LISA RAPHALS

Knowing Words

Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece

MYTH AND POETICS

KNOWING WORDS

Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece

LISA RAPHALS

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Foreword

My goal as editor of the Myth and Poetics series is to encourage work that helps to integrate the critical study of literature with the approaches of anthropology and pays special attention to problems concerning the nexus of ritual and myth. Early volumes in the series set the groundwork for a broadened understanding of the very concepts of myth and ritual as reflected in the specific cultural context of ancient Greek poetics. Later volumes extended the field of vision from the Greek perspective to linguistically related realms such as ancient Indic ritual syntax and medieval Scandinavian heroic sagas and ballads. Lisa Raphals's *Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece* extends the field even further, drawing on the philosophical and literary traditions of China to explore the semantics of wisdom and cunning, and, through them, the broader problem of intelligence. In the area of Greek intellectual history, an anthropological approach to this problem, most clearly articulated in Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant's *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* has proved to be particularly successful. Raphals's book offers a reexamination of this approach in terms of Chinese traditions, arriving at a powerful new formulation that will interest sinologists, classicists, and scholars of philosophy and comparative literature.

Gregory Nagy

Preface

For the past two or more millennia, the operation of a set of mental capacities defined variously as knowledge, wisdom, rationality, and more generally as intelligence, has tended to dominate not only the Western intellectual landscape but many general considerations of the human condition. Attempts to define an essence of humanity have focused on intelligence; in name at least, *homo sapiens* is taxonomically distinguished from the other hominids by the capacity to *know.*[1]

This book is about a mode of intelligence or way of knowing that is easier to recognize than to talk about—a mode of knowing that falls into the lacuna between the kinds of knowledge we formally acknowledge and those we recognize in social practice and everyday language. This mode of intelligence embraces a set of skills and mental attitudes that range from wisdom, forethought, keen attention, and resourcefulness to subtle indirection, craft, deception, and cunning. It relies on skill, strategy, and a general knack for handling whatever comes along. It is the intelligence not of Apollo but of Athena, an intelligence best associated in the Western tradition with the wily and resourceful Odysseus.

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[1] In both etymology and general usage, the terms *knowledge, wisdom,* and *intelligence* describe a complex set of faculties: the ability to recognize, discriminate, or perceive significant differences and think, learn, or reason about them. *Knowledge* often refers to a particular domain of expertise, and in this sense *intelligence* is more general and refers to broader capacities, which include having knowledge, sagacity, and the ability to *know*. It is in this sense that we make a distinction between stupidity as lacking intelligence and ignorance as lacking knowledge. But the broader meaning of *knowing* refers to wisdom, the exercise of sound judgment, discernment, and the ability to perceive. Wisdom entails skill (which may include skill in magic or the occult arts), expertise, knowledge, and learning. In this broad sense, *to know* means to be aware, cognizant, versed, or skilled. The English root *know* of *knowledge* is cognate with the Greek **gnō*. *Wisdom* and *wit* derive from the Indo-European roots **woid-* and **weid-* (to know) and **wid-* (to see). Thus wit is the seat of consciousness, thinking, and the faculty of reasoning. Cognates include Greek *oida* (to know), Latin *videre* (to see) and German *wissen*.

The importance of practical wisdom, sagacity, and cunning are widely acknowledged in practice, but we must move from philosophical discourse to everyday language to find a nonpejorative language in which to talk about them. Even so, English has no equivalent for what the Greeks called *mētis*. The range of English words for wisdom and cunning provides an example of this tension. In positive terms, we say someone is wise, knowledgeable, sagacious, subtle, prescient, foresighted, or expert. The same individual may be negatively described as cunning, crafty, slippery, underhanded, or devious. Several terms are ambiguous in their moral weighting, for example, clever, canny, wily, and sharp. Yet for all their different nuances, these terms may all be applied to the same type of individual. This lacuna between the knowledge we recognize in official discourse and that which we recognize in ordinary language and day-to-day activities is reflected in linguistic practice as a tension between "wisdom" and "cunning," virtuous and vicious intelligence.

In a germinal study, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society,* in which they investigate what they call "practical and cunning intelligence," Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant argue that there is a polarity in Greek culture between two modes of knowing: speculative reason and *mētis*. Suggesting that *mētis* operates as an independent mode of intelligence with its own logic and methods, they describe it as a way of knowing, with complex but coherent mental attitudes and characteristic intellectual behavior, typically applied to shifting, ambiguous situations that are not amenable to rigorous logic or calculation. They argue that the principal types of individual within Greek society relied on *mētis*. Their investigation not only demonstrates the nature and importance of *mētis* within Greek society but also suggests its importance as a universal type of human intelligence.

In this book I examine the applicability of what I call *metic intelligence* (from the Greek word *mētis*) to the culture and language of early China.[2] By using indigenous issues within the Chinese intellectual tradition, I examine the provenance of metic intelligence in classical Chinese culture and society. As in the Greek case, metic intelligence tacitly informed many aspects of early Chinese society, including both personal and social morality, military strategy, and statecraft. I draw upon representative Warring States philosophical, historical, and military texts and late Ming historical-fictional texts to establish the continuing importance of metic intelligence in China, and I then compare the problems of metic intelligence in China and Greece.

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[2] The word *mētis* is related to the verbs *mētiaō,* "to consider, meditate, plan," and

In the first part of the book I examine early Chinese understandings of wisdom, knowledge, craft, and cunning from the viewpoint of early Chinese theories of language. Within the domain of Chinese studies, I argue that Chinese views of the nature of language and knowledge were fundamental to other considerations not usually associated with the question of language and its relation to thought. These include statecraft, warfare, and a variety of questions of personal and social morality.

Chapter 1 concerns the problem of Chinese textual sources for the investigation of metic intelligence. In chapters 2 through 5, I examine the key word *zhi* in representative texts from the Warring States period of early China (403–222 B.C.E.) by using groups of significant and representative philosophical, historical, and military texts to illustrate Warring States period reflections on the nature of wisdom and intelligence. In chapter 2, I describe the uses of *zhi* in two pre-Confucian texts, the *Shu jing* and three classical Confucian works, the *Lunyu,* or *Analects,* of Confucius (551–479 B.C.E) and the works of Mencius (380?–305? B.C.E.) and Xunzi (340?–245? B.C.E.). In chapter 3, I examine the epistemology of the Mohist canon; in chapter 4, the Taoist texts attributed to Laozi and Zhuangzi; and in chapter 5, two works on military strategy and persuasion, the *Sunzi bingfa,* or *Sunzi's Art of War,* and the *Zhanguo ce,* or *Strategies of the Warring States.*

The second part of the book shows the centrality of metic intelligence to the construction of two novels from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 C.E.), the *Romance of Three Kingdoms,* or *Sanguo yanyi,* (fourteenth century) and the *Journey to the West,* or *Xiyou ji* (sixteenth century). Both works combine elements of history, fiction, legend,

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mētióomai, "to contrive." The term *metic intelligence* is totally unrelated to the word *metic,* which refers to the *metoikoi,* foreign-born, "second-class citizens" of Athens, who paid a tax (*metoikion*) for the privilege of residing there but enjoyed no civil rights.

religion, and philosophy and deal with prominent figures within Chinese history. Both novels feature metic characters and illustrate characteristic modes of action of metic individuals. Each work draws on the history and the rich philosophical debates of the Warring States period.

In chapter 6, I look at the role of metic intelligence in the *Romance of Three Kingdoms,* where it is the modus operandi of the historical strategist-general Zhuge Liang, probably the locus classicus for the person of *zhi* within the Chinese tradition. In chapter 7, I examine metic intelligence as a central element in the quest of the *Journey,* especially in the fictional construction of the historical figure Xuan Zang (probably the most famous Buddhist cleric in Chinese history) and his wily double, best known as Monkey. Chapters 6 and 7 provide evidence of the construction of metic characters and the preservation of the semantic field of consistent usages of *zhi* in Ming works.

In chapters 8 and 9, I compare the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and the *Journey to the West* and argue that metic intelligence informs five broad themes common to all these texts: force and guile, kings and kingmakers, representation of the hero, designing women, and like-mindedness.

A broader goal of the book is to show the relevance and importance of the Chinese philosophical tradition to contemporary issues in philosophy of language, linguistics, anthropology, and poetics. I argue for the relevance of early Chinese debates about knowledge and language to a variety of questions of contemporary interest and for the importance of comparative inquiry. The first half of the book may be of particular interest to philosophers and specialists in the intellectual history of early China. In these chapters I seek to reposition and clarify the relation of knowledge and language within early Chinese philosophical inquiry and to argue that metic intelligence is not only discernible in the culture and philosophy of early China but is actually central to several issues vexing that philosophical tradition. In the second half of the book, I include material of specific interest to students of classics and comparative literature, and I use a comparison between certain aspects of the Chinese historical-fictional tradition and the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to address broad themes of heroism and recognition that are more typically addressed only in the context of epics composed in Indo-European languages.

In cases where I use my own translations, I have tried to provide references to alternate translations of Chinese works. The bibliography contains a list of a variety of translations of classical works. The Pinyin system of romanization is used, except where a Westernized name (for example, Confucius) or a Wade-Giles romanization (for example, Taoism) is already in general use. Direct quotations preserve the transliteration system used by the author or translator. In one particularly difficult case, Tao and *dao,* I use both forms.

I am indebted to more people than it is possible to acknowledge here for the help they have given me. I am especially grateful to Anthony Yu both for early guidance in the formulation of this project and for insights, details, and generosity over the years. The timely interventions of Gregory Nagy and Stephen Toulmin have shaped this book in diverse ways. Angus Graham, Anne McLaren, Victor Mair, Andrew Plaks, Kidder Smith, and Lothar Von Falkenhausen have read various versions of this work and have generously provided detailed comments and corrections. Roger Ames, Francisca Cho Bantly, David Keightley, Lee Yearley, and Yu Chun-fang have generously provided access to unpublished materials. Finally, I am grateful to Alison Johnson for meticulous and intelligent editing of my manuscript. Part of the research for this project was conducted with financial support from the Committee on Asian Studies of the University of Chicago.

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Abbreviations

Major editions for primary sources are indicated here. Full citations for all primary sources appear in the Bibliography. References to commentary that appears in works of translation are listed as secondary sources, by year of publication.

Editions, Reference Works, and Journals

HY	*Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series*
SPTK	*Ssu Pu Ts'ung K'an*
ZZJC	*Zhuzi jicheng*

Texts

An.	*Analects* (*Lunyu*) (*HY*)
EY	*Er ya* (*HY*)
HF	*Han feizi*
HN	*Huai nanzi* (*ZZJC*)
HS	*Han shu*
Lao	*Laozi* (*ZZJC*)
Lie	*Liezi* (*ZZJC*)
LJ	*Li ji* (*HY*)
LSCQ	*Lu shi chun qiu* (*ZZJC*)
M	*Mengzi* (Mencius) (*HY*)

Mao	*Mao shi (HY)*
Mo	*Mozi jiangu (ZZJC)*
SBBF	*Sun Bin bingfa*
SGC	*Sanguo ce*
SGTSYY	*Sanguo tong su yanyi*
SGYY	*Sanguo (zhi) yanyi*
SGYYPH	*Sanguo yanyi pinghua*
SGYYPP	*Pi ping Sanguo yanyi* (ed. Li Jowu)
SGZ	*Sanguo zhi*
SJ	*Shi ji*
SMF	*Sima fa (SPTK)*
SSZY	*Shang shu zhengyi*
Sun	*Sunzi*
SW	*Shuo wen*
SZBF	*Sunzi bingfa*
TGLT	*Taigong liu tao zhijie (SPTK)*
TPYL	*Taiping yulan*
WLZ	*Wei liaozi (SPTK)*
X	*Xunzi (ZZJC)*
XYJ	*Xiyou ji*
YJ	*Yi jing (HY)*
YWLJ	*Yiwen leiju*
Z	*Zhuangzi*
ZGC	*Zhanguo ce*
ZLL	*Zhuge liang lun*

KNOWING WORDS

Introduction

The problem of metic intelligence in the Western tradition begins, in a sense, with Plato, the first of the Greek philosophers to attempt a systematic philosophical inquiry into the nature of knowledge. In the *Theaetetus* he attempts to define knowledge,[1] in the *Republic* to determine its proper *objects*.[2] Aristotle preserves the Platonic distinction between universal objects of knowledge and ephemeral objects of belief but introduces the notion of *phronēsis,* or practical intelligence, as a means to induce theoretical knowledge from concrete particulars. For Aristotle, *to know* was to be able to demonstrate, one aspect of which was the intuitive grasp (*nous*) of the premises of knowledge.

Since Plato, two broad dispositions have dominated the problem of knowledge; both tend to exclude metic intelligence because it does not fit easily into their conceptual categories. The first is a "scientific" tendency to take *epistēmē* as knowledge,[3] to reduce knowledge to propositional knowledge, and to reduce intelligence to the abilities connected with propositional knowledge.[4] Although Plato does not reach any final account of knowledge, the Christian Neoplatonism of the Middle Ages is concerned with theoretical knowledge and abstract universals. The skeptics of the seventeenth century question medieval claims to knowledge and methods of discussing it but do not challenge its definition. The legacy of Locke, Descartes, and Kant privileges theoretical over practical knowledge and associates true knowledge with essences that can be described and defined in words. Thus in the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Kant equates humanity with rationality and views pure reason as the wellspring of both practical reason and moral knowledge.

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[1] The *Theaetetus* proposes and rejects three definitions of knowledge: that is, perception (151d–186e), true opinion (187a–201c), and true opinion justified by an account or *logos* (201c–210a). For an excellent analysis of the arguments in the *Theaetetus,* see Levett 1928.v–xi and Burnyeat 1990.251–55.

[2] In the *Republic* (5.477b) Plato argues that knowledge and belief are different faculties and therefore must have different objects, the Forms and opinion. It is unclear whether this argument identifies *epistēmē* with propositional knowledge or with acquaintance. Cross and Woozley (1971.74–78) have argued that a failure to distinguish clearly between propositional knowledge and acquaintance may have led Plato to search inappropriately for objects of knowledge, which would be reasonable for acquaintance but not for propositional knowledge.

This tendency pervades the empirical sciences, which have increasingly displaced philosophy as a primary source of cultural identity and value.[5] It is an unexpressed corollary to empiricism and positivism. (The positivist view that genuine knowledge concerns the observable world presupposes the ability to *describe* such "positive" knowledge.) Examples of this tendency include the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and, more recently, the "multiple intelligences" of Howard Gardner and the entire field of "artificial intelligence."[6] Anthropologists like Claude Lévi-Strauss and Clifford

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[3] I take this sense of the term from R. G. Collingwood's critique of "scientific" thinking in his *Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933.26–31), in which he questions the validity of mathematics as an apt model for philosophical reflection. He argues that science concerns universals; its concepts conform to exclusive rules of classification, which in the exact sciences derive from logic. By contrast, the concerns of historical thinking are individual, and the concepts of philosophy are overlapping, rather than exclusive.

[4] Gilbert Ryle makes a similar argument in his "Knowing How and Knowing That" chapter in *The Concept of Mind.* See Ryle 1949.25–62, especially 27–28. He ascribes some of the range of qualities I associate with metic intelligence to intelligence itself (1949.25).

[5] For discussion of the ascendancy of the social sciences, see Berlin 1978.1–11 and Rorty 1979 and 1982.

[6] Piaget addresses the issues that Kant deems central to human intelligence in a model of human cognition which focuses on the development of logical and rational thought; this view still largely informs the field of developmental psychology. Gardner provisionally defines six "intelligences": (1) linguistic, (2) musical, (3) logical-mathematical, (4) spatial, (5) bodily-kinesthetic, and (6) personal. He draws on evidence from experimental psychology, psychometry, biology, and neurobiology to extend Piaget's paradigm to a broader model of human intelligence. Although the last three of his "intelligences" may describe skills that are not directly related to the development of logical and rational thought, none of them accounts for the skills of *mētis.* See Gardner 1983.17–22.

Geertz provide other examples of the view that if we really *know* something, we can provide a conceptual articulation of it and, further, that if the articulation is a good one, it will stand up to transposition into another system of analysis.[7] Ironically, Geertz's dilemma about the nature of anthropology as an "interpretive science" arises out of an attempt to emphasize the importance of "practical knowledge" to ethnography without compromising the latter's status as a science.

The concerns of abstraction, propositional knowledge, logocentric formulation, and "objective" bases of knowledge all tend to make metic intelligence invisible, precisely because it cannot be formulated in terms of a definition or essence and because its "objects" are changing, ambiguous situations that are not amenable to rigorous logical demonstration. While the scientific tendency may make metic intelligence invisible, a second "moralist" tendency makes it vicious. Metic intelligence is morally and ethically problematic because the abilities we recognize and approve as wisdom may be the same abilities we disparage as cunning and cleverness. This tendency is concerned with the relation of knowledge and virtue. The view that virtue (*aretē*) is a branch of knowledge (*epistēmē*) begins with Socrates, who opposes Protagoras's view that virtue is a "knack" or a set of patterns of conduct that are tacitly learned (*Protagoras* 319a–320c). Socrates enjoins self-knowledge through the somewhat paradoxical assertion that no one who knows the Good wittingly does ill. Unlike the Socrates of the middle and late dialogues, the Socrates of the early dialogues is "a moral philosopher, pure and simple,"[8] and Plato never decisively abandons this strongest statement of the moralist position.[9]

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[7] Lévi-Strauss (1969.1) describes *The Raw and the Cooked* as an attempt to use empirical categories to formulate abstract ideas and propositions. Although his categories are based on ethnographic observation and particular cultural standpoints, their intent is to develop conceptual tools to "elaborate abstract ideas and combine them in the form of propositions." According to Clifford Geertz's (1973.24) now classic essay on thick description: "The besetting sin of interpretive approaches to anything—literature, dreams, symptoms, culture—is that they tend to resist, or to be permitted to resist, *conceptual articulation and thus to escape systematic modes of assessment*" (italics mine).

[8] See Vlastos 1988.91, who articulates ten fundamental contrasts in the philosophies ascribed to Socrates in the early and middle dialogues. The early Socrates makes no ironclad distinction between what we would now call propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. The definitions in the early dialogues establish a model of propositional or logocentric knowledge; Socrates considers giving the *logos* to be sufficient for both knowledge and virtue. By contrast, the self-knowledge of the later dialogues may be nonpropositional knowledge by acquaintance. This tension within the figure of Socrates may mirror a larger tension within Plato between *mētis* and the

Christian adaptations of Platonism "moralize" the ethical orientation of the Socratic philosophy of the early dialogues. When Saint Augustine locates intelligence as the first cause of the universe, he is referring both to an intellectual virtue and to a moral capacity. The tradition that Machiavelli was diabolically inspired, a legend already established by the time of the first English translation of *The Prince* in 1640, is an indication of the dubious reception that could be accorded to reflections on the amoral exercise of a practical intelligence.[10] It is noteworthy that in the *The Prince,* Machiavelli used practice (as evidenced by history), rather than abstract considerations and principles, to draw conclusions about politics and the art of government. Metic intelligence does not fit into this moralizing tendency, because it presents us with a continuum of wisdom and cunning. In contrast to the Greek distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence, the Buddhist distinction between *prajñā,* "theoretical knowledge," and *upāya,* "skill in means," recognizes the oblique and devious, as well as the practical, aspects of knowledge and wisdom.

Despite recent challenges from both philosophy and the social sciences, these scientific and moralist dispositions remain key elements in the construction and representation of Western culture.[11] These two tendencies do not accommodate metic intelligence, which too easily appears both arational and amoral, if not irrational and immor-

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logocentric view of knowledge generally ascribed to Plato. As in the case of Confucius and "Confucians," the possibility that Plato's views of knowledge may have differed from those of his later interpreters raises important questions beyond the scope of the present work. For a fuller discussion of Plato's view(s) of (moral) knowledge, see Dodds 1951.183–85 and Vlastos 1988.97–98.

[9] Plato repeatedly reaffirms this view. See his *Timaeus* 86b, *Protagoras* 345d, *Gorgias* 509e, *Republic* 351a and c, and *Laws* 862. For discussion of the problem of virtue as knowledge in Plato, see Grube 1935.216n1.

[10] See Machiavelli, *The Prince* 9 and 23–24.

[11] To cite a few out of many possible examples, Richard Rorty (1979) attacks Lockean-Cartesian-Kantian notions of philosophy of mind, theory of knowledge, and foundations of philosophy, in short, the very notion of epistemology. We can see philosophical opposition to the scientific tendency in the works of R. G. Collingwood (1933, discussed briefly on page 2), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), and J. L. Austin (1961). Within the disciplines of anthropology, history, and sociology, explorations of broad problems of human and social agency and their roles in the constitution of self-knowledge have also challenged the tacit epistemology of the scientific tendency. Examples include the works of Vološinov (1929), Gramsci (1957), Giddens (1983), Rosaldo (1989), and Inden (1990). This entire issue calls for fuller discussion than these few examples.

al. By contrast, the Chinese tradition is overwhelmingly concerned with *practical* knowledge. As such, it stands to offer a fresh perspective on an area of inquiry that in the West has for centuries been overwhelmed by our cultural emphasis on abstraction.[12] As Christoph Harbsmeier observes, both transformational grammar and analytical philosophy tend to downplay serious structural differences between languages; by contrast, Classical Chinese presents important evidence to such diverse fields as the history of ideas, the history of science, historiography, lyric poetry, and the philosophy of language precisely because of its differences from the Western tradition.[13] Classical Chinese provides an alternative grammar and semantics in which to examine many of the preoccupations of contemporary philosophy and linguistics.

An immediate obstacle to a preliminary description of metic intelligence is the overt resemblance between *mētis* and *phronēsis,* the "practical intelligence" of Aristotle. Yet metic intelligence operates with a peculiar twist, the unexpressed premise that both reality and language cannot be understood (or manipulated) in straightforward "rational" terms but must be approached by subtlety, indirection, and even cunning. By contrast, *phronēsis* is practical but not inherently oblique, devious, or indirect.[14] In more contemporary terms, it is tempting, but misleading, to reduce metic intelligence to "know-how knowledge."[15]

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[12] Several recent studies have moved in this direction. Herbert Fingarette's *Confucius: the Secular as Sacred* (1972) addresses the contribution of the Chinese tradition to modern Western philosophical discourse. More recently, Ames and Hall's *Thinking through Confucius* (1987) addresses the role of practical intelligence in Confucian thought and is a pioneering work in comparative philosophical inquiry. Angus Graham's *Disputes of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China* (1989) focuses on the role of modes of argumentation in the philosophical development of early China. In an even more ambitious vein, Graham (1985) attempts to ground a contemporary consideration of moral philosophy in the thought of the *Zhuangzi*.

[13] Harbsmeier 1981.2. See also Lloyd 1990.10–12 and 105–35.

[14] In Plato and Aristotle, the term *mētis* only appears in reference to *polumētis* Odysseus. Aristotle uses *phronēsis* for the practical aspects of metic intelligence but not its indirect and devious aspect. I am indebted to Stephen Toulmin for raising the question of the relationship of *mētis* and *phronēsis,* to Martha Nussbaum for her discussion of this point, and to Theodore Brunner for access to the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae,* which answered it.

[15] This term is one of a group of epistemological distinctions introduced by Bertrand Russell and modified by Gilbert Ryle. For Russell's distinction between acquaintance ("know-of" knowledge of things) and description ("know-that" knowledge of truths), see Russell 1912, chapters 5 and 13. For Ryle's threefold distinc-

In their investigation, Detienne and Vernant stress that *mētis* cannot be treated as a concept or idea because of its complex range of actions and attitudes. This "mode of action" or "attitude of mind" falls outside the purview of the history of ideas because it was never explicitly formulated, analyzed, or discussed and can only be studied indirectly.

Detienne and Vernant used philological methods to show that *mētis* was associated with a well-defined and coherent *semantic field* of words and images. A semantic field refers to a consistent association of a group of words over a long period of time and their consistent distinction from other words of different usage. The word *mētis,* for example, is consistently used to describe uncertain situations governed by the use of guile, rather than force, and by the exercise of "knack," rather than the knowledge of *epistēmē.* Individuals of *mētis* are typically never at a loss or without expedient; they are *polumētis, polutropos,* and *polumēkhanos.* They are diverse in their arts and tricks, *doloi pantoioi* and *tēkhnē pantoiē.* Their *mētis* is *poikilē,* variegated and multicolored; *pantoiē,* multiple; and *aiolē,* shifting and swift as the wind.[16] The consistent presence of a semantic field allowed Detienne and Vernant to claim that *mētis* was a permanent feature of the Greek world and that it was consistently used and understood in texts as different in time and subject matter as the works of Homer and Oppian. For more than ten centuries, a consistent, if tacit, notion of metic intelligence was applied to domains as diverse as weaving, navigation, and medicine.

If Detienne and Vernant are correct in their identification of metic intelligence as a universal mode of intelligence, we should see its operation in cultural traditions and languages that are as independent as possible of Greek and European linguistic and conceptual categories. In particular, we should find both specific equivalents for *mētis* and broad equivalents for the semantic field of *mētis* in classical Chinese, the literary language that evolved in China between the years 500 and 200 B.C.E. Classical Chinese has set the standard for philosophical and intellectual discourse in both China and much of Asia; its role in Asia has been similar to that of Classical Greek in Western Europe. It was the vehicle for the expression of philosophical, liter-

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tion between knowing how, knowing that (propositional knowledge), and acquaintance, see Ryle 1949.25–62. For a general discussion of these issues, see Quinton 1967.4.350.

[16] Detienne and Vernant 1978.18–20.

ary, and historical works that were the textual foundations of both Chinese society and many other Asian societies.

Several issues complicate such an undertaking. First, the investigation of a nontheoretical mode of intelligence presents methodological difficulties that do not apply to explicitly formulated philosophies and systems of knowledge. Because of the diversity of its manifestations and the lack of systematic or self-reflective accounts of *mētis,* Detienne and Vernant rely on indirect "archaeological" methods in their examination of a wide variety of mythological and historical sources.[17] In this book I apply the philological methods of Detienne and Vernant to representative Chinese texts separated by long periods of time in order to establish consistent semantic fields for metic intelligence within Chinese culture and society.

To locate equivalents for *mētis,* I focus on the semantic range of the term *zhi,* which has a wide variety of meanings from *wisdom, knowledge,* and *intelligence* to *skill, craft, cleverness,* or *cunning.* Following the general method of Detienne and Vernant's investigation of *mētis,* I examine the operation of *zhi* in representative texts from two periods of Chinese history separated by some sixteen centuries: the Warring States period (403–222 B.C.E.) and the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Not all usages of *zhi* correspond to *mētis,* however. There is also a general tendency within Chinese philosophical works for rival schools to use the same vocabulary to advance very different ideas. The same locution may express three entirely different notions in Confucian, Taoist, and Militarist works; a considerable variety of metaphysical assumptions may underlie one word.[18]

A second caveat involves cross-cultural study. The richness of the Classical Chinese language and textual tradition, its importance in Asia, and its independence of Greece all invite cross-comparison. Yet any such comparison must address the Chinese intellectual tradition on its own terms. To do otherwise would be merely to import a

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[17] For a different and more general description of such archaeological methods of historical investigation, see Foucault 1972.

[18] Roger Ames addresses this issue with his method of "conceptual reconstruction." He traces the origins and development of "crucial concepts" in the growth of early Chinese philosophy and disentangles Confucian, Mohist, and Taoist elements and usages by making explicit the implicit metaphysical foundations underlying these terms. Since there is no exact mapping between concept and locution, the multiplicity of concepts described by the same word must be disentangled and clarified. He thus reconstructs a field of concepts associated with a given locution. See Ames 1983.xi–xii.

Greek problem into China and effect a Greek solution. In this sense, cross-cultural comparison has had a dubious past, insofar as it has been used to privilege implicitly the Western perspective.[19]

To avoid the risk of simply importing a Greek conceptual category into China and making it fit, I examine usages of *zhi* in the context of two issues that are articulated in the Chinese intellectual tradition: the question of the respective roles of *wen* and *wu*—the civil and the martial spheres of society—and the "language crisis," a debate about the nature and limits of language that was of great concern to the Chinese speculative thinkers of the late Warring States period. The problem of the relation of wisdom and morality maps approximately onto the "wen-wu conflict." The problem of whether true knowledge can be expressed directly in words is expressed in the "language crisis."

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[19] Historically, such comparisons have tended to portray China as a mythical, mystical, timeless, infinitely homeostatic "Other." See, for example, Foucault's description of Borges's "Chinese encyclopedia" as the inspiration for *The Order of Things* (1973.xv–xxiv). For an excellent summary of historical and literary treatments of China in the West, see Zhang 1988.108–31. For a discussion of the relation of language to thought, especially the Greek language, see Bernal 1987.

CHAPTER I

Chinese Accounts of Wisdom and Knowledge

The Chinese reflective thinkers of the first millennium B.C.E. did not describe metic intelligence in treatises or explicitly formulated philosophical systems. Nevertheless, practical intelligence, wisdom, or savoir faire pervades the thought of texts as diverse (and in some cases, as mutually antagonistic) as those attributed to Confucius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Sunzi, and Mencius and haunts their peripheries like a sort of after-image. Normative Confucianism dominated China in much the same way that rationalistic and ethical Platonism dominated first Greece and then Europe. In China, as in ancient Greece, philosophies that recognized the importance of metic intelligence existed side-by-side with their more normative counterparts. These alternative views differ in their concepts of both language and morality. The Militarist tradition (*Bing jia*), in strong contrast with Confucianism, presents a martial (*wu*) and relatively amoral view of intellectual capability as the crucial capability of the sage-general. The Taoist tradition (*Dao jia*) also attacks Confucian accounts of knowledge and language and illustrates, rather than describes, wisdom indirectly through aphoristic accounts of the character and actions of "sages" (*sheng*).

Several sources, and in particular Han redactions of late Zhou and Warring States texts, provide direct and indirect information about early Chinese views of wisdom and cunning. Han dictionaries and compendia give important information about key terms and categories, but they also incorporate Han interpretations and interpolations. It was these very interpretations and classificatory schemata that were to set the tone for the subsequent interpretation of Warring States period works.

Texts of Pre-Confucian Origin

I use the *Shi jing*, or *Book of Poetry*, and the *Shu jing*, or *Book of History*, to examine the treatment of knowledge, cunning, and informed prudence in texts of pre-Confucian origin. The *Shu jing*, however, is not a homogeneous text and can by no means be presented as uniformly "pre-Confucian." Parts of the *Shu jing* date from the late Eastern Zhou, and others are later Han forgeries. Karlgren translates only the undeniably authentic parts of the *Shu jing*, and I have used his translation to select verifiably pre-Confucian passages.[1]

The *Shu jing* typically describes intelligence and wisdom with the terms *ming* and *zhe*, rather than *zhi*. The preface to the *Shu jing* (a later interpolation attributed to Confucius) describes Yao as "intelligent and enlightened, accomplished and sincere" (*cong ming wen si*) (*SSZY* Yao 2.2b).[2] Another passage explains that the ruler of a well-run state must have two key qualities: wisdom and kindness. Wisdom (*zhe*) is described as "knowing others" (*zhi ren*). A wise ruler can nominate the right people for office. A ruler who possesses the second quality brings peace to the people (*an min*), and the people cherish him (*SSZY* Yu 4.10b).

The one use of *zhi* in the *Shu jing* (Zhou 15.4a) is synonymous with *zhe* and describes a badly run state.[3] In these accounts, the ruler who is *ming* is discerning and enlightened by the ability to understand, perceive, and appreciate; Henri Maspero argues that the true meaning of *ming* is not simply intelligence but *sacred* intelligence.[4] Another important quality of the ruler is the ability to use the talents of others appropriately. According to Gao Yao, a ruler can attract enlightened (*ming*) and harmonious counsels (*mou*) by cultivating his own virtue (*de*) (*SSZY* Yu 4.9b). One of the measures of a true ruler is the ability to attract wise ministers. The episode in the *Romance* where the sage-general Zhuge Liang agrees to advise the Han heir, Liu Bei, is an illustration of this principle. A counterpart appears in a purely martial context in considerations of the respective roles of rulers and generals. This skill in recognition has an opposite in the skills of concealment and hiddenness. Warring States concern with these negative metic abilities may underlie the notion of interiority that pervades large areas of Chinese poetic discourse.[5]

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[1] For translations of the *Shu jing*, see Karlgren 1950. The translations of this and other texts discussed in this book are my own unless otherwise indicated. I indicate a translation other than my own by citing the translator's name following the primary source citation, for example, (*SSZY* Yao 2.4a, Karlgren 1).

[2] The *Shu jing* itself describes the emperor Yao as "reverent, enlightened, accomplished, sincere and peaceful" (*qin ming wen si an an*) (*SSZY* Yao 2.4a, Karlgren 1). A similar passage of more questionable authenticity (*SSZY* Shun 3.1a) describes Yao's successor, Shun, as "wise, accomplished, and intelligent" (*zhe wen ming*).

[3] This passage refers to the demise of the state of Yin and contrasts the wise (*zhe*) former kings of Yin with the last Yin ruler, who brought misery on the wise (*zhi*) and good (*SSZY* Zhou 15.4a). For translation, see Karlgren 49.

Thus the *Shu jing* explicitly describes two attributes of virtuous (*de*) rulers: (1) enlightened (or sacred) intelligence (*ming*), wisdom (*zhe*), and the ability to understand others (*zhi ren*) and (2) the ability to bring peace to the people (*an min*) through counsel (*mou*). Unstated but implied is a third attribute: the capacity to recognize and use the abilities of others.

These descriptions of the illuminating knowledge of virtuous rulers contrast with another group of terms that describe individuals of artifice and deceptive speech, whose words do not conform to their actions. The wisdom and skill of rulers and their counselors—*ming, zhi, zhe,* and *mou*—are contrasted with cleverness and artifice (*qiao*), deceit (*yin*), and trickery (*jian*). Virtuous rulers are not only wise and kind; they protect the people against "clever language" (*qiao yan*) and beguiling appearance (*SSZY* Yu 4.10b). Confucius quotes this passage (*An.* 1.3), and its sentiment appears in a similar *Shu jing* passage of questionable authenticity, which warns against employing men of "artful language" (*qiao yan*) and insinuating looks (*SSZY* Zhou 19.8b).

The emperor Yao's search for a worthy successor to whom he can hand over the empire exemplifies this antithesis between wisdom and deceit. Presented with someone who has accumulated and exhibited merit everywhere, Yao replies that the man speaks smoothly, but his actions are perverse (*SSZY* Yao 2.11b). A second passage contrasts the wisdom of the emperor Shun with his family's negative qualities: his father was blind and stupid, his mother deceitful (*yin*), and his brother arrogant. Nevertheless, Shun remained filial and self-controlled and did not become wicked (*jian*) (*SSZY* Yao 2.14b).

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[4] The traditional etymology for *ming,* "bright," is from "sun" and "moon." For this argument, see Maspero 1933.249–96.

[5] I am grateful to Stephen Owen for suggesting this possibility.

Unlike later Confucian works, which do not ascribe any of the qualities of wisdom to cunning individuals, the *Shu jing* presents a striking case of a person who is described as both wise and deceptive. When the emperor Yao seeks a worthy heir, his ministers suggest that his own son is enlightened (*ming*). The emperor responds that he is deceitful (*yin*) and quarrelsome and bypasses him in favor of the commoner Shun (*SSZY* Yao 2.11b).

The *Shu jing* thus presents a semantic field of intelligence and wisdom that portrays the ruler as *zhe, ming,* and only incidentally *zhi.* This wisdom is also associated with *wen,* "cultivation," *si,* "sincerity" or "the ability to reflect," and *mou,* "the felicitous counsels of ministers." *Ren,* Confucian "benevolence," is conspicuously absent.[6] These qualities are contrasted with *qiao, yin,* and *jian*—"cunning," "deceit," and "treachery." In contrast to later Confucian discussions of wisdom (*zhi*), in *Shu jing* semantics a person can be both enlightened (*ming*) and deceptive.

In the *Shi jing,* or *Classic of Poetry,* the graph *zhi,* "knowledge," is replaced by its near equivalent, *zhi,* "to know." This graph appears thirty-nine times, usually in its verbal sense of "to know" and once in the nominal sense of "knowledge." The King of Heaven (*shang di*) praises the legendary King Wen because he is naturally law-abiding *without knowledge or wisdom* (*bu shi bu zhi*) (*Mao* 241.7). In fact, Karlgren glosses this passage: "but by nature, without effort" (Karlgren 196). Its description of *zhi* as implicit and inarticulate is far closer to the *Laozi* description of the sage than to the Confucian understanding of *zhi* as discursive and practical. It also suggests the *Er ya* definition of *zhi* as intuitive understanding.

The *Shi jing* typically uses *ming* in its literal meaning "to be bright" for the purpose of describing the stars, sun, and moon and in the more abstract meaning "to brighten virtue" (*ming de*).[7] In a number of passages, *ming* seems to mean intelligence, rather than literal brightness. For example, the *Shi jing* ascribes intelligence (*ming*) and clairvoyance to heaven because of its ability to observe the conduct of men (*Mao* 254.8) and describes Zhong Shanfu as enlightened (*ming*) and wise (*zhe*) (*Mao* 260.4).

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[6] *Ren* occurs only five times in the *Shu jing* and is not a significant concept therein. For a discussion of the concept of *ren* as a Confucian innovation, see Schwartz 1986.76.

[7] See *Mao* 241.2, 241.4, 241.7, 255.4, 262.6, and 299.4.

As in the hierarchies of psychological types described later in the chapter, wisdom (*ming, zhe*) is contrasted to stupidity or foolishness (*yu*). Individuals of wisdom are responsible for their own knowledge and their own ignorance. The *Shi jing* quotes a saying: "There is no wise [*zhe*] man who has no folly [*yu*]; the folly of the common people is simply a natural fault; but the folly of the wise man is a (deliberate) offense" (*Mao* 256.1, Karlgren 217). Similarly, Mao 181.3 employs a contrast between the perceptions of "wise men" (*zhe*), who recognize toil and suffering, and stupid men (*yu*), who see only bravado. The breadth and ambivalence of words for wisdom, cleverness, and cunning in the *Shi jing* is especially noteworthy. The ostensibly positive words for wisdom and foresight, *zhe* and *sheng,* have a semantic range from wise to clever; similarly, *mou* and *you,* terms for planning and counsel, are used ambivalently over a semantic span from wise counsel and foresight to deception and craft. The ostensibly negative term *qiao* is used to mean, on the one hand, "deceitful" and "cunning," on the other, "artful," "agile," or "graceful."

The use of *zhe* and *mou* in the *Shi jing* is ambivalent. In some cases, *zhe* refers to the august and ethical wisdom of kings, for example, the "all-embracing wisdom" (*xuan zhe*) (*Mao* 282) of "wise kings" (*zhe wang*) (*Mao* 243.1) and the wisdom (*zhe*) of the emperor Shang (*Mao* 304.1). In other cases, these terms refer to cleverness verging on trickery; it would appear that *zhe* is a term of praise for a man but of blame for a woman. *Mao* 264 contrasts a clever (*zhe*) man, who builds a city wall, to a clever woman, who overthrows it. This passage names women, not the action of heaven, as the source of disorder in the world and goes so far as to claim that only women and eunuchs are incapable of instruction.

Mou, like *zhe,* has a range of meaning in the *Shi jing*. In its positive or neutral sense, *mou* is the foresight of kings and good ministers (as in the *Shu jing*). Negatively, *mou* is the scheming of crafty and wicked ministers.[8] A poem that laments destructive counsel in a degenerate state makes it clear that the same ability—foresight—can be used for good or ill by ministers and rulers (Mao 195). The poem deplores the state of the country's counsels and plans (*mou you*) as crooked and awry. Good counsels (*mou*) are ignored or opposed; bad counsels are followed.

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[8] An exception occurs at *Mao* 58.1, where *mou* refers to the craftiness of a man scheming to approach a woman.

The poet further laments that the plans (*you*) are pitiful, because they no longer take the ancient people or the great counsels (*da you*) as a standard but merely compete in uttering shallow words. The poet ends by stating that although the state is disordered and its people few, "some are wise (*sheng*), some are not . . . some are clever (*zhe*), some are plotting" (*mou*) (*Mao* 195.4–5, Karlgren 142–43).

This poem describes a situation in which rulers lack the ability to recognize foresight, and ministers either lack the ability to exercise foresight or pervert that ability to selfish ends. In its positive sense, the term *mou* is used of the ancient prince Dan Fu, who "plans" (*mou*) for the future of his people by building houses and making boundaries and divisions (*Mao* 237). Similarly, King Wu hands down plans (*mou*) to his descendants (*Mao* 244.8). *Mou* and its synonym *yu* are also used in connection with "the old ways," for example, in describing sacrifice, where grain is prepared, followed by "laying plans" (*mou*) and the subsequent preparation of sacrificial meats (*Mao* 245.7). Similarly, *yu,* like *mou,* is used in lamentation for political disorder (where no king or sage is present to plan adequately) and in general, in admonitions from old men to younger ones. *Mao* 254 remonstrates with makers of untrue speeches and short-sighted plans (*you*), men who are not wise (*sheng*) or sincere, men whose plans (*you*) are not far-seeing (*Mao* 254.1).[9]

In its negative sense of scheming foresight, *mou* is typically associated with clever language: "Tattling and glib-tongued, you plan [*mou*] and would slander people; be careful about your words, one will say that you are not reliable" (*Mao* 200.3, Karlgren 151).

Sheng, "wisdom," can also be used in the derogatory sense of "cleverness," as in *Mao* 193, where the term is applied to the "clever" prime minister Huang Fu. The poet claims that Huang Fu has perverted the foresight proper to a minister by selecting avaricious ministers and is "not even willing to leave a single old man, whom he could let guard our king" (*Mao* 193.5–6, Karlgren 139). In another double contrast at *Mao* 195.5, individuals who are sage (*sheng*) and wise (*zhe*) are contrasted with wrongdoers (*pi*) and schemers (*mou*).

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[9] Similar passages occur elsewhere in the *Shi jing:* "Oh, you youngsters, I tell you the old ways; if you listen to my counsels [*mou*] you will have no cause for great regret" (*Mao* 256.12, Karlgren 219) and "I plan [*mou*] for you, I caution you: if the disorder increases, it will destroy you" (*Mao* 257.5, Karlgren 221).

Another *Shi jing* remonstrance contrasts the unthinking and unplanned destructiveness of heaven with the negligent destructiveness of degenerate ministers. Heaven does not prolong its grace (*de*), but sends down death and famine. It does not ponder (*si*) or plan (*tu*). The words of rulers are not reliable; their "artful words" (*qiao yan*) are like a flow (*Mao* 194.5).

Artful language refers not to verbal facility per se but to a discontinuity between words and actions. *Qiao yan,* clever language, is the title and subject of *Mao* 198: "Vast and grand the ancestral temple, a lord [*junzi*] made it. Well made the great plan [*da you*], a sage [*sheng*] laid it; others have their (own) minds [*xin*], but even I can guess them; leap, leap crafty [*chan*] hare, but a stupid [*yu*] dog can catch him" (*Mao* 198.4). As Karlgren points out in his translation (147–48), this passage suggests that if even a simple-minded subordinate such as the speaker can see through these falsehoods, how much more so should the lord, who represents power and wisdom.

Qiao occurs in the *Shi jing* six times, three in the phrase *qiao yan,* clever language. But elsewhere in the *Shi jing, qiao* is a term of praise. Two instances praise the artful make-up of a beautiful woman. One, *Mao* 57.2, contrasts the red of her artful (*qiao*) smile with the black and white of her beautiful eyes. The other praises the fresh white gleam of her artful (*qiao*) smile and the richness of her girdle gems (*Mao* 59.3). A third instance describes the beauty and smooth grace of an athlete whose shooting is skillful and whose running is agile (*qiao*) and stately (*Mao* 106.1).

Qiao has entirely separate meanings in the realms of speech and action. In the context of language, "clever talk," the connotations of *qiao* are negative from the *Shi jing* through the works of late Warring States period philosophers. In the context of action, however, *qiao* is "skill," and lacks the negative connotations of "cunning talk."

Thus the terms in which these texts describe intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom, even in the earliest representative examples, present a complex and ambiguous view. On the one hand, they praise the power of wisdom, intelligence, and foresight to bring about social well-being and also praise the individuals who wield power in this way. Yet the same descriptions of wisdom admit, however grudgingly, its capacity for deception and disorder. The words that describe the enlightened wisdom and civilizing activities of the three legendary sage-emperors Yao, Shun, and Yu also describe the socially destructive activities of cunning ministers, deceptive language, and clever women.

The descriptions of wisdom and intelligence in early Chinese texts present a spectrum, out of which Confucius uses *zhi* to describe the wisdom of his ideal sage-ruler. Confucian *zhi* is a moral virtue that involves not only the perception of *ming* but also the ability to transform and regulate the social order. In the remainder of this chapter I shall describe the Confucian recension of the wisdom-cunning ambiguity, as expressed in the *Analects* of Confucius and in the transmission and elaboration of the thought of Confucius in the works of Mencius and Xunzi.

Zhi and Its Semantic Field

Metic intelligence is best represented in Chinese by certain aspects of *zhi:* wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, skill, cleverness, or cunning. In this nominal sense, *zhi* is derived from and cognate with *zhi*—to know, be aware, understand, be acquainted with or appreciate. These two graphs are often used interchangeably in pre-Qin texts. Definitions and etymologies of *zhi* first occur in two ancient dictionaries, the *Er ya* and the *Shuo wen.*

The *Er ya* is a late Zhou text that glosses the meanings of words used in the Confucian classics; thus the inclusion of terms in this text indicates their usage and significance at approximately the time of Confucius. The *Er ya* mentions *zhi* three times; there is already a polarization between two views of wisdom, one as propositional and explicit, the other as practical or intuitive. One mention (*EY* 2.196) identifies *zhi* with *zhe,* wisdom; another (*EY* 3.2) defines *zhi* as "every principle ranged in proper order" (*tiao tiao zhi zhi*). These two definitions, a chapter apart, suggest very different understandings of how *zhi* is acquired. The former suggests that *zhi* is not taught or learned but intuitively or directly perceived. The latter implies that *zhi* is the fruit of an orderly progression of study.

Etymologically, *zhi* is connected with speech. The great Han etymological dictionary, the *Shuo wen,* gives no entry for the nominal form *zhi* (knowledge) but glosses the verbal form *zhi* (to know) as deriving in meaning from "mouth" (*kou*) and "arrow" (*shi*): "to speak so as to hit the mark" (*SW* 2262). This traditional etymology is probably incorrect. Bernhard Karlgren suggests that the signific is not "arrow" but "man" and that the "speech" (*yue*) and "mind" (*xin*) significs were added subsequently to distinguish the verbal and nominal usages.[10] Mozi, for example, uses all three graphs and elucidates three different meanings.

The *Shuo wen* gives entries for several other terms for intelligence, cleverness, and knowledge. The term *hui,* which is also used for wisdom in the sense of intuitively obtained knowledge or wisdom, derives its meaning from the "mind" signific (*SW* 4667). This term is used, along with *zhi,* as a Chinese translation for Sanskrit *prajñā,* the wisdom that is the correlative of *upāya,* "skillful means."

Mou takes its meaning from the "word" signific *yan* (*SW* 977). Its meanings range from "strategy," "plans," and "counsel" to "cunning" and "*crafty* counsel." In the former sense, *mou* can be used almost interchangeably with *zhi.* (Examples are found in the *Shi ji* and *Sunzi.*) The Confucian philosopher Xunzi uses *mou* in its strongly derogatory sense. In both senses, *mou* refers to the ability to plan, predict, and order knowledge.

Qiao, "craft" or "skill," is also associated with *zhi.* Confucius contrasts cleverness with wisdom; Laozi reduces Confucian "wisdom" to mere cleverness. *Qiao* appears as part of the phrase *qiao fang bian,* one standard translation of the Mahayana Buddhist term *upāya,* skillful means. According to the *Shuo wen,* the signific for *qiao* is *gong,* "work" (*SW* 2018).

Finally, *ji,* "a plan or calculation" (a term that will be extensively associated with *zhi* in the *Romance*), is glossed as "wisdom" (*hui*) or "to plan" (*suan*). Derived from the graphs for *word* and *ten,* it refers to the ability to use language to create (numeric) order (*SW* 1003).

Even this small sample of terms associated with *zhi* indicates the extent to which these terms are associated etymologically with mind(fullness) (*xin*) and speech (*kou, yue,* and *yan*). The Appendixes include tentative semantic fields for the Warring States period and Ming works and provisional groupings of Chinese terms for wisdom and cunning according to their significs.

Chinese Discussions about Wisdom and Cunning

Two problems of early Chinese intellectual history correspond fairly closely to the ancient Greek problem of *mētis.* The question of

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[10] Karlgren 1957.228. For an account of the traditional etymology, see Karlgren 1923.346.