Keywords for Today

Appropriation
Black
Capitalism
Celebrity
Class
Democracy
Depression
Evolution
Feminist

A 21st Century Vocabulary

Gender
Karma
Liberal
Love
Muslim
Network
Occupy
Political
Queer
Race
Risk
Sexuality
Soul
Technology
Trauma
Truth
Violence
Youth

The Keywords Project

Edited by

Colin MacCabe and Holly Yanacek

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KEYWORDS FOR TODAY

A 21ST CENTURY VOCABULARY

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COLIN MACCABE

HOLLY YANACEK

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History of the Keywords Project

The Keywords Project is a radically collaborative, cross-institutional, and cross-disciplinary research initiative sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh, Jesus College Cambridge, and the academic journal *Critical Quarterly*. Over the past decade, the members of the Keywords Project have worked to update Raymond Williams's classic *Keywords* for the 21st century and new generations of readers.

As the Keywords Project concludes, the membership list includes some who have left the Project and others who joined while work was already underway, but all have contributed to the substance of this volume and of the website (http://keywords.pitt.edu/):

Sylvia Adamson, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics and Literary History, School of English, University of Sheffield

Kathryn Allan, Senior Lecturer in the History of English, University College London

Susan Z. Andrade, Associate Professor of English, University of Pittsburgh

Jonathan Arac, Director of the Humanities Center at the University of Pittsburgh

Jennifer Davis, Faculty of Law and Fellow of Wolfson College, University of Cambridge

Alan Durant, Professor of Communication in the School of Law, Middlesex University, London

Philip Durkin, Deputy Chief Editor of the *Oxford English Dictionary*

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Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, SOAS University of London
Stephen Heath, Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, and Keeper of the Old Library
Colin MacCabe, Distinguished Professor of English and Film, University of Pittsburgh
Seth Mehl, Research Associate, School of English, University of Sheffield
Arjuna Parakrama, Senior Professor of English, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka
Kellie Robertson, Associate Professor of English, University of Maryland
Holly Yanacek, Assistant Professor of German, James Madison University

In addition to these fourteen members of the Keywords Project, *Keywords for Today* brought together over twenty participants in University of Pittsburgh graduate seminars. More information about the seminar directed by Jonathan Arac and Colin MacCabe may be found in *Critical Quarterly* (2016), along with a sample of the students' work; some others appear as part of this volume, and yet others appear on the website. These are the students and the words they worked on: Samuel Allen, *Public*; Amanda Awanjo, *Trans*; Sagnika Chanda, *Man*; Evan Chen, *Gentrification*; Max Ginsberg, *Authority*; Joshua Graber, *Social*; Sylvia Grove, *Artificial*; Treviene Harris, *Privilege*; Kaitlyn Haynal, *Access*; Adam Hebert, *Occupy*; Artan Hoxha, *Fundamental*; Nicholas Marsellas, *Respect*; Sarah Mejia, *Digital*; Alexandra Ouyang, *Security*; Lauren Posey, *Gender*; Sarah Schaefer, *Love*; Tetyana Shlikar, *Network*; Leonardo Solano, *Diaspora*; Nicholas Stefanski, *Future*; Marina Tyquiengco, *Appropriation*.

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Introduction

Key is a very old word in English with the simple sense of an instrument designed to be inserted into a lock and turned. Over time it has developed a whole range of figurative uses, and in its sense of "a solution or explanation for a problem" it undoubtedly informed Raymond Williams's choice of the term **keywords** to name the set of words for which he began to write glosses in the 1950s. These **keywords** helped to solve both a very particular and a very general problem with which he was wrestling in that decade. The particular problem was the meaning of *culture*. In 1948 T. S. Eliot had published *Notes towards the Definition of Culture*. Eliot was widely considered both as the greatest of living poets and the most important of literary critics, but his message was unambiguously conservative. If you valued culture, then you had to abandon the desire for a classless society, because culture could only be produced by a class-stratified society. As a socialist, Williams had struggled against these arguments, and he found his solution, almost by chance, in the *Oxford English Dictionary*: the dictionary's history of this complex word *culture* allowed him both to place Eliot's argument within a development and also to find in that development alternative arguments, which linked the fullest form of culture to the fullest growth of democracy in a classless society. Eliot's definition of *culture* effectively restricted it to the arts, but the dictionary revealed that this sense of the word dated back no further than the late nineteenth century. Earlier meanings of the word stretched back a further century, and they focused on a general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development. Those earlier senses led Williams to his own formulation of *culture* as "a whole way of life." By this means he could value the solidarity that he understood to be the great cultural value

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of the working class into which he had been born, while he could also value those artistic productions to which Eliot had limited the sense of the word.

The *OED* not only provided a very specific answer to the particular problem of *culture*, it also provided the best evidence for the very slow and complicated process of social change which Williams was trying to understand in the 1950s. This had a deeply personal level, explored in his semi-autobiographical novel *Border Country*, but it was also a pressing political problem for anyone who agreed with Marx's analysis of the centrality of class struggle but who rejected Lenin's call for violent and sudden revolution. As Williams tracked his **keywords** across the matrix of the *OED* and his own reading, he revealed those slow movements of consciousness composed both of material progress and mental reflection, which he christened "the long revolution." This revolution made the development of the forms of communication from newspapers to television, from the book to the standard language a crucial element in the development of a fully democratic society. Williams's decade of work in the 1950s produced, in addition to his novel, two massively influential books: *Culture and Society* and *The Long Revolution*. He also produced his glossary of **keywords**, but his publisher, citing the cost of extra pages, refused to include it as an appendix to *Culture and Society*.

Williams published *Keywords*, as a stand-alone book, two decades later in 1976. By then he was no longer an adult education teacher but a university professor at Cambridge, and Lenin's call for a short and sudden revolution had found a new audience in the politicized students of Western universities. **Keywords**, with its long perspective of linguistic change, makes an implicit argument against any such sudden revolution. Williams's work, and the long revolution for which he argued, was deeply rooted in the experience of the postwar years and a moment of great political optimism concerning the possibility of social change. That change would take many decades and generations to reach its final conclusion, but all Williams's work evinces this fundamental political optimism. Today, the universal coverage provided by the British National Health Service remains the most visible evidence of that moment.

The Keywords Project to update Williams's work took shape in the first decade of the 21st century, when it appeared to many that a Labour government in London and a Democratic administration in Washington had largely abandoned the ambition to achieve a more equal society and when the false dawn of the 1960s and its promise of liberation had degenerated into a host of competing identity politics. The members of the Keywords Project could loosely be described as of the left, but it was not politics that propelled us through a decade of writing new entries.

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Political imperatives drove Williams to language, but intellectual admiration drove the Project. *Keywords* had pioneered a new way to tell the history of English. That history now needed updating. We all hope that this work will be politically illuminating, but the politics must emerge from the linguistic analysis.

The Keywords Project began over fifty years after Williams had done the bulk of this work. In this period, political and technological change had thrown up new words and had rendered others obsolete. Indeed, even Williams's title was not immune from this process. When Williams selected **keyword** as his name for those lexical items that concentrated political and cultural disagreement, the word also had a specialist meaning related to indexes and catalogues. That specialist use of **keyword**, after Williams's death, came to designate a word entered as a search term in a database or search engine. That term has become so important in our digital world that we had to consider whether we should try to find a new name for what we were doing to update Williams's vocabulary. We decided against such a radical step because there is little chance of confusing the two meanings. Williams's and our use of **keyword** is rooted in the widespread non-technical use of **key** in such familiar phrases as *key witness* and *key concept*.

Williams never makes explicit his criteria for what constitutes a **keyword**; they grow out of his general research project. In deciding which words to discard from Williams's list and which to add, we had to make his criteria explicit. First, they must be words current in social and political debate, and that currency must stretch beyond academic contexts. *Alienation* was one of Williams's words that failed this test. One could argue for its continuing philosophical and political importance as a word that articulates together the individual and the social, but its frequency of use has declined very sharply; in the 1960s there was no doubt that it was a **keyword**, but now it no longer functions in widespread debate. However, frequency is not the only criterion. Both *mentor* and *debt* were words we considered adding because they are much used now, but their philological histories show little complexity, and we do not find several meanings active together in any contemporary use of the words. The best characterization of a **keyword** is a word that both bears a complex meaning rooted in centuries of social history and also features that complexity in current debate. In focusing on these **keywords**, we follow Williams in viewing language not as a shared understanding but rather as a site of division, with the crucial twist that some of the most crucial divisions are masked by the **keywords** themselves. They seem to suggest a single meaning, where in fact there are many competing semantic elements. A very good example of this is the **keyword**

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democracy, where what is meant by "rule of the people" oscillates constantly between notions of representative parliamentary democracy and more direct forms of popular rule, ranging from referendums to workers' representation on company boards. In a volume claiming to represent crucial terms for the early 21st century, one might reasonably expect to find many versions of *cyber* and *digital*. We have not, however, chosen words on the basis of their mere ubiquity. Instead, following the principles articulated in Williams's own Introduction, we have sought to identify words that could be used in virtually antithetical ways by individuals or social groups with very different social agendas, concepts whose meaning is contested in some crucial way.

Setting out to update *Keywords* was not simply a question of adding recent developments to the some forty of Williams's entries that were still current and of replacing some eighty-five of his words that had faded into history with newer words from the political and social debates of our time. We also believed that the huge databases and powerful search engines now available would enable us to broaden the base of Williams's work. The long revolution continues in the digital revolution, and in the study of vocabulary and the lexicon, the most obvious new resource has been the emergence of ever larger corpora of (largely written) English, especially contemporary written standard US and British English. (Appendix 1 provides a survey of the sources we used.) Such corpora make it possible to obtain a snapshot of the "typical" behavior of a word (in the types of source that they are compiled from). In studying a word, you let the software generate a summary of the usual patterns of collocation shown by a word—e.g., which other words a noun typically occurs beside, or which verbs it is typically the object of—and then analyze this summary to discover what it reveals about the word's semantics. *Collocate* proved such an important technical term that we have not purged it from our entries, which we had hoped to keep completely free of specialized linguistic or lexicographic terminology. Yet collocation patterns and analysis of frequency are not the best instruments for investigating many of the questions this book most cares about: often, our entries focus on fine nuances of meaning and connotation, which emerge from close reading of significant texts. The interaction and intertwining of language with culture and society form the core of this book, and investigating this necessarily involves stepping beyond corpus data abstracted from a word's original contexts of use. In establishing the discrimination and interaction of meanings, we have found, like Williams, that our most important tools have been the *OED* and our own reading and frames of intellectual reference.

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Williams's *Keywords* grew from an individual intellectual and political project; *Keywords for Today* brought together some dozen individuals differentiated by age, gender, class, and nationality, as well as over twenty participants in University of Pittsburgh seminars. This multiple and multiply differentiated authorship of the entries is evident even when the entries have been subjected to the most rigorous standardization by collaborative editing. Something certainly is lost as we miss the unified tone and manner of Williams's entries, but something also is gained in the different range of readings and references. What unifies both *Keywords* and *Keywords for Today* is the method of close reading developed by I. A. Richards and elaborated by William Empson for the reading of complex poetry. Williams's most original contribution came from applying this method to the historical record of the English language. *Keywords for Today* follows in those footsteps.

Williams composed his **keyword** entries at a time when the national press in England enjoyed its period of greatest dominance, and *Keywords* can be understood as assuming the discursive dominance of such a national press. The challenge to this dominance posed by the new technology of television had not yet become clear in Williams's lifetime, because public service broadcasting in Britain preserved and enlarged the discursive space that Williams explored. However, since his death in 1988, the breaking of the public service remit for British television in the 1990s and even more importantly the growth of the Internet have fundamentally altered the public discursive space. In 1990, research showed that the vast majority of the population, after leaving formal education, used writing only to make lists (as the telephone had very largely usurped the role of letter writing); however, the next twenty years saw an explosion of writing. By e-mailing, texting, blogging, and tweeting, written language burgeoned in ways that redefine our conceptions of public and private and that may even end by abolishing entirely the press which provided a central focus for Williams.

Such considerations threaten to render the very pursuit of a **keywords** project obsolete. The notion of investigating polysemous words whose histories carry clues to sharpening and making more acute social debate may seem to belong to the past. And yet when we look at society, at health, at education, we see in words like *diversity, well-being*, and *excellence* a crystallization of social contradictions that seem active in our political debates. We still share Williams's hope that sketching this crystallization may add an extra "edge of consciousness" to contemporary social understanding.

The Keywords Project

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How to Read *Keywords for Today*

Types of Headwords in this Volume

Standard font (e.g., IDENTITY)

Completely new entries written by Keywords Project members

Bold font (e.g., DEMOCRACY)

Words in Raymond Williams's *Keywords* with recent developments

***Bold italic font* (e.g., *SEXUALITY*)**

New entries that replace entries in Williams's *Keywords*

In-Text and End-of-Text Cross-References

Raymond Williams used cross-references in his original *Keywords* in order to remind readers of the "many necessary connections" between his analyses of particular words.

Following Williams, cross-references to other words in *Keywords for Today* are provided within the text and at the end of each entry in small caps (e.g., See LITERATURE, REALISM).

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Citation Practice for Secondary Sources

In the era of fake news, it is more vital than ever that every argument is properly sourced so that any reader may pursue the discussion to its roots. However, to use unnecessary scholarly apparatus would be against all that Raymond Williams embodied.

At the core of each entry in this book is dialogue between the history of each word as presented in the *OED* and our own readings in social and cultural history. Unless otherwise noted, the different senses of each word are cited from the *OED*, and, following Williams, quotations followed by a name and date only, or a date only, are often illustrative examples cited in the *OED*. Quotes from other sources that are not cited in the *OED* are only identified if they cannot be searched easily on Google. For the rest, scholarly marking of author name, title, and date indicate their importance for the argument. This follows Williams's practice in the original *Keywords*: references are part of the discourse. The ease of searching on Google was the criteria used to prune Williams's original according to his own principles.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the text.

fw	immediate forerunner of a word, in the same or another language.
rw	ultimate traceable word, from which "root" meanings are derived.
C	followed by numeral, century (C19: nineteenth century).
eC	first period (third) of a century.
mC	middle period (third) of a century.
lC	last period (third) of a century.
a	(before a date) *ante*, before, not later than.
c	(before a date) *circa*, approximately.
AN	Anglo-Norman
ME	Middle English (*c*1100–1500).
OE	Old English (to *c*1100).
F	French

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mF Medieval French

oF Old French

Gk Classical Greek

IE Indo-European

It Italian

L Latin

mL Medieval Latin

vL Vulgar Latin

OED *The Oxford English Dictionary*.

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ABSTRACT

Abstract comes from Latin *abstractus*: this is the past participle of the verb *abstrahere*, to draw from, and the elements it is composed of are *abs*, from, and *tractus*, drawn. It enters English from lC14 as past participle and then adjective: "[the authors] of whom thys presente cronicle is abstracte" (1475). With the formation of **abstract** as a verb, **abstracted** eventually replaced **abstract** as participle. The senses of **abstract** and the noun **abstraction** (second half of C15) follow from the Latin etymology, involving ideas of withdrawing, removing, separating from: *c*1550, "He dois chestee [rebuke] them, be the abstractione of . . . superfluite"; 1690, "The more abstract therefore we are from the Body, . . . the more fit we shall be both to behold, and to indure the Rays of the Divine Light."

Such **abstraction** could have a more secular context: 1660, "Justice must have . . . abstraction from all affections of love, hate, or self-interest." It could also refer to mental inattention: 1509, "Theyr mynde abstract, nat knowynge what they say." This sense has become common, usually with more or less negative connotations. Charles Dickens talks cheerfully of his "habit of easy self-abstraction" (1867), but **abstract** in Iris Murdoch's *A Severed Head* (1961) indicates failure of expression or feeling: "she spoke in an abstract tone"; "the abstractedness of his bond [with his lover]." Joseph Conrad's *The Shadow Line* (1917) exemplifies the habitual opposition of **abstract** and *concrete*: the command of a ship "is an abstract idea," which the encounter with its "concrete existence" makes real—"concreting the abstract sentiment." From eC19 there is a use of **abstraction** to mean theft: "He robs nothing but the revenue—an abstraction I never greatly cared about" (Charles

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Lamb, 1828); **abstracting electricity** is a criminal offense in British law (the offense with which computer hackers were initially charged).

The *OED* cites an occurrence of "a noun abstract" by 1398, and the characterization of certain nouns as **abstract**, denoting an idea, quality, or state, or *concrete*, denoting an individual particularity, is established in grammar and logic by C17: "Let it be considered whither it be a Noun Abstract or Concrete" (Zachary Coke, 1653). A similar distinction is made from that time with regard to numbers: "some are said to be abstract, and some concreate" (Thomas Blundeville, 1594). For John Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), **abstraction** is the process "whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind." The existence, or not, of such representatives or "abstract ideas" concerned British empiricist philosophers in accounting for knowledge as derived from the senses, and **abstraction** was taken generally as epistemologically fundamental, "the first in order of the scientific processes" (Alexander Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, 1855).

Though **abstract** is not an entry in Raymond Williams's *Keywords*, it is very much a key word in his writing. Most *Keywords* words are **abstract** nouns of Latin provenance, and come from what Williams calls "the vocabulary of learning and power." **Abstraction** could be regarded as a defining *human* capacity—for Locke "the power of abstracting" marked "a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes" but also a *social* one related to class and education: "the Vulgar have not such Logical Heads, as to be able to Abstract subtile Conceptions" (Robert South, 1690). For George Orwell, "many necessary abstract words" were class-identified and so rejected by the working class as "public-schoolish" (Orwell, *The English People*, 1947). Williams's stated intention in *Culture and Society*, from which *Keywords* derives, was to give people confidence in using such words.

Abstract appears regularly in *Keywords* to describe this class of word: *communications* is "the abstract general term" in C19 for "roads, canals, railways." It is also often distinguished from *general: society* is "our most general term for the body of institutions and relationships within which a relatively large group of people live" *and* "our most abstract term for the condition in which such institutions and relationships are formed." The distinction is important for Williams's treatment of his keywords, critically seen as frequently involving a hardening into abstraction. *Progress* as "forward movement" has no necessary ideological implication. There is, however, an ideological abstraction of this movement as "a discoverable historical pattern," linked to similarly abstracted

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and ideologically deployed formulations of *civilization* and *improvement*. **Abstract** is essential to *Culture and Society*'s analysis of modes of thought abstracted from a society's "whole way of life"—thinking not governed by attention to social reality and historical process leads "very quickly to abstraction and unreality." *Culture and Society* itself was later faulted by Williams for "a degree of abstraction from history," and Williams used this self-criticism to make an important distinction between *ideology* and *hegemony*. Marx attacked "the abstract categories of 'individual' and 'society,' " and attacked ideology as "abstract and false thought," yet Marxism could itself fall too easily into abstraction. Hegemony goes beyond "abstracted ideology," refuses "to equate consciousness with the articulated formal system which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as 'ideology,' " and understands "a wider area of reality than the abstractions of 'social' and 'economic' experience" (Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 1977).

Tocqueville noted a predilection for "abstract expressions" in "democratic languages," and a tendency "to sublimate into further abstraction the abstract terms of the language": "an abstract term is like a box with a false bottom: you may put in it what ideas you please" (*Democracy in America*, trans. H. Reeve, 1840). **Abstract** and **abstraction**, indeed, have been key words in arguments over democracy, notably as regards its dependence on abstracting from the concrete realities of the individuals within it—democracy as "a dense abstract mass of somebody elses" (Wyndham Lewis, 1927). Recent feminist thought has opposed **abstract individualism**: the masking of individual histories and cultural experiences with "abstract notions of equality" (Marie A. Failinger, 2007). Arguments here crystallize around *liberalism*, perceived as viewing "individual human beings as social atoms, abstracted from their social contexts" (Marilyn Friedman, 1989).

The first decades of C20 saw an important concern with **abstraction** in LITERATURE and ART. "Go in fear of abstractions"—poetic images "should be 'concrete' " (Ezra Pound, 1913); this at the same time as the emergence of **abstract art**, or art moving away from figurative traditions. *OED* has an instance of **abstract painting** from 1851, then **abstract canvas**, 1915; **abstraction** as opposed to *realism*, 1909; and **abstract expressionism**, 1922. **Abstract** here indicates a crisis of REPRESENTATION, running parallel with arguments about political—democratic—representation. On the one hand, there is a movement against abstraction, for a language of the concrete in place of a worn-out language of "abstract counters" (T. E. Hulme, 1909); on the other, abstraction is presented as a throwing off of conventional forms, a struggle for new vision, new language (Virginia Woolf wants

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a cinema of "abstractions," 1926; and she attempts in *To the Lighthouse* "the most difficult abstract writing," 1927).

The history of **abstract** shows not so much substantial shifts in meaning as shifts in the value attached to Locke's "power of abstracting." This is evident in the ways in which the last two hundred years or so have seen the word given both negative and positive values; this above all in thinking about the individual and society, rights and equality—the very focus of *Keywords* and of Williams's work overall.

See ART, REPRESENTATION

ACCESS

The use of **access** has increased considerably in English in the last fifty years at the same time as its once current medical meanings have become effectively archaic. This increase is directly related to its use in relation to both disability and computing, but these uses are intertwined with a set of political debates in which **access** is interpreted as an important right. Contemporary questions of **access** often mobilize contradictory ideological assumptions, and **access** has become a key term in debates ranging from law to medicine to education.

Etymologically, **access** is derived from both French and Latin with the root word being the classical Latin *accessus*, which is a noun covering a very wide range of movement from approach or visit to the rising of the tide or the blowing of the wind. As Norman French *accesse* or Middle French *acces,* it emerges in C13 as an attack or onset of an illness: the body is invaded by a "strong access of fever." With this sense it enters English at the beginning of C14: "[Tymon] in a strong acces was of a feuere" (*c*1300). It soon developed an important figurative use signaling the onset of a powerful EMOTION: "an axcess of soule" (*c*1384), "þacces of anguych" (*c*1400). Thus, in 1815, "In a fresh access of jealousy, [he] plunged a dagger into her heart." This figurative meaning is important into C20 but is now rare, if not archaic.

Much of **access**'s importance in the past fifty years is its ability to switch between very concrete meanings and very vague ones. Thus **access** can refer to a physical point of entry or to its digital equivalent, but it can also imply a set of RIGHTS or PRIVILEGES that come with this entry. This emphasis on rights and privileges was stressed in the selection of **Access** as the brand name for the first credit card in the UK to challenge the Barclaycard in 1972. The brand disappeared when it was taken over by MasterCard in 1996, but the ambiguities of the word continue to make it a potent articulator of political promise.

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Its most direct political role has been in the disability movement that developed out of the wider Civil Rights movements of the 1960s. In a series of developments of the past fifty years, **access** has been a key term to refer to the attempts to integrate disabled people into a physical world that until then had ignored their needs. In 1968 the US Congress passed the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) that required federal facilities to become **accessible** to people with disabilities. Significantly, when it was realized that this act required a regulatory body, the name chosen in 1973 was Access Board, which was charged with "Full Access and Inclusion for All." The UK Disability Discrimination Act of 1995 gave rights "to use and access services."

At the same time, **access** became an important term in efforts to democratize television so that people outside the television industry could enjoy the possibility of producing television programs. The important use of **access television** was very short lived as technological developments in the recording, editing, and broadcasting of sound and image meant that the aims of access television were realized on an unimaginable scale even if the broadcasting outlets remain largely in state or commercial ownership. You could call YouTube **access television**, but technology and language have moved so fast that it is not clear that younger speakers of the language would recognize this use at all.

Access's connection with computing and telecommunications has been more durable, and a host of compounds have appeared in recent decades: **access provider** (1983), **access code** (1955), and **access time** (1979). **Access** has also been the rallying cry of the digital **open access** movement, which took off in the late 1990s as the Internet encouraged and enabled a low-cost means of distributing content and knowledge, characterized by the rise of blogs, content-sharing forums, and other social media platforms. The **open access** movement argues that all research online should be freely **accessible**, and its utopian vision is well articulated by *Wikipedia* founder Jim Wales: "imagine a world in which every single person on the planet is given free access to the sum of all human knowledge." A specialist use, anticipating the Internet use, is its development as a term in library science referring to unrestricted **access** for readers to the shelves on which a library's books and other publications are kept—"the principle of open access" (*The Library*, November 1894).

The vagueness of **access** enables the utopian vision of **open access** to ignore those who lack the education to benefit from it. This ambiguity of **access** is written deep into its history. From lC14 there are uses of **access** which link admission to right and thus suggest that to gain **access** is to enjoy some entitlement. This sense

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clearly emerges in mC16: "the one has access to the legal maintenance; the other is cast upon peoples benevolence, and burdensome to their private purse."

This vagueness about what constitutes **access** surfaces in many political debates. Thus, the debates about health provision in the United States often use *availability, affordability*, and **accessibility** as confusing synonyms. For some, equal **access** entails guarantee of availability of medical supplies and resources. Others argue that equal **access** should ensure equal use for equal need and that the question of the external factors that affect the understanding of that availability is a crucial part of providing a FAIR provision of health care. The way that **access** semantically implies that entry or admittance also provides entitlement has made it a very much used term in debates about education and culture. The LEGITIMATE demand for **access** can often mask inconvenient facts about the difficulty of fully benefiting from the cultural or educational INSTITUTION to which **access** is being demanded.

Access plays a central role in two of the most important political movements of recent years. It was a key argument of the movement for same-sex MARRIAGE that same-sex couples should have **access** to all the benefits enjoyed by differently sexed couples. More recently, the question of **access** to appropriate bathrooms has become a key demand of the TRANSGENDER movement. **Access**, however, with its constant promise that entry will provide satisfaction, proliferates from banks which offer **instant access** accounts to Maya Angelou's statement that "the most called-upon prerequisite of a friend is an accessible ear." **Access** hesitates in its senses between potential for use and actual achievement. In a society that combines an ideology of EQUALITY with ever greater inequality, **access** often hides what is **inaccessible**.

See EQUALITY, FAIR, PRIVILEGE, RIGHTS

ANIMAL

The word **animal** used to refer to a living organism is a borrowing from French and Latin that enters English in lC14, where it joins C13 *beast* and lC14 *creature*, both of which similarly refer to living organisms. In early uses, **animal** can encompass humans: "man is animal and hors is animal, and so of oþer bestes" (*a*1398); "undyr *animal* beyn conteynt all mankynd, beist, byrd, fowll, fish serpent, and all other sik thingis" (*a*1522). That last quotation separates *mankind* from *beast*, a word that could likewise in the first instance include humans: "Al þing þat haþ lif and felynge is y-clept a beste" (*a*1387). Application to humans is made explicit with some distinguishing qualification: "a man or woman, which be reasonable beastes" (1547);

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"reasonable" evoking the traditional division of the soul into three parts: vegetative, animal, and rational, with humans alone possessed of the latter. The use of *beast* in respect to humans came increasingly to indicate negative *beastlike* characteristics that pervert our essential humanity when we should rather "exalt the man and depress the beast in us" (1667). The adjective *beastly* exemplifies the movement from a relatively straightforward designation of **animals** other than humans to an emphasis on what is *beastlike* in the latter. Humans may be "beastly witted" or "beastly foolish" (1561), lacking the sense and intelligence that should distinguish them from humans; just as they may give in to "beastly desires of inordinate lust" (1567). The word *creature*, which had a first, now obsolete sense of the created universe, of creation—"the bigynnynge of creature" (*c*1384)—is initially bound up with the account of God creating "every living creature that moveth" (Genesis 1:21, King James Bible, 1611); "all creatures great and small," in the words of the popular Victorian hymn "All Things Bright and Beautiful" (1848). Like *beast, creature* includes the human being, the creature above all others, "the master work": "a creature who not prone/And brute as other creatures, but endued/With sanctity of reason" (*Paradise Lost*, 1667). Used for an individual, *creature* is qualified by a descriptive term: "a ful comely creature" (*c*1400), "a sorweful creature," "this ravishing creature" (2007). The current main use of **animal** to refer to living organisms *other* than man is from lC16. The range of organisms to which it is applied varies, though, as *OED* notes, it frequently designates mammals, as opposed to birds, reptiles, fish, etc.; with distinctions made regarding habitat: **land-animal**, **water-animal**, **sea-animal**. The **human animal** (1495) is indeed an **animal** but special, above all others—"the paragon of animals" (1616).

Human beings by definition possess HUMANITY (*c*1384), the quality of being human, which also has meanings referring particularly to qualities, of kindness, goodness, fellow-feeling. The later **animality** appears in eC17 with the meaning, now rare, of **animal nature**, vital power of LIFE—"Lifesomeness or animality" (1674), along with that of **animal** characteristics as distinct from human ones. Unlike the first, this second meaning opposes **animality** to *humanity*; it follows "the Dictates of Flesh and Blood" (1726) and is largely seen in men—since "In woman, humanity, as contradistinguished to animality . . . has attained its zenith" (1836). The same neutral/negative shift occurs with **animal**, moving from simple designation of living organisms to lC16 emphasis on people or peoples lacking the qualities of humanity: "sick monstruous animals . . . the cruell cannibals, [who] feids on flesch of men" (?1590–1); "he is only an annimall, only sensible in the duller partes"

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(1598). "Campbell is an absolute animal. Scum like him should never be allowed to walk the streets" (2004). A positive human-animal reality is expressed by **animal spirit** (*a*1425), referring first to a supposed vital agent responsible for sensation and movement that runs through the body from the brain: "spirit animal dwellith in the brayne" (*a*1500). From lC17 the plural, **animal spirits**, draws figuratively on this idea of animal vitality to mean courage, vivacity, possibly excessive liveliness in a person: "[in young people] A Spring-tide of Animal Spirits easily overflows the judgement before it's grown up" (1701); *Pride and Prejudice*'s Lydia Bennet has "high animal spirits" (1813).

The understanding of **animal** and of the kind and nature of the many species the word includes has shifted over the centuries and has been a matter of much recent debate and cultural-political action regarding the boundaries between *human* and **animal**, animals and humans. Common law distinguished between *ferae naturae* and *mansuetae naturae*, animals wild and tame. A division conventionally assumed today is among **wild animals**, **domestic animals** (such as cattle, horses, sheep, pigs, poultry, reared for human purposes), and *pets*. The word *pet* is a C16 borrowing from Scottish Gaelic *peata* used of a lamb or other animal reared by hand; Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language* definition is: "A lamb taken into the house, and brought up by hand" (1755). The current meaning of an animal domesticated and kept for pleasure or companionship is recorded from eC18, as is **animal companion** (1731). The continuing increase in the number of *pet lovers* in eC20 produced *pet shops, pet food*, and an industry providing for all requirements until death—*pet cemetery*.

Pets are a special case of the human recognition of animals, given names and included within their owner's domestic life and space (the German for *pet* is *Haustier*, "house animal," the French is *animal de compagnie*, "animal companion"; these languages, along with many others, have no equivalent word for the special intimacy of *pet*, distinct from **animal**). Indicatively, *pet* became a term of affection used of humans, women and children especially: "*Pet* . . . a fond designation for a female favourite" (1825); "Do you know, pet, it seems almost a dream . . . that we have been married" (1849).

The relation between *human* and **animal** has been central to many of the most important debates in recorded history. **Animal sacrifice** was perhaps the most important public argument that divided Christian and pagan in the later Roman Empire. The status of **animal slaughter** is central to Hinduism and many versions of Buddhism. The moral status of animals has become a central issue for modern

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Western times since Jeremy Bentham's oft-cited assertion of the moral status of animals as grounded in their capacity to suffer: "The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor, Can they *talk*?, but, Can they *suffer*?" (1781). Concern for **animal welfare** (1828) and opposition to **animal cruelty** (1809) knew substantial development in C19: New York passed the first US state law against animal cruelty in 1828; the UK passed its first Cruelty to Animals Act in 1835. It should be noted that **animal cruelty** means both cruelty *to* animals and cruelty *of* animals, the latter also subject to legislation in respect of the danger they may represent and the damage they may cause; the UK Dangerous Wild Animals Act (1976) is one example.

The UK Animal Welfare Act (2006) works with a definition of **animal** as "a vertebrate other than man" capable of experiencing pain or suffering; the earlier US Animal Welfare Act (1966) defines **animal** for its purposes by listing the warm-blooded animals it concerns and those it excludes. Different pieces of legislation deal with different species of animals in respect to the particular matters with which they are concerned, such as conditions for scientific **animal experiment** (1770). What counts as an **animal**, however, for legal and other protection has been increasingly posed from lC19 in terms of **animal rights** (1875) and **animal liberation** (1970). The former has brought debates as to whether animals, not possessed of self-consciousness, could fulfill duties and RESPONSIBILITIES that RIGHTS entail; the latter as to which animals are selected for liberation and what their liberated state would be. At an extreme, *speciesism* (1970) was coined to name "the widespread discrimination practised by man against other species."

Modern debates and controversies about the ETHICAL treatment of animals, along with questions, there from the beginning in the history of the word **animal**, concerning the position of the **human animal** *as animal*, have given **animal** its presence in contemporary discourse. This is at a time when developments in artificial intelligence and robotics are recasting how we may have to think about *human* and **animal**.

See HUMANITY, LIFE, NATURE, RIGHTS

APPROPRIATION

Although **cultural appropriation**'s centrality in eC21 has yet to be fully documented in the *OED*, it is a key term for cultural debate on contemporary university campuses. In April 2016 one could count over 40,000 tags on Instagram and nearly 100,000

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conversations featuring the term on Facebook. Nor is this popularity limited to social media. While barely featuring before the late 1980s, its frequency in print has increased dramatically in the past twenty years. Further evidence of its particular importance for universities was that the student members of the Keywords seminar of 2016 overwhelmingly voted **appropriation** the most important of the keywords that the seminar was discussing. **Cultural appropriation** relates to a whole series of terms with which it overlaps, including *acculturation, hybridity, assimilation, cultural exchange*, and *cultural interaction*, words related to the mass movement of peoples since the colonial period. It is also related to much older and more central words like AUTHENTICITY, COMMUNITY, IDENTITY. It is a crucial term in contemporary debates about the importance of cultural identity and the complexity of its formation.

Appropriation enters the language in lC14 from the late Latin *appropriare*, derived from *proprius*, the Latin adjective for "own," and linked etymologically to PROPERTY and proper, among others. **Appropriation**'s first sense in the *OED* is "The making of a thing private property," with an increasing emphasis that this private property is now one's own. There are early uses that refer to taking land to endow religious institutions, and a related sense is written deep into the political process in both the UK and the US where **Appropriation Bills** move money from tax income to government expenditure. Indeed the strong economic connotation of **appropriation** is attested by the fact that **misappropriation**'s dominant meaning, from its entry into the language in C18, is misuse of funds. **Appropriation** develops from the Latin verb and has a strong meaning of action, while the closely related adjective **appropriate** has the sense of a state. This grammatical difference leads to the very different valences that these two words have had on college campuses in C21. **Appropriate** is secure in the proper, while **appropriation** destroys the very notion. There has been no strong relation between these different senses from C15 on.

The Marxist tradition displays a use which may be echoed in contemporary debate. For Marx, the **appropriation** of surplus value was the key form of exploitation in CAPITALISM, and **appropriation** thus grounds the very definition of an economically unjust system. If this sense may provide some of the background for contemporary usage, it is art history and not political economy that is the key discourse for its contemporary importance. **Appropriation** as an artistic technique is first described by the artist and writer John La Farge in 1895 and the *OED* glosses it as follows: "The practice or technique of reworking the images or styles contained in earlier works of art, esp. (in later use) in order to provoke critical re-evaluation

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of well-known pieces by presenting them in new contexts, or to challenge notions of individual creativity or authenticity in art." New York's Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) defines **appropriation** as "the intentional borrowing, copying, and alteration of preexisting images and objects," citing the work of Andy Warhol and Robert Rauschenberg as examples.

In the 1980s and in the context of debates in media and cultural studies around so-called **appropriation artists**, **cultural appropriation** began to gather force as a term. Perhaps the most famous example of **appropriation art** was Sherrie Levine's re-photographing the famous Depression-era Walker Evans photographs and titling the results *After Walker Evans*. The debates around Levine and other artists' work led to a dropping of the term **appropriation artists**; **appropriation** migrated through debates in media and cultural studies into **cultural appropriation**. A crucial context for these debates was the growing importance of notions of **cultural property** first recorded in the *OED* in 1898 and recognized in a UNESCO convention of 1954 with a further protocol in 1999.

There is no founding text or manifesto for this focus on **cultural appropriation**, and the difficulty of defining cultures as limited and autonomous entities makes it impossible to set out a rigorous definition. There are, however, two constant examples: the relations between dominant white American culture and black African American culture, on the one hand, and Native American culture, on the other. A favorite illustration is the use of blackface in music halls where white performers appeared with the exaggerated features of African Americans. The ideological purpose of this mimicry was to demean and disparage black culture and to emphasize the power differentials within American society which oppressed African Americans. Some see **cultural appropriation** as more ambivalent or dialectical in character, as sketched in Eric Lott's *Love and Theft* (1993), a title then appropriated by Bob Dylan in 2001.

Another illustration of what is meant by **cultural appropriation** is the use of toys described as Indian war bonnets in children's play. Here the offense is that the clothing being imitated is rich in symbolic and ritual meanings for the Native Americans, who are simply and offensively ignored in the production and marketing of these children's toys.

Perhaps the single most famous example because it combined cultural and economic **appropriation** was the case that pitted Urban Outfitters, the clothing manufacturers, against the Navajo Nation. Urban Outfitters, which had previously used both the traditional Palestinian headscarf and the Hindu elephant god Ganesh

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as models for clothing, marketed a whole range of products under the name Navajo. The Navajo Nation took a court action, claiming that Urban Outfitters was unlawfully using the Navajo name.

These examples and others are what underlie definitions of **cultural appropriation**, such as the following from *The Concise Oxford Companion to English Literature*: "a term used to describe the taking over of creative or artistic forms, themes, or practices by one cultural group from another. It is in general used to describe Western appropriations of non-Western or non-white forms, and carries connotations of exploitation and dominance." However, the practices described here—which could also be labelled "borrowing," "influence," "adaptation," "translation," "imitation"—have been central to the techniques of literary modernism (typified by Eliot's collaging of other writers' texts in *The Waste Land*, Pound's imitation of Chinese poetic forms in *Cathay*, and Joyce's use of Homeric plot and polyglot wordplay in *Ulysses*).

Much of the force of the arguments around **cultural appropriation** seems to come from the word **appropriation** itself. The word is in criminal law a term for theft, as in the UK Theft Act of 1968, which has as its "basic definition of theft" the dishonest **appropriation** of property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. Its strong sense of "taking" something from someone else and making it your own means that questions of economics and power are immediately in play. Many uses and connotations of the word CULTURE work in the other direction, producing an area of activity divorced from politics and economics, but **appropriation** immediately reintroduces both.

The concept of **cultural appropriation** is often criticized for positing notions of cultures as homogenous, autonomous, and not subject to historical change. It is also criticized for refusing to allow identifications and explorations outside one's own culture. However, its contemporary importance does not simply reside in the questions of power and exploitation that are written into its etymological history, but as importantly on its emphasis on the emotional reaction of those whose cultures have been appropriated. The inflection of culture by both power and emotion makes **cultural appropriation** such a powerful key phrase.

See CULTURE, IDENTITY, PROPERTY

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ART

The original general meaning of **art**, to refer to any kind of skill, is still active in English. But a more specialized meaning has become common, and in **the arts** and to a large extent in **artist** has become predominant.

Art has been used in English from C13, fw *art*, oF, rw *artem*, L—skill. It was widely applied, without predominant specialization, until 1C17, in matters as various as mathematics, medicine, and angling. In the medieval university curriculum the **arts** ("the seven arts" and later "the LIBERAL arts") were grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, and **artist**, from C16, was first used in this context, though with almost contemporary developments to describe any skilled person (as which it is in effect identical with **artisan** until 1C16) or a practitioner of one of the **arts** in another grouping, those presided over by the seven muses: history, poetry, comedy, tragedy, music, dancing, astronomy. Then, from 1C17, there was an increasingly common specialized application to a group of skills not hitherto formally represented: painting, drawing, engraving, and sculpture. The now dominant use of **art** and **artist** to refer to these skills was not fully established until 1C19, but it was within this grouping that in 1C18, and with special reference to the exclusion of engravers from the new Royal Academy, a now general distinction between **artist** and **artisan**—the latter being specialized to "skilled manual worker" without "intellectual" or "imaginative" or "creative" purposes—was strengthened and popularized. This development of **artisan**, and the mC19 definition of *scientist*, allowed the specialization of **artist** and the distinction not now of the *liberal* but of the **fine arts**.

The emergence of an ABSTRACT, capitalized **Art**, with its own internal but general principles, is difficult to localize. There are several plausible C18 uses, but it was in C19 that the concept became general. It is historically related, in this sense, to the development of CULTURE and *aesthetics*. Wordsworth wrote to the painter Haydon in 1815: "High is our calling, friend! Creative Art." The now normal association with *creative* and *imaginative*, as a matter of classification, dates effectively from 1C18 and eC19. The significant adjective **artistic** dates effectively from mC19. **Artistic temperament** and **artistic sensibility** date from the same period. So too does **artiste**, a further distinguishing specialization to describe performers such as actors or singers, thus keeping **artist** for painter, sculptor, and eventually (from mC19) writer and composer.

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It is interesting to notice what words, in different periods, are ordinarily distinguished from or contrasted with **art**. **Artless** before mC17 meant "unskilled" or "devoid of skill," and this sense has survived. But there was an early regular contrast between **art** and *nature*: that is, between the product of human skill and the product of some inherent quality. **Artless** then acquired, from mC17 but especially from 1C18, a positive sense to indicate spontaneity even in **art**. While **art** still meant skill and *industry* diligent skill, they were often closely associated, but when each was abstracted and specialized they were often, from eC19, contrasted as the separate areas of imagination and utility. Until C18 most sciences were **arts**; the modern distinction between *science* and **art**, as contrasted areas of human skill and effort, with fundamentally different methods and purposes, dates effectively from mC19, though the words themselves are sometimes contrasted, much earlier, in the sense of "theory" and "practice" (see THEORY).

This complex set of historical distinctions between various kinds of human skill and between varying basic purposes in the use of such skills is evidently related both to changes in the practical division of labor and to fundamental changes in practical definitions of the purposes of the exercise of skill. It can be primarily related to the changes inherent in capitalist commodity production, with its specialization and reduction of use values to exchange values. There was a consequent defensive specialization of certain skills and purposes to **the arts** or *the humanities* where forms of general use and intention which were not determined by immediate exchange could be at least conceptually abstracted. This is the formal basis of the distinction between **art** and *industry*, and between **fine arts** and **useful arts** (the latter eventually acquiring a new specialized term, in TECHNOLOGY).

The **artist** is then distinct within this fundamental perspective not only from *scientist* and *technologist*—each of whom in earlier periods would have been called **artist**—but from *artisan* and *craftsman* and *skilled worker*, who are now *operatives* in terms of a specific definition and organization of work. As these practical distinctions are pressed, within a given mode of production, **art** and **artist** acquire ever more general (and more vague) associations, offering to express a general *human* (i.e., non-utilitarian) interest, even while, ironically, most **works of art** are effectively treated as commodities and most **artists,** even when they justly claim quite other intentions, are effectively treated as a category of independent *craftsmen* or *skilled workers* producing a certain kind of marginal commodity.

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Recent Developments

The frequency of the word **art** has remained relatively steady in English since its high point in lC18. However, in the last half-century compounds have proliferated. **Pop art** (1957), for which the most prominent names were Andy Warhol and Roy Lichtenstein, appropriated images from commercial and popular CULTURE into the world of art, marking in practice the refusal to distinguish between ELITE and popular culture that was the theoretical base of cultural studies. **Conceptual art** (1967) and **performance art** (1971) both challenged the status of the art object: **conceptual art** focused on the ideas that underpinned the art object and **performance art** on the moment of its consumption. Both could be considered as extreme reactions to the contradiction that Williams noted between the ambition of art to transcend the commodity form and its reality as a marginal commodity. **Computer art** (1969), **video art** (1970), and **digital art** (1978) are different attempts to capture artists' efforts to utilize the new MEDIA. Finally, **public art** (1982) marks a new emphasis on **art** that is located outside the space of gallery exhibition. While the history of **public art** is as old as the history of statuary, only recently has emphasis fallen on the geographical and political possibilities of work that incorporated its setting into its significance and found its audience in the aleatory choice of passing spectators rather than a self-selected gallery audience.

All these compounds mark a desire to expand and challenge the notion of **art**, often characterized as elite, while still retaining an appeal to **art** as offering a privileged ACCESS to a world of transcendent VALUE. The contradictions of these arguments do not in any way detract from, indeed may fundamentally constitute, their force.

See ABSTRACT, APPROPRIATION, ARTIFICIAL, CREATIVE, CULTURE, ELITE, TECHNOLOGY

ARTIFICIAL

The word **artificial** is currently employed in the fields of nutrition, marketing, technology, medicine, and more, and is often evoked with a broad range of ethical undertones that speak to its contested meaning. It was borrowed into English in mC15, partly via AN and mF *artificial,* from Latin *artificiālis* "made or contrived by art," in some medieval sources also "prescribed by art, scientific," "skilled, artistic, involving craftsmanship." In C15 in English **artificial**

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was first deployed to describe physical objects, as seen in Caxton's translation of *Eneydos,* "to destroye soo artyfycyall a werke" (1490), and also systems or situations brought about by human skill or intervention. **Artificial** could also indicate the acquired intellectual reasoning of an individual, such as Thomas Elyot's 1531 definition of rhetoricians as "artificiall spekers." While as early as 1475, the meaning of **artificial** could coincide with that of the modern word *artifice*, as in "cunning, seeking to deceive," during the scientific Renaissance of mC15 to mC17, **artificial** generally lauded the progression of human scientific, artistic, and intellectual achievements. Well into C19 the term could designate something that was skillfully crafted or a person who was untrustworthy. Coleridge can praise the "artificial" writing of Shakespeare and Milton, a poetry so well-crafted that one cannot remove a single word without destroying its effect (1833), while a religious writer can lament how unsuspecting men are "caught and drawn into evil by political and artificial men" (*Family Prayer Book*, 1868).

Since the terms *natural* and **artificial** are mutually constitutive—the first definition for **artificial** in the *OED* is "opposed to natural"—**artificial**'s connotations depend heavily upon the way that the *natural* is constructed. From eC15 to C17, the two words predominantly described the physical relationship between objects, such as John Lydgate's *c*1425 depiction of the embalming of Hector's body with "bawme natural" running into it through "pipes artificial." Frequent collocations with **artificial** from lC16 onward evoke the restoration of the human body with **artificial eyes**, **ears**, **teeth**, and **legs**. In eC21, this particular definition of **artificial** maintains currency; **artificial heart**, for example, is one of the most common collocations in contemporary American English.

However, the increasing proximity between that which was perceived to be *natural* and its **artificial** imitations provoked rising levels of anxiety from mC16 onward. Originally, the two were similar but distinguishable in physical and intellectual contexts, such as William Bullein's 1558 judgment, "Artificiall women . . . haue more beastlines then beuty" or John Rastell's 1564 challenge that readers "plaie the foole with a foole . . ., that he may beholde his artificiall wysedome." **Artificial**'s connotation of interpersonal deceptiveness was enhanced—as expressed by Edward Stillingfleet in 1679, "the most artificial men have found it necessary to put on a guise of simplicity and plainness"—and extended to all social relationships. In his influential 1750 essay, "Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," Jean-Jacques Rousseau declared,

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> Before art had molded our behavior, and taught our passions to speak an artificial [*apprêté*] language, our morals were rude but natural [*naturelles*] . . . men found their security in the ease with which they could see through one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel the value, prevented their having many vices.

Throughout the Industrial Revolution of mC19, the dominant meanings of **artificial** split between connoting concrete scientific and TECHNOLOGICAL advancements—including **artificial fertilizer**, **artificial blood**, **artificial insemination**, and **artificial satellite** (first cited from 1883 and thus far predating Sputnik 1)—and indicating interpersonal duplicity. The tension between **artificial** and *natural* still resonates in the significant crossover found between these definitions in C20 and C21, in which people, objects, science, and deceit are blurred.

Early debates regarding **artificial additives** in processed foods attest to this complexity. The contemporary concern regarding the healthfulness of **artificial additives** in processed foods began during the Progressive Era (1890–1920) when consumers learned that saccharin, an **artificial sweetener** from lC19, had been used in place of sugar in carbonated beverages. Public outcry identified danger to the physical body as the primary concern, as well as threats to the familial and social order, as indicated in the accusation of Alfred McCann that saccharin was "as false a scarlet as the glow of health transferred from the rouge pot to the cheek of a bawd." Despite the rise in popularity in mC20, during which **artificial sweeteners** occupied the intersection of progressivity, health, and science, the instability of these relationships is displayed in their eC21 reversal. Global food and beverage giants—including Pepsi-Cola and its 2014 product line "Pepsi-Cola Made with REAL Sugar"—have shifted production and marketing in response to the opposition of the concepts *nature/natural, real*(*ity*), *transparency*, and *health* to the notions *illusion,* **artificial**, and *harm*. Used in the grammatical subject of recent headlines such as "Artificial flavors are making you hate healthy food," the term **artificial** is no longer perceived to be a mere descriptor of duplicity: unperceived and unperceivable, **artificial** connotes the very agent of that deception.

Contemporary anxieties regarding **artificial intelligence** follow a similar trajectory in which the social order is perceived to be threatened by scientific and technological systems that are indistinguishable from human bodies and minds. While the term **artificial intelligence** was coined by John McCarthy in 1955, the anxieties surrounding it date back to eC19 in which tales, such as Mary Shelley's

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1818 *Frankenstein,* pit *mechanical* creations against the ORGANIC social order. Today, the word *natural* pairs with *human* and **artificial** with *deceit*, especially in relationship to the female body; in *The Guardian*'s 2015 list of the top twenty **artificial intelligence** films of the century, five—including Alex Garland's *Ex Machina* (2015) and Spike Jonze's *Her* (2013)—gender **artificiality** and *deceit* as feminine.

The advent of **artificial intelligence** (AI) has only intensified discussions about the ethical problems that the adjective marks. The increasing automation of even complex tasks through AI has resulted in significant economic and social change. While there are economic benefits (cheaper production costs, medical advances), there are also significant social disruptions (the loss of manufacturing jobs, information monopolies). Techno-optimists such as Daniel Dennett who are involved with attempting to create a humanoid agent (or co-agent) argue that these projects give us insight into just what human consciousness is; that is, the **artificial** helps us to understand better the biological.

While **artificial** can often denote an imitative or deficient copy, the term can also be invoked with an optimistic even utopian spirit, particularly in the domains of science and medicine. From C18, the development of **artificial languages** was intended to allow for easier communication among a diversity of speakers. From the early modern period, **artificial limbs** have replaced or supplemented body parts. Today, **artificial satellites** orbit around our planet and send us information about ones much farther away. The rise of experimental laboratory biology, including experimental embryology, biochemistry, and genetics, have led to a rise in technologies such as **artificial life**, **artificial selection**, and **artificial chromosomes**.

In considering the long history of **artificial**, one sees that the poles of this argument remain constant even as the specifics of the argument shift over time. Each society values (or devalues) the **artificial** depending on how it defines ART as opposed to NATURE. Finally, there remains a constant tension between those who are uneasy with certain technological innovations (designating them **artificial**), as opposed to those who see utopian promise in mankind's ability to exceed nature through **artifice**.

See ART, NATURE, ORGANIC, TECHNOLOGY

AUTHENTIC

Borrowed in C15, from French (*autentic*) and Latin (*authenticus*), **authentic** appears to have been polysemous from the beginning; but many of its early senses—"legally

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valid," "authorized," "authoritative"—are mutually reinforcing, and many early contexts make it difficult or pointless to distinguish among them.

A good vantage point for tracking the emergence of today's complexities is the entry for **authentic** in Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755), which looks both backward and forward in the history of the word's meaning.

> **Authentick** adj. [*authenticus*, Lat.] That which has every thing requisite to give it authority, as an *authentick* register. It is used in opposition to any thing by which authority is destroyed, as *authentick*, not *counterfeit*. It is never used of persons.

Johnson starts with a generalized definition and "an authentic register" is an example intelligible in all periods of the word's use. Modern readers, however, probably interpret it as an instance of what the *OED* labels "now the usual sense" signifying "genuine," whereas the default C16 interpretation would have been "legally valid because duly authorized by the relevant religious or secular authority." In the first of Johnson's illustrative quotations, John Milton reserves **authentic** for the divine source of AUTHORITY, reaching back to its more distant ancestor, the Greek *authentes*, the first author and creative origin: "one who does things with his own hand, an absolute master, an autocrat."

> URIEL, for thou of those seav'n Spirits that stand
> In sight of God's high Throne, gloriously bright,
> The first art wont his great authentic will
> Interpreter through highest Heav'n to bring,
> Where all his Sons thy Embassie attend.

By 1755, the divine and regal power bases of **authenticity** had been secularized into the secular warranty that C18 called "good authority" (Chesterfield, 1739). Johnson's choice of *counterfeit* as the defining antonym of **authentic** expresses the anxieties of a period that developed a mass market for texts and material artifacts and coined the terms *authorship* and *connoisseurship* for its regulators. Market value depended on **authentic** authorship, and connoisseurship was the—somewhat unreliable—method of establishing **authenticity**. C18 literary critics were much troubled by questions of forgery (as with Macpherson's Ossian, Chatterton's Rowleie, Ireland's

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Shakespeare) and the artworks brought back from Italy by amateur-connoisseur Grand Tourists too often proved bogus.

By lC18, another strand in the modern sense-range of **authentic** became salient, prompting Johnson to enlarge his 1755 entry to include the sense "not fictitious." This may not seem very different from "not counterfeit," but in fact it marks an important shift in the notion of what is "requisite to give authority," displacing the criterion of attested authorship with adherence to "matters of fact, as they really happened" (Richard Watson, 1796). One impulse towards redefinition may have been the spate of C18 autobiographical and travel writings entitled **Authentic** Accounts/Narratives/Memoirs, etc. The problem was that while some of these accounts were written to satisfy natural science's demand for "authentic facts and unquestionable evidence" (*Geographical Magazine*, 1782), others fed the growing appetite of circulating libraries and their readers for the imaginary worlds of the novel. The scientists' desire for empirical facts coincided with the educationalists' fear of fictitious fictions. The perils (especially for women) of failing to distinguish fiction from fact became a key issue of the period, viewed comically in Austen's *Northanger Abbey* (1817), more tragically in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (1856) and its descendants.

For the *New English Dictionary* (1885) and *OED1* (1933) truth-to-fact was "the prevailing sense" of **authentic** and in eC20, the distinction between "matters of fact" and the novel was reinforced by the coinage of the genre label *non-fiction*. But that very coinage implies that fiction was assuming the status of the norm, and by mC20 the fact-fiction distinction was sufficiently blurred to legitimize the use of **authentic** for both the factual reporting of warfare and its fictional but verisimilitudinous representation. *OED* lists "The latest authentic reports of the progress of the war" (1944) alongside "a tense story of sea warfare. . . . The mess-room talk is most authentic" (1958). This blurring of boundaries licensed the new fusion genres of *docu-drama* and *non-fiction novel* (or *faction)* in the 1960s and *reality TV* shows in the 1990s. C21 has radicalized the fusion with the controversial coinages *alternative facts* and *post-truth*.

A similar (con)fusion has overtaken Johnson's distinction between **authentic** and *counterfeit*, as witness such collocations as **authentic reproduction**. Recent editions of *Merriam-Webster Student Dictionary* offer its young readers just two current senses for **authentic**:

1: being really what it seems to be: <*authentic* examples of Hopi jewelry>
2: made to be or look just like an original <*authentic* colonial costumes> <*authentic* French-style mustard>

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These definitions are virtually antonymic: (1) = "what it seems to be"; (2) = "*not* what it seems to be"; and the contradiction clearly signals that the word in its most frequent contemporary uses is being pulled in opposite directions by its users. Arguably, **authentic** has become a go-to term in the language of advertising precisely because sense (2) exploits the resonances of sense (1), evoking consumers' desire for "the real" and their value for particular ethnic origins or geographical provenances. The ambiguity becomes an overt site of contestation in the domains of law (see BRAND) and identity politics (see APPROPRIATION), where battles have raged over, e.g., what can legally be called champagne or who can legitimately wear cornrow hairstyles.

While subverting the antonymic distinctions that Johnson set up, modern usage has added a strand of meaning that he had not envisaged. His 1755 entry declares that **authentic** is "never used of persons." This is factually inaccurate. But earlier examples typically occur in specialized legal contexts (referring, for instance, to a notary) and Johnson may have ignored such uses, in line with his policy of excluding technical terms from his dictionary. The non-technical application of **authentic** to persons begins in eC20, when traditional questions about the **authenticity** of documents and artifacts were supplemented by questions about the subjective world. The *OED* attests "authenticity of the emotions" from 1910, closely followed by the 1915 example, "I wanted to shake him into being a man, some one who would bear me off, or make tremendous and authentic love" (which, surprisingly, comes from *Good Housekeeping* rather than D. H. Lawrence). This person-orientated strand of meaning was given a theoretical foundation and extension in Heideggerian existentialism and (particularly after World War II) in the polemical and literary works of Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus. The French existentialists developed a line of argument dating back at least to Johnson's contemporary, Rousseau—for whom society and its processes of education and enculturation deformed personal development. De Beauvoir's analysis of the **inauthentic** identity internalized by women was particularly important to the 1970s FEMINIST movement, as it directed attention not only to negative stereotypes of woman ("the weaker vessel") but also to ostensibly positive ones ("ministering angel"): "the altruism of women is merely the inauthenticity of the feminine person carried over into behaviour" (Germaine Greer, 1970). Camus's *L'Etranger* (1942) was perhaps even more influential: its cultural misfit could be transposed to a wide range of contexts, for example, the alienated black intellectual of Richard Wright's *The Outsider* (1953) and the alienated teenager of

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J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye* (1951), whose use of *phony* popularized a colloquial equivalent of **inauthentic**.

Despite its non-colloquial register, **inauthentic** shows a steep rise in frequency in lC20, coinciding—not coincidentally—with similar peaks in the frequency of IDENTITY and *autonomy* and the appearance of EXPERIENCE, *voice*, and *self* among **authentic**'s common collocates. The goal of finding and defending **authentic** identity shapes the rhetoric of many of the shared-interest groups designated by themselves or others as distinct COMMUNITIES and competing for social recognition. At the individual level, the rejection of social conformism in favor of *autonomy* finds expression in such formulae as "that's what I do" or WYSIWYG ("what you see is what you get"), an acronym borrowed from computing as a hallmark of personal **authenticity**.

As early as 1977, Cyra McFadden's *The Serial* satirized the conversion of existentialist philosophy into contemporary moral slang: "the really authentic thing to do was to act on your impulses," suggesting that being "really authentic" had already become a social prescription and a social asset. In subsequent decades, the cultivation of **authenticity** (sometimes now called "the **authenticity** cult") has moved into self-help manuals (such as James Park's *Becoming More Authentic*, 1983) and thereafter into the curriculum of management and leadership courses. There is a historical irony here: the existentialist hero was socially marginalized by his quest for truth-to-self; the new **authentic** individual is seen as a natural leader and winner, as in actor Tom Hiddleston's description of Shakespeare's character Henry V. "What distinguished him, above all, were his qualities as a leader: his courage, his rhetoric, his authenticity, his self-sacrifice. 'We few, we happy few, we band of brothers' " (*Radio Times*, July 2012). But what does **authenticity** mean in this context?

An article titled "Mitt Romney: S#*! Authentic People Say" forecasts Romney's defeat in the presidential election and ascribes it to his failure to transfer his tell-it-how-it-is management skills to the political context. He is urged to "let go of the fear of offending people and embrace his authentic side" by imitating "the great philosopher Popeye" because "authentic people give you some version of 'I yam what I yam, and that's all what I yam' " (*Reuter's*, March 9, 2012). A picture emerges of the **authentic** leader as the maverick outsider who is nonetheless one of a "band of brothers" and fundamentally "like everyone else," i.e., authentically *human*. Correspondingly, C21 political discourse has thrown up a striking new antonym for **authentic**, replacing *unlicensed, counterfeit, fictitious, inauthentic* with *robotic*, a term applied to the losers in US presidential elections (Romney in 2012; Clinton in

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2016) and UK general elections (Miliband in 2015; May, metaphorically "the loser" in 2017).

The historical trajectory of **authentic** has drawn it variously into the semantic orbits of its etymological relatives AUTHORITY, *author*, and *autonomy.* But Johnson's general definition holds good throughout. To be **authentic** is still to possess "everything requisite to give authority." What has changed is the perceived source of authority, devolving from the autocratic institutions of Church and State to the self-determining individual citizen. But why has the word itself survived this process of democratization? Why is the high-register **authentic** preferred in so many contexts when its contrast terms are colloquial, e.g., *fake, phony*? The *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* advises its users that "in everyday English, people usually say that something is *real* or *the real thing* rather than authentic." But perhaps there's a residual authoritativeness in the Latinate form of **authentic**, or a semantic persistence of the Greek *authentikós* from *authentes*, which Milton invoked to describe God. After all, Popeye's "I yam what I yam" is a distant echo of the divine declaration of autonomous identity: "I Am that I Am."

See APPROPRIATION, ARTIFICIAL, AUTHORITY, BRAND, COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, LITERATURE, REALISM

AUTHORITY

The Latin noun *auctoritas*, from which English **authority** is complexly derived through varieties of medieval French, has a wide range of meanings: right of ownership, sanction, approval, resolution, advice, right or power to authorize, leadership, authoritativeness, weighty testimony, precedent, example, prestige, personal influence, esteem, repute. These meanings blend in and out of each other in a particularly complex history in which **authority** plays a key role in regard to both knowledge and power.

Its first established medieval sense, derived from mF *authorité*, is an "authoritative book or passage of text accepted as a source of reliable information," a definition that was carried into its first appearance in English in eC13. **Authority**, in its earliest use, was most commonly synonymous with the Bible and notions of **biblical authority**, in mC13 "God's authoritative or potestative power," in which God was **author** (defined in the *OED* as both writer and creator), the Bible His **authority**.

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Early uses of **authority** were frequently references to scripture, as in eC13 "Nothing must be sought contrary to the rule of the supreme authority . . ." from Ancrene Riwle, as well as lC14 "For auctorite of holi writte telliþ vs . . ." from Bartholomaeus Anglicus. This **authority** of the Bible began to disperse over other books, and to cite something as **an authority** became a common way to signify the reliability of a TEXT, such as this C16 example from Sir Thomas More: "Hys fyrst authorite be these words of saynte Austyne in hys fyftieth sermon." This use has carried over into the present, and uses of **authority** similar to the lC20 use in the journal *Rhetorica*, "This dictionary is the authority for the orthography of the edition," remain common in contemporary discourse.

From eC14 **authority** began to refer to individuals with particular claim to legitimated knowledge, as in an **authoritative opinion**, in which an OPINION gains special status because of its relation to legal or scholarly knowledge, a meaning with direct links to eC19 *expert*, or one regarded as an **authority** on a certain subject. Phrases such as "to have it on good authority" and "on the authority of" have become standard. All such **authority** is, however, from the Renaissance on, provisional. As Galileo says in eC17, "In questions of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble reasoning of a single individual," signifying the increase in emphasis on the importance of human reasoning and experimental method over the citing of written texts or even relying on acknowledged experts.

However, if **authority** weakened in relation to knowledge, it strengthened in relation to power, and from C16 onward it is a key political term in a sense that the *OED* defines as "power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience." This sense develops in relation to arguments about theories of divine right, as in, "According to theories of divine right, the authority of monarchs is ordained by God and acquired through heredity" (*Encyclopedia of American Religion and Politics*). It is a key term, however, in the assertion of Parliament's rights in England during the Civil War, "The Supreme Autoritie of the Nation, the Parlament of the Common-wealth of England," 1652. Perhaps even more telling is its occurrence in the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, which refers to the "Authority of the United States." From lC19 onward, this **authority** of the state begins to proliferate as numerous **authorities—municipal authority**, **education authority**, **local authority**, **port authority**—and **the authorities** becomes a collective noun embracing a range of state bodies.

In this steady development of the power and presence of the STATE, one can detect two countervailing tendencies over the past two centuries; the first wished

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to increase the **authority** of the state until it dominates every aspect of life, and at the other end of the spectrum, there was a questioning of **authority** in all its forms. This is most evident in the explicitly anarchist arguments of Michael Bakunin and his followers and a refusal to accept any state whatsoever. However, the general questioning of **authority** is less a matter of explicitly anarchist politics and much more the result of the thoroughgoing investigation and interrogation of forms of **authority** across the full range of social sciences: psychology, sociology, anthropology.

In eC20, forms of both fascist and communist governments adopted positions so **authoritarian** that a new term was coined to describe them: **totalitarian**. If these totalitarianisms have been defeated, the rise of the executive power of the state means that authoritarianism is seen as a constant danger, as in a 2014 *Washington Times* article which states, "If Mr. Obama follows through on his threat . . . to ignore Congress and to implicitly emulate the style of authoritarian governments . . . we are in for a rough couple of years," and, more recently, in a 2016 *Washington Post* article regarding supporters of presidential candidate Donald Trump: "Watch out, the authoritarians are coming!"

If the number and power of state-related authorities seem to increase relentlessly, it is also the case that since World War II there has developed an increasingly powerful set of anti-authoritarian discourses. In 1954 Hannah Arendt asked, "What Is Authority?" but lamented that "authority has vanished from the modern world," noting that for the first time in recorded history the **authority** of a parent over a child was being contested. This anti-authoritarianism peaked in the 1960s when a worldwide cultural movement (for which "hippie" is an inadequate description) found a global political cause in opposition to the war in Vietnam. Yet the sixties also saw a proliferation of **authority figures**. This phrase first occurs in 1948 and is glossed by the *OED* as "any person regarded as having authority"; it applies to a government agent, a policeman, an educator, or a parent.

While the role of **authority** and its limits seem clearly defined with relation to knowledge (even allowing for increasingly strident challenges from the far right on climate change and evolution), questions of the LEGITIMACY and necessity of **authority** in the political and personal realm are more fraught and confused than ever. If the need for the authorities becomes ever more pressing in relation to violence in all its varying manifestations, from the domestic to the international, the basis of that **authority**—legal, political, moral—becomes ever more contested.

See LEGITIMATE, STATE, TEXT

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(particularly anthropology and its re-evaluation of questions of barbarity), and the growth of anti-colonial movements means that in C20 **civilization** becomes plural and, certainly within educated discourse, WESTERN **civilization** now simply becomes one **civilization** among others. It also loses its automatic claim to superiority, as is well captured by Gandhi's apocryphal reply to the question, "What do you think of Western civilization?": "I think it would be a good idea."

In its earliest uses, **civilization** is implicitly an alternative to nations and STATES as a way of capturing political realities. Although it is possible to talk of French or English **civilization**, EUROPEAN or **Western civilization** tend to be more frequent collocates in general American and British English corpora. These first uses of **civilization** are linked to notions of religious tolerance and peace.

However, the most important recent development of the term makes RELIGION the key element of a **civilization** and has **civilization** take up the mantle of nations and states as the key organizer of violent conflict. This new use, which contradicts many of the term's earlier peaceful connotations, has a precursor in 1946 when Albert Camus in a radio broadcast talked of the "shock of civilizations," which he saw as opposing the colonizing nations to the colonized. However, it was "the clash of civilizations" that was widely popularized in the 1990s in articles and books by Samuel Huntington. For Huntington, religions define **civilizations** and the opposition between religions, he argued, would provide the motive for violent conflict in C21. Huntington identified eight **civilizations** and their attendant religions, but his notion of a clash of **civilizations** between Christianity and Islam has become a burning political question. Many ultra-right groups have adopted this vocabulary, reworking themes from the long history of conflict between Christianity and Islam, yet others have refused the identification of **civilization** and religion, and more fundamentally have opposed the idea of radically separate **civilizations**. The history of Islam and Christianity is so interlinked that it might make more sense to talk of one **civilization** rather than two.

There can be little doubt that the relation of **civilization** to conflict is among the most vital questions of the contemporary world and that these questions will not find simple answers in the history of words. Yet the history does teach a lesson: a term originally used idealizingly to justify Western supremacy became pluralized as that supremacy foundered in the bloody realities of IMPERIALISM and is now invoked as a practical necessity to justify another version of Western supremacy.

See CIVIL, CULTURE, IMPERIALISM, MODERN, RELIGION, STATE, WELL-BEING, WEST

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