STUDIES IN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT

Martin Heidegger

BASIC CONCEPTS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

TRANSLATED BY **Richard Rojcewicz**



This book is a publication of

Indiana University Press
601 North Morton Street
Bloomington, IN 47404-3797 USA

http://iupress.indiana.edu

Telephone orders 800-842-6796
Fax orders 812-855-7931
Orders by e-mail iuporder@indiana.edu

Published in German as Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, volume 22:
Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie,
edited by Franz-Karl Blust

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976.
[Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. English]
Basic concepts of ancient philosophy / Martin Heidegger ;
translated by Richard Rojcewicz.
p. cm. — (Studies in Continental thought)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN-13: 978-0-253-34965-1 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Philosophy, Ancient. I. Title.
B113.H4513 2008
180—dc22
2007016095

1 2 3 4 5 13 12 11 10 09 08

CONTENTS

Translator's Foreword

This book is a translation of a lecture course Martin Heidegger offered in the summer semester 1926 at the University of Marburg. The German original appeared posthumously in 1993 (with a second edition in 2004) as volume 22 of Heidegger's collected works (*Gesamtausgabe*).

The date of the course places it at a time when Heidegger was completing the last of the published divisions of his magnum opus, *Being and Time.* His work on that book affected both the content and form of these lectures. The content of the course, besides illuminating the ancient thinkers, also sheds light on many of the central concepts of *Being and Time* and shows how these have roots in the basic concepts of ancient philosophy itself. On the other hand, the close connection to *Being and Time* had a deleterious effect on the form of the lectures as we have them. What we possess are precisely lecture *notes,* the notes Heidegger wrote for himself and referred to in his oral delivery. He did not, beforehand or afterward, elaborate them into full sentences. The pressing need to complete *Being and Time* precluded it. Thus the main part of the present text is in style almost always sketchy and at times even cryptic.

To eke out these inchoate notes, the editor of the volume has appended excerpts from student transcriptions of the lectures as actually delivered by Heidegger. The editor did not weave this material from the students into the main text, because the transcriptions were not officially approved by Heidegger. Thus the transcriptions must be approached with caution, but that they stem from Heidegger is beyond doubt: as he himself once remarked regarding some passages of disputed authenticity in Aristotle, "No student could write like that." The appended texts provide the required elaboration of the lecture notes, and if I may offer a word of advice to the reader, it is to take up the various transcriptions and supplements exactly at the place they attach to the main text (as indicated in footnotes), rather than all at once at the end. Otherwise, the notes will seem like an overture with-

out the opera, an announcement of motifs without development, and the transcriptions like an opera without the overture.

The present translation is a complete English version of the German of the *Gesamtausgabe* edition. In fact, it is more. The work is heavily laden with Greek (and some Latin) terms and quotations, and very many of these are left untranslated. I have provided, and inserted into the text, within brackets, an English translation of all this untranslated Greek (and Latin) material. For recurring Greek terms, I have translated them in the text only the first time they appear but have compiled a glossary of them, to be found at the end of the volume. I attempted to provide a translation of the Greek which would be consistent with Heidegger's interpretation of the ancient authors. In a few instances, I found, in other volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe,* Heidegger's own translations of Greek passages he also cites here. In the other cases, I tried to take inspiration from Heidegger's inimitable way of translating but did not stray very far from the conventional renderings.

Square brackets have been used throughout the book for my insertions into the text, and the few footnotes I introduced are bracketed and marked "Trans." Braces ({}) are reserved for the editor's interpolations. As a convenience to anyone wishing to correlate passages in this translation with the original, the running heads indicate the *Gesamtausgabe* pagination.

Richard Rojcewicz
Point Park University

Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

§1. On the aim and character of the course.[1]

The first task is to become clear about the aim and character of the course.

Aim: a penetrating understanding of the basic scientific concepts, ones which not only have determined—decisively determined—all subsequent philosophy but which have also made possible Western science as a whole and today still provide that science its foundations.

Character: introductory. That is, we will proceed step by step toward what is meant in the concepts and toward the way they are formed and grounded. It will thereby become evident *what* these lectures are dealing with, their object, as well as *how* they interrogate and investigate the objects, the mode of dealing with them. Included will be an increasing clarification of the non-philosophical positive sciences. Introductory: but not a popularization designed to promote so-called general culture. Since philosophy does play this role in the popular consciousness, however, and since philosophy is even being officially degraded to such a function, we need to clarify how things do stand with philosophy.

§2. Preliminary determination of the concept of philosophy over and against the current views.

Point of departure: popular view of philosophy and of its role in higher education.

1. Philosophy deals with "universal questions," ones that can touch and interest every person.

1. Title on the manuscript: "Sketches for the course on the basic concepts of ancient philosophy. Summer semester 1926."

2. What philosophy inquires into can also be encountered in every science, indeed even outside the sciences.

3. Philosophy is something in which everyone is engaged, either constantly or occasionally, out of different motives, in diverse circumstances, and with various degrees of urgency.

Philosophy is something universal, not a special science. Therefore philosophy must also be universally accessible, universally understandable. Philosophy requires no specialized method but only the universally distributed thinking of sound common sense; every fully awake head must understand it, everyone has something to say about it.

If a classical philologist attends a lecture on the theory of functions and understands nothing, he finds that to be in order. If a chemist listens to a talk about Hindu philology and understands nothing, he finds that to be in order. If they both, along with their colleagues from whatever disciplines, hear a lecture in philosophy and do not understand it, then that is found not to be in order, since philosophy is indeed something universal and must be accessible to everyone in the universe. That which, in some way or other, touches everyone must also be understood by everyone. This is not only the opinion of the students in higher education but is also, in large part, that of their teachers. A college course in philosophy is an opportunity for everyone's intellectual sustenance, for the renewal and expansion of culture, perhaps even for edification or the imparting of world-views. It is considered a great value that philosophical instruction is tailored to the needs of the students.

These universally held positions on philosophy are truly appalling. The most radical science and, accordingly, the most difficult one has been debased to a matter of so-called general culture. The presentations of philosophy as well as its problematics are supposed to be tailored to the needs predominant at any time. We will not now inquire into the grounds of this state of affairs nor into the means that have allowed it to develop and to spread today more widely than ever. Over and against the popular conception, we want, instead, to take a positive approach and gain at least a preliminary understanding of the possible idea of philosophy and to see clearly the positive necessities of its study, necessities predelineated in that idea.

If the just-characterized popular conception of philosophy is a perversion and a corruption, then it might be concluded that philosophy is a special science, like any other, and is restricted to only a few persons. Most are excluded, because what is required by the content of their individual science makes it practically impossible for them to take up in addition the exertions involved in the study of this particular specialty.

Such an argument, however, is merely the obverse of the popular conception and shares with it the same basic unclarity regarding the essence and task of philosophy.

1. Philosophy indeed deals with something universal but is not universally accessible without further ado.

2. Philosophy is the science of the most proper domain of all and yet is not a specialty.

Regarding 1: It remains to be determined in what sense philosophy is universal and how something can be an object such that it is in a genuine sense universal.

Regarding 2: The kind of questioning and proving involved in philosophical research likewise remains to be clarified. Philosophy is not a specialty but, rather, deals with that whose very articulation first makes possible something like specialties, i.e., subject-matters delimited one against the other.

Philosophy is research that lies at the foundation of all the sciences and that is "alive" in all of them, however this statement may come to be determined more precisely. But we can already ask: if philosophy lies at the basis of the sciences, then can it be less scientific or must it satisfy, in an even higher and more radical sense, the idea of science? Obviously, the latter.

But if philosophy is the *most original science, science in the utterly proper sense,* then the study of it must come completely from *free choice.* This latter cannot in the least be determined through points of view such as that of occupation or training in a specialty. To choose and take up the study of philosophy means to choose between full scientific existence and manual, blind preparation for an occupation. To choose the study of philosophy, to penetrate into its problematics, does not mean to take up one additional specialty for the sake of completeness and to be well-rounded. Nor does it mean to register for a so-called comprehensive course. On the contrary, it means to *decide in favor of transparency in one's own scientific acting, forbearing, and existing at the university,* versus blind preparation for exams and non-deliberate nibbling on intellectual tidbits. To spend one's student days in this latter way does not at all differ from serving an apprenticeship as a handyman's helper; at most it differs by way of its greater capriciousness, which is customarily called academic freedom. But freedom is not the "indifference of caprice"; on the contrary, it is *letting advance the authentic possibilities of human Da-sein,* thus here it is letting *genuine scientific questioning* advance, not being content with accidental knowledge.

One has already become unfree, a slave to prejudice and indolence, if one makes the excuse: philosophy is too difficult and too much. It might seem that this excuse expresses modesty and prudence, but at bottom it signifies flight from the exertions of genuine scientific study. For philosophy is not something "more," a mere "addition" to something else, but is exactly what the specialized sciences are, only more radically and in a more penetrating understanding. "Too difficult": no

science, as long as it remains moved by actual questioning, is easy. What alone is easy is mere erudition without understanding.

Freedom is letting advance the questioning that takes place in scientific research. And that requires a proper openness and an understanding of science in general and of what is at issue in science. The foregoing consideration is not meant to frighten away, nor to entice, but to open the possibility of free reflection.

§3. Preliminary determination of the object of philosophy over and against the positive sciences: philosophy as critical science.

Therefore a preliminary orientation regarding the essence and task of philosophy. These can be determined in several ways. In the course itself we will choose one way: we will trace philosophy's original breakthrough, its first, decisive formation. Preliminarily, however, we will take another path, the nearest one: what lies closest is the sphere of the non-philosophical sciences. It is versus them that we now wish to determine philosophy.

Striking: the other sciences, mathematics, physics, history, philology, linguistics, do not begin by asking what is mathematics, physics, philology; instead, they just set about their work, they plunge into their subject matter. Or, if not, then they merely make some brief, general, prefatory remarks. That is no accident; on the contrary, an essential characteristic of the sciences is here manifesting itself. If asked what mathematics is, what philology is, the mathematician or philologist answers by bringing forth his science, by posing and working through definite mathematical or philological problems. That is the best, and the only, way.

And yet, the question remains in a certain sense unanswered. If the mathematician wished to say what mathematics is, not by presenting mathematical problems and proofs, but by talking *about* mathematics, its objects and method, then he could no longer employ mathematical proofs and concepts, just as little as the physicist could employ experiments to show and prove the essence of physics. Likewise, with the philological method one cannot show what philology is. When scientists try to answer such questions, they are beginning to philosophize. There is no mathematical concept of mathematics, because mathematics as such is not something mathematical. There is no philological concept of philology, because philology as such is not something philological.

Whence stems this remarkable state of affairs? In the very essence of all these sciences, in the fact that they are *positive* sciences, versus philosophy, which we call the *critical* science.

Positive: *ponere*—"posit," "lay"; *positum*—what has been "laid down," what already lies there. Positive sciences are those for which what they deal with, what can become their object and their theme, *already lies there.* Numbers are already there, spatial relations exist, nature is at hand, language is present, and so is literature. All this is *positum,* it lies there. It is a being; everything uncovered in science is *a being.* Positive sciences are sciences *of beings.*

But is that not a determination pertaining essentially to every science, thus also to philosophy as critical science? Or is not that which philosophy makes its theme pre-given to it? Is its object—and that which is to become an object—first thought up, first posited, or even invented, in mere thought? Then again, are not the positive sciences also critical ones? Are they somehow uncritical, unmethodical? Does not critique pertain to every scientific method? Thus if philosophy, too, has a theme and is not capricious invention, is it indeed also a positive science? And conversely, is every non-philosophical positive science, as science, not uncritical but in fact critical science? What then happens to the distinction between positive and critical science?

If the distinction is justified, then "critical" must mean something other than "methodologically cautious and free from prejudice." And if philosophy, too, actually encounters its theme and does not invent it, then it must be possible for something to be made a theme that does *not lie there,* i.e., is *not a being.*

§4. The "critical" function of philosophy: to separate and differentiate beings from Being.

Critical: κρίνειν—"to separate," "to differentiate," in differentiating something from something to make visible both what has been differentiated and what differentiates it. To differentiate: triangle from square, mammal from bird, epic from drama, noun from verb, one being from another—every science is constantly differentiating such things and thereby determining what has been differentiated.

Accordingly, if philosophy is critical science, such that it is preeminently "critical" in character, then there takes place in philosophy a differentiating in a preeminent sense. But what can be differentiated from beings other than beings? What can we still say of beings? They *are,* and only beings are. They are; they *have Being.* From beings and in beings what can be differentiated is *Being.* This differentiation does not concern beings and beings, but *beings and Being.* "Being"—under that term nothing can be represented. Indeed beings; but Being? In fact, the common understanding and common experience understand and seek only beings. To see and to grasp Being in beings, to differentiate

ing; not for the sake of extensity in knowledge of topics and materials but, instead, for intensity in conceptualization; secure grasp of the differentiation; nothing left to caprice and accident) specifically in this way, namely by participating in and, as it were, *repeating* the first decisive beginning of scientific philosophy. We will retread the path of the uncovering of Being out of beings; such uncovering is the most radical and most difficult task facing human knowledge. It is a task that has never yet been brought to its pure state and today is more misunderstood than perhaps ever before. In this light, we can measure the very meager forward steps taken by scientific philosophy since the beginning.

A running start was accomplished by the Greeks; since then only a rerunning that has long since covered over and deformed the original intentions. To become able to understand this philosophy concretely, *how* Being was investigated, how conceptualized, i.e., which concepts of Being and of its determinations were gained.

Modern erudition, the knowledge of everything and the discussing of everything, has lost its edge long ago and is now incapable of radically differentiating between what we do understand, in the genuine sense, and what we do not understand within the original domains of scientific questioning. This erudition has become much too clever and jaded, i.e., philosophically unproductive, and so can no longer appreciate the verve that animated the discoveries of Plato and Aristotle.

Method of this introduction: weight will be placed on acquiring substantive understanding. No intention of filling the class sessions with anecdotes about the lives and fates of the ancient thinkers or rambling on about Greek culture. There will be no mere enumeration of the titles of the writings of the ancient authors, no synopsis of contents which contributes nothing to the understanding of the problems. All that can be had cheaply in compendia available by the dozen. It might be important for a full historiographical comprehension of Greek civilization. But our concern is philosophical understanding; not historiography but, instead, philosophy. To be sure, that does not mean to interpret unhistoriographically. Historiographical comprehension is itself possible only if substantive understanding has already been gained. One can describe ever so thoroughly the relations of the philosophers and of the philosophical schools to the then-contemporaneous poetry, art, politics, and social conditions, these can be analyzed minutely, and yet that will never lead to an understanding of philosophy itself, its intention, its philosophical content, the sphere of its problematics, the level of its methodological accomplishment. Furthermore, such understanding is not a matter of becoming informed about opinions, tenets, views. What *is* necessary is that we co-philosophize, and the attempt to do so will itself claim the entire time of our sessions and all of our force.

The exoteric works {?}—easily available today in various forms. We will later name the most important resources.[11]

Our concern will be fourfold:

1. The *whole* of the problematics of ancient philosophy is to be brought to light: some few central problems which are still unresolved.

2. The *main lines of development* are to be worked out; not the mere succession of philosophers and schools, but the way the problems have arisen out of one another: what direction did the questions take, with what conceptual means were they answered. Bogging down of lines of questioning, motives of stagnation, causes of foundering.

3. To form a more penetrating understanding with regard to determinate, concrete, *basic concepts*: Being–truth, principle–cause, possibility–necessity, relation, unity, multiplicity, nature, life, knowledge, expression–proof.[12]

4. On the basis of this consideration, to cast a glance at contemporary problematics and to characterize the way ancient philosophy *played out* in the Middle Ages and in modern times. Necessary to pose the questions more radically than did the Greeks. Can do so only if we have already understood Greek philosophy entirely on its own and do not interpret modern problems back into it. To be sure, in order to understand it that way it must first be understood at all, the horizons of its problems worked out, its intentions followed to the end; otherwise, philosophical discourse says nothing.

On the whole, the principal aim: 1. Substantive understanding, not anecdotes. 2. Contact with the primary sources, not with the secondary literature and others' opinions.

Let these suffice as the most needed preliminary remarks. Something of the sort was required by the confusion over the essence and tasks of philosophy but would have been completely superfluous if the state of research in scientific philosophy were more or less in order. Accordingly, these remarks have merely a propaedeutic goal here. Now the substantive *issues* alone are to speak.

11. Cf. below, §6, pp. 11–13.

12. Mörchen transcription: "All this has its inner coherence, the basis of which we need to grasp." (Supplementing the main text, from which Heidegger lectured, are student notes taken by H. Mörchen and W. Bröcker. Transcriptions of those notes are presented in the appendix and will be referred to according to this example: See Mörchen transcription, no. 1, p. 168.)


image
not
available

Concept of σοφία: περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐπιστήμη[13] ["knowledge regarding principles and causes"]. σοφία: ἐπιστήμη pure and simple; ἐπιστάτης: the one who stands [*steht*] before and over some matter, who can stand at the head of it [*vorsteht*], who understands [*versteht*] it.

Path of the investigation: apprehending and knowing are comportments of humans, possessions of humans. Humans are beings among others. Lifeless—living. Living beings have determinate comportments; animals—humans. The task is then to interrogate the latter with regard to their comportments having something to do with knowing, understanding, apprehending, perceiving. Manifold of possibilities and of modes of disclosing in a certain gradation: σοφώτερος ["wiser"] (cf. 982a13f.), μᾶλλον σοφός[14] ["more of a wise man"], ἔνδοξον ["esteemed"]).

ἀληθεύειν:[15] "to take out of concealment," "make unconcealed," "*dis*-cover" what was covered over. Living beings: human Dasein is that peculiar being which discloses other beings and itself, not simply as a supplementary faculty but, rather, φύσει ["by nature"]. *By virtue of its very Being, the world and itself are already disclosed to it,* though indeterminately, confusedly, uncertainly. World: what is closest, Being *in the proper sense.*

ἀληθεύειν: "to disclose," apprehend, understand: truth; knowledge as appropriated cognition: certainty. Modes of disclosing and understanding, pre-theoretically.

Gradation,[16] development of the circumspection required for free motion:

αἴσθησις
μνήμη
ἐμπειρία
τέχνη
ἐπιστήμη
σοφία (φρόνησις)

αἴσθησις (cf. 980a22):[17] "sense perception," ἴδια–κοινά–κατά συμβεβηκός ["proper–common–incidental"], because what is present is in every case enclosed in relations {?}.

μνήμη (980a29),[18] "retention," "memory," knowledge of what is not present or, rather, is again present; to have already apprehended.

13. *Met.* A 1, 982a2. Reading in Christ: περί τινας αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς.
14. *Met.* A 1, 982a15f.: μᾶλλον . . . σοφίαν.
15. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 170.
16. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 170f.
17. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 170f.
18. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 170f.

Freer orientation, circumspection, to take in at a glance. More teachable, richer possibilities of taking in, not merely (perceptual) staring at, not simply bound to one and the same present {possibility}.[19] A certain understanding.

φρόνιμος ["the insightful one"] (cf. 980b21)[20]
μαθητικός ["the learned one"] (cf. 980b21)
φαντασίαι–μνήμη ["images–memory"] (cf. 980b26)

τέχνη–λογισμός (cf. 980b28),[21] "knowing one's way about"–"deliberation." {τέχνη:}[22] "understanding," title for a science: medicine; not "art," not dealing with the practical, but, instead, dealing with the theoretical, ἐπιστήμη (981a3).

ἐμπειρία (980b28)—ἀπειρία (981a5), "experience," not in the theoretical sense, distinguished from thinking, but the difference between being inexperienced and being experienced, practiced.

ἐμπειρία and τέχνη (cf. 981a4), "being experienced in . . . ," "knowing one's way about with understanding." ἐμπειρία has ἐννοήματα (cf. 981a6), taken cognizance of, deliberated, thought over in "many considerations." In each case: if this–then that, as often as this–so often that.

ἐμπειρία ἔχει ὑπόληψιν (cf. 981a7),[23] "also already has its anticipation." Being experienced in what is to be done in each case, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον (981a9). From many experiences arises a single anticipation. καθόλου (981a6), "in general," "on the whole," not in each case if–then, but, rather, because–therefore. The individual cases change: always if this–then that, ὅμοιον ["something alike"] (cf. 981a7). Something always remains the same, recurs, maintains itself throughout; therefore a persistent connection remains. τέχνη is not "in every case if–then," "as often as," i.e., finding the right thing to do from case to case, but is knowing *in advance,* everywhere such experiences have "one and the same outer look," κατ᾽ εἶδος ἕν (981a10), and specifically *because.* "If–then": here the "then" is ambiguous: (1) if–then; (2) because–therefore: delineation of the εἶδος, understanding the why. Being experienced, having cognizance: in every case if this–then that. ἔχει ὑπόληψιν ["has anticipation"] (cf. 981a7): knows in advance what? The *connection* of the if this–then that. Whence arises the possibility of *giving direction.* A healer. A machinist who looks after a machine. Connection of the sequence of processes. *Because* this is such and such, because the physiological state is such and such, *therefore*

19. Editor's interpolation.
20. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 170f.
21. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 171.
22. Editor's interpolation.
23. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 171.

this chemical intervention is possible and necessary. Not simply from case to case, but as an instance of something *universal,* an instance of a factual connection that holds without exception. The connection of the because–therefore is disclosed in this way: that which maintains itself in every case is explicitly seen, is seen *out of* the "empirically" given and is held fast. Thereby arises an understanding that, in a higher sense, is independent of the momentarily given. To this understanding, the being unveils itself more and more, just as it *always* and *properly* is. This is not simply understanding as the potential to understand, but is actually conceiving. He has a *concept.*[24] He can at any time exhibit the being as what it is and why it is such and such. τὸ ὅτι–τὸ διότι (981a29), "whereby"–"wherefore." Cognition, taking cognizance, knowing.

σοφώτερος (cf. 981a25f.):[25] κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ["by seeing more"] (981a27), κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν ["by possessing the *logos*"] (981b6). ἔχειν λόγον, μετὰ λόγου ["with *logos*"]: "showing" of what something is in itself. τέχνη is therefore μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμη ["more of knowledge"] (cf. 981b8f). δύνασθαι διδάσκει (981b7), it is "able to teach," to show why this is so and that is otherwise, and indeed for all possible cases. αἴσθησις ["sense perception"], even though it grasps what is nearest and what is factual, just as it is at any time, is still not σοφία: for οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί ["it does not tell us why"] (981b11f.).

§10. More precise characterization of σοφία (*Met.* A, chap. 2).

Chap. 1: Idea of σοφία in general predelineated.
Chap. 2: How σοφία itself appears more precisely.

a) Everyday preconception of it;
b) interpretation of what is named in it;
c) its goal is not practical;
d) possibility of appropriating it, living in it: the most proper, most divine science; in it humans are most above and beyond themselves, highest possibility of their Being;
e) transformation of one's Being by possessing it.

Regarding a): Everyday preconception of σοφία[26]

Everyday view of understanding and science:

1. πάντα ["all things"] (982a8),

24. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 171f.
25. See Mörchen transcription, no. 3, p. 171f.
26. See Mörchen transcription, no. 4, p. 172; cf. GA 19, p. 94ff.

2. χαλεπά ["difficult things"] (982a10),
3. ἀκριβεστάτη ["most rigorous"] (cf. 982a13 and 25)—διδασκαλικὴ μάλιστα ["most instructive"] (cf. 982a13 and 28ff.),
4. ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκεν ["for the sake of itself"] (982a15),
5. ἀρχικωτάτη ["supreme"] (cf. 982a16f. and b4).

Regarding b): Interpretation of what is named in the everyday conception

In all the moments, it is the same thing that is meant. What satisfies the idea of σοφία, as meant in the enumerated characteristics, is the science that deals with the first principles and causes.

This interpretation of the average view of that science and of its proper sense is at once its concrete {?} determination, produced through a positive demonstration of its central motif.

Regarding c): Without practical purpose

οὐ ποιητική, {. . .} ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάτων ["not making anything practical, . . . from the first ones who philosophized"] (982b10f.); τὸ θαυμάζειν (982b11f.)—"to wonder" about something, i.e., not simply accept it as evident. Not to accept—the ground thereof is a claim to higher understanding, the will to go beyond mere recognition, not to be content with what is commonly taken as self-evident. τὰ ἄτοπα—"what is not in its place," what cannot be accommodated in one's greatest efforts at understanding, even if that which gives it its peculiarity may be clear to average knowledge. It lends itself to open-ended questioning. He alone wonders who: 1. does not yet understand, but 2. desires to understand. He seeks to escape from ἄγνοια ["ignorance"] (cf. 982b20) and thereby demonstrates that he desires νοεῖν ["apprehension"]. Whence arises διαπορεῖν ["to be at an impasse"] (cf. 982b15). Common sense believes it understands everything, because it is unaware of any higher possibilities of questioning. The one who wonders and questions further does not *make it through*, finds "no way out," ἀπορία (cf. 982b17). Therefore he must seek possibilities, work out the question, master the problem.

The scientific problem is not an arbitrary question, one randomly spit[27] out, but is a deliberately posed question, the predelineation and discussion of possible ways, means, and factual motifs, i.e., motifs offered by the interrogated object itself for its own determination. The most multifarious knowledge of everything possible is not yet science. What is essential (the problem) is a *capacity to question, drawn from, and developed in conformity with, the matter at issue itself.* Hence σοφία μόνη is ἐλευθέρα

27. Heidegger uses a word (*spatzen*) in the Swabian dialect that has this meaning.