providing a fresh reading of Marx, Li filled that theoretical lacuna.

For obvious reasons, there is little explicit reference to Marx in a history of

Chinese thought from Confucius up to the nineteenth century. Rather, the book uses Marxist theoretical perspectives and a historicist approach to the explanation of social phenomena, as seen in the appeal to a *cultural-psychological formation*. Consistent with Marx's historical materialism, this idea indicates how external social practices and material forces shape people's conscious experiences and engagement with the world. Shared psychological entities, broadly construed so as to include concepts and norms, structure or 'form' the conscious minds of those who share the same social and material tradition. Furthermore, as external culture and material forces evolve, so do people's mental or psychological lives.

The influence of Marxist and historicist thought is also seen in Li's playful term 'Western root with Chinese application' (*xiti zhongyong*). Discussed in Chapter 9, this is a reworking of the popular reformist slogan mentioned earlier: 'Chinese root with Western applications' (*zhongti xiyong*). Subverting the notion that an established Chinese tradition (*zhongti*) can make use of features of Western civilization such as science and the technocratic management of society (*xiyong*), Li's analysis of Chinese history appeals to theoretical frameworks and social analysis that originates in the West (*xiti*) in order to derive conclusions about, and prescriptions for, Chinese society (*zhongyong*). This approach is redolent with Marx's belief that the surface level events of a society or tradition can be explained by 'hidden' theoretical constructs (such as the cultural-psychological formation), which are not themselves discussed in the literature and life of that tradition. This approach is apparent in the book's first chapter, in Li's assessment of the historical Confucius.

By emphasizing the humanistic strand of Marx, Li was able to connect Marxism with important Chinese cultural questions. In particular, Li reintroduced a concern with the inner life of the individual, which had been lost amid socialist theory that focused on social engineering and economic determinism. Yet Li did so in a way that differed from the conventional liberal notion of the free individual, understood in Lockean terms as a pre-social individual already possessing certain determinate features and rights. The cultural-psychological formation located the individual in a broader social and cultural matrix.

This insight allowed for discussions of the human subject and human subjectivity in ways that spoke to traditional Chinese thought. The traditional approach to human subjectivity was characterized as, among other things, "conquering the self and returning to ritual" (*Analects* 12.1). The Confucian focus on the sociality of the individual—constituted by social roles, shared common goods, and a multigenerational perspective—and on harmony between a person and a more vast cosmological order was brought into dialogue with the Marxist view that the human subject is determined by social, cultural, and technological forces to a greater extent than the ideal of the autonomous liberal self allows.

In Li's work, this view is explored as a dialectic between ideas found in Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*— the humanization of nature and the naturalization of humans. Humans strive to remake and reform the environment in

ways more amenable to themselves but, at the same time, their inner natures and dispositions also undergo alteration as a result of the encounter with the surrounding environment. This is an evolving relationship of mutual influence, in which a kind of symbiotic harmony is reached. Li does not view 'human nature' as a fixed and essential notion; rather the characteristics associated with humans evolved as their particular cultural, geographical, and historical tradition evolved. An ideal endpoint in such evolution arrives when human practices, in the broadest sense of the term, are in full harmony with the laws of nature and applicable technological or social forces.

The prominence of the human subject in Li's writings conveys a faith in human freedom, and the possibility of transcending the more deterministic elements of his explanatory framework. As Li reinvigorates Confucianism through the use of Marxist thought, so he also seeks to enrich Marx's thought by providing a richer picture of the inner life of persons, one sympathetic to the idea of human freedom. The ideal of freedom had great power in post-Mao reform-era China, but to articulate it involved turning to Western thought beyond Marx. This is the third vector in Li's general philosophical orientation and, while thinkers such Freud and Clifford Geertz occasionally appear in the text, it is most clearly illustrated in Li's use of Kant's (1724–1804) thought.

Li was as an accomplished Kant scholar who had already published a substantial commentary on Kant in 1979, *Pipan Zhexue de Pipan* (A Critique of Critical Philosophy). Kant's writings provided a framework to discuss the mental and ideal aspects of human life, and allowed Li to produce a theory of subjectivity (*zhutixing* 主體性) or, to use Li's term, *subjectality*. The term 'subjectality' was intended to underline a difference from subjectivism. Subjectality emphasizes the importance of first-person experience, in contrast to deterministic macro-level theories of social forces, but also rejects shallow subjectivism. The latter understands the inner lives of people as being private and without connections to history, culture, and the surrounding environment, such that personal values have no deeper source than personal choice and commitment.

Li's theory of the human subject integrated Marx and the Confucian tradition, and ameliorated the tension between the determinism of the later Marx and the voluntarism of Mao—the idea that the sheer strength of human will could transform society. His theory developed Kant's account of abstract cognitive or perceptual structures or formations that condition the subject's experiences of the world; for Li, unlike Marx, the inner life of the individual is real and never a matter of false consciousness. However, Li rejected Kant's notion of transcendental a priori knowledge and the idea of the ahistorical and acultural synthesizing activity of the intellect (a transcendental ego, in Kant's terms). Instead, as noted earlier, the forms or categories through which the individual experienced the world were the products of the accumulated historical experience. Such experience 'sedimented' or accrued in people's minds, shaping thought, conscious life, and self-understanding. There is thus a kind of openness to the form of human subjectivity, and a freedom from a


image
not
available

social and political authority, the valuing of historical and textual study, a culture of optimism or delight, a stress on the unity of the human and the cosmic (discussed later), and an emphasis on practical utility and a distinctive conception of wisdom.

One noteworthy feature of this Confucian core is described in Chapter 9 as *legan wenhua*. This is sometimes translated as 'a culture of optimism' but is better understood as indicating a culture characterized by a sensitivity toward socially grounded pleasure or delight. To explain this characterization of the Chinese tradition, Li proceeds by a comparison with classical Greek and Christian views of the world.

Classical Greek and Christian metaphysics often posit two distinct realms. For example, Plato's forms constitute an ideal realm, distinct from the imperfect world of the senses. Access to this realm is arrived at through intellectual excellence in which the body plays little or no role. Similarly, a Christian creator God is the source of truth and perfection, and humanity must appeal to divine grace in order to overcome a flawed human nature and enter a more perfect realm beyond mortal life. The individual's relationship with God was more important than all worldly relationships, including those of the family. Li notes that this kind of religious mentality has been very important in Western culture, which has been labeled as a 'culture of guilt.'

In contrast, Li claims the Chinese tradition has a 'one-world' view in which the only realm from which ultimate human meaning can be derived is the concrete, historical, social human world. No higher transcendental realm exists to explain human life and guide conduct. The Chinese tradition thus contrasts with those that derive their ethical and social codes from a transcendental realm of perfect intellectual forms or a creator deity; the search for existential meaning in China was confined to the human realm. This search is 'optimistic' because the Chinese tradition, unlike other traditions, has not valued denigration of the body, self-sacrifice, or self-abnegation. This was a tradition characterized by a faith in everyday life and the possibility of finding meaning through the realization of pleasure in everyday social interaction.

Li's work is not merely an account of a particular historical tradition, however. In his intellectual history the very meaning of 'intellect' and 'wisdom' are rethought. In several of the chapters, he explores an alternative conception of wisdom that differs from prominent accounts in the Western tradition (Li, like many scholars of his time, makes extensive use of the broad term '*xifang*' or 'Western' as a useful conceptual foil for discussions of Chinese culture and history). On the question of what 'wisdom' means in history of Chinese thought, Li writes in Chapter 9:

> I use the word 'wisdom' (*zhihui* 智慧) here not only to indicate the ability to think or a mode of the intellect. For this characteristic is not merely intellectual, but also refers to all internal psychological structures and mental powers. These include elements of ethics and aesthetics such as ethical consciousness, one's attitude towards life, and the capacity for intuition. The characteristic feature of Chinese thought is how intelligence resides in an amalgamation of intellect and all these elements. Wisdom is an accumulated inner life and acculturation that

enables people to advance their lives.

(p. 309)

Partly because a creator God or a timeless transcendental realm had no important role to play in guiding human decisions and judgments, so excellent practical reasoning had to find other starting points. Chinese cosmology is grounded in ceaseless transformation and creation (*shengsheng buxi*), and the interaction of various mutually entailing forces and energies, as indicated by ideas such as vital energies (*qi*) and the force or weight of circumstances (*shi*). One consequence of this metaphysical picture is the identification of complementary and interrelated paired forces or tendencies—more commonly known as yin and yang. The yin-yang framework is found, as Li explains, in texts such as the *Daodejing* or *Laozi* (see Chapter 3) and, later, the *Yizhuan* (Chapter 4); but the military strategists, responsible for texts like Sunzi's *Art of War* (Chapter 3), provide the earliest comprehensive formulation of this way of thinking.

The *Art of War* represents a mode of thinking that had lasting influence on the tradition. Such thinking understands practical affairs through the use of mutually opposed but interrelated categories, such as night and day, male and female, hot and cold. Understanding any situation—and therefore making wise choices and living well—consists in grasping the relevant paired forces at play in the situation, and grasping the direction of events and outcomes to which these will give rise. The more careful the observation and far-reaching the anticipation, the more effective will be the action.

Li's achievement is to present this account as a distinctive form of practical reasoning or wisdom. This way of acting can be contrasted with other forms of practical reasoning and representations of the world. Since the account involves a degree of objectivity, seeking to track forces in the world, it differs from action originating in blind instinct, mere subjective preference, or trial and error—all of which involve little if any systematic thought.

Admittedly, this form of practical reasoning lacks the detailed causal pathways and theoretical models of natural phenomenon and processes of modern natural science. It is still empirical and this-worldly, however, and free from superstition or the positing of supernatural entities. More importantly, it also has an advantage over these more elaborate scientific accounts of the world. In everyday life, problems arise in a dynamic and fluid manner, and often involve a number of variables or considerations too great for any individual mind to track them. Under such conditions, scientific models might be of less help when action is needed in the immediate present and there is limited time for investigation. Instead, a schematic model of the world that roughly tracks the practically important features of a situation is useful, one that the individual can apply in order to generate practical judgment and choice. Lying in between the uniformed subjectivity of desire or preference and a detailed but noncommonsensical scientific blueprint, and addressing conditions that are dynamic and changing, the yin-yang model of practical wisdom

represents a useful compromise. Li describes how the influence of yin-yang theory on accounts of wisdom in the Chinese tradition persisted until China's encounter with Western science highlighted its shortcomings.

Yin-yang theory forms one part of a Chinese approach to practical wisdom that Li describes as 'pragmatic reasoning.' Li emphasizes that the Chinese tradition never developed a deeper concern with the mechanisms and processes that underlie the observable events of the social world, in the way that Baconian scientific method did. The intellectuals of the Confucian tradition were, Li insists, always primarily concerned with practical benefit and social well-being. If something benefitted the population at large, then the mechanisms behind it were of secondary concern. Heuristic-based thinking, such as yin-yang theory, served this practical goal well; but it became a barrier to developing other modes of theoretical thought and partly explained why the scientific method and its fruits appeared relatively late in China.

Another feature of Li's overview of the Chinese intellectual tradition is his challenge to the orthodox view of intellectual lineages within the tradition. Li rejects the notion that the ideas that constitute the Confucian tradition should be understood as a single lineage that is often described as '*Kong-Meng-Cheng-Zhu*.' He rejects the idea that Mencius (372 BCE–289 BCE) was the heir to the original Confucian school and that the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi later revived and refined the tradition's key ideas. Such a gloss ignores how different schools in early China borrowed from and influenced each other, and how each contributed to the cultural-psychological formation that came to characterize the Chinese tradition.

For example, while Xunzi (d. 238 BCE) and Mencius are often discussed in terms of their differences, Chapter 4 emphasizes their commonalities—described as 'the Confucian school's spirit of optimistic striving' (p. 118)—and ascribes the differences to different historical circumstances. The more developed capacity to control the natural environment and increase agriculture output of Xunzi's time led to a different account of how to secure the enduring Confucian ideal of *tianren heyi*, or the unity of humanity and cosmos. For Mencius, this was something achieved through inner-regarding personal cultivation, such as the cultivation of the four shoots (*siduan*) or emotional responses. In Xunzi's thought, however, the more developed social and technological means for ordering society, not available at the time of Mencius, played a greater role. In turn, Li argues, the *Yi Zhuan* or *Commentary on the Book of Changes*—though not typically associated with Xunzi—is an extension of Xunzi's thought. Xunzi's concern with *tian*, which here means the natural world, can be seen in the *Yi Zhuan*. Therein, it is transformed into a more complex cosmological notion. It becomes continuous with human life, inseparable from it, and also acquires an ethical connotation. Distinct from Xunzi's notion of *tian* as external environment, and also Mencius' sense of *tian* as an internal commander, *tian* is still external, but also includes moral and emotional qualities. This is one example of how a deeply rooted ideal, such as the unity of humanity and the cosmos (*tianren heyi*), evolves through successive iterations while remaining at the core of

the Confucian tradition as a whole.

The importance of connections between superficially different thinkers or eras within the tradition is also seen in Chapter 6. Here, Li discusses how the *Zhuangzi* played a formative role in the emergence of Zen Buddhism. Both "cultivated an aesthetic attitude" (p. 221), idealizing a person who is completely free and, unlike the Confucian ideal person, does not value integration into the social world. In the same chapter, however, we also see Li's willingness to challenge familiar associations. The supposed unity of the *Zhuangzi* and the *Daodejing* texts, conventionally understood to constitute a single classical Daoist philosophy, is rejected. Li argues that the *Daodejing* presents a political philosophy that involves engagement with the world, while the *Zhuangzi* seeks a metaphysics of transcendence and detachment. Seen clearly, the *Zhuangzi* focuses on a very different set of concerns, such as the equivalence of life and death, transcending benefit and harm, and nourishing the body and prolonging life.

Perhaps the most striking commentary about the lineage of Chinese thought concerns Li's view of the Neo-Confucians, including Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. In contrast to later thinkers who treated figures such as Zhu Xi as sources of authority, Li is often critical of the Neo-Confucians for what he regards as their excessive focus on inner states and inward-looking cultivation. This preoccupation led to the neglect of the external world and wider society, and contributed to the social and political problems that faced the empire during that period.

Li's view of Neo-Confucianism is provocative and suggestive because he sees it as primarily an ethical theory, not metaphysical or epistemological. According to him, the Confucian way is an approach that stressed pragmatic reasoning, human relationality (Li's later work refers to this as '*guanxi-ism*,' or the study of human attachment), and social benefit. Under the challenge of Buddhism and its sophisticated metaphysics, however, this ethical system needed a more philosophical foundation. Accordingly, Neo-Confucian philosophers attempted to situate Confucian teachings about human attachment within a cosmological framework that made sense of them. This framework particularly stressed the patterning or principle (*li*).

'Principle' (*li*) referred to some form of abstract order that inhered in the world (or within human nature) and which could be either grasped through the investigation of things or given full expression from within with the right kind of training or stance. Li Zehou's materialist historicist methodology, however, understands the Song-Ming study of pattern or principle (*Lixue*) in terms of the historical context and social system within which it emerged. It provided an abstract justification to a conservative order of hierarchical human relationships and their accompanying responsibilities. While seemingly grounded in cosmology and metaphysics, Li Zehou's explanation implied that such principle or patterning was a theoretical construction that effectively served to justify the status quo. Regardless of whether the language of patterning and principle was true in any objective sense, the social

responsibilities and demands of Confucian society had, at the very least, an intellectual framework that purported to make sense of them, and distinguished the Confucian way from the growing influence of Buddhism.

Critics of Li Zehou's approach to Neo-Confucian thought might argue that it is unfairly reductive, treating Neo-Confucian thought as a kind of governing ideology that merely reinforced the existing order. In his defense, however, Li does offer an extended discussion of the Neo-Confucian project, which he treats largely as a single enterprise, downplaying the distinctions between the School of Principle, *Lixue*, and the School of Mind, *Xinxue*. He proceeds via comparisons with Kant, specifically on the idea of a foundational transcendental principle—such as the categorical imperative—that marked the intersection of a metaphysics of the human subject and human experience, and a practical code governing human action. The Neo-Confucians can be understood as undertaking a roughly analogous project: seeking foundational principles or laws that link the ethical to the most basic features of reality and human experience. They, however, came to a different conclusion from Kant, in that they did not locate the source of their governing abstractions or principles in some a priori feature of the human subject that transcends time and place; instead, its source lay in the workings of the universe and society, or in a human nature made manifest through engagement with the world.

In general, however, Li remains critical of Song-Ming Confucianism and argues that it constituted a regrettable departure from earlier Confucian philosophy and values. What was lost in its exaggerated concern for inner-directed refinement and moral consciousness was a meaningful concern with 'kingliness without'—that is, with the cultivation of the skills and habits required to govern the state and lead the people, as the Confucian exemplars of antiquity had been able to do. *The Analects* and the *Mencius* had treated both personal self-cultivation and virtuous rulership as two sides of the same coin, but Li believes that this duality had been lost in Neo-Confucian doctrines.

The Neo-Confucians' lack of serious engagement with the specific practical problems of the day, coupled with a misplaced confidence that quasi-religious self-cultivation would lead to practical effectiveness, were, Li argues, partly responsible for China's subsequent decline and the crisis of confidence in traditional Confucian society.

Li's critique of Neo-Confucianism is particularly interesting because it offers a nuanced response to the attack on Confucianism in the twentieth century—the claim that it was responsible for China falling into a state of disorder and vulnerability to foreign powers. Li's analysis of the Confucian tradition as a whole suggests that this claim is partly true and partly false. It is partly true in that Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism had a pernicious effect on Chinese bureaucrats, with the excessive concern with bookish learning and personal virtue leading to a state less able to respond to complex political problems and external threats. However, according to Li's analysis, Song-Ming Confucianism constituted a departure from earlier Confucian philosophy. Thus, while Neo-Confucianism might be connected to China's

social and political decline, the same accusation could not be made against classical Confucianism. This allows Li to defend the relevance of the Confucian tradition to a modernizing China, and to reject the view that the answer to China's malaise lay in its wholesale abandonment of Westernization.

Assessing Li Zehou's Scholarship

The breadth of Li's scholarly interests and the tendency for his ideas to evolve through successive iterations make simple assessments of his work difficult. Despite this, it is possible to sketch some of the ways in which Li has influenced present and future work on Chinese thought.

First, Li's work blends innovation with tradition. Li reenergized traditional Chinese thought by introducing Marxist and Kantian perspectives. He has sought to offer modern interpretations of traditional ideas, such as 'sageliness within and kingliness without' (*neisheng waiwang*), while affirming those aspects of the tradition he regarded as "rational and full of vitality" (p. 327). Perhaps the best illustration of this appeal to the modern to renew the ancient is his interpretation of *tianren heyi*, or the unity of humanity and the cosmos. Li provides a new conceptualization of this term, suited to the 'new' China of the post-1949 era. This was a society moving away from a stable conservative order and toward a more technologically and scientifically orientated worldview. In Li's interpretation, the external, *tian*, is understood as an array of material, technological, and social forces, while *ren* was the human subject expressed by Li's notion of subjectality. Unity arises as the human subject seeks to make the external forces more hospitable to human life, utilizing science and technology, while also being conditioned by and gradually accommodating to them.

This modern formal unity involves an understanding of human subjectivity or nature that differs from earlier accounts of *tianren heyi*. It features a richer inner psychological life, a less fatalistic approach to the external world and a greater interest in freedom, but it is also one that grasps and abides by the empirical laws that science reveals. In a comparative context, Li believes that this form of freedom is more mature than that posited by extreme forms of liberalism, which overemphasize an inner willfulness without due regard for the wider social and natural world.

Second, Li's work is also important for articulating a middle path between Westernization and conservatives who defend Chinese culture, seeking its preservation and insulation against Western influence. He is not unique among Chinese thinkers in trying to find a path between these, but his account of one such middle way is distinctive. It is rooted in his theory of sedimentation—the ideas and feelings through which the human subject understands the world as the product of an evolving historical and social milieu.

On the one hand, Li takes seriously the differences between cultural traditions and their role in the creation of human subjectivity; however, he does not defend the idea of a culture having an essence, something that must be preserved indefinitely. The open nature of the driving dialectical relationship between the human subject and its environment means that the cultural and psychological formation that comprises the Chinese tradition is always open to the absorption and accumulation of new practices and ideas, including those from outside of China. However, at the same time, such evolution is rooted in a distinct tradition of cultural transmission, stretching back to the clan systems and ritualized practices of Chinese antiquity. This includes the ideas through which subjects cognize the world and affectively experience it. As a result, doctrines that offer far-reaching and foundational claims about the nature of the world or the human subject, such as Christianity or liberalism, cannot become dominant in China in any simple way—for they can have influence only insofar as they fit with or can be integrated into existing categories and concepts that define the Chinese worldview at the present time. Such a nuanced position seems largely correct: there is a Chinese tradition that exerts a wide-ranging and coherent influence on an emerging Chinese modernity; but it is not monolithic or inert. New ideas or practices can become sedimented into the evolving cultural-psychological formation of the tradition. It is an open question whether the cultural-psychological formation of those in China and those outside will merge at some future point.

Li's approach thus offers a vision of a modernized Confucianism, one that is fitted for the challenges of contemporary society. Like other modernizing interpretations, it clearly distinguishes between elements of traditional thinking worthy of retention and those best left in the past. It is one account of how Confucianism in the twenty-first century can have meaning and relevance, alongside other scholarly accounts of Confucian thought—as pragmatic, as an ethics of virtue, as offering a meritocratic corrective to democracy, and so on.

Third, Li's work can also serve as a source of ideas for discussions beyond the Chinese tradition. In recent debates with Michael Sandel on the role of justice in the good society, for example, Li claims that harmony is a higher regulative ideal than justice.[5] Justice relies on reason and logical discourse to generate rules that order society, but Li seeks greater recognition for the role of the emotions in creating stable social arrangements. This suggests a confidence that an order emerges from the natural, social and historical realms that, if trusted and allowed to shape affective responses, can harmonize human actions and desires, as well as human relations and the relation between humans and the natural world. This source of order, however, is not always represented in explicit rational discourse and negotiation. Customary norms, for example, might be forms of life that instantiate such well-grounded emotional responses, even if no explicit rational justification for them is readily apparent. Li argues that insistence on the integration of reason and emotion is a feature of the Chinese philosophical tradition, in contrast to the sole focus on logical and propositional reasoning found in the tradition upon which Sandel draws. For Li,

the regulation of social morals and markets through both emotional and rational responses is, *pace* Sandel, the most secure way to protect the common good and bring about the good life for all.

Li's work also invites us to rethink the place of the aesthetic in everyday life. Mainstream Anglo-American aesthetics typically explores a narrow notion of beauty. Discussions concerning aesthetics are usually confined to areas of human conduct outside of the public realm and moral debate, and associated with escape from the everyday into a special realm of aesthetic experience. Such experiences arise, for example, in the disinterested contemplation of fine art or exquisite objects in museums and art galleries. Within Western theory there has been some criticism of such approaches, with John Dewey's *Art as Experience* the origin of many important criticisms of classical aesthetics.

Li's work on the place of beauty and aesthetic experience in human flourishing can enrich this emerging sub-discipline in contemporary Anglo-American aesthetics.[6] Li's theory suggests that the role of the aesthetic in setting the ends of human life and in guiding action is much broader. Aesthetic experience is a pervasive guiding force in everyday life, and this demands a more thoughtful exploration of the intersection between the aesthetic and the ethical.

Li offers the provocative suggestion that 'beautiful' aesthetic experience can itself play a defining role in what count as meaningful forms of life.[7] Echoing the figure of Confucius at 70 (*Analects* 2.4) who resided in feelings that reliably guided conduct, the creation of events that are aesthetically pleasing to all involved could be regarded as an ethical goal. This might be compared with the integration of all members of a community in a shared ritual event, where each finds a role in producing the event and draws delight and satisfaction from their contribution. The Confucian *junzi* or cultivated person has an important role here, in leading the group in the construction or invention of such social events.[8] Furthermore, a cultivated aesthetic sensibility might help to bridge the divide between areas of human life that are currently compartmentalized, such as work and leisure. It could provide guidance by, for example, helping to reform working conditions so as to yield greater aesthetic value, or by indicating what forms of labor or work are more aesthetically pleasing and so more worthwhile. An analysis of human conduct that starts from aesthetic experience is possible because Li believes that aesthetic experience is veridical, not subjective, being rooted in the external social world; and, also, he believes that the story of human evolution is one in which beauty (including harmony) eventually becomes the highest guiding ideal for human life. Li thus invites us to consider how the sensuous nature of human experience, rooted in shared and stable social practices, can be trusted to guide human action, on a more-or-less equal footing with the ideals of individual deliberation.

A Note About Translation

Finally, it is worthwhile to consider the role of translation in conveying Li Zehou's work. The oft-heard phrase 'Traduttore traditore' (roughly, 'the translator is a traitor') hints that translation is inevitably interpretation rather than a literal transmission of data from one language to another, and the present volume well illustrates this. It is particularly challenging since it interweaves classical Chinese language and details of ancient customs, modern Chinese thinkers, Western theorists, and a number of neologisms. This creates a variety of technical and philosophical difficulties.

For example, Li's own theoretical framework for understanding the Chinese tradition and its evolution raises questions about how to render Li's quotations from classical Chinese texts. The conventional approach would be to use established English translations for the passages he cites. Since Li is offering novel interpretations of many philosophical thinkers and schools, however, inserting standard translations might obscure his philosophical vision. In what follows, I have tried to make use of established translations by James Legge, Ames and Rosemont, Eric Hutton, and others, but modified these when necessary to reflect Li's philosophical framework. If no published translation seemed to fit, I offered my own translations. The priority has been to convey Li's distinctive readings of the early texts, even if this temporarily renders well-known passages unfamiliar.

There is also a historical question hanging over Li's work. In one sense, Li clearly intends his ideas to be understood as an ahistorical set of ideas that express a determinate logic or viewpoint. But the papers gathered here were written over an extended period of time, and Li's thinking has evolved over a long and distinguished career. For example, his early work on Kant has a more critical tone, while his later work conveys greater appreciation (see, for example, Li's *Zhexue Gangyao*). Also, later editions of the *A History of Classical Chinese Thought* feature changes in vocabulary, with language connected to the more doctrinaire aspects of Marx's theory of history removed—gone are references to a 'slave-based system' that form part of Marx's stages of historical development. Similarly, does Li's use of a phrase like '*zhutixing*' in this text carry the same connotations as its use does 20 years later, when it is translated using Li's own neologism 'subjectality'? A further question arises in response: should the translation reflect the views of Li Zehou at the time he wrote the book, or should it read like the views of the contemporary Li Zehou? It is not the reader's role to answer such questions, but it is helpful to keep in mind that the original text is a richer and more open work than any translation can capture.

Consider one final example of the philosophical issues at play below the surface of the finished translation. In translation theory, there is a tension between a commitment to express the author's or text's original vision, and the need for a text that speaks to a reader located in a specific social and historical milieu, one disconnected from the original text. The ideal translation satisfies all such demands; in practice the human translator must use his or her judgment to balance these demands. The keener the attempt to fully capture the author's original world that gave rise the text, the greater the risk of moving away from the contemporary

readers who are the raison d'être for any translation. Gayatri Spivak, for example, emphasizes the need to 'surrender' to texts and to the author's world.[9] Failure to do so produces texts that are 'safe'—grammatically accurate but failing to capture what was distinctive about the original. Others, however, such as Dongming Gu, have argued that the reader is the primary focus of translation.[10] Following post-structuralists such as Barthes, they agree that the author is 'dead,' and that each text is remade for a particular audience.

This tension is relevant to Chinese philosophical texts in general, and especially to a contemporary Chinese thinker such as Li Zehou. A prominent call among translators of Chinese philosophical texts has been to 'let the texts speak for themselves,' thereby avoiding the imposition of alien conceptual frameworks. In the case of the present volume, however, Li Zehou is using Western theorists such as Marx and Kant to offer innovative readings of the Chinese tradition. He is reevaluating the Chinese tradition, rather than offering a transmission of traditional views.

Accordingly, a different heuristic seems appropriate for this translation, which might be described as follows. Translations are inevitably situated in a particular historical moment, and this includes translations introducing modern Chinese thinkers to English-language readers. The historical and institutional context for such translation is that of universities—assuming most readers will be academics—and, in particular, academic departments such as philosophy. As a discipline, philosophy has proceeded largely in ignorance of non-Western traditions. As social and economic changes bring these traditions inescapably into view, however, and attention is paid to non-Western traditions, questions arise about the status of Chinese philosophical thought. One attitude found in philosophy departments is to doubt whether these works are really philosophy. If they are not, then they may be ignored.

In response to such context, a guiding aim of this translation has been to produce a text that speaks to these readers. In order to effectively introduce contemporary Chinese thought into such Anglophone philosophy departments, it is necessary to present their members with texts that, as far as possible, engage them. Engagement happens when those philosophers realize that the Chinese tradition is relevant to their own research and teaching. Clearly, *A History of Classical Chinese Thought* contains ideas, insights, and arguments that can be brought into dialogue with, and enrich, existing research in Anglophone departments, particularly in ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of history. The task of the translation is to make clear such connections. This means, for example, finding words both faithful to terms in the original text and also suggestive for the reader, connecting the text with more familiar ideas and debates. It also means taking care to avoid language or phrasing that obscures the conceptual and imaginative connections between the original text and existing or possible research programs.

Li's work is characterized by the boldness and suggestiveness of its vision and numerous thought-provoking claims and ideas. However, partly as a consequence of such a vast and ambitious syncretic project—integrating Kant, Confucius, and Marx—

and partly as a matter of personal style, Li—as he admits in the postscript—sometimes sketches a vision rather than fully exploring the implications of his ideas. It is the suggestiveness of these ideas, and the feeling that more can and should be said about them, that guide this translation; it aims to speak to contemporary Anglophone thinkers who are well-placed to expand and enrich Li's legacy.

Notes

1. John Zijiang Ding, "Li Zehou: Chinese Aesthetics from a Post-Marxist and Confucian Perspective," in *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*, edited by Chungying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 246.

2. For recent discussions of Li's work, see the collection of articles focusing on his work in *Philosophy East and West* 66.3 (2016) and 66.4 (2016). See also the dedicated issues of *Contemporary Chinese Thought*, 31.2 (1999), and *Philosophy East and West* 49.2 (1999); the latter focuses on Li's work in aesthetics.

3. For a detailed glossary containing many of Li's neologisms and key terms, see D'Ambrosio Carleo III, and Andrew Lambert, "On Li Zehou's Philosophy: An Introduction by Three Translators," *Philosophy East and West* 66.4 (2016): 1057–67. A useful recent collection of essays on Li's thought is *Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy*, edited by Roger T. Ames and Jinhua Jia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018).

4. Other recent translation of Li's work include: *A New Approach to Kant: A Confucian-Marxist's Viewpoint*, translated by Jeanne Haizhen Allen and Christopher Ahn, Singapore: Springer Nature, 2018; and *The Origins of Chinese Thought From Shamanism to Ritual Regulations and Humaneness*, translated by Robert Carleo III, Leiden: Brill, 2018.

5. Li Zehou, "A Response to Michael Sandel and Other Matters," *Philosophy East and West* 64.4 (2016): 1068–147.

6. See, for example, Sherri Irvin's, "The Pervasiveness of the Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48.1 (2008): 29–44, and Yuriko Saito's book *Everyday Aesthetics* (London: Oxford University Press, 2007).

7. See Li's three translated works on Chinese aesthetics, *The Path of Beauty* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), *The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), and *Four Essays on Aesthetics: Towards a Global View* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).

8. For an account of the creation of aesthetic social events as an ethical task, see Andrew Lambert, "Determinism and the Problem of Individual Freedom in Li Zehou," in *Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy*, edited by Roger T. Ames and Jinhua Jia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018), 94–117.

9. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "The Politics of Translation" in *Outside in the Teaching*

Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), 179–200.

10. Mingdong Gu, preface, *Translating China for Western Readers: Reflective, Critical and Practical Essays* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016).

1
Reevaluating Confucius

A great deal of scholarly work has been done on Confucius (551 BCE–479 BCE), yet much divergence in opinion remains. An important reason for this divergence is a lack of clear understanding about the societal changes taking place around the time of Confucius, which has resulted in myriad interpretations of the nature and significance of Confucius' ideas. Exploring the characteristics of that society is not possible in this work, which can only analyze some of Confucius' ideas. These ideas include multiple mutually intersecting and reinforcing elements and dimensions, which gave rise to a *cultural-psychological formation* (*wenhua xinli jiegou* 文化 心理 结构) that has exerted tremendous influence on the Chinese people.

How to accurately grasp and describe this formation is perhaps the key to understanding Confucius. The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods were marked by a transition from a nascent patriarchal clan system, which preserved the traditions of clan-based society, to a developed system of regional states. Although Confucius' thought was an expression of certain aspects of clan and aristocratic society during this time of unprecedented change, its relative independence and stability meant that the cultural-psychological formation initiated by Confucius endured through the ages and continued to develop.

The Characteristics of 'Ritual'

Regardless of which school of thought a scholar belongs to, it is difficult to deny that Confucius vigorously maintained and defended the codified ritual tradition of the Zhou dynasty (*Zhouli* 周禮). The *Analects* mentions ritual or ritualized practice (*li* 禮) numerous times, clearly expressing Confucius' dismay at the decay of ritual in his social world, and demanding that people restore and abide by many aspects of the Zhou ritual tradition.

So, what is the Zhou ritual tradition? The general consensus is that it is a set of decrees, institutions, norms, and rules of etiquette or protocol that were fixed in the early Zhou dynasty. It might be characterized as the standardization and systematization of one kind of clan governance, which was itself based on primitive shamanistic ceremonies. As part of the nascent patriarchal clan system of the later

Shang and the Zhou dynasties, it remained bound up with multiple aspects of clan and kinship life, and its structure and ideology were a direct extension of earlier primitive culture. What follows is a description of some of the characteristics of the Zhou ritual tradition.

On the one hand, there were clear and strict rules of order, which involved ordered hierarchies of seniority, class, status, and age, with the primitive clan ceremonies that previously included all in society being monopolized by small numbers of nobility. On the other hand, because the basic economic structure inherited the social structure of communal clan-based society, this set of ceremonies and rituals preserved a degree of primitive democratic and populist spirit. It is possible to find traces of this in the *Yili* 儀禮, a text which became known as the *Book of Rites* and was transmitted to the Han dynasty as the first of the three texts on ritual. The first chapter of the *Yili*, "The Capping of the Scholar Ceremony" (*shiguan li* 士冠禮), constituted an extension and modification of the ceremonies in earlier clan society that marked coming of age and the entry into society. For example, "Drinking Rituals in Country Districts" (*Xiangyinjiu li* 鄉飲酒禮) emphasized great respect for elders, and the *Book of Rites* described this differential treatment for men of different ages as follows:

> 60 year-olds are seated, 50 year-olds stand in waiting and listen to the orders of government. This is how respect for the aged is made clear. 60 years gets three dishes, 70 gets four, 80 gets five, 90 gets six; this is how nourishing the elderly is made manifest. The people knowing respect for the aged and nourishing the old is the beginning of filial and fraternal conduct.[1]

From this it is clear that filial piety and fraternal responsibility presume respect for seniority. I agree with Yang Kuan's view, that this kind of ritualized respect for seniority was not just a rite of respecting elders at a drinking party.[2] Rather, it showed the characteristics of a primitive assembly, with a particular role in the structuring of political authority in ancient China. Both within and beyond China, many early clans had this kind of assembly. For example, among the Ewenki people in China, "for the past sixty plus years, at each level of the community, some important matters would be discussed and resolved through a '*Wulileng*' 烏力楞 assembly. This assembly was mainly made up of elderly males and females from each family, and the longer a man's beard the greater his authority."[3] The '*Pinli*' 聘禮 (betrothal gifts) and '*Sheli*' 射禮 (archery etiquette) chapters of the *Yili*, among others, also can all be traced back to various rites and shamanistic activity associated with clan society.[4] Each chapter of the *Yili* described highly specific rites, and these could not be fabricated by later generations; nor were they meaningless literary flourishes; as primitive rites, their original form had an important social function. It was through such primitive ritual activity that ancient clans bound the collective together and created unity. Such social order and convention were instrumental to economic production and daily life and underpinned the entire society's survival and success.

As a result, these rituals had, for each clan member, great power to compel and restrict, much as law had in later times. In effect, the rituals constituted a kind of unwritten common law. By the time of the later Shang and the Zhou dynasties, the rites and ceremonies that functioned as common law gradually became the exclusive preserve of the clan nobility.[5] Confucius' attitude to the Zhou ritual tradition was consistent with his defense of this system of clan government and the primitive ritual preserved by it. For example, Confucius and Mencius consistently 'revere elders': "In his ancestral village he was most deferential as though almost at a loss for words";[6] "When drinking wine in his village, he would wait for those with canes to depart before leaving";[7] "In the world there are three objects of the highest respect, rank, age and virtue."[8]

'Ritual' is a capacious term, but its origins and core meaning is respect for and sacrifice to ancestors. Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877–1927) wrote:

> The vessel holding jades, presented to deities or ancestors during ceremonies, were known as *li* 豐 (vessel); by analogy, the wine used for sacrifice to deities were also called *li* 醴 [the character *li* 豐 with a wine radical added]. Further, offerings to deities were known as *li* 禮 or ritual [the character *li* 豐, with a deity radical added].[9]

Similarly, Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978) wrote:

> The character for ritual came later. In the bronze inscriptions, we sometimes see the use of the character *li* 豐. Based on the composition of the character, it was a vessel that contained luxuriant stringed jade and was used for offerings to the spirits. The "precious shells and jade" reference in the 'Pan Geng' 盤庚 chapter of the *Shangshu* 尚書 should be understood in this way, thus confirming the original meaning of the character for ritual. The ritual was possibly generated from sacrifices to deities, and therefore the character for deity was combined with the character for vessel to form the character for ritual. Later, its meaning was extended to include people, and later still it expanded to include all rituals for auspicious and inauspicious affairs, as well as military matters and banquets.[10]

It is thus clear that the distinguishing feature of the Zhou ritual tradition was that it took primitive rituals and ceremonies, centered on sacrifices to ancestral spirits, and remade, systematized, and expanded them.[11] They were transformed into a set of governing customary laws and regulations (a system of rites with legalistic force).[12] The backbone of these laws and regulations was a hierarchical system of kinship and patrilineal succession, which was extended outward through a political and economic system based on enfeoffment, inheritance, the well-field system, and patriarchal clan rules. As for the Confucians or Ruists, represented by figures such as Confucius, they emerged from among the organizers and leaders of primitive rituals and shamanic practices—the shamans, officials, and scribes—to become the expert overseers and preservers of what was to become Confucian ritual and ceremony.

Late Qing scholar Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1869–1936), also known as Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 wrote, "In the earliest times, humans were governed by shaman-officials."[13] Zhang believed that Confucians originally were 'shaman-officials'

(*shushi* 術士, a term also used by Zhang's teacher, Yu Yue 俞樾 [1821–1907]) and were in charge of ritual and helping the ruler to accord with yin and yang forces in order to teach and transform the people. This meant that they were important figures both religiously and politically.[14] The great Confucian figures of antiquity, such as Emperor Shun's minister Gao Yao 皋陶, Shang minister Yi Yin 伊尹 and the Duke of Zhou 周公 were all such shaman-officials, serving as both overseers of ritual and auxiliary rulers. The later Confucian idealization of a 'prime minister' (*zaixiang* 宰相) who helped the emperor rule the empire originated from this earlier role.[15]

Qing scholar Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738–1801) believed that men of virtue learned from the sages and the sages learned from the common people,[16] and that the great synthesizing figure was not Confucius but the Duke of Zhou. Moreover, "The greatness of Confucius was that, in studying the Zhou ritual code, he could capture its essence in a single phrase."[17] It was not Confucius but the Duke of Zhou who comprehensively sorted, remolded, and standardized the primitive rituals of high antiquity up to the Shang dynasty. At the time this was a hugely important transformation. Wang Guowei argues in *Yinzhou zhidu lun* (*On the Institutions of Shang and Zhou*)[18] that Confucius repeatedly emphasized that he "loved the ancients but did not innovate";[19] "followed the Zhou";[20] and "dreamed of the Duke of Zhou,"[21] indicating that he intended to preserve the Duke of Zhou's legacy in toto. The following passages also show Confucius upholding a 'governing by ritual' that is founded upon customary norms that require trust or faith:[22] "A ritual vessel that is not a ritual vessel, ah, a ritual vessel indeed!";[23] "Ji has established eight lines of dancers in the court. If this is tolerated, what cannot be tolerated?";[24] "You begrudge the sheep, and I the ritual";[25] "If the way consists of law and use of punishments to order them, people might follow the law but lack a sense of shame. If led by virtue (*de*),[26] and ordered by means of ritual, then the people will have a sense of shame and act with propriety";[27] "All men must die but if there is no trust in the ruler, he cannot survive."[28]

However, Confucius' era was already one in which ritual and ceremonial music were in decline. The clan system of government and collectivist social structures were collapsing.[29] In the Spring and Autumn period, many clan-based states were wiped out and many nobles could not hold on to their inherited status; some fell into poverty and some undertook minor civic duties. Some of the clan nobility abandoned old conventions and focused on land and private enterprise, forming a new rising class and quickly becoming powerful and wealthy. Han Fei 韓非 (ca. 280 BCE–233 BCE) commented, "the partition of Jin and the conquest of Qi were both the result of the great wealth of their many ministers."[30] Great economic power led them to seize political authority and to pursue mergers and annexations in military affairs, all of which lead to the complete collapse of the traditional Zhou ritual system of control that emerged from the tribal alliances among clans—with the emperor at the apex, the feudal lords below in the regions, and ministers and officials at all levels.[31] Blatant oppression and exploitation, and the advocating of warfare, removed the veil of tender-hearted 'ritual propriety' and 'virtue' from that layer of society, and made

plain the maintenance of an ideology and political logic of oppressive exploitation.[32] The Legalist school of thought, from Guan Zhong 管仲 (ca. 723 BCE–645 BCE) to Han Fei, steadily gained the ascendency.

During this period of turbulent change, Confucius was clearly on the side of the conservatives and reactionaries. His political posturing was manifested in the maintenance of order, based on ritual and his opposition to politics and penal code. In addition, in terms of economy, he advocated the continuation of economic structures already entrenched in society, and would rather have uniform poverty than too great a division between rich and poor. This was to avoid destroying the original clan and administrative structures ("What is fearful is not that the people are poor, but that wealth is unequally distributed, not that they are few in number but are discontent").[33] Opposition to the pursuit of wealth (amassed by taxation) and to the harm to the established order between ruler-minister and father-son, and to the personal honor of clan nobles, became key ideas of Confucius:

> The Master said, "Wealth and social eminence are things that all people desire, and yet unless they are acquired in the proper way I will not abide them. Poverty and disgrace are things that all people hate, and yet unless they are avoided in the proper way I will not despise them."[34]
>
> A true gentleman is one who has set his heart upon the way. A fellow who is ashamed merely of shabby clothing or modest meals is not even worth conversing with.[35]
>
> The head of the Ji family was richer than the Duke of Zhou had been, and yet Qiu collected his imposts for him, and increased his wealth. The Master said, "He is no disciple of mine. My young friends, beat the drum and assail him."[36]
>
> The Master said, "Even in my early days, a historiographer would leave a blank in his text, and he who had a horse would lend him to another to ride. Now, alas, there are no such things."[37]
>
> The Master said, "Dressed in a tattered robe quilted with hemp, yet standing by the side of men dressed in furs, and not ashamed—ah! it is You who is equal to this!"[38]

These passages all reflect clan nobility who had lost their wealth and fallen on hard times. Although Confucius traveled everywhere, striving to restore the ritual system of Zhou, he was frustrated. History inexorably moved on, from the early patriarchal clan system to the later more advanced system of regional states. This was a great leap forward in the society. On the back of this, the glorious civilizations of the Warring States appeared, and, later, the Qin and Han empires flourished. At the same time, however, the large number of primitive ritual practices preserved by the patriarchal clan system were lost, including various democratic and humanistic remnants integral to the clans, as well as the populist regimes of many small and mid-sized city states of clans in the Spring and Autumn period. History always entails the playing out of such tragic contradictions. Engels wrote:

> Since the exploitation of one class by another is the basis of civilization, its development moves in a continuous contradiction. Every advance in production is at the same time a regression in the condition of the oppressed class, that is, of the great majority.[39]

Engels was referring to capitalism's increasing use of machinery. But primitive society's advance to a class society was an even better illustration of this logic. The advance of society, increases in production and in wealth, come at the cost of the majority of people making great sacrifices. For example, in primitive society and in class society, wars are often an important factor in the advancement of history, and yet they bring regret, protest, opposition to the suffering that war brings, and a popular clamor for justice.[40]

Both sides are often reasonable, and thus we can say that this is an irresolvable and tragic historical paradox.[41] The new emerging class in China, made powerful by wealth, suppressed the ritualized governance of the clan nobles. It treated agriculture and warfare as a foundation, established an unsentimental rule of law, boldly practiced oppressive exploitation, replaced the populist spirit of the clan nobles with the authoritarian control of a ruler, and brought about the collapse of the outdated form of clan governance based on the male head of household. When these happened, they represented reason and progress in history. However, on the other hand, the opposite side also possessed a certain rationality and popular spirit. This view included: lamenting the final collapse of the clan system; opposing the relentless spread of wars of conquest; dreaming of the return to an ancient 'Golden Age' with less oppressive exploitation; attempting to preserve a system of governance which were relatively tolerant of clan members; and dissatisfaction with, renouncement of, and attacks on shameless exploitative oppression.[42] The relation between history, reality, and people is often one of complexity and contradiction. Trying to assess all these in terms of a simplistic 'good versus bad' is contrived and a failure to accord with reality. Confucius' upholding of the rituals of Zhou was conservative and backward, and even reactionary (being against the flow of history), but his thought was proto-democratic and popular in that he opposed a cruel exploitation and extortion, and sought to uphold and revive an ancient system of clan government that was relatively mild. Confucius' teachings about humaneness were thus founded upon these kinds of contradictory foundations.

The Formation of Confucian Humaneness (*Ren*)

The majority of Confucian scholars recognize that the most important category of Confucian thought is not ritual but humaneness (*ren*).[43] The former implies compliance; the latter indicates creation. Although the character *ren* 仁 had been around for a long time, Confucius was the first person to place in at the center of a system of thought. So, what is *ren*?

The character *ren* (仁) appears over 100 times in the *Analects*. Its meaning is broad and varied, so no single explanation will capture its full meaning. The past 2,000 years have not yielded a definitive account and, moreover, later interpreters have

each read their own meaning into the term and offered different interpretations. By grounding an interpretation in particular phrases from the *Analects*, it is possible to derive mutually opposed accounts of *ren*: "*Ren* is to love others" versus "To overcome oneself and return to ritual propriety, this is *ren*." Among the 100 appearances of the term in the text, determining which is the most important or accurate gloss and taking this as the touchstone for understanding the rest is problematic and not necessarily the right approach. The sum of the parts does not equal the whole, and so when an organic whole forms, it gains its own distinctive characteristics. Confucius' idea of *ren* had a similarly holistic quality. Its constitutive parts entail, permeate, and regulate each other. Accordingly, the parts are self-regulating, mutually interchangeable, and relatively stable. This enabled *ren* to absorb or rebut frequent challenges to its integrity and endure over time as a coherent idea. Thus, it became a distinctive mode of thought and a cultural-psychological formation (*wenhua-xinli jiegou* 文化心理結構), one that left a deep imprint on the emerging Han culture.[44]

There were four features of *ren* that generated this mode of thought and its philosophical structure. These were i. a foundation in bloodline and kinship, ii. psychological principles or regularities, iii. humanism, and iv. personal character. A more general characteristic, and a fifth feature, was practical rationality. There are many complex questions regarding this framework that require detailed study, but this work can present only an initial account of the issues and offer a tentative hypothesis.

i. A Foundation in Bloodline and Kinship

Confucius talked about humaneness when explaining ritual propriety, so it was directly relevant to the upholding of ritual propriety. As described earlier, ritual propriety was based on blood relationships and served a system of clan governance based on hierarchy. To maintain or revive it is the fundamental aim of 'humaneness.' Therefore:

> It is rare for someone who is filial to parents and deferential to elders to be found of defying authority. There has never been a person who was not fond of defying authority and yet initiated rebellion. Cultivated people concentrate on the root, and one the root is established, then the way grows. As for the filial and deferential person, isn't this the root of being fully human?[45]
>
> "Why do you not serve in government?" Confucius replied: "What does the *Book of Documents* say about filial piety? Being filial and friendly towards brothers is carrying out the work of government. In doing this I am employed in governing. What else is government?"[46]
>
> A young man should be filial at home and respectful to elders when out in the world, diligent and sincere, broadly love the multitude, and stay close to virtue.[47]
>
> When the cultivated person is diligent towards his intimates, then the common people are inspired to be humane.[48]

Bearing in mind Mencius' comments that "Affection for parents is humaneness"[49] and "The fruit of *ren* is service to parents,"[50] it is clear that *ren* strongly implies consanguineal bonds. Filial piety (*xiao*)[51] and fraternal deference or brotherly respect (*ti*) structured the clan system and its hierarchy around both vertical (filial) and horizontal (fraternal) biological ties. From antiquity to the Zhou dynasty, this was the core of the patriarchal clan system of rulership (and was the meaning of the Zhou ritual tradition or *Zhouli*); it also constituted the politics of the time (hence Confucius' comment that to be filial is to engage in government) and is also captured by the traditional Confucian call to "cultivate the person, order the family, rule the nation and bring peace to the empire." What was referred to as '*jia*' (家)—often translated as family—during the Warring States and by the Confucians of the time was not the individual household or extended family of later periods but the clans and tribes that were similar to the idea of a nation (*guo*).[52] The phrase bring peace to the empire also included the entire network of clans (presided over by enfeoffed noblemen), larger clan groupings or tribes (governed by feudal lords) and tribal alliances (under the control of the emperor).[53]

Only in this way can we understand Confucius' comment "Serve your father in the household and serve your ruler beyond," or Mencius' claim that "The root of the empire is the nation, the root of the nation is the household, and the household is rooted in the person." Note also Confucius' statements, such as "Revive embattled states, restore disrupted family lineages, raise up men of talent,"[54] which are echoed by Mencius:

> Release captives, young and old; do not take any more vessels from conquered states; discuss the important matters with the people of Yan; appoint a ruler for them and then withdraw the troops.[55]

This was a call to revive the earlier authority of the clan-based tribal states. Confucius took filial piety and fraternal deference as the grounds of humaneness; he took affection for the extended family and respect for the elders as the standard for humaneness; he upheld the hierarchical tradition that recognized paternal authority in the clan; and he opposed the separation of politics and the penal code from ritual propriety and virtue.[56] All of these were concrete reflections of ancient historical facts. As Engels wrote, "In view of the decisive part played by consanguinity in the social structure of all savage and barbarian peoples, the importance of a system so widespread cannot be dismissed with phrases."[57]

At a time when clan society and kinship relations were collapsing, Confucius picked up consanguineal ties and historical traditions and promoted them as a philosophical position. He offered a clear political explanation of blood and kinship relations and the hierarchical system, which shaped the organization of society and transcended the biological world and frameworks derived from it. He thereby extracted the features of clan society from its particular historical confines, and highlighted their universal and long-lasting social significance. This was hugely

important. In particular, he identified a direct connection between them and derivative psychological norms, and connected them to an even wider set of considerations.

ii. Ritual Propriety Initiated Externally

Li originally referred to a collection of customary norms, ceremonies, rituals, and magic that functioned as an external constraint for people. *Analects* phrases such as "filial piety at home, fraternal deference outside" originally indicated this kind of unreflective ritual. For example, the empire-wide mourning rituals promoted by Confucius and Mencius (such as the three years of mourning prescribed in *Analects* 17.21) were long-established traditional ritual practices that people were required to respect and follow.[58] Accordingly, during an era in which ritual and music had lost their relevance and power, suspicion and opposition to this collection of traditional rituals and ceremonies (and so to the clan system of government) were widespread. It was also at that time that new understandings and explanations of ritual began to emerge. Among these, some thought that ritual was not merely a collection of external ritual forms and practices to be blindly followed, but ought to include a focus on the intrinsic qualities of ritual. For example:

> Zi Dashu had an interview with Zhao Jianzi and was asked by him about rituals of bowing, yielding precedence, and moving from one position to another. "These," said Zi Dashu, "are matters of deportment and not of ritual."
>
> "Allow me to ask," said Zhao Jianzi, "what we are to understand by ceremonies?"
>
> "Ritual is the regular warp and weft of the Heavens, the duties of the Earth, and the behavior of the people…. Since people lose their nature ritual is therefore used to support that nature. There were the six domestic animals, the five beasts [of the chase], and the three [classes of] sacrifice to support the five flavors. There were the nine [emblematic] ornaments [of robes], with their six colors and five methods of display, to maintain the five colors. There were the nine songs, the eight airs, the seven sounds, and the six pitch-pipes, to maintain the five notes. The responsibilities of ruler and minister, high and low, followed the characteristics of the Earth. For both husband and wife, as well as within the home and the outside world, there were separate spheres of affairs. Father and son, elder and younger brother, aunt and sister, maternal uncles and aunts, father-in-law, the relation of one's children their mother's family, and brothers-in-law—all were illuminated by images from the Heavens. There were duties of government and administration, services especially for the people, [legislative] vigor, the force of conduct, and attention to what was required by the times—all accorded with the phenomena of the four seasons…. For grief there are mourning and crying; for joy, songs and dancing; for pleasure, beneficence; for anger, fighting and contests. Pleasure is born of love, and anger of hatred. Therefore [the sage kings] were careful judges of conduct and sincere in their orders; they apportioned misery and happiness, rewards and punishments, to regulate the people in life and death."[59]

This passage makes clear that ritual is not merely ceremony, though it also proves

that they were not initially distinguished, and both were an extension of primitive religious ceremonies and shamanistic practices.[60] In contrast, contemporary Confucianism distinguishes the two, and strives to articulate the inherent qualities of ritual. At that time, ritual was already explicitly acknowledged as providing social norms, which included important political order; it was no longer simply a capacious and varied assortment of primitive ceremonies.

The preceding passage also suggests that the understanding of ritual as political order and social standards started from natural human sensitivity to taste, sight, sound, and smell, as well as happiness, anger, sorrow, and joy. Governing norms could not be separated from a human interest in food, sex, attraction, and aversion.

That being so, an additional issue arises: what is the 'human nature' that functions as a foundation here? Confucius' answer to his disciple Zaiwo's question about three years of mourning captures his thinking:

> Zaiwo said, "The three-year mourning period for the death of parents is too long. If cultivated persons were, for three years, to give up observing ritual propriety then the rituals would be ruined. If for three years they give up the performing of music, then musical practice would collapse. The old grain has been used up and the new crop is ready for harvest. The different woods used for making fire have gone through their full cycle—surely a year is enough (for mourning one's parents)?" The Master replied, "Would you be comfortable eating fine rice and wearing colorful garments?" "I would," replied Zaiwo. "If you are comfortable, then do it," said Confucius. "When cultivated persons are in mourning, it is because they find no pleasure in fine food, no pleasure in the sound of music, and no comfort in their usual lodgings; hence they do not shorten the mourning period to a single year. But if you are comfortable with this then, indeed, enjoy them."
>
> When Zaiwo had left, Confucius said, "Zaiwo is truly inhumane. If it only after being cared for by parents for three years that an infant can finally leave their bosom. The ritual of three-years of mourning for parents is practiced throughout the empire. Certainly Zaiwo received his three years of loving care from his parents!"[61]

Re-interpreting 'ritual' so that it accorded with his approach as a whole, Confucius attributed the traditional ritual practice of three years of mourning to the intelligible everyday love of parent and child; he directly related the foundations of ritual to psychological need. In this way, he defined all ritualized consanguineal bonds in terms of filial piety and fraternal deference, with these grounded in the everyday love between parent and child. This was to explain the external trappings of ritual and ceremony in terms of inner personal need, and to elevate seemingly rigid and oppressive norms to the level of self-conscious ideals for living. A religious and mysterious matter was transformed into everyday emotions, thereby melding together ethics, norms and psychological desire. Ritual was humanized by acquiring this internal psychological ground, and the psychological norms noted previously became the basic structure of human consciousness. These changes—from spirits or gods being the defining authority to people's inner drives and self-consciousness, and from obedience to these spirits to obedience to people and oneself—marked a new era in ancient Chinese thought.

Confucius' account of ritual was free from lofty and obtuse reasoning or mysterious doctrines, and was better suited to everyday life than to the aforementioned account of ritual in the *Zuozhuan*. It possessed a general plausibility and a practical efficacy. The important point here is that Confucius did not link human emotion and psychology to the worship of external objects or to some ethereal realm, but integrated them into the world of human relations in which the parent-child relationship was key. He created a unified whole in which the three elements of religion—concepts, sentiment, and ceremony—merged with and permeated commonsense ethics and everyday psychology; none of this was built on esoteric theology or faith.[62] This, combined with other elements, meant that Confucianism was not a religion but could perform the function and role of religion—something rare in the history of the cultures of the world.[63] The defining feature of Confucian culture and the doctrine of humaneness was that it did not establish an external system based on mysticism and faith but presented a realistic model of ethics and psychology.

Precisely because concepts, emotions, and ceremony (actions) were determined by, and found fulfillment in, the ethics and psychology of everyday life, so the psychological norms therein were derived from the ordinary sensibilities of normal people, and this enabled the doctrine of humaneness to consistently avoid the suppression of desire found in religious asceticism. Confucius did not have a concept of original sin and forbidden desire and, on the contrary, affirmed the reasonableness of ordinary desire and the reasonable guidance provided by it. Upholding the legitimacy of normal everyday living and the needs of both body and mind meant that religious renunciation of the world was avoided, as well as pessimism about lived reality. Confucianism and Confucian thought's active engagement with this world and its commitment to psychological norms were two sides of the same coin.

In addition, since humaneness emphasized this internal psychological foundation, it occupied a much more important position than ceremony and also made the idea of ritual subordinate to it. Confucius originally used humaneness to explain ritual so as to revive its status, and yet the process became more important than that goal. The humaneness 'discovered' and promoted by Confucius, i.e., the human psychological foundation, actually became the essential idea: the external blood links (expressed in ritual) yielded to the inner mental world of humaneness. Thus, the *Analects* declares, "What has a person who is not humane got to do with ritual? What has a person who is not human go to do with music?";[64] "In referring time and again to ritual, how could I just be talking about gifts of jade and silk? And in referring time and again to making music, how could I just be talking about bells and drums?";[65] "In observing ritual propriety, it is better to be modest than extravagant; in mourning, it is better to express real grief than to worry over formal details";[66] "Those today who are filial are considered so because they are able to provide for their parents. But even dogs and horses are given that much care. If you do not respect your parents, what is the difference?"[67]

Here, both external form (ceremony and its props such as jade, silks, bells, and

drums) and external matters (i.e., the practice of ritual) are subordinated and secondary. What is essential and primary is the person's internal ethical and psychological state, which might also be called human nature. Mencius later greatly developed this embryonic viewpoint. As a result, this second, inner aspect of humaneness is of a very different order from the first (which stresses blood ties and fraternal deference), and further removed from traditional ritual and ceremony. It's more tentative and abstract (compared to the explicit clan system of organization), and yet also more concrete and practical, since human psychology is susceptible to being molded.

iii. Humanism

Grounded in these affective psychological regularities, the external trappings of this doctrine of humaneness were the proto-democratic and humanistic aspects of the primitive clan system. The classical lexicon *Shuowen Jiezi* gloss reads, "*Ren* comes from the character for person (*ren* 人) and the character for two (*er* 二), and means people's kinship." This corroborates the Mencius comments that "To be humane is to be human," and "Honor old people as we do our own aged parents, and care for other's children as one's own." This interpretation of humaneness orthodox from the Han dynasty is thus highly credible. This meant the extending of concern from nearest and dearest to other people, the extension of love from preferential, graded love to a broad love for the multitude, and the growth from affection toward parents (among close blood ties of clan nobility) to humane conduct toward the population (all clans, tribes, and freemen involved in tribal alliances). However, the so-called barbarian tribes (those outside the tribal alliances) took kinship duties and social hierarchy as basic and demanded that all members of the clan or tribe strictly observe social hierarchy and establish a kind of broad love or affection in relations with others. The Confucian approach strongly emphasized the human disposition toward sociality and interaction, and the internal order, harmony, mutual help, and adjustment found within clans; these were, in turn, based on distinctions of greater and lesser authority, noble and common, young and old. This kind of 'primitive humanism' was the outward manifestation of Confucius' doctrine of humaneness. Confucius rarely conveyed any animosity; on the contrary in the *Analects* we find the following passages: "Care for others";[68] "Make the elderly content, create trust among friends, and cherish the young";[69] "In enacting government, what need is there for killing?";[70] "If tolerant, you will win over the multitude … if generous you will be able to make use of others";[71] "The Master said of Zi Chan, 'in nourishing the people, he was generous'";[72] "If the people have plenty, you will not be left to want alone. If the people are in want, you cannot enjoy plenty alone";[73] "To put the people to death without having instructed them—this is called cruelty. To expect a job to be finished without having first given notice—this is called oppression";[74] "The Master asked, 'Was anyone hurt?' He did not inquire about the horses";[75] "The Duke of She

asked about government. The Master said, 'Good government obtains, when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far off are attracted'";[76] "All the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract [distant populations]";[77] "The people from all quarters will come to him, bearing their children on their backs—what need has he of a knowledge of farming?"[78]

These passages make clear that Confucius' political and economic proposals involved strenuously upholding a hierarchical order featuring superiors and inferiors, noble and common, which constituted the clan-based system of rule. These passages also show that Confucius' outlook remained rooted in a primitive democracy and humanism, which were staunchly opposed to excessive and cruel exploitation. This is also the outlook expressed by the Doctrine of the Mean (*Zhongyong* 中庸). Both historically and today, explanations of the doctrine of the mean abound, but I believe that the inscription on a Warring States bronze recently excavated from a Zhongshan tomb—"taxes were appropriate, and the common people followed"[79]—expresses the essence of Confucius' way: preserving a tender-minded clan-based form of primitive democracy and humanism, while also implementing class-based rule.

This humanistic dimension of *ren* is significant. It shows that humaneness tied together the whole of society through shared benefits and cost (including clans, tribes and alliances, as well as men of service at the level of the fiefs, feudal lords in the feudal states, and the emperor as head of the empire). It also became an important standard for quantifying *ren*. Thus, although Confucius in the *Analects* was greatly unhappy at Guan Zhong's overstepping of his authority with regard to ritual and ceremonial propriety, and accused him of not understanding ritual, he nevertheless approved of Guanzhong's understanding of humaneness:

> "Did Guan Zhong know the rules of propriety?" The Master said, "The princes of states have a screen intercepting the view at their gates. Guan had likewise a screen at his gate. The princes of states on any friendly meeting between two of them, had a stand on which to place their inverted cups. Guan had also such a stand. If Guan knew the rules of propriety, who does not know them?"[80]
>
> Zi Lu said, "The Duke of Huan caused his brother Jiu to be killed, when Shao Hu died with his master, but Guan Zhong did not die. May not I say that he was wanting in virtue?" The Master said, "Duke Huan assembled all the princes together, and not with weapons of war and chariots—it was all through the influence of Guan Zhong. What sort of humaneness was this? What sort of humaneness was this?"[81]
>
> Zi Gong said, "Guan Zhong, I apprehend, was wanting in virtue. When the Duke of Huan caused his brother Jiu to be killed, Guan Zhong was not able to die with him. Moreover, he became prime minister to Huan." The Master said, "Guan Zhong acted as prime minister to the Duke of Huan, who made him leader of all the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present day, the people enjoy the gifts which he conferred. But for Guan Zhong, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoning on the left side. Will you require from him the small fidelity of common men and common women, who would commit suicide in a stream or ditch, no one knowing anything about them?"[82]