Kant and Cosmopolitanism

The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship

PAULINE KLEINGELD

CAMBRIDGE

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University of Groningen, the Netherlands

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Abbreviations and main primary texts

WORKS BY KANT

ApH	Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Ak 7 (1798) Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view
BBM	Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrasse, Ak 8 (1785) Determination of the concept of a human race
BSE	Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, Ak 2 (1764) Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime
DpG	Dohna Vorlesungen über physische Geographie (1792) Dohna lectures on physical geography
EaD	Das Ende aller Dinge, Ak 8 (1794) The end of all things
G	Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Ak 4 (1785) Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals
GTP	Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, Ak 8 (1793) On the common saying: This may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice
IaG	Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Ak 8 (1784) Idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan perspective
KdU	Kritik der Urteilskraft, Ak 5 (1790) Critique of judgment
KpV	Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Ak 5 (1788) Critique of practical reason
KrV	Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 1787) Critique of pure reason
LD	Nachschrift zu Christian Gottlieb Mielckes Littauisch-deutschem und deutsch-littauischem Wörterbuch, Ak 8 (1800)

	Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's *Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian dictionary*
MAM	Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, Ak 8 (1786) Conjectural beginning of human history
MdS	Metaphysik der Sitten, Ak 6 (1797) Metaphysics of morals
MdS Vig	Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius, Ak 27 (1793–94) Metaphysics of morals Vigilantius
nevT	Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie Ak 8 (1796) On a recently prominent tone of superiority in philosophy
Ped	Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik, Ak 9 (1803) Lectures on pedagogy
Phil	Aufsätze, das Philanthropin betreffend, Ak 2 (1776, 1777) Essays regarding the Philanthropinum
R	Reflexionen aus dem Nachlaß, Ak 14–23 Notes and fragments, unpublished remains
Rel	Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Ak 6 (1793) Religion within the boundaries of mere reason
RezH	Rezensionen von J.G. Herders *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*. Teil 1 und 2, Ak 8 (1785) Review of J.G. Herder's *Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity, parts 1 and 2*
SdF	Der Streit der Facultäten, Ak 7 (1798) The conflict of the faculties
TPP	Űber den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie, Ak 8 (1788) On the use of teleological principles in philosophy
VA	Vorlesungen über Anthropologie, Ak 25 Lectures on anthropology
VRM	Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen, Ak 2 (1775, 1777) Of the different races of human beings
WiA	Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? Ak 8 (1784) An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?
ZeF	Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf, Ak 8 (1795) Toward perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch

References are to: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*. Ausgabe der Preussischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1902–).

Kant's writings are cited by the abbreviated title as indicated above, using the Akademie volume and page numbers. The only exception is the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for which, as is customary, the page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) editions are cited. The Dohna lectures on physical geography are available on http://kant.bbaw.de/base.htm.

Translations are my own, but I have made use of the following translations:

Cambridge Edition of the Writings of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1992–).

Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*. Edited by Hans Reiss. Translation H. B. Nisbet, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Immanuel Kant, *'Toward Perpetual Peace' and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Edited and with an introduction by Pauline Kleingeld. Translation David L. Colclasure. With essays by Jeremy Waldron, Michael W. Doyle, and Allen Wood. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

WORKS BY OTHERS

Anacharsis Cloots

References are to: Anacharsis Cloots, *Oeuvres* (Munich: Kraus Reprint, 1980).

Abbreviations

B	Bases constitutionelles de la république du genre humain (1793) Constitutional foundation for the republic of the human race
O	L'orateur du genre humain (1791) The speaker of the human race
RU	La république universelle ou Adresse aux tyrannicides (1792) The universal republic: Address to the tyrannicides

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

References are to: *Fichte's sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Veit & Comp., later Walter de Gruyter, 1845–46).

Abbreviations

GHS Der geschloßne Handelsstaat: Ein philosophischer Entwurf als Anhang zur Rechtslehre, und Probe einer künftig zu liefernden Politik (1800)
The closed commercial state: A philosophical sketch as an appendix to the doctrine of right and an example of a future politics

GNR Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre (1796)
The foundation of natural right according to the principles of the Wissenschaftslehre

RZeF Rezension von Kants Zum ewigen Frieden (1796)
Review of Kant's *Toward Perpetual Peace*

Georg Forster

References are to: *Georg Forsters Werke*, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958–).

Abbreviations

LaB Über lokale und allgemeine Bildung (1791)
On local and general *Bildung*

LkG Leitfaden zu einer künftigen Geschichte der Menschheit (1789)
Guiding thread to a future history of humankind

MR Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen (1786)
Something more on the human races

SNA Vorläufige Schilderung des Nordens von Amerika (1791)
Provisional sketch of North America

VS Vorrede, Sakontala oder der entscheidende Ring (1791)
Preface to Sakontala or the decisive ring

Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch

References are to the original publications, mentioned below.

Abbreviations

EaM Über einen in Europa einzuführenden allgemeinen Münzfuß, *Historisch-politisches Magazin* 1 (1787): 211–14
On a common monetary standard, to be introduced in Europe

GH Über den wahren Grundsatz der Handelsgesetzgebung und über die Vorbereitungsmittel, das Handelsverkehr unter allen Völkern zum möglich höchsten Grade zu erweitern und zu beleben, *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 20 (1792): 502–35
On the true principle of trade legislation, and on the preparatory measures to extend and stimulate commerce among all peoples to the highest possible degree

MS Welche von den europäischen Nazionen hat das Merkantilsystem zuerst vollständig in Ausübung gebracht? *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 20 (1792): 401–13
Which of the European nations was the first to implement the system of mercantilism completely?

NB Neue Betrachtungen über den nemlichen Gegenstand, in D.H. Hegewisch, *Historische, philosophische und literarische Schriften* (Hamburg: Bohn, 1793), 249–56
New observations on the same subject (that is, the same subject as GH)

WvZ Über die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines künftigen vollkommnern Zustandes der Menschheit, *Deutsches Magazin* 10 (1795): 36–69
On the probability of a future more perfect condition of humankind

Novalis

References are to Novalis, *Schriften*, ed. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960). References contain title, volume, page, and fragment number.

Abbreviations

AB Allgemeines Brouillon
Universal brouillon

Bl Blüthenstaub (1798)
Pollen

CE Die Christenheit oder Europa: Ein Fragment (presented 1799, first published in full in 1826)
Christianity or Europe: A fragment

FS Fichte-Studien
Fichte studies

GL Glauben und Liebe (1798)
Faith and love

HS	Hemsterhuis Studien Hemsterhuis studies
LLF	Logologische Fragmente Logological fragments
TF	Teplitzer Fragmente Teplitz fragments
VB	Vermischte Bemerkungen Mixed remarks

Translations are mine, but I have benefited from Frederick Beiser's translations. If the passage referred to is also included in Beiser's edition of *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, the page number in the English translation is added to the reference. Novalis' Fichte Studies are translated in *Novalis: Fichte Studies*, ed. Jane Kneller (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and listed by fragment number.

Christoph Martin Wieland

References to Wieland's work are to: *Wielands Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Deutsche Kommission der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Weidmann, 1909–). Wieland's *Geschichte der Abderiten* has been translated: *History of the Abderites*, trans. Max Dufner (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1993).

Abbreviations

Abd	Geschichte der Abderiten (1774–80, 1781) History of the Abderites
BLV	Betrachtungen über die gegenwärtige Lage des Vaterlandes (1793) Observations on the current situation of our country
GKO	Das Geheimniß des Kosmopoliten-Ordens (1788) The secret of the order of cosmopolitans
Patr	Über teutschen Patriotismus: Betrachtungen, Fragen und Zweifel (1793) On German patriotism: Observations, questions, and doubts
PB	Patriotischer Beytrag zu Deutschlands höchstem Flor, veranlaßt durch einen unter diesem Titel im Jahr 1780 im Druck erschienenen Vorschlag eines Ungenannten (1780) Patriotic contribution to Germany's highest flourishing, occasioned by an anonymous proposal that was published under this title in the year 1780

VAD Vorrede zu: Allgemeine Damenbibliothek, vol. 1 (1785)
Preface to the general library for ladies

VHC Vorrede zu: Schiller, Historischer Calender für Damen für das Jahr 1792 (1791)
Preface to Schiller's historical calendar for ladies for the year 1792

Introduction

1 THE COUNTRY OF WORLD CITIZENS

According to Immanuel Kant, Germans are model cosmopolitans. In his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* of 1798 he writes that they are hospitable toward foreigners, they easily recognize the merits of other peoples, they are modest in their dealings with others, and they readily learn foreign languages. Finally, "as cosmopolitans," they are not passionately bound to their fatherland (ApH 7:317–18). Germany "is the country of world citizens" where strangers feel at home (R 15:590).

This description is remarkable not just for its evocation of an intellectual world that was about to be swept away, in the early nineteenth century, by a wave of nationalism. It also paints a picture of the cosmopolitan that is quite different from the image of the rootless traveler often associated with the term. The cosmopolitans Kant describes here do not fit the stereotype of the individualistic citizens of nowhere, who relish their unattached and unencumbered existence, are self-satisfied with their self-styled identity, pick and choose cultural tidbits from many parts of the world, and regard the more rooted mortals around them with unmistakable condescension.

Instead, on Kant's view, cosmopolitanism is an attitude taken up in acting: an attitude of recognition, respect, openness, interest, beneficence and concern toward other human individuals, cultures, and peoples as members of one global community. One need not travel at all to merit the designation of being a citizen of the world. As his own biography famously illustrated, Kant found the commitment to cosmopolitanism perfectly compatible with spending one's entire life in one's home town. He emphasized that Königsberg, with its sea port, university, government offices, and international commercial traffic flow, which facilitated contact with countries with different languages and cultures, was a perfect place "for broadening one's knowledge of human beings as well as of

the world … also without traveling" (ApH 7:120–21n.). Whether or not Kant's cosmopolitanism might have benefited from a bit more travel, it is important that, on his conception, the cosmopolitan is not rootless or unattached. In fact, Kant even goes so far as to claim that cosmopolitans ought to be good patriots.[1]

The uprooted variety of world citizenship stands in a tradition that started with the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope, who is commonly regarded as the father of the term "cosmopolitan." When he was asked where he came from, he reportedly answered: "I am a citizen of the world."[2] With this answer, Diogenes seems to have meant that he did not recognize any special ties to a particular city or state. Denying local affiliations and obligations (more than affirming obligations to the larger whole of humanity), Diogenes endorses a *negative* conception of world citizenship. He defends a personal attitude of extreme individualism and disregard for social conventions. Traveling with his knapsack, clothed in rags, he is the perfect image of the unencumbered, ultra-mobile individual: "Without a city, without a home, without a country / A beggar and a vagabond, living from day to day."[3]

Kant's cosmopolitanism, by contrast, stands more in the tradition of the Stoics, who developed a *positive* conception of world citizenship that differed significantly from the Cynic view.[4] For the Stoics, cosmopolitanism involved the affirmation of moral obligations toward humans anywhere in the world because they all share in a common rationality, regardless of their different political, religious, and other particular affiliations. The Stoic cosmopolitans held the view that all humans live together "as it were in one state."[5] They conceived of this community in moral terms, however, and although some Stoics lived during the era of the Roman Empire, they did not advocate the establishment of world-wide political institutions. They used world citizenship as a metaphor for common membership in a single moral community.[6] The Stoics regarded such moral world citizenship as compatible with

[1] See Chapter 1.

[2] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 6:63, ed. and trans. Robert Drew Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925).

[3] *Ibid.*, 6:38, cited by Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes of Sinope is said to have declared that this statement applied to himself.

[4] On Kant and Stoic cosmopolitanism, see Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 5 (1997): 1–25.

[5] Marcus Antoninus, *The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus*, ed. and trans. A. S. L. Farquharson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1944), iv.4.

[6] See Eric Brown, *Stoic Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) for a discussion of the different versions of Stoic cosmopolitanism.

political membership in (and special obligations toward) a particular city or state.

Kant, too, defends a cosmopolitan moral theory, but he takes cosmopolitanism in many other directions as well. In addition to the moral aspect of cosmopolitanism as an attitude in acting, he also develops the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of world citizenship and elaborates the necessary global institutional arrangements for realizing a genuine "cosmopolitan condition."

Kant was by no means the only one to defend cosmopolitanism in his time, however. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, many other authors in the German-speaking world developed philosophical defenses of cosmopolitanism. This discussion started in the 1770s when Christoph Martin Wieland, the editor of the influential journal *Der Teutsche Merkur* and a towering intellectual figure in his day,[7] revived the ancient philosophical concept of world citizenship. The term was already in use at the time as a synonym for open-mindedness and as an antonym for parochialism. Wieland, however, brushed up its older meaning from antiquity.[8] He first portrayed Diogenes of Sinope in his 1770 *Socrates Gone Mad: The Dialogues of Diogenes of Sinope*.[9] A few years later, in his successful series *The Abderites* (1774–80), he introduced and defended a more Stoic-inspired version of cosmopolitanism, which he elaborated in subsequent publications. In the years following Wieland's texts, many other German authors debated the moral, political, economic, and cultural aspects of cosmopolitanism, as well as the possibility of realizing cosmopolitan ideals. In 1788, Wieland credits himself with having inspired widespread interest in cosmopolitanism through his *Abderites* (GKO 15:207).

Although Kant has long been recognized as a major defender of cosmopolitanism, this wider debate has gone largely neglected. Once the nationalist perspective of the nineteenth century took hold, cosmopolitanism was treated with hostility and contempt, and this debate was largely forgotten or denounced. This neglect is regrettable, however, because the German debate reveals a spectrum of possible positions in

[7] Kant, in his discussion of genius in the *Critique of Judgment*, mentions Wieland next to Homer (KdU 5:309).

[8] This is not to deny that there were important cosmopolitan elements in earlier writings. For discussions of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Emerich de Vattel (1714–67), see Francis Cheneval, *Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung: Über die Entstehung und die philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne* (Basel: Schwabe, 2002) and Georg Cavallar, *Imperfect Cosmopolis* (Aberystwyth: University of Wales Press, 2011).

[9] *Socrates mainomenos, oder die Dialogen des Diogenes von Sinope*. Later editions appeared under the neutral title, *Unpublished Work of Diogenes of Sinope* (*Nachlaß des Diogenes von Sinope*), 8: 220–314.

cosmopolitan theory that is much broader than is generally recognized in today's debates.

In current moral and political philosophy,[10] "cosmopolitanism" is most often equated with the endorsement of the idea that a theory of global justice should address the needs and interests of human individuals directly – regard them as citizens of the world – rather than indirectly, via their membership in different states. Since its origins with the Cynics and Stoics, however, the term has had multiple meanings, and the spectrum has since broadened much beyond the individualist renunciation of particular affiliations or the endorsement of a common bond with all other humans. The range of meanings now includes, in addition to a position on global justice, a particular view of modern identity, a political theory about the proper relations among the states of the world, the view that states should dissolve into a unified world state, and many other views as well, as will become clear in this book. There is no common core of these different positions that can be captured by a definition containing more than the rather uninformative statement that philosophical cosmopolitanism is the endorsement of some conception of world citizenship. In Chapter 1, I show that even the presumption of the equal moral status of all human beings – often regarded as the lowest common denominator of philosophical cosmopolitanisms – is not a necessary ingredient. Cosmopolitanism employs the idea of world citizenship either literally, in the context of some political theories, or as a structuring metaphor or model, in other philosophical contexts, and this allows for a broad range of positions. Furthermore, the meaning of the term also varies greatly depending on the conception of citizenship involved.[11]

2 OVERVIEW OF THIS BOOK

The two-fold aim of this book, in the most general terms, is to provide a comprehensive statement of Kant's cosmopolitan theory and to situate it in relation to other German cosmopolitan conceptions of his time.[12] One

[10] My focus is on the philosophical debates. Outside of philosophy, there is also an extensive literature on cosmopolitanism, especially in areas such as history, literature, and the social sciences. To mention just two examples from the latter: Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda," in Beck and Sznaider (eds.), special issue Cosmopolitanism, *British Journal of Sociology* 57 (2006): 1–23; Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford University Press, 2002).

[11] I return to the issue of defining cosmopolitanism in Chapter 7.

[12] The term "German" here refers primarily to authors who wrote in German or who lived or were born in German-language territory. A precise demarcation of this group is neither possible nor

reason for doing so is to draw attention to this wider spectrum of cosmopolitan positions. Another reason is that despite Kant's stature and his reputation as a cosmopolitan thinker, there is no full-scale philosophical study of the cosmopolitan aspects of his thought.

This book has a number of more specific Kant-related aims as well. As I argue in the chapters to follow, important aspects of Kant's views have been misunderstood. Each of the chapters of this book has at least one interpretive thesis of its own, in addition to the contribution it makes to achieving the book's overall aim. Together, these different theses themselves exhibit a pattern. First, they show that Kant changed his cosmopolitan theory radically during the mid 1790s, much more radically than has been recognized to date. Second, they show that Kant, in his later years, defends a rich conception of cosmopolitanism that is much more coherent than is usually thought.

I have organized the material thematically, rather than chronologically or by author, in order to focus on the philosophical questions at issue. Thus, each chapter of this book thematizes one aspect of Kant's cosmopolitanism in conjunction with selected arguments of some of his contemporaries. In this way, I hope to showcase some (often largely forgotten) historical figures, while letting their arguments bring into relief the specific features of Kant's thought.

In the first chapter, I discuss the moral cosmopolitanism of Wieland and Kant. I examine the relation between cosmopolitan commitments and particular allegiances. The key question here is whether (and if so, how) one's membership in a cosmopolitan moral community can be reconciled with special obligations stemming from particular relationships. Opponents of cosmopolitanism tend to equate moral cosmopolitanism with the Cynic variety and criticize it for not being able to account for the value of special relationships. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, writes that cosmopolitans "boast that they love everyone [*tout le monde*, which also means 'the whole world'], in order to have the right to love no one."[13] And the dictionary of the Académie Française defines a cosmopolitan as "he who does not adopt a country," adding, "a cosmopolitan is not a good citizen" (fourth edition, 1762). Similar criticisms are

desirable for the purposes of this study, given the complex political situation and the fact that the linguistic community did not map onto a political community. Indeed, some of the authors here included would not identify themselves as Germans. This is most clearly the case for the Prussian-born migrant "citizen of the world" Anacharsis Cloots; see Chapter 2.

[13] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat Social*, Manuscrit de Genève. In *Oeuvres complètes*, eds. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 3:287. Cf. *Émile ou de l'Éducation*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, 3:21.

form of cosmopolitanism that allows him to create more room, within the parameters of morality and right, for cultural diversity. The debate between Kant and Forster also highlights the differences between Kant's and Forster's endorsements of cultural diversity.

In Chapter 5, I discuss cosmopolitanism in relation to economic justice and free trade. I start with a discussion of the views of a champion of free-market cosmopolitanism, Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch. Kant's claim that international trade promotes peace is often read as an implicit defense of the thesis that global trade should be "free" trade. A comparison between Hegewisch's and Kant's views on the issue, however, reveals that this inference is not correct. Rather, Kant's legal and political theory (especially his republicanism, his theory of property, and his defense of state-funded poverty relief) implies that trade should first of all be just, and that it can be "free" trade only within the bounds of justice. Again, Kant's views change during the Critical period (i.e., during the period from the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781 until Kant's death). As late as the *Critique of Judgment*, he highlighted the negative effects of trade, in particular what he saw as its debasing effect on a people's manner of thinking. A few years later, in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, he foregrounds the productive role of trade in approaching a condition of peace.

In the sixth chapter, I discuss Kant's account of the feasibility of the cosmopolitan ideal. Cosmopolitans are often criticized for being "unrealistic," and Kant is no exception. For example, key figures in Romantic cosmopolitanism, such as Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, criticized Kant for relying on enlightened self-interest as conducive to peace and for disregarding the importance of feelings. They developed an alternative cosmopolitan ideal that revolved around the emotional and spiritual unity of humankind. By contrasting their views with Kant's, I show how Kant conceived of the emergence of cosmopolitan attitudes and moral dispositions. Kant incorporated the natural affective dimensions of human motivation into his cosmopolitan approach, as essential components of his account of the practicability of the moral cosmopolitan ideal.

In this way, the first six chapters show that Kant's philosophical cosmopolitanism underwent a number of interrelated and radical transformations in the mid 1790s. Furthermore, they show that, in its final form, Kant's cosmopolitan moral and political theory includes an account of the fundamental importance of particular affiliations, by defending, among other things, the importance of states, patriotism (of a specific kind), and cultural diversity. Third, the wider eighteenth-century German discussion

of Kant's time reveals a spectrum of possible positions in cosmopolitan theory that is much broader than is often recognized in debates carried on under the banner of "cosmopolitanism" today.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the relevance of these results for current philosophical discussions, such as debates over the compatibility of cosmopolitanism and patriotism, the philosophical justification of a plurality of states, global economic justice, or the continuing impact of the history of racism and colonialism in cosmopolitan political theory.

3 A FEW WORDS ON THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

In writing this book, I faced several difficult decisions about what to include. Providing a complete historical overview of the entire late eighteenth-century German debate about cosmopolitanism might have filled in an important gap in the intellectual history of this period, but the wealth of historical details would have crowded out discussion of the philosophical arguments. Instead, I have chosen to focus in more detail on Kant's cosmopolitanism and the arguments of a select number of his contemporaries. Much additional work on the history of this philosophical debate remains to be done.[16]

Although my focus is not on the historical political and cultural context of this debate, a few brief remarks on this context are in order. The main texts discussed in this book were written during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The historical context of the increasing prominence of cosmopolitanism during this time is complex, but an important political circumstance was without doubt the fact that the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" was in a state of crisis. It was a heterogeneous amalgam of more than 300 sovereign territories and close to 1,500 *Ritterschaften*, half-autonomous regions, and independent cities, with entities varying from tiny units like Wieland's native town, the free city of Biberach with its 4,000 inhabitants, to large and powerful states like

[16] But see, for much excellent work in this larger area, Frederick C. Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought 1790–1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Cavallar, *Imperfect Cosmopolis*; Cheneval, *Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung*; Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2003); Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). A very useful collection of texts is the edition by Anita and Walter Dietze, eds., *Ewiger Friede? Dokumente einer deutschen Diskussion um 1800* (Leipzig and Weimar: Kiepenheuer, 1989).

Austria and Prussia (and, further complicating matters, part of Prussia fell outside the Holy Roman Empire). Moreover, the German linguistic community and the political entity known as the Holy Roman Empire by no means mapped onto each other.[17] The German-language intellectual community extended beyond the borders of the Holy Roman Empire and included not just the rest of Prussia, but also parts of Switzerland and Denmark, and these territories also included other languages. This complex situation provided ample occasion for debates about the pros and cons of various kinds of (cosmo) political organization, especially in comparison with the situation in France and Great Britain.

Another important political factor is that many of the German-speaking territories pursued active immigration policies on a massive scale. Prussia, for example, admitted political and religious refugees by the tens of thousands, as well as large numbers of people hoping to escape poverty, and it complemented this policy with laws requiring toleration.

Finally, there was a lively debate about the merits of the Germanic cultural heritage, which German intellectuals widely viewed as inferior to French and British culture. Indeed, even the King of Prussia, Frederick the Great, wrote a book – in French – arguing that German literature did not amount to much.[18] Many cosmopolitan authors saw a silver lining in the absence of a strong German national culture, however, arguing that it enabled them to appreciate the cultural achievements of others without being blinded by nationalist bias. There was a steady stream of translations of "world literature" and a thirst, among the literate public, for knowledge about the cultures of peoples outside Europe.

Over the course of the 1790s, more and more authors (including, as we shall see, Kant) began to value cosmopolitanism itself as a specific part of the "German character." What was first seen as the *absence* of a German character became cherished as its *hallmark*, which, in a striking dialectical twist, re-emerged in the early nineteenth century as a basis for nationalist claims to German superiority. But from then on, German philosophical cosmopolitanism started to wane, and the French conquests caused a rapid ascent of German nationalism.

The debate about cosmopolitanism should not be seen merely in the light of the German political and cultural situation at the time, of course. For one thing, the idea of world citizenship has much older roots. As

[17] Cf. Terry Pinkard's instructive discussion of "Germany" in Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–15.

[18] Ludwig Geiger, ed., *De la litterature Allemande (1780) von Friedrich dem Grossen* (Berlin: Behr, 1902) (orig. Berlin: Decker, 1780).

mentioned above, the history of philosophical cosmopolitanism, with its roots in Greek and Roman antiquity, resonates in the writings of the authors discussed here. The same is true for the Christian ideal of a religious community comprising all humans. The ideal of a spiritual unity of humankind was expressed both in theological doctrines and in the practice of missionary organizations that fanned out across the globe, and it was reflected in German conceptions of cosmopolitanism as well. Conceptions of cosmopolitanism defended outside of the German linguistic community had their influence as well, especially in France during the early years after the revolution and the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen." For example, foreign authors ("all thinkers of the earth") were invited to comment or collaborate on the project of developing a new constitution, and in 1791, Jews were admitted to French citizenship. In 1792, a law was passed to grant citizenship to foreign authors supportive of the revolution in order that they could be elected as deputies to the National Convention, and several foreigners were indeed elected, including Joseph Priestley (who declined), Thomas Paine,[19] and Anacharsis Cloots.[20] Finally, in late eighteenth-century Germany, and throughout Europe, there was much discussion of the activities of Europeans on other continents. Reports about slavery, the slave trade, and other forms of injustice provoked debate and activism on the part of some. Other authors focused on the question of how world-wide trade could be reformed so as to increase the standard of living of humans everywhere on earth and make trade conducive to world-wide peace.

Within this broader historical context, the specific situation in the German-speaking world during the final quarter of the eighteenth century made it particularly productive for the development of cosmopolitan theories. The combination of the complicated political situation and the self-conception among the literate public as being particularly open to other cultures provided a singularly fertile ground for the defense of different conceptions of world citizenship.

The nineteenth-century rise of German nationalism has influenced the study and the perception of the preceding cosmopolitan discussion. From a nationalist perspective, there is little motivation to study the history of German cosmopolitan theory, except a polemical one, as for example

[19] See, on Paine's own cosmopolitanism, Thomas C. Walker, "The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine's Cosmopolitanism and International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 51–72.

[20] On cosmopolitanism in several French Enlightenment authors, especially Denis Diderot and the Marquis de Condorcet, see Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire*.

in the works of Friedrich Meinecke and Edmund Pfleiderer.[21] Moreover, these authors tended to characterize eighteenth-century German cosmopolitanism contemptuously as an escapist compensatory move. They regarded it as an affliction of isolated intellectuals suffering from an inferiority complex, who attempted to present their weakness (that is, their lack of a strong national culture) as a strength. This psychologizing interpretation has outlasted its nationalist creators, and its traces can still be found in the current literature.[22] I doubt that Kant is best described as an isolated intellectual with an inferiority complex. More importantly, however, the arguments of Kant and other eighteenth-century German cosmopolitans deserve to be taken seriously and not to be side-stepped on the non-philosophical grounds of speculative armchair psychology.[23]

[21] Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1928[7], 1907[1]) (English: *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert B. Kimber (Princeton University Press, 1970)); Edmund Pfleiderer, *Kosmopolitismus und Patriotismus* (Berlin: Habel, 1874).

[22] See, e.g., Irmtraut Sahmland, *Christoph Martin Wieland und die deutsche Nation: Zwischen Patriotismus, Kosmopolitismus und Griechentum* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1990), 268–72.

[23] Frederick C. Beiser has done much to disprove the older prejudices regarding eighteenth-century German political theory, with his ground-breaking study, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*. See also, more recently, but with a mostly literary focus: Andrea Albrecht, *Kosmopolitismus: Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Philosophie und Publizistik um 1800* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2005).

Both Wieland and Kant stress the importance of patriotism, and both face strong criticism regarding the relation between their cosmopolitanism and their account of world citizens' attitude toward their own state. Wieland wrote a parody of the oak-leaf enthusiasts, but he is also the author of a well-known essay in which he called for German patriotism. Kant, father of the ideal of an international federation of states and defender of a robust notion of human rights that transcends national borders, also wrote that cosmopolitans have a duty to be patriotic. Many of their readers have found it impossible to reconcile these views.

In this chapter I argue that a better understanding of their notions of cosmopolitanism and patriotism will enable us to see how both Wieland and Kant succeed in reconciling the two. Cosmopolitanism and patriotism are indeed compatible, and showing why this is so will give sharper contours to the philosophical commitments entailed by their cosmopolitan positions.

2 MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM IN THE WORKS OF WIELAND AND KANT

The main figure in *The Abderites* is Democritus of Abdera, whom Wieland casts as a sage with a number of Stoic traits. Democritus returns to the city, after having traveled around the world for several decades. He is a "citizen of the world," a "friend of humankind in the true sense," who attempts to do good wherever he goes, without regard for political affiliations.[6] In contrast to Diogenes the Cynic, whose cosmopolitanism mainly consists in the denial of local affiliations and obligations, Wieland's Democritus believes that he has a special duty toward his own city of origin. He believes, for example, that he has a duty to let his fellow citizens share in what he has learned during his absence. Due to their incurable stupidity all his well-meaning attempts end in hilarious failure, prompting the Abderites to clamp down on foreign travel; but Democritus is not to blame.

In later work, Wieland further develops the theme of cosmopolitanism. Time and again, he characterizes it as the impartial and unprejudiced pursuit of the good. Thus, he writes:

> The cosmopolitans carry the designation *citizens of the world* in the most authentic and eminent sense. They regard *all peoples* on earth as just so many *branches*

[6] Abd 10:74–75. The main passages introducing cosmopolitanism are Abd 1.9, 10:56–60 and Abd 2.6, 10:110–13.

of a *single family*, and the *universe* as a *state*, in which [the cosmopolitans] are *citizens*, together with innumerable other rational beings, in order to promote the perfection of the *whole*, under general natural laws, while every [rational being] is active, in its own specific way, on behalf of its own well-being. (GKO 15:212–13)

The orientation toward one's own "well-being" (*Wohlstand*) should be understood in a Stoic, not a hedonistic sense. The well-being pursued by the sages is their own moral perfection which benefits the entire cosmos and its inhabitants.[7] They pursue the good, and in doing so their scope is the entire world.

In the quoted passage, the cosmopolitans are said to "regard" the world as a state; it is not literally a state, nor should it become one. Wieland's cosmopolitanism is not a call for world-wide political institutions. Rather, the cosmopolitan community is an "invisible society" (GKO 15:207). Cosmopolitanism is a moral ideal: world citizens have a duty to promote the perfection of the entire human community. The world is regarded as one community in the sense that individual cosmopolitans recognize their common bond and their common duty across and independently from particular political or national affiliations. When Democritus meets a fellow sage from elsewhere, the two instantaneously sense a deep connection (Abd 2.6, 10:110–13).

According to Wieland (and many Stoics), however, none of this implies that all human beings (or all rational beings) are citizens of the world. There are *world citizens* and there are mere *world inhabitants*, he states (GKO 15:214). Only sages are world citizens in the full sense; the foolish masses are not (GKO 15:210–11, 214). The second group has a lower status as a matter of ability, not merely as a result of defective upbringing. But the scope of the sages' beneficence is the entire community of all rational beings, including the world inhabitants. In this regard they act without prejudice, without discriminating on the basis of nationality, religion, race, or, to some degree, even gender. Wieland's version of cosmopolitanism is elitist, and already in his own age he was criticized for treating "the masses" with contempt.[8] But it *is* a kind of cosmopolitanism, because he uses the metaphor of world citizenship to emphasize the bond that unites all humans and the duty of world citizens toward all humans equally and toward humanity as a whole.

[7] See also "Wohlstand" (under "Wohlfahrt") in Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universallexicon aller Wissenschafften und Künste*, 68 vols. (Halle: Zedler, 1732–1754).

[8] Anon. (Johann Georg Schlosser), "Schreiben an Herrn Hofrat Wieland in Weimar über die Abderiten im deutschen Merkur," *Deutsches Museum* 1 (1776): 147–61.

Kant objected to Wieland's elitism and gave cosmopolitanism a more egalitarian interpretation by attributing the status of world citizen to all humans. After Rousseau "put him straight," as Kant wrote in his own copy of his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, he dropped his earlier disdain for "the most common laborer" (R 20:44). Kant designated all humans, qua rational beings, as fellow citizens of a shared moral world. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he speaks of the idea of a "moral world," in the context of his discussion of the highest good, as the systematic union of rational beings under common laws (KrV A808/B836). In the *Groundwork*, we find the notion of the "realm of ends" (*Reich der Zwecke*) which also clearly expresses the polis metaphor and amounts to a moral cosmopolis (G 4:433–36). Kant describes the realm of ends in similar terms as the first Critique's moral world, as a "systematic union of different rational beings through common laws" (G 4:433), but he now adds the notion of collective self-legislation (G 4:431–34). It is the world that would be realized through moral action if agents universally obeyed the Categorical Imperative (G 4:438).[9] In *Religion*, Kant further introduces the idea of an "ethical commonwealth" (*ethisches Gemeinwesen*) under moral laws (Rel 6:98). There are subtle differences between these various ideas, but their common core is that all rational beings are conceived (and should conceive of themselves) as fellow citizens in a moral community that transcends all other communities, and that all are united into this community by common laws. With this conception of oneself and others as fellow agents in a shared moral world, moral agents move beyond regarding the moral law merely as the principle for their own actions, because it is at the same time regarded as the principle that constitutes a moral community, a moral cosmopolis (see also Chapter 6).

According to Kant, this moral community is a community of equals. This means not only that all moral persons are the potential *object* of cosmopolitan activity, but also that they are all equally cosmopolitan *subjects*, which is to say that all are fellow citizens and ought to treat each

[9] Barbara Herman discusses the realm of ends as a cosmopolitan ideal but argues that it is not an ideal that Kant believed ought to be realized, but just a way of thinking (61), or "just another way of representing the moral law" (66). Barbara Herman, *Moral Literacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Already in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, however, Kant writes that the moral world is an ideal that ought to be realized as much as possible (KrV A 808/B836). On his defense of the duty to promote the realization of a moral world, see my "What Do the Virtuous Hope For? Re-Reading Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good," in *Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995*, ed. Hoke Robinson, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), vol. 1.1, 91–112.

other as such. This is a clear contrast with Wieland's distinction between the sages and the foolish masses.

It should be added straightaway, however, that Kant does not always follow his own egalitarian theory in practice. There is some irony in the fact that Wieland, despite his inegalitarian bent, is more critical of sexism and racism than Kant. Wieland's distinction between world inhabitants and world citizens does not map onto a distinction between, say, different sexes, races, or peoples. Wieland regards women as intellectually equal to men and argues that the enlightenment of women ought not to fall behind that of men (VAD 23:75). Moreover, in *The Abderites*, he criticizes the racially biased aesthetics of his contemporaries through the figure of Gulleru, Democritus' beautiful black friend, although he stops short of casting her as a fellow sage (Abd 1.4–1.6, 10:34–48). Kant, by contrast, defends a hierarchical account of human "races" until the 1790s and never gives up his view that women are naturally inferior to men. I shall discuss Kant's views on race in more detail in Chapter 4, arguing that Kant's pronouncements are inconsistent with the main principles of his own moral egalitarianism. Despite Kant's inconsistencies, however, it remains important to recognize the *theoretical* difference between the elitist and egalitarian conceptions of cosmopolitanism.

Related to the difference between Wieland's elitist and Kant's egalitarian theory is a difference in their views on determining how one ought to act. In accordance with his understanding of the special wisdom of sages, Wieland does not conceive of morality as providing a blueprint for action or a set of principles readily available to anyone. Rather, morality requires discerning what is rational and in accordance with nature in the Stoic sense (GKO 15:212–13), which is an ability given only to a few. Accordingly, Wieland is quite general in his description of what is morally required of the cosmopolitan. He mentions virtues such as prudence, steadfastness, frankness, and persistence, and he claims that reason commands "moderation in all things" (GKO 15:219). On his view, the hard question of what exactly those virtues require in practice is not one that can be answered, however. Nor does it need answering. Sages know the answer of their own accord, and the rest of humanity is too foolish to understand it.

Kant's theoretical egalitarianism, by contrast, is bound up with the view that all rational beings have insight into the basic principle of morality, namely, the Categorical Imperative. All ordinary human beings are able to discern right from wrong, and their understanding of what is morally demanded is fundamentally correct, even if it may lack precision and clarity. In fact, on Kant's view, if there is confusion on this

count, it is more likely to be caused by philosophers than by the common people. Kant, then, rejects the moral paternalism implicit in Wieland's cosmopolitanism, according to which the sages discern what is best for the "world inhabitants" and benefit them accordingly. Kant, too, regards promoting the well-being of others as a duty. But instead of doing so in accordance with one's own view of the good, one should respect others as moral agents in their own right. This entails that one let oneself be guided by *their* ends, provided these ends are morally defensible (e.g., one should not help another commit a crime), and one should take care that one not help others in a way that is humiliating or paternalistic (e.g., MdS 6:388, 448, 453).

3 THE ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY OF COSMOPOLITANISM AND PATRIOTISM

Despite their different ways of elaborating the moral cosmopolitan ideal, Kant and Wieland agree that rootless vagabondism is not part of it. As mentioned in the Introduction, Kant believes that one could be a world citizen in the full sense of the term and never leave one's home town (cf. ApH 7:120–21n.). Moreover, he agrees with Wieland that world citizenship is compatible with loyalty and special duties toward particular groups, such as one's own state or one's own family. Kant even goes so far as to say that patriotism is a cosmopolitan duty.

This combination of cosmopolitanism and patriotism usually goes unnoticed in the literature and, when it is observed, it is often interpreted as inconsistency. Many critics claim that cosmopolitanism is not able to do justice to the special personal ties between people and to the special obligations that are connected with these relationships. Cosmopolitanism, so their assumption goes, requires an attitude according to which we treat our own circle (family, friends, fellow citizens, etc.) no differently than strangers elsewhere in the world. If all humans, as moral persons, belong to a moral community that transcends national boundaries, compatriots and foreigners ought to be treated alike (at least as far as morality is concerned). On this assumption, it is then further claimed that cosmopolitanism condemns one to acting as a citizen of nowhere. The cosmopolitan ought to promote justice in general, everywhere and anywhere, without being allowed to act as a citizen of a particular country, let alone as a patriot – or so it is argued. This alleged result is often thought to constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of cosmopolitanism, or in any event a strong reason against it.

to one's own national community (taken as a linguistic and/or cultural community).[14] In the process, the older republican meaning receded from view, so much so that current readers may have trouble recognizing eighteenth-century conceptions of patriotism as "genuine" forms of patriotism because they feel that there is something missing which they regard as essential to it.

As is the case with cosmopolitanism, there is little value in quarrelling over the question whether the older or the newer conception represents the "real meaning" of patriotism. Words often accrue new meanings over time, and the best way to deal with that very common phenomenon is to distinguish between the different meanings when relevant. In this case, it means distinguishing the currently dominant nationalist understanding of patriotism from other versions of patriotism with older ancestry.

Whether the currently dominant understanding of the word is a reason to avoid using it in its older meaning, or whether the older meaning is worth retrieving exactly in order to show that the emphasis on the special connection between citizens and their own countries is not unique to nationalisms is a question I do not pursue here. What is important for the purposes of this book is that on Wieland's and Kant's understanding of the term, it can be used to capture the special allegiance of world citizens toward their own particular country.

4 WIELAND'S DEFENSE OF COSMOPOLITANISM AND PATRIOTISM

Wieland contends that the principles and convictions of world citizens justify their benevolent attitude toward the political community of which they are members. In other words: on his view it is possible to defend, on the basis of cosmopolitan principles, a certain benevolence toward one's own socio-political group. But, he adds immediately, the cosmopolitan principles also determine the proper limits of this beneficence.[15] For although world citizens wish the best for their own country, they also wish the best for all others, and that means that they are not allowed to promote the well-being, the reputation, and the expansion of their own country by undue preferential treatment of their own state or by oppressing others (GKO 15:217–18).

[14] Hugh Cunningham, "The Language of Patriotism, 1750–1914," *History Workshop* 12 (1981): 8–33.
[15] See also Abd 1.12, 10:75.

What Wieland claims here is that world citizens know that they cannot help *all* humans but that they ought to do good somewhere. Given this situation, one is allowed to benefit one's own group under certain conditions. Suppose, for the sake of argument, there are ten countries with people in need, and one's own country is one of them. It is not wrong, in that case, to help people in one of those other countries, because the cosmopolitan wishes the best for all humans. But it may be best to work in one's own country, for example when this is the only place where one can be effective. And when one directs one's beneficence toward one's compatriots, this is not unjust toward other people elsewhere, as long as one does not oppress them or give undue preferential treatment to one's own group (as when, for example, one's own group does not really need help).

But how does Wieland get from this position to the defense of patriotism? After all, if one's beneficent action is directed toward one's own country because this is the most efficient, the focus on one's own country would be accidental, as it were. One's help would not be motivated by "love of country" and so would not qualify as patriotic.

In order to understand Wieland's position correctly, it is important to see, first of all, that there are two kinds of patriotism that he rejects. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, he rejects *nationalist* patriotism, particularly the nationalism that extols the German people as a cultural unity with a shared Germanic heritage, because he regards this as both empirically fictitious and dogmatic. Second, he also rejects *militant republican* patriotism. He condemns the so-called "Roman" form of patriotism, by which he means the attitude of "republican enthusiasts" such as Brutus and Cassius (who killed Caesar after he had been given the title of "dictator in perpetuity") and Milton (who defended the decapitation of Charles I) (GKO 15:219). In keeping with his elitism and his contempt for "the foolish masses," Wieland defends political paternalism and believes that most people do not have the necessary abilities to qualify for political participation. Hence he strongly rejects republicanism in general,[16] and abhors still more the political murder of kings in the name of the people. But his rejection of nationalist and militant republican patriotism does not imply that he rejects *all* forms, and he does in fact defend a third form.

[16] Earlier in his life Wieland had been a defender of republicanism, but he became disillusioned with it during the 1760s, when he learned of Bern's expulsion of Rousseau and served as scribe of the chancellery in the small free town of Biberach. See Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 345.

Wieland describes the form of patriotism that he defends as the "love of the present constitution of the commonwealth" (*Liebe der gegenwärtigen Verfassung des gemeinen Wesens*) and the honest attempt to contribute to the maintenance and perfection thereof (PB 15:279–80, cf. Patr 15:592). He claims that this patriotic love naturally emerges in the good state: "Patriotism is the natural product of the contentment of the people with its situation, a contentment which is based on the justice of the laws and the reliability of their enforcement" (Patr 15:593). It is the love for a political system and the attempt to maintain and perfect it. This love naturally emerges in just states, because wealth is distributed more equally in a just state, the people enjoy certain rights and liberties, and they recognize and value the security provided by the just state (Patr 15:590). This love of one's country is not accidental, but tied to the specific qualities of its political system. People are generally happier in a just state than in an unjust state, and when they realize the positive role played by the state, Wieland claims, they will come to love it. The patriotism which he defends is therefore tied to the quality of the political system. It is not tied to a national or cultural group. It is in fact a version of what has come to be termed "constitutional patriotism," in the phrase of Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas[17] (though their criterion for deciding *which* constitutions deserve such patriotism is radically different from Wieland's).

Wieland contends that the Germans have good reasons to be patriotic in this sense, given the loose and pluralistic political system of the Holy Roman Empire. Most rulers have a relatively good system of legislation, he writes, and most also make an effort to promote the well-being of the population. If one does not like one's own ruler or political system, it is not too difficult to move to a different jurisdiction. There is less social inequality in Germany than elsewhere in Europe, and the average standard of living is not too bad: Germany knows the "golden mean" (VHC 23:390). In short, the Germans have a number of reasons to be patriotic, precisely because they do *not* live in a centralized state like France.

Wieland's empirical claims may well be overstated,[18] and it is easy to disagree with his political ideal of the paternalistic monarch, but that is not my concern here. What *is* important in the present context is that this kind of constitutional patriotism, the love of a political system and the attempt to maintain and perfect it, is compatible with cosmopolitanism.

[17] Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in *Between Facts and Norms*, Jürgen Habermas, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 491–515; Dolf Sternberger, *Verfassungspatriotismus* (Frankfurt: Insel, 1990).

[18] See Sahmland, *Christoph Martin Wieland*, 195–200.

As long as the justice of the laws is determined in terms of cosmopolitan standards, and as long as one's patriotism does not come at the expense of others, constitutional patriotism can go hand in hand with cosmopolitanism. Assuming a cosmopolitan ideal of justice, there is no problem with loving one's own just country for being just. One can also come to love countries other than one's own for their justice, although this love is likely to be less strong. When this happens, such love is not called patriotism but something else, for instance graecophilia or francophilia. But when it concerns one's own country, such love can rightly be called "patriotic" love. The standard criticism of Wieland – that he contradicts himself by defending both cosmopolitanism and patriotism – thus misses the central point of his endorsement of patriotism.

This diagnosis is confirmed if we look at the textual support adduced for the claim that Wieland contradicts himself. Frederick Beiser cites Wieland as saying that cosmopolitan principles exclude the sentiment known as "love of the fatherland," and adds that "Wieland's attitude toward the German nation was much more complex, and much more favorable, than his cosmopolitanism would allow."[19] The passage about "love of the fatherland" which Beiser quotes, however, actually expresses a different view. The "passion" that Wieland calls "incompatible with cosmopolitan principles" is not "love of the fatherland" in general, but, more narrowly, "what was called love of the fatherland by the proud citizens of that city that believed it was founded in order to rule the world," namely Rome (GKO 15:217). In other words, what Wieland here calls incompatible with cosmopolitanism is the "republican enthusiast" variety of patriotism (GKO 15:217, 219), not patriotism in general. He distances himself from forms of patriotism that aim to ground the "prosperity, fame, or size of one's country on intentional preferential treatment and on oppression of other states" (GKO 15:218). Certainly, militant and imperialist patriotism runs counter to cosmopolitanism. But this does not imply that all forms of patriotism do.

On Wieland's account, it follows that if one's *patria* is unjust internally or in its outward relations, it will not engender constitutional patriotism. This form of patriotism emerges only as the result of good government. World citizens who happen to live in a bad and unjust state will of course attempt to promote reforms, but they do so without being inspired by patriotism. And should their attempts to reform their own political community lead to nothing, they may turn toward other endeavors. In

[19] Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 352.

Wieland's narrative, this is exactly what Democritus does after all his efforts in Abdera have failed. He moves away and devotes himself to more fruitful projects.

5 KANT ON COSMOPOLITAN PATRIOTISM

Kant, too, defends both patriotism and cosmopolitanism. There are even a number of striking passages in which Kant claims that cosmopolitans *ought* to act patriotically. In the *Reflexionen* on Anthropology, he speaks of a "national delusion" (*Nationalwahn*) that one's own nation is inherently superior to others. Kant claims that this delusion should be "eradicated" and replaced by "patriotism and cosmopolitism" (R 15:591). In the *Metaphysics of Morals Vigilantius* – lectures Kant probably gave in 1793–94 – he curiously speaks of "world patriotism and local patriotism," and says that "both are required of the cosmopolitan" (MdS Vig 27.2:673–74). In "On the Common Saying," he advocates both a "cosmopolitan constitution" (GTP 8:307–13) and a "patriotic way of thinking" (GTP 8:291). Similarly, he defends a cosmopolitan ideal in the *Metaphysics of Morals* while also advocating a "patriotic" regime (MdS 6:317).

On the basis of these quotations, Kant's views on patriotism may sound profoundly contradictory, and this may explain why they are almost completely ignored in the literature.[20] Indeed, most political theorists take it to be a defining problem of Kantian theory that it leaves no theoretical space for special duties toward one's own state. Several authors have objected that there may well be a Kantian justification for states in general and for the duty to promote justice in general, but that this does not (and cannot) show that I have a duty of special allegiance toward the *particular* state that is *mine*. John Simmons has argued that Kantian arguments for a duty toward one's particular state are missing an essential component. He formulates the objection in this way:

> [E]ven if you had perfectly general duties to promote justice and happiness, say, and consequently duties to support just or happiness-producing states, these duties would require of you that you support all such states, providing you with no necessary reason to show any special favouritism or unique allegiance to

[20] Two texts mention the topic: cf. Manfred Riedel, "Menschenrechtsuniversalismus und Patriotismus: Kants politisches Vermächtnis an unsere Zeit," in *Politik und Ethik*, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 331–61; and Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press: 1999), 132–45. Riedel provides an instructive overview of the relevant passages in Kant's work. Cavallar discusses Riedel's essay and shows some parallels between Kant's discussion of patriotism and the current debate about "constitutional patriotism."

therefore be a system according to which the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all others. In the absence of a just legal system with coercive authority, no one can be secure against violence by others (MdS 6:312). This is not because people in the state of nature are necessarily hostile toward each other. Kant explicitly claims that the requirement to establish a just state also holds when we assume that people in the state of nature are "good-natured and justice-loving" (*gutartig und rechtsliebend*, MdS 6:312). Thus, the argument does not hinge on particular anthropological claims about human psychological propensities or on a claim regarding the empirical circumstances in which human beings find themselves. Rather, the problem is that in the state of nature, freedom cannot be protected and right cannot be instituted. Hence, people ought to join those with whom they interact, submit to common public laws and law enforcement, and thus form a state in accordance with the requirements of right (MdS 6:236–37, 255–57, 264–66, 311–13; MdS Vig 27.2:528).

It is important to note that Kant's view here is neither that people should choose to live in a just state because it is in their interest to do so, nor that the people's free consent is what gives the state its normative authority. Rather, his view is that every human being has a fundamental ("innate") right to freedom, and that this right requires the coercive power of a state which justly enforces the laws that lay down how far that freedom extends. It might of course *also* be the case that people find it to be in their interest to form a just state, and it might empirically be the case that people *also* consent to membership in such a state. But neither the beneficial role of the state nor the consent of the people subjecting themselves to its laws is the foundation for the legitimacy of the just state or the requirement to establish it.[25]

On Kant's view, the just state is a republic, in which the citizens are free and equal co-legislators. All "active" citizens have the right to vote, but their legislative activity is to take place via their representatives: "Any true republic is and can be nothing other than a *representative system* of the people, in order to protect its rights in its name, by all the citizens united and acting through their delegates (deputies)" (MdS 6:341, cf. 6:319, 322). Moreover, a republic should separate the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government (MdS 6:315–17).

This is important to the question of patriotism because such a conception of the state implies that citizens have certain *duties* toward it that they

[25] See also Arthur Ripstein, *Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

do not have toward other states. Why this is so is best brought out by contrasting the republic with a despotic state. Conceptually speaking, a despotic state is possible even when its subjects try to retreat into their own private projects as much as they can and make it their principle to disregard their own state. These subjects are not an integral part of the workings of the state. They may be necessary to provide the state with wealth (through taxation), but if the state has independent resources, such as mines, it may in principle function even without any involvement on their part.

By contrast, Kant defines citizens in a republic as "members of … a society who are united for giving law" (MdS 6:314). The description of the active citizen as a free and equal, co-legislating member of the state implies that a republic can exist only when its citizens support and are involved in its core institutions. Citizens ought not to treat the state as a mere instrument for their own benefit; given that the state is conceived as the united body of the citizens, this would come down to treating their fellow citizens as mere means. This explains Kant's comment, in "On the Common Saying," that it is one of the characteristics of the patriotic attitude that one regards oneself as prohibited from subjecting the commonwealth to one's arbitrary personal purposes and using it at one's discretion (GTP 8:291).

Instead, citizens should acknowledge that they stand in a unique relation to their own republic. For if all citizens of a *republic* decide to focus exclusively on their private affairs and to withdraw from public affairs as a matter of principle, the republic as *res publica* becomes impossible. This is because a system of *self*-government is conceptually impossible if all citizens adopt the maxim not to pay any special attention to their own state. The problem here does not occur at the level of empirical consequences, as it is an empirically open question whether citizens will ever in fact disperse their attention in this way, and republics might de facto function even without the commitment and active involvement of all of their citizens. Rather, the problem is that such a maxim, when universally adopted by citizens who strive to promote republican states for the sake of justice, leads to a contradiction at a fundamental level. Such citizens would make it their principle to promote just republics for the sake of justice, while at the same time refusing, as a matter of principle, to do what is necessary for just republics to exist.

Thus, because the republican system of political self-legislation is the only kind of state that is fully in accordance with the requirements of morality and right, according to Kant, and because republics require the involvement of their citizens for self-legislation to be possible in the

first place, the maxim to renounce one's special bond with the republic in which one is a citizen cannot be willed as a universal law. From a Kantian perspective this maxim is shown to be wrong. As a result, there is a duty to be concerned with the political life of one's own republic (or democracy, in today's understanding of the term). Therefore, one ought to adopt the maxim to fulfill one's role as citizen. This means, in answer to Simmons' charge, that one does have a *special* allegiance and *special* obligations to the state of which one is a citizen.

The key point is that because a just state is a republic (in Kant's sense), the normative requirement to establish just states implies a duty, albeit perhaps minimal, on the part of citizens toward their *particular* just state. This duty is not based on consent or received benefits but flows from the special role citizens play in a republic. This is a role that they can play *only* for the republic in which they are *citizens*. Therefore, one could usefully distinguish this form of patriotism from other versions by calling it "civic patriotism."

This argument supports a negative (perfect) duty not to pay no special attention to the civic affairs in one's own state as a matter of principle, and it supports an equivalent positive (imperfect) duty to adopt the maxim to have some special concern for the state in which one is citizen. The argument thus gives rise to a positive duty to be concerned, for the sake of justice, with at least the following: (1) the preservation of the republican state in which one is a citizen, (2) its flourishing insofar (and only insofar) as a certain degree of flourishing is necessary for the state to secure justice (bankrupt states cannot enforce their own laws), and (3) the functioning of the state as a republic and the improvement of its institutions where necessary (including such preconditions for effective political participation as a good educational system). All this, and perhaps more, is necessary to maintain a just state, and to maintain and improve an imperfectly just one.

Which activities civic patriotism requires of one will depend on the situation and on one's abilities. Regarding oneself as a "member" of the commonwealth may lead to a broad range of activities on its behalf, in addition to the obvious activity of voting, such as participating in public debate about laws and policies or promoting enlightened education. We are here dealing with what in Kantian parlance is called an imperfect duty, which means that no precise list can be given of what exactly needs to be done under what circumstances.

This shows that Kant can indeed consistently defend the view that citizens have special duties toward the just state of which they are citizens,

duties they do not have toward other states or their members. Ruling out *any* special status of and unique allegiance to one's own just republic would come down to requiring a world in which one were not allowed to form just republics at all. Given the crucial role of the republic in Kant's theory of right, the impossibility of a republic would imply the impossibility of right itself.

Importantly, the argument above does not yield a blanket justification for directing one's moral and political efforts entirely toward one's compatriots while disregarding the needs of others. Citizens ought to adopt the maxim to promote the functioning and improvement of the republic as an institution of justice. This is not originally a duty to support one's compatriots but, rather, a duty to promote the institutionalization of justice. If and when one's compatriots receive certain benefits as a result, this is not simply because they are one's compatriots but rather because they are members of the just republic that needs the involvement of its citizens in order to function and improve as an institution of justice.

Of course, the duty of civic patriotism does not prohibit one from trying to promote just states elsewhere. Because (on Kant's account) an imperfect duty is the duty to adopt a certain maxim and not a duty to do a certain act, and because one has a number of different maxims, it is even possible that one adopts the maxim to pay special attention to one's own republic, as a citizen, and that one still ends up working for justice elsewhere in the world, say, under the maxim to help others in need. In the case of imperfect duties, it is not wrong not to act on a maxim on some occasions, provided one's failure to act on the maxim does not stem from a failure to adopt it (MdS 6:390). Thus, it is not wrong not to act on one's maxim of patriotism in favor of some cosmopolitan end, and vice versa, provided one has indeed adopted both maxims. People have many different duties, and it is a matter of *moral judgment* to decide, given the many duties one acknowledges, the circumstances, and one's abilities, what one is to do in a particular situation. Determining what ought to be done in specific situations cannot be calculated *in abstracto*. Claiming that we have a patriotic duty toward our own republic, therefore, does not imply that we should always give priority to one's duties as a citizen over one's other duties. For example, most people would acknowledge that someone who is on her way to the polls, five minutes before closing time, and who comes across a severely wounded person in an otherwise empty street who clearly needs help, ought not to let that person die in order to make it to the polling station in time. It is important, though, that one not *renounce* one's special role as citizen as a matter of principle.

Furthermore, there is no inherent and necessary conflict between patriotic and cosmopolitan duties. It is not difficult to think of situations in which the two are compatible, or even of situations in which both can be fulfilled at the same time. For example, in promoting the justice of one's own republic one should strive to make it more just in its dealings with other states. Kant regards patriotism and cosmopolitanism as leading in the same direction, and this makes it even *desirable*, from the perspective of one's own republic, that people elsewhere adopt the maxim of civic patriotism in *their* countries. Republics are by nature more peaceful than tyrannies, Kant argues, because citizens would have a vote as to whether or not the state will start a war, and having to shoulder the burdens of war themselves, they are less likely to vote for war (ZeF 8:351). Tending toward peace, republics are more likely to promote the cosmopolitan goal of perpetual peace, which in turn enhances the stability of the republics themselves. In short, Kant's view is that the more cosmopolitan patriots of the right sort there are in the world, the more people there are who support republican forms of government, and the more this will promote the cause of freedom, right, and world-wide peace.

Conversely, Kant holds that opposing the patriotic good to the cosmopolitan good involves a misunderstanding of the former and is self-destructive in the long run. He gives the example of the Greeks, who in his view

> expressed no benevolence towards foreigners, and who instead labeled foreigners as enemies: This was a prominent source of the decline of their state, because this produced … hostility, jealousy, and a tendency to oppose the interest of foreign states. (MdS Vig 27.2:674)

A just republic and its citizens will naturally conduct themselves in a way that is peaceful and just toward non-citizens internally and toward other states and non-citizens in their external relations. In other words, whenever cosmopolitans work on behalf of freedom and justice within their own countries, they do so in a way that is compatible with promoting justice elsewhere, too. They do not try to improve the standard of living in their own state by exploiting others elsewhere. Instead, on Kant's view, they aim to achieve justice both at home and abroad.

Some theorists attach importance to patriotic responsibilities being non-derivative and fundamental, rather than being justified indirectly from cosmopolitan premises. Samuel Scheffler, for example, claims that if special responsibilities are justified indirectly, this "drastically demote[s] such responsibilities in status and significance," and that the only account