"There is no living political writer who has more radically changed how more people think in more parts of the world about political issues."
—Glenn Greenwald

noam chomsky

masters of mankind



essays and lectures, 1969–2013

Masters of Mankind

ESSAYS AND LECTURES, 1969–2013

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Foreword

BY MARCUS RASKIN

Noam Chomsky's political activities and his understanding of the nature of language capacity may be described metaphorically as an unbroken band labeled *universality*. But his universality is no mystification aimed at masking truths and marginalizing truthful inquiries, nor is it the belief that all of public life must be the same everywhere. One side of the Chomsky strip is innateness, which presents humanity with the gift of language and therefore communication. Follow that strip of universality; you will note that there is imprinted on the strip a capacity that allows for rationality and moral action that can catalyze humanity's benign social purpose. We may even speculate that human nature contains a capacity for invariant empathy. We leap and conclude that humanity is more than a bunch of indivisible but empty monads unconnected except through their accidental collision; we further conclude that humankind is imprinted with an inexorable drive to create something better out of its raw material. We desire our shared knowledge to lead to love, and vice versa; we want power to be in service of both. Perhaps a humane world civilization might come into being in which universality does not assign a preferred place to any particular group, but in which all are joined in solidarity and mutual dignity with all others. However, when we look again we see that the strands of the strip are torn and they need repair.

But how to repair them so that the band does not disintegrate? What are the tools we use to repair the tear? And who repairs the band of which we are an integral part?

For Chomsky, in the deepest personal sense, language becomes a critical means for the repair of the tear(s) of humanity; the structure of language is a wondrous feature of life that is simultaneously stable and infinitely malleable. In this, his views are radically different from those of Jean-Paul Sartre, who sees words and language as keeping us from the world as it is, or perhaps could be. For Chomsky, there are two courses in attaining repair and in creating something different, a new thing, a new organizational structure or alternative. One is in the spoken and written word, which comes from how we are hardwired. The other is the language of exemplary doing, where general propositions, for example about love and empathy, are made clear in action through lived experience. In politics, the body and mind are the tools to repair the body and mind.

For the casual observer, Chomsky seems to hold that on the one hand, there is science and analysis, and on the other hand, there are those desired values that we hold dear and preach about through different social means. In this world, the body is divided into unconnected categories where mind and heart, thinking and discernment, are separate from emotions and feeling. Is this not what the modern academy attempted to create, hoping in this way to ensure a soundness and civility, a series of golden lies, the distance of self from object and therefore a perverted objectivity, thereby protecting the scientist and her inquiries while intentionally missing the point of integration and wholeness?

His fellow academics were in for a big surprise if they thought Chomsky was domesticated to accept rationality as a division between thinking, passion, and political commitment in terms of how one leads a life of responsibility. This supreme rationalist in his actions and studies says that the basic concerns of intellectuals must be "to speak the truth and expose lies."[1] For him the basic concern in the political realm is to integrate knowledge, power, and love as the basis of law and value. That is to say, the ideal intellectual is to exercise responsibility through his rationality and the exercise of courage and integrity to expose lies and to

tell the truth. Human responsibility beyond a designated narrow social role can be a lonely activity in a society that gets by on grease paint and self-delusion. Chomsky's concern as a lover of wisdom that serves the wider humanity, as he knows and points out, can hit up against a stone wall where political thought and commentary is bereft of truth telling, even attempts at it.

It takes very little to find out what and whose interests are served when responsibility is defined in action as service to a master. Just spend a Sunday morning with the commentators on television whose interests have virtually nothing to do with truth telling and whose programs are sponsored by agribusiness and power companies. Responsibility morphs into servility. For many in the world of journalism and politics the consequences of what they do and why may not necessarily be known to them. The structure of Sunday morning news allows Exxon and a state apparatus to "guide" the journalist and the people listening. And this has dire consequences for a peaceful constitutional democracy. Read in Chomsky's *On Power and Ideology* the words of a columnist and former ambassador, William Shannon, who asserts that for the best of motives the United States ends up supporting military dictatorships, perhaps forgetting that everyone always claims the best of motives.[2] Throughout history American leaders have never shirked their responsibility of explaining in high-minded terms the American role in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Politics is the means that tells us how we are going to arrange and use the mirrors of everyday life. It arranges the framework that turns "ought" into "is" in culture and experience. This is why practical actions, in the sense of choosing and responsibility, determine the course of human history.

This is why Chomsky's analysis and his practical actions are so important. They are the bellwether of *what could be*. His drive and commitment come from a directed use of passion, intuition, and a deeply held responsibility for others. It is what I have termed "standing with" or "withness." But withness is more than reporting to others. Withness takes us beyond personal interest, accepting the risks of the other when there is no "pragmatic" reason to do so. Withness is an instrument of awareness

that helps us to know where and who we are, for it locates ourselves with others, and asks through example that others relocate and reorder themselves. When Henry David Thoreau, protesting the poll tax, was asked by Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Henry, why are you here?" Thoreau responded, "Waldo, why are you not here?"[3] There was no need for Chomsky to commit civil disobedience during the Indochina war except as a citizen responsibility. It was his statement of withness responsibility with the unseen Other. Our government could not respond to the anguish of millions; its policy makers were the chief culprits. If Chomsky's sensibility and drive were more infectious, it would be the saving possibility and hope of humanity. It would mean the recognition of international civil rights laws that renounced the color of legitimacy and would put an end to realpolitik from genocide to torture. It would mean an end to American military and economic imperialism; in the Indochina war, it would have meant a million lives saved. In the last decades, it would have meant that a quarter million Guatemalans would not have died with the not-so-silent assent of the United States.[4] It would mean that the United States would not supply with weapons and politically support the "stable oppression" seen throughout the Third World.[5]

Since in Chomsky's world the intellectual must turn his talent and spirit to the presentation of truthful accounts and acute analysis of things as they are, personal choices become obvious and inescapable. For Chomsky, inquiries are instruments that encourage the oppressed *to be free to do*. These inquiries mean seeing social relations and events without the opaque glasses considerately provided by closely interrelated universities, corporations, foundations, and media. On the intellectual side, rational inquiry seeks to "try to extract some principles that have explanatory force . . . thus hoping to account for at least the major effects."[6] This means analyzing how and to what end the United States organizes its clearly predominant global power.[7] With relatively free access to information, America's role in the world can be analyzed, explained, and understood with considerable accuracy.

But for Chomsky this is only half of the story. The question for him becomes "How does one live as an intellectual and citizen in the world

of the dominant empire?" Now choices requiring courage emerge. They necessitate working against the grain of established conventional intellectuals who have surrendered their critical faculties and internalized the values of the hierarchic system, to an extent that they often do not even realize. While Chomsky and others, this writer included, may have contempt for the role of intellectual scribes such as Henry Kissinger, who organized the thoughts and interests of a ruling class so that it would feel more secure, condemnation must also extend to an educational and rewards system that is eager to turn out such scribes. Fabrication is the tool of the intellectual valet in the state apparatus; he or she dresses up force in perfumed clothes. This fabrication extends to institutions and "disciplines" that enforce and coordinate state and economic power.

Thus, Chomsky is not surprised by intellectuals and a professoriate whose interests in truthful, uncontrolled inquiry are relatively modest. Such inquiry would require personal risk, perceived jeopardy of status, and confrontation with authority. But how much risk to the intellectual is really involved? After all, the national security state clings to the ornamental trappings of constitutional democracy as long as they don't get in the way of power. For those in the middle class, the United States is not a totalitarian state within its own borders. Those who adopt a contrary or skeptical stance need not fear for their lives. Perhaps that is why Chomsky holds so many intellectuals in disdain. They really would risk little if they would act other than as clerks for power.

When Chomsky wonders in "The Responsibility of Intellectuals"[8] why Arthur Schlesinger Jr. lied on behalf of the Kennedy administration, and was then rewarded by the academic community with a distinguished chair at a university, he is talking as the preeminent scholar who hates fraud and cowardice. He disdains intellectuals who undermine the importance and value of intellectual honesty in order to retain a place at the palace court. In this sense, Chomsky challenges the intellectual's privileged place when he or she does not act as truth teller. For Chomsky, the intellectual has historic importance when acting as an outsider to established power. Rationality allows us to demystify social constructions and find discernible messages that lay the basis for understanding and action. It is here where

the meaning of language is turned into moral action. It is here that Chomsky has chosen to show by words, lived experiences, and acts what he has in mind. Throughout the essays in *The Masters of Mankind*, Chomsky raises moral and legal questions about responsibility and accountability, as well as the meaning of rights embedded in law. Indeed, what does it mean to be responsible in relation to moral acts?

Chomsky knows full well the limits of leaders and of their advisors, the arrogance, posturing, and malign intentions he finds in their words. It does not matter whether these leaders are elected or appointed, or hold their office through blood or advantage of wealth or even as the result of some level of educational attainment useful to a ruling elite. He is aware that oligarchs do not rule as trustees for others, but for themselves. They have in mind the destruction of democracy if it ever proves to be more than a rhetorical fig leaf, when it means the redistribution of economic and political power along the ideological lines of Adam Smith and Tom Paine, or when it means the renunciation of imperialism. There is a direct line between the antidemocratic elites and the establishment of secret organizations such as the CIA, which know and do things that a democracy would not begin to understand or countenance—until the democracy is deadened through propaganda. The history of the American struggle with elitism is, of course, embedded in the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. The Electoral College, the establishment of secret agencies, and the limit of two senators per state are examples of fearing the people.

This problem became even more acute during the Cold War when the United States inherited and strove for imperial expansion. Whether it was the elitism of Walter Lippmann or the pipe-smoking spymaster Allen Dulles, secrets were deemed necessary against the public that needed "embedded" journalists to interpret reality for them. Chomsky is aware of the difficulties of concretizing ideals in practice, finding that what is propounded is not the same as what can be accommodated and accepted in practice. But even more so, he is aware of the structures and policies that patently lead in antidemocratic directions, where the rhetoric of democracy and freedom is a self-serving mask for decidedly unlovely consequences.

The imperial brand of globalism that emanates from the Pentagon and Wall Street is an example of oligarchy posing as the spread of democracy. Economically, poor nations are treated to a burlesque of Adam Smith's ideas of a free market while in reality being burdened by colonialism and neocolonialism. More importantly, they bring into being the distortion and degradation of human possibility. Globalism in its present form is the organization of immiseration through technology and imperialism. Under corporate globalism, the humane and political potentiality of the person is turned into a bundle of unrequited desires answered only by deplorable working and living conditions.

Yet Chomsky must believe that technology and communication could be fused to create the possibility of a world civilization. Surely this must have been one of the attractions of being at MIT, that factory for the pushing of possible worlds into reality. In that milieu he witnesses a new set of relationships emerging beyond the nation-state that perhaps could give rise in the twenty-first century to anarcracies. They would be bound together by a vast interlocking communications network that could yield the creation of a world civilization with plural cultures and without the burden of the nation-state. It could be a world in which differences in principles and ways of living could bang against one another through analysis and discussion, clarifying and deepening understanding, leading to more general principles that uncover and reflect that innate capacity for decency found in people and reflected in common documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is the human tragedy that these documents only seem to arise after great upheavals. They do have political weight once they come into being. They are reinterpreted through an intermingling of law and violent and nonviolent action—as, say, in the liberation of South Africa from apartheid, the moral force of the successful civil rights struggles within the United States, and the successful attempts at confronting military imperialism in and over the Third World. These struggles have led to attitudes and assumptions of scholarship as we learn more about ourselves through the quest for common enduring principles intended to liberate humanity.

Even if it is misplaced moral fervor or Machiavellian cleverness justifying the use of overwhelming force, that language of justification becomes the basis upon which succeeding generations build their struggles for expanded human rights. The oppressed ask, "If freedom and justice apply to oligarchs, why can't they apply to us?" Chomsky understands that law itself has two aspects. One is the politics and power struggles of the past frozen into rituals, laws, and court decisions, the conclusions of which are reified and laid onto the future: law as restraint that from time to time needs direct challenge. In this sense, the civil disobedience actions that Chomsky undertook as a conscientious citizen (with his Hush Puppies and book bag) were meant as a way to reshape the law, seeing it less as the consensus between competing powerful and often unaccountable interests or prejudices written in legal language, and more as law in a second sense, as the basis upon which civilization must function. Law and lawmakers need a nudge to arrive at a level of respect for freedom and dignity—concepts linked in Chomsky's political actions—so that law advances society to its next stage of freedom. Law in the hands of judges who take seriously the Bill of Rights and the preamble to the Constitution, as well as other foundational documents, takes on that meritorious purpose. It organizes a set of rituals and words that reflect the inquiry and actions of dignity and liberation. It seeks to influence practice constituted as extending freedom and holding at bay the dogs of oppression and war. Thus, the task of the "jurisprude" is the setting of new boundaries, internalizing the spirit of freedom in those boundaries so that they become more than Sunday school rhetoric. They are guides based on felt injustice and inquiry. Or, to stick with our metaphor, they are the threads of the Möbius strip that may or may not be seen but are recognized and repaired through our actions and those of our social and legal structures.

A new generation might ask whether the positive features of enlightenment can be used and expanded in this century. I suspect Chomsky might say yes in more optimistic moments. For there is within human nature the capacity for betterment, empathy, and active caring. This nature can be fulfilled through our reason and those feelings that Mikhail Kropotkin described at the beginning of the twentieth century that would

lead to wholly different but not utopian institutions. After all, Chomsky shows in these essays and in his body of work that practical paths can be found without demanding sainthood from each person. Rather he tells us that political action tied to demystification and analysis clears a path through the underbrush of mistakes and lies. Chomsky has acted as the wise catalyst for this necessary purpose. His thought and actions have made an indelible mark on two generations, and no doubt will do so for generations to come. In another time and in another tradition, we might have said that Chomsky's focused energy derived from a religious calling, a comment that Chomsky would surely scoff at and reject. His mastery of public texts is as awesome as scholars who analyze and interpret the words of the Talmud. His commitment to truth and justice is no less a religious calling than Reinhold Niebuhr's was to the idea of the Christian God as the hope of humankind, and without the muddle-headed contradictions that Niebuhr offered as practical guides to the perplexed and the opportunistic.

In Plato's *Republic,* Socrates expresses great fear about democracy because it is, in his mind, synonymous with freedom. The result is tyranny. But modern times have brought us a different understanding of democracy as an ideal. It is how to give the appearance of democracy yet deny it in practice, ensuring that democracy in its false form gives consent by the people to a small group, the oligarchs. This is accomplished through a combination of the people's silence and a rigged system that changes a working democracy of public participation and deliberation to a charade. In his essay "Consent Without Consent" in this volume, Chomsky exposes for us what all should know, but that the middle class, if it is doing well, has a tendency to forget: the two major political parties are business-oriented parties identifying in their soul with the centrality of big corporations as the engine of American life. Of course, in the workplace standards have always been rock solid. There is to be no kidding around about democracy. The workplace is the very definition of top-down authoritarianism. In this case, labor and the union movement have been in a continuous struggle around how deeply authoritarianism can extend into the lives of the workers—not whether it should exist. The business classes are forever conscious of class struggle and the importance of winning it.

Chomsky has not been alone in understanding the nature of class struggle and the baleful effects of a greedy oligarchy. Tom Paine understood the American Revolution as the struggle over democracy and the need of the people to judge, participate, and deliberate on their own destiny. Even James Madison, who best reflected the melding of aristocracy and republic as the way to ensure stability and to keep the barbarians away from power, was shocked to find that the real barbarians were sitting inside, not outside, the gate. In the twentieth century, John Dewey understood that those who held the keys to production, distribution, publicity, and transportation arrogated to themselves the role of rulers of the country. We may go one step further. The oligarchic national security state has turned the public election system into a wholly ornamental activity that we might term "politainment," politics as entertainment. Given control over the public discourse, it is relatively easy to change the channel of concern, changing the "discourse" like a child who might otherwise be caught out in a lie. This skill should not be underestimated and is really part of the genius of American advertising and state propaganda.

A large part of US history, like that of other nations, can be read as a narrative of imperial hubris.[9] But in every case there were also individuals who argued with and confronted this hubris. Chomsky is one of them.

ONE

Knowledge and Power: Intellectuals and the Welfare-Warfare State*

"War is the health of the State," wrote Randolph Bourne in a classic essay as America entered the First World War:

> It automatically sets in motion throughout society those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate cooperation with the Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack the larger herd sense. . . . Other values such as artistic creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, the enhancement of life, are instantly and almost unanimously sacrificed, and the significant classes who have constituted themselves the amateur agents of the State are engaged not only in sacrificing these values for themselves but in coercing all other persons into sacrificing them.

And at the service of society's "significant classes" were the intelligentsia, "trained up in the pragmatic dispensation, immensely ready for the executive ordering of events, pitifully unprepared for the intellectual interpretation or the idealistic focusing of ends." They are: "lined up in service of the war-technique. There seems to have been a peculiar congeniality between the war and these men. It is as if the war and they had been waiting for each other."[1]

*From "Knowledge and Power: Intellectuals and the Welfare-Warfare State," in *The New Left*, ed. Priscilla Long (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1970), pp. 172–99.

Bourne emphasizes the ideological consequences of national mobilization: the "irresistible forces for uniformity" that induce obedience to the State and subservience to the needs of the "significant classes." To this we may add the material benefits of mobilization for war, particularly evident in World War II and the Cold War as government intervention in the economy brought the depression to a close and guaranteed the "healthy functioning" of an economy geared, quite extensively, to the social goals of destruction and waste. Events have verified Bourne's prediction that the mobilization for war would bring the intelligentsia to a position of power and influence "in the service of the war technique." His remarks may be compared to those of James Thomson, East Asian specialist at the Department of State and the White House between 1961 and 1966:

> [T]he increased commitment to Vietnam was also fueled by a new breed of military strategists and academic social scientists (some of whom had entered the new Administration) who had developed theories of counterguerrilla warfare and were eager to see them put to the test. To some, "counterinsurgency" seemed a new panacea for coping with the world's instability. . . . There is a result of our Vietnam policy which holds potential danger for the future of American foreign policy: *the rise of a new breed of American ideologues who see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine.* . . . In a sense, these men are our counterpart to the visionaries of communism's radical left: they are technocracy's own Maoists. They do not govern Washington today—but their doctrine rides high.[2]

To this observation we can conjoin another, regarding a parallel phenomenon that has been the subject of wide discussion in recent years: "Power in economic life has over time passed from its ancient association with land to association with capital and then on, in recent times, to the composite of knowledge and skills which comprises the technostructure . . . [that is, the group that] embraces all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making [in government and corporation]."[3]

The role of the technical intelligentsia in decision-making is predominant in those parts of the economy that are "in the service of the

war technique" (or such substitutes as the space race) and that are closely linked to government, which underwrites their security and growth. It is little wonder, then, that the technical intelligentsia is, typically, committed to what Barrington Moore calls "the predatory solution of token reform at home and counterrevolutionary imperialism abroad."[4] Elsewhere, Moore offers the following summary of the "predominant voice of America at home and abroad"—an ideology that expresses the needs of the American socioeconomic elite, that is propounded with various gradations of subtlety by many American intellectuals, and that gains substantial adherence on the part of the majority that has obtained "some share in the affluent society":

> You may protest in words as much as you like. There is but one condition attached to the freedom we would very much like to encourage: your protests may be as loud as possible as long as they remain ineffective. Though we regret your sufferings very much and would like to do something about them—indeed we have studied them very carefully and have already spoken to your rulers and immediate superiors about these matters—any attempt by you to remove your oppressors by force is a threat to civilized society and the democratic process. Such threats we cannot and shall not tolerate. As you resort to force, we will, if need be, wipe you from the face of the earth by the measured response that rains down flame from the skies.[5]

A society in which this is the predominant voice can be maintained only through some form of national mobilization, which may range in its extent from, at the minimum, a commitment of substantial resources to a credible threat of force and violence. Given the realities of international politics, this commitment can be maintained in the United States only by a form of national psychosis of the sort given voice, for example, by the present secretary of defense, who sees us "locked in a real war, joined in mortal combat on the battlefield, each contender maneuvering for advantage"[6]—a war against an enemy who appears in many guises: Kremlin bureaucrat, Asian peasant, Latin American student, and, no doubt, "urban guerrilla" at home. Far saner voices can be heard expressing a perception that is not totally dissimilar.[7] Perhaps success can be attained in the national endeavor announced by this predominant voice.

In Moore's informed judgment, the system "has considerable flexibility and room for maneuver, including strategic retreat."[8] In any event, this much is fairly sure. Success can be achieved only at the cost of severe demoralization, which will make life as meaningless for those who share in the affluent society as it is hopeless for the peasant in Guatemala. Perhaps "war is the health of the state"—but only in the sense in which an economy is "healthy" when a rising GNP includes the cost of napalm and missiles and riot-control devices, jails and detention camps, placing a man on the moon, and so on.

Even in this sense of "health," it is not war that is the health of the state in the modern era, but rather permanent preparation for war. Full-scale war means that the game is lost. Even a "limited war" can be harmful, not only to the economy,[9] as the stock market and the complaints of aerospace executives indicate, but also to the long-range commitment to the use of force. Probably what success the peace movement has had in limiting the attack on Vietnam came not from its present power but rather from the danger that the "predominant voice" that Moore correctly hears might be challenged in a more general and far-reaching way. Better to nip dissent in the bud while it is still focused on the specific atrocity of Vietnam and deflect a movement that might, if it grows, begin to raise serious questions about American society and its international role. Thus we now hear of the mistake of bombing North Vietnam (which caused moral outrage and thus threatened the stability of the body politic)[10] and of using conscripts to fight a colonial war; and we hear proposals for a volunteer army at "market prices" so that resistance will be cooled when Vietnam is reenacted elsewhere.

I would like to elaborate on both of Bourne's points: the function of preparation for war in guaranteeing the health of the state, and the opportunities that this condition provides for "the new breed of American ideologues"—adding some historical perspective and some comments on what intellectuals might hope to do to counter these tendencies.

The intellectual has, traditionally, been caught between the conflicting demands of truth and power. He would like to see himself as the man who seeks to discern the truth, to tell the truth as he sees it, to act—collectively

where he can, alone where he must—to oppose injustice and oppression, to help bring a better social order into being. If he chooses this path, he can expect to be a lonely creature, disregarded or reviled. If, on the other hand, he brings his talents to the service of power, he can achieve prestige and affluence. He may also succeed in persuading himself—perhaps, on occasion, with justice—that he can humanize the exercise of power by the "significant classes." He may hope to join with them or even replace them in the role of social management, in the ultimate interest of efficiency and freedom. The intellectual who aspires to this role may use the rhetoric of revolutionary socialism or of welfare-state social engineering in pursuit of his vision of a "meritocracy" in which knowledge and technical ability confer power. He may represent himself as part of a "revolutionary vanguard" leading the way to a new society or as a technical expert applying "piecemeal technology" to the management of a society that can meet its problems without fundamental changes. For some, the choice may depend on little more than an assessment of the relative strength of competing social forces. It comes as no surprise, then, that quite commonly the roles shift; the student radical becomes the counterinsurgency expert. His claims must, in either case, be viewed with suspicion: he is propounding the self-serving ideology of a "meritocratic elite" that, in Marx's phrase (applied, in this case, to the bourgeoisie), defines "the special conditions of its emancipation [as] the *general* conditions through which alone modern society can be saved." Failure to present a reasoned justification will simply confirm these suspicions.

Long ago, Kropotkin observed that "the modern radical is a centralizer, a State partisan, a Jacobin to the core, and the Socialist walks in his footsteps."[11] To a large extent he is correct in thus echoing the warning of Bakunin that "scientific socialism" might in practice be distorted into "the despotic domination of the laboring masses by a new aristocracy, small in number, composed of real or pretended experts,"[12] the "red bureaucracy" that would prove to be "the most vile and terrible lie that our century has created."[13] Western critics have been quick to point out how the Bolshevik leadership took on the role outlined in the anarchist critique[14]—as was in fact sensed by Rosa Luxemburg,[15] barely a few

months before her murder by the troops of the German socialist government exactly half a century ago.

Rosa Luxemburg's critique of Bolshevism was sympathetic and fraternal but incisive, and full of meaning for today's radical intellectuals. Fourteen years earlier, in her *Leninism or Marxism*,[16] she had criticized Leninist organizational principles, arguing that "*nothing will more surely enslave a young labor movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic straitjacket, which will immobilize the movement and turn it into an automaton manipulated by a Central Committee.*" These dangerous tendencies toward authoritarian centralization she saw, with great accuracy, in the earliest stages of the Bolshevik revolution. She examined the conditions that led the Bolshevik leadership to terror and dictatorship of "a little leading minority in the name of the class," a dictatorship that stifled "the growing political training of the mass of the people" instead of contributing to it; and she warned against making a virtue of necessity and turning authoritarian practice into a style of rule by the new elite. Democratic institutions have their defects: "But the remedy which Trotsky and Lenin[17] have found, the elimination of democracy as such, is worse than the disease it is supposed to cure; for it stops up the very living source from which alone can come the correction of all the innate shortcomings of social institutions. That source is the active, untrammeled, energetic political life of the broadest masses of the people."

Unless the whole mass of the people take part in the determination of all aspects of economic and social life, unless the new society grows out of their creative experience and spontaneous action, it will be merely a new form of repression. "Socialism will be decreed from behind a few official desks by a dozen intellectuals," whereas in fact it "demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule," a transformation that can take place only within institutions that extend the freedoms of bourgeois society. There is no explicit recipe for socialism: "Only experience is capable of correcting and opening new ways. Only unobstructed, effervescing life falls into a thousand new forms and improvisations, brings to light creative force, itself corrects all mistaken attempts."

The role of the intellectuals and radical activists, then, must be to assess and evaluate, to attempt to persuade, to organize, but not to seize power and rule. "Historically, the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee."[18]

These remarks are a useful guide for the radical intellectual. They also provide a refreshing antidote to the dogmatism so typical of discourse on the left, with its arid certainties and religious fervor regarding matters that are barely understood—the self-destructive left-wing counterpart to the smug superficiality of the defenders of the status quo who can perceive their own ideological commitments no more than a fish can perceive that it swims in the sea.

It would be useful, though beyond the bounds of discussion, to review the interplay between radical intellectuals and technical intelligentsia on the one hand and mass, popular-based organizations on the other, in revolutionary and post-revolutionary situations. Such an investigation might consider at one extreme the Bolshevik experience and the ideology of the liberal technocracy, which are united in the belief that mass organizations and popular politics must be submerged.[19] At the other extreme, it might deal with the anarchist revolution in Spain in 1936–37—and the response to it by liberal and Communist intellectuals.[20] Equally relevant would be the evolving relationship between the Communist Party and the popular organizations (workers' councils and commune governments) in Yugoslavia today,[21] and the love-hate relationship between party cadres and peasant associations that provides the dramatic tension for William Hinton's brilliant account of a moment in the Chinese revolution.[22] It could draw from the experience of the National Liberation Front as described, say, by Douglas Pike in his *Vietcong*[23] and other more objective sources,[24] and from many documentary accounts of developments in Cuba. One should not exaggerate the relevance of these cases to the problems of an advanced industrial society, but I think there is no doubt that a great deal can nevertheless be learned from them, not only about the feasibility of other forms of social organization[25] but also about the problems that arise as intellectuals and activists attempt to relate to mass politics.

It is worth mention that the post–World War I remnants of the non-Bolshevik left reechoed and sharpened the critique of the "revolutionary vanguard" of activist intellectuals. The Dutch Marxist Anton Pannekoek[26] describes "the aim of the Communist Party—which it called world-revolution" in this way: "to bring to power, by means of the fighting force of the workers, a layer of leaders who then establish planned production by means of State Power." Continuing:

> The social ideals growing up in the minds of the intellectual class now that it feels its increasing importance in the process of production: a well-ordered organization of production for use under the direction of technical and scientific experts—are hardly different [from those of the Bolshevik leadership]. So the Communist Party considers this class its natural allies which it has to draw into its circle. By an able theoretical propaganda it tries to detach the intelligentsia from the spiritual influences of the declining bourgeoisie and of private capitalism, and to win them for the revolution that will put them into their proper place as a new leading and ruling class . . . they will intervene and slide themselves in as leaders of the revolution, nominally to give their aid by taking part in the fight, in reality to deflect the action in the direction of their party aims. Whether or not the beaten bourgeoisie will then rally with them to save of capitalism what can be saved, in any case their intervention comes down to cheating the workers, leading them off from the road to freedom. . . . The Communist Party, though it may lose ground among the workers, tries to form with the socialists and the intellectual class a united front, ready at the first major crisis of capitalism to take in its hands the power over and against the workers. . . . Thus the fighting working class, basing itself upon Marxism, will find Lenin's philosophical work a stumbling-block in its way, as the theory of a class that tries to perpetuate its serfdom.[27]

And in the postwar Western welfare state, the technically trained intelligentsia also aspire to positions of control in the emerging state-capitalist societies in which a powerful state is linked in complex ways to a network of corporations that are on their way to becoming international institutions. They look forward to "a well-ordered production for use under the direction of technical scientific experts" in what they de-

scribe as the "post-industrial technetronic society" in which "plutocratic pre-eminence comes under a sustained challenge from the political leadership which itself is increasingly permeated by individuals possessing special skills and intellectual talents," a society in which "knowledge becomes a tool of power, and the effective mobilization of talent an important way for acquiring power."[28]

Bourne's critical words on the treachery of the intellectuals thus fall within a broader analytic framework. Furthermore, his perception of the ideological role of the mobilization for war has been proven accurate by events. When Bourne wrote, the United States was already the world's major industrial society—in the 1890s, its industrial production already equaled that of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany combined.[29] The war of course greatly enhanced its position of economic superiority. From World War II, the United States emerged as the world-dominant power, and so it has remained. The national mobilization for war permitted the exercise of means to escape from the economic stagnation of the 1930s and provided some important insights into economics. As Chandler puts it:

> World War II taught other lessons. The government spent far more than the most enthusiastic New Dealer had ever proposed. Most of the output of the expenditures was destroyed or left on the battlefields of Europe and Asia. But the resulting increased demand sent the nation into a period of prosperity the like of which had never before been seen. Moreover, the supplying of huge armies and navies fighting the most massive war of all time required a tight, centralized control of the national economy. This effort brought corporate managers to Washington to carry out one of the most complex pieces of economic planning in history. That experience lessened the ideological fears over the government's role in stabilizing the economy.[30]

Apparently, the lesson was learned very well. It has been pointed out, accurately, that in the postwar world "the armaments industry has provided a sort of automatic stabilizer for the whole economy,"[31] and enlightened corporate managers, far from fearing government intervention in the economy, view "the New Economics as a technique for increasing corporate viability."[32]

The ensuing Cold War carried further the depoliticization of American society and created a psychological environment in which the government was able to intervene, in part through fiscal policies, public works, and public services, but very largely through "defense" spending, as "a coordinator of last resort" when "managers are unable to maintain a high level of aggregate demand" (Chandler). The Cold War has also guaranteed the financial resources as well as the psychological environment for the government to undertake an extensive commitment to the project of constructing an integrated world economy dominated by American capital—"no idealistic pipe dream," according to George Ball, "but a hard-headed prediction; it is a role into which we are being pushed by the imperatives of our own technology."[33] The major instrument is the multinational corporation, described by Ball as follows: "In its modern form, the multinational corporation, or one with world-wide operations and markets, is a distinctly American development. Through such corporations it has become possible for the first time to use the world's resources with maximum efficiency. . . . But there must be greater unification of the world economy to give full play to the benefits of multinational corporations."[34]

The multinational corporation itself is the beneficiary of the mobilization of resources by the government, and its activities are backed, ultimately, by American military force. Simultaneously, there is a process of increased centralization of control in the domestic economy, as also in political life, with the decline of parliamentary institutions—a decline that is, in fact, noticeable throughout the Western industrial societies.[35]

The "unification of the world economy" by American-based international corporations obviously poses serious threats to freedom. The Brazilian political economist Helio Jaguaribe, no radical, puts it as follows:

> Increasing dependence on alien developed countries, particularly the United States, together with increasing internal poverty and unrest, would leave the Latin American peoples with the choice between permanent foreign domination and internal revolution. This alternative is already visible in the Caribbean area, where the countries have lost their individual viability and are not being allowed, by the combined action of their own internal oligarchies and the external intervention of the United States, to form a larger autonomous

> community. What is happening today in the Caribbean is likely to happen in less than two decades in the major Latin American countries if they do not achieve minimal conditions of autonomous self-sustained development.[36]

It is no secret that the same concerns arise in Asia, and even in Western Europe, where national capital is incapable of competing with state-supported American enterprise, the system that Nieburg describes as "a government-subsidized private profit system."[37]

Economic domination carries with it as well the threat of cultural subjugation—not a threat but a positive virtue, from the point of view of the colonial administrator or, often, the American political scientist delighted with the opportunity to preside over the "modernization" of some helpless society. An example, extreme perhaps, is the statement of an American diplomat in Laos: "For this country, it is necessary, in order to achieve any progress, to level everything. It is necessary to reduce the inhabitants to zero, to disencumber them of their traditional culture which blocks everything."[38]

At another level, the same phenomenon can be observed in Latin America. Claude Julien comments:

> The revolt of Latin American students is not directed only against dictatorial regimes that are corrupt and inefficient—nor only against the exploitation by the foreigner of the economic and human resources of their country—but also against the cultural colonization that touches them at the deepest level of their being. And this is perhaps why their revolt is more virulent than that of the worker or peasant organizations that experience primarily economic colonization.[39]

The classic case in the American empire is the Philippines, where the effects have been disastrous.

The long-range threat is to national independence and cultural vitality, as well as to successful, balanced economic development.[40] The factors interweave. Domestic ruling elites develop a vested interest in American dominance and even in American imperial ventures—a fact illustrated clearly in the Far East, where the Korean war and now the Vietnam war have substantially contributed to the "health" of the states

that are gradually being "unified" in the American system. At times the results verge on the grotesque: thus Japan produces the plastic containers used to ship home corpses of American soldiers, and "the successor companies to I. G. Farben, the firm which produced Zyklon B for the gas chambers of the German extermination camps, . . . have now set up an industrial plant in South Vietnam for the production of toxic chemicals and gases for the US expeditionary force."[41] The ordinary reality is grim enough, without such examples.

Each year in the Economic Survey of Asia and the Pacific published by the *New York Times* we read such items as this:

> *Thais See Peace as a Mixed Blessing*: . . . [It is an] unarguable fact that an end to the fighting [in Vietnam] would pose a grave threat to Thailand's economy. *The Investor*, the new monthly magazine of the Thai Board of Investment, put the case candidly in the cover story of its first issue, published in December. "The economic development of Thailand has become so inextricably linked with the war," the magazine said, "that whatever decisions the United States makes about its future role in Southeast Asia cannot fail to have far reaching implications here." "An abrupt termination of the American war effort in Southeast Asia," the magazine went on to say, "would be quite painful economically". . . . If, however, as many people think, an American pullout from Vietnam actually results in an even bigger United States military presence here, the Thais will be faced with the even more difficult choice between a continued boom and further deterioration of their traditional society.[42]

The impact is severe, and cumulative: it is added to the devastating heritage of the colonial era, nicely summarized, for example, in the testimony of the director of the USAID Mission in the Philippines before a House subcommittee on April 25, 1967:

> Agriculture . . . is a product of almost studied neglect—inadequate transportation, limited irrigation, insufficient farm credit programs, price policies aimed at cheap food for urban areas which discourage farm production, high rate of tenancy, absentee land ownership, poorly organized markets and high interest rates. The average farmer (with a family of six) in Central Luzon makes about 800 pesos from his farming operation. His condition has not changed in the last fifty years [to

> be more precise, since the Spanish occupation]. Perhaps even more critical than the actual condition of the rural inhabitant . . . is the ever increasing gap between urban and rural living. . . . In the past ten years the rich have become richer and the poor have become poorer.[43]

Conceivably new technical advances—for example, "miracle rice"—may help. One certainly hopes so, but the advance euphoria seems questionable:

> The new high-yielding varieties, developed partly by Ford- and Rockefeller-financed organizations, require scientific management, two to three times the cash inputs previously needed, and extensive water control. . . . [If self-sufficiency is reached], the market price of the commodity will drop considerably in the Philippines. This means that only the most efficient farming units will lie with the large, mechanized, tenantless, agro-business farms. This technological fact, coupled with a loophole in the Land Reform Code that allows a landlord to throw his tenants off the land and retain it himself if he farms the area, might destroy whatever attempts are made at land reform in the Philippines. . . . [President Marcos] is very much aware of a little-publicized report issued in 1965, which clearly proves the feudal, and therefore explosive, nature of Philippine rural society. The report reveals that only eighteen years ago, less than half of 1 percent of the population owned 42 percent of the agricultural land. Two hundred and twenty-one of the largest landowners—the Catholic Church being the largest—held over 9 percent of the farm area. In 1958, nearly 50 percent of the farmers were tenants and an additional 20 percent of the farmers were tenants and an additional 20 percent were farm laborers. Thus 70 percent of those employed in agriculture were landless. . . . In 1903, the tenancy rate for the entire country was 18 percent excluding farm laborers. By 1948 this figure had climbed to 37 percent. In 1961, it was over 50 percent. There is no evidence that this trend has at all changed in the last eight years. It may even be outpacing the minuscule efforts at land reform. . . . Will the Congress in Manila, composed of the very same rural banking elite, ever vote the necessary funds to finance the Agricultural Credit Administration, the Land Bank and Cooperatives?[44]

The report may have gone on to indicate that this situation is, largely, a consequence of American colonial policy, and it also might have ventured a prediction as to the fate of those driven off the land under "ra-

tionalization" in a country that has been described as an American vegetable garden.

Similar reports are coming from India: "Though it is clear that the Indian farmer wants to exploit the new technology, it is less clear that he has been able to do so to any dramatic degree in the paddy fields."[45] The same report cites another problem, namely: "State governments in India have been eliminating taxes on the incomes of the more prosperous farmers at a time when those incomes have been rising steadily. Politicians are convinced that it would be suicidal for any party to press for the restoration of these taxes. But without some mechanism for diverting a portion of the new income in rural areas to development, growth will inevitably lag."

Again, this situation is a legacy of colonialism. It can be met only by social reconstruction of a sort that, throughout the world, will now be resisted by American influence and direct application of force, the latter applied, where possible, through the medium of the American-trained and -equipped native armies. Brazil is merely the most recent and most obvious example. There, the military elite preaches this ideology: "Accepting the principle of 'total war against subversion,' the doctrine of national security considers that the 'underdeveloped countries must aid the leading State of the Christian world to defend civilization by furnishing it with primary materials.'"[46]

In such ways, it becomes possible, to return to George Ball's formulation, "to use the world's resources with maximum efficiency" and with "greater unification of the world economy." In such ways we strive to realize the prediction outlined long ago by Brooks Adams: "Our geographical position, our wealth, and our energy preeminently fit us to enter upon the development of Eastern Asia [but why only there?] and to reduce it to part of our own economic system."[47] Our own economic system, meanwhile, is heavily dependent on government-induced production. Increasingly, it is becoming a "government-subsidized private profit system" with a deep involvement of the technical intelligentsia. The system is tolerated by public opinion, which is tortured by chimeras and stupefied by the mass media.

That a situation such as this is fraught with perils is obvious. From the point of view of the liberal technocrat the solution to the problem lies

in strengthening the federal government (the "radical centralizer" goes further, insisting that all power be vested in the central state authorities and the "vanguard party"). Only thus can the military-industrial complex be tamed and controlled: "The filter-down process of pump-priming the civilian economy by fostering ever-greater economic concentration and income inequality must be replaced by a frank acceptance of federal responsibility to control the tide of economic bigness, and to plan the conservation and growth of all sectors of the economy and the society."[48]

The hope lies in skilled managers such as Robert McNamara, who "has been the unflinching hero of the campaign to reform and control the 'Contract State.'"[49] It is probably correct to suppose that the technostructure offers no greater hope than McNamara, who has clearly explained his own views regarding social organization: "Vital decision-making, in policy matters as well as in business, must remain at the top. This is partly—though not completely—what the top is for."

Ultimate control must be vested in the hands of management, which is, "in the end, the most creative of all the arts—for its medium is human talent itself." This is apparently a divine imperative: "God is clearly democratic. He distributes brainpower universally. But He quite justifiably expects us to do something efficient and constructive with that priceless gift. That is what management is all about."[50]

This is a relatively pure form of the vision of the technocratic elite. We can arrive at a more considered judgment regarding the likely role of a strengthened federal authority in a state capitalist society by examining the past record. The federal government has continuously accelerated the arms race and the centralization of the domestic and international economy, not only by subsidizing research and development, but also by investment that is turned over to private capital and by direct purchase.[51] A plausible forecast is suggested by Letwin's observation that in the past, "businessmen invented, advocated, or at least rapidly recognized the usefulness of each main measure of [government intervention]" since they could thus "put government to positive use as a means for imposing the social arrangements that suited their own economic interests." McNamara's capitulation on the ABM system, in the face of his clear understanding of

its irrationality (except as a subsidy to the electronics industry) indicates rather dramatically what the more human forces among the technical intelligentsia can hope to achieve solely by "working from within."

As we move into the Nixon period, there is every reason to suppose that even the feeble gestures of the McNamaras will be restrained. In a series of articles in the *Washington Post* (December 1968), Bernard Nossiter quotes the president of North American Rockwell: "All of Mr. Nixon's statements on weapons and space are very positive. I think he has perhaps a little more awareness of these things than some people we've seen in the White House." The above prospect, Nossiter concludes from his study, is this:

> Powerful industrial giants eagerly pressing for more military business, Pentagon defense planners eager to get on with the new weapons production, Congressmen whose districts profit directly from the anticipated contracts, and millions of Americans from the blue collar aircraft worker to the university physicist drawing their paychecks from the production of arms. About to take over the White House is a new president whose campaign left little doubt of his inclination to support the ABM and other costly arms spending while tightening up on expenditures for civilian purposes. This is the military-industrial complex of 1969.

Of course, any competent economist can sketch other methods by which government-induced production can serve to keep the economy functioning. "But capitalist reality is more intractable than planners' pens and paper. For one thing too much productive expenditure by the state is ruled out. Seen from the individual capitalist's corner, such expenditure would be a straight invasion of his preserve by an immensely more powerful and materially resourceful competitor; as such it needs to be fought off."[52]

Furthermore, in a society in which a "vigorous appetite for income and wealth" is extolled as the highest good (see note 50), it is difficult—subversive of the prevailing ideology, in fact—to mobilize popular support for use of the resources for the public welfare or to meet human needs, however desperate they may be. The point is explained clearly by Samuel F. Downer, financial vice president for LTV aerospace, who is

quoted by Nossiter in explanation of why "the post-war world must be bolstered with military orders": "It's basic. Its selling appeal is defense of the home. This is one of the greatest appeals the politicians have to adjusting the system. If you're President and you need a central factor in the economy, and you need to sell this factor, you can't sell Harlem and Watts but you can sell self-preservation, a new environment. We're going to increase defense budgets as long as those Russians are ahead of us. The American people understand this."

Similarly, the American people "understand" the necessity for the grotesquerie of the space race, which is quite susceptible to Madison Avenue techniques and thus, along with the science-technology race in general, serves as "a transfigured, transmuted and theoretical substitute for an infinite strategic arms race; it is a continuation of the race by other means."[53] It is fashionable to decry such analyses—or even references to the "military-industrial complex"—as "unsophisticated." It is interesting, therefore, to note that those who manipulate the process and stand directly to gain by it are much less coy about the matter.

There are some perceptive analysts—J. K. Galbraith is the best example—who argue that the concern for growth and profit maximization has become only one of several motives for management and technostructure, that it is supplemented, perhaps dominated, by identification with and adaptation to the needs of the organization, the corporation, which serves as a basic planning unit for the economy.[54] Perhaps this is true, but the consequences of this shift of motivation may nevertheless be slight, since the corporation as planning unit is geared to production of consumer goods[55]—the consumer, often, being the national state—rather than satisfaction of social needs, and to the extension of its dominion in the organized international economy.

In his famous address on the military-industrial complex, President Eisenhower warned that: "The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded." In fact, the government has long been the "employer of last resort"—in fact, the dominant employer—for the engineering profession, and there is little doubt

that the world would be a better place without a good deal of the technology that is being developed.

The facts are clearly perceived and rightly deplored by many very able critics. H. L. Neiburg, in the work cited, explains the background for the "science-technology race" as follows: "Built into this equation and secondary to it is the need to maintain a healthy economy. Fear of stagnation, the habit of massive wartime spending, the vested interests embracing virtually all groups, pork-barrel politics—all are aspects of what has become deliberate government policy to invest in the 'research and development' empire as an economic stimulant and a public works project."

He shows how government contracts have become "an escape route" from the "stagnating civilian economy," with the "contemporary dedication to science" and the "popular faith in the mystique of innovation" serving as "a cover for the emergence of an industrial research-and-development and systems-engineering management cult with unparalleled private economic and public decision-making power."

> For almost three decades the nation's resources have been commanded by military needs, and the political and economic power have been consolidated behind defense priorities. . . . The surviving myths of private enterprise insulate the industrial giants from social control, distorting the national reading of realities at home and abroad, concealing the galloping pace of corporate mergers and economic concentration, protecting the quasi-public status of narrow private interests. . . . In addition to claims of security, national prestige, and prosperity, the sacred name of science is hailed as a surrogate consensus, an alibi to soften, defer, and deflect the growing divisions of American society. . . . The science-technology race provided an avenue of substitute pump-priming which maintained personal income without increasing civilian goods, further aggravating inequities in the structure of purchasing power which commands and organizes national resources.

In his analysis of these developments, and in his passionate denunciation of their perverse and inhuman character, Nieburg is acting in the highest tradition of the critical intellectual. He is unrealistic, however, when he suggests that enlightened bureaucrats—McNamara, for example—can use the

undeniable power of the federal government to ameliorate the situation in any fundamental way by working from within; just as the scientists who rightly fear a nuclear catastrophe are deluding themselves if they believe that private lectures to government bureaucrats on the irrationality of an arms or space race will succeed in changing national priorities. Similarly, it may be true, in the abstract, that "the techniques of economic stimulation and stabilization are simply neutral administrative tools capable of distributing national income either more or less equitably, improving the relative bargaining position of either unions or employers, and increasing or decreasing the importance of the public sector of the economy.[56] But in the real world, as the same author points out, these "neutral administrative tools" are applied "within the context of a consensus whose limits are defined by the business community." The tax reforms of the "new economics" benefit the rich.[57] Urban renewal, the war on poverty, expenditures for science and education, turn out, in large measure, to be a subsidy to the already privileged.

There are a number of ways in which the intellectual who is aware of these facts can hope to change them. He might, for example, try to "humanize" the meritocratic or corporate elite or the government bureaucrats closely allied to them, a plan that has seemed plausible to many scientists and social scientists. He might try to contribute to the formation of a new or revitalized reformist political party, operating within the framework of conventional politics.[58] He can try to ally himself with—to help create—a mass movement committed to far more radical social change. He can act as an individual in resistance to the demands placed on him, or the temptations offered to him, by a society that affords him privilege and affluence if he will accept the limits "defined by the business community" and the technical intelligentsia allied to it. He can try to organize large-scale resistance by the technical intelligentsia to the nightmare they are helping to create, and to find ways in which their skills can be put to a constructive social use, perhaps in cooperation with a popular movement that searches for new social forms.

The importance of collective action—obvious enough in itself—becomes still more clear when the question is approached in more gen-

eral terms. In a society of isolated and competitive individuals, there are few opportunities for effective action against repressive institutions or deep-seated social forces. The point is underscored, in a different but related connection, in some pertinent remarks by Galbraith on the management of demand, which, he observes:

> is in all respects an admirably subtle arrangement in social design. It works not on the individual but on the mass. Any individual can contract out from its influence. This being so, no case for individual compulsion in the purchase of any product can be established. To all who object there is a natural answer: You are at liberty to leave! Yet there is slight danger that enough people will ever assert their individuality to impair the management of mass behavior.[59]

The real threat that has been posed by organized resistance in the past few years has been to the "management of mass behavior." There are circumstances when one can assert his own individuality only by being prepared to act collectively. He can thus overcome the social fragmentation that prevents him from coming to recognize his real interests, and can learn how to defend these interests. It is quite possible that the society will tolerate individuals who "contract out," but only insofar as they do not organize to do so collectively, thus impairing "the management of mass behavior" that is a crucial feature of a society designed along the lines that appeal to the liberal technocrats (compare the remarks by McNamara cited above) or to the radical centralizers of whom the Bolshevik ideologists have been the most prominent examples.

In small but important ways, such tasks as those suggested above are being undertaken—for example, by the students and junior faculty who have formed a Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars to try to reconstruct Asian studies on a basis that is both more objective and more humane, and in this way strike at one of the underpinnings of the aggressive ideology that supports the national commitment to repression, social management on a global scale, and ultimately, destruction; or by groups of scientists and engineers who are just now beginning to organize in opposition to the demands of the military-industrial-academic complex, a development of very great potential; or by those who, recognizing that

university teaching and research are, in large measure, conditioned by the demands of the privileged, are seeking to construct alternative programs of study and action, of teaching and research, that will be more compelling on intellectual and moral grounds, will change the character of the university by changing not their formal structures—a relatively insignificant matter—but what is actually done by students and faculty in the university, and will reorient the lives of those who pass through it; or, outside the university, by those who are resisting the war machine directly or who are working to create alternative social institutions that might, ultimately, serve as the cells of a very different society; or those who are trying to organize, and to learn, in communities or factories; or those who attempt to construct a political movement that will integrate such efforts on a national, in fact international, scale.

Other examples might be mentioned. I see no reason why there should be conflict between such efforts as these. We cannot know which will prove successful, or how far they can advance, or how experience may cause them to develop, or, in detail, what vision of a new society might grow out of thought and action directed to these ends. We can predict that the elitist and authoritarian tendencies to which intellectuals are all too prone will subvert such efforts unless they are vigorously combatted. We can predict that only mass participation in planning, decision-making, and reconstruction of social institutions—"the active, untrammeled, energetic political life of the broadest masses of the people"—will create the "spiritual transformation in the masses" that is a prerequisite for any advance in social evolution and that will solve the myriad problems of social reconstruction in a decent and humane fashion. We can also predict that if such efforts become effective and significant in scale, they will meet with repression and force. Whether or not they can withstand such force will be determined by the strength and cohesiveness they have developed, as part of a general, integrated movement with a strong base of popular support in many social strata, support by people whose ideals and hopes are given form by this movement and the social forms it tries to bring to reality.

It has always been taken for granted by radical thinkers, and quite rightly so, that effective political action that threatens entrenched social

interests will lead to "confrontation" and repression. It is, correspondingly, a sign of intellectual bankruptcy for the left to seek to construct "confrontations"; it is a clear indication that the efforts to organize significant social action have failed. Impatience, horror at evident atrocities, may impel one to seek an immediate confrontation with authority. This can be extremely valuable in one of two ways: by posing a threat to the interests of those who are implementing specific policies; or by bringing to the consciousness of others a reality that is much too easy to forget. But the search for confrontations can also be a kind of self-indulgence that may abort a movement for social change and condemn it to irrelevance and disaster. A confrontation that grows out of effective policies may be unavoidable, but one who takes his own rhetoric seriously will seek to delay a confrontation until he can hope to emerge successful, either in the narrower senses noted above or in the far more important sense of bringing about, through this success, some substantive change in institutions. Particularly objectionable is the idea of designing confrontations so as to manipulate the unwitting participants into accepting a point of view that does not grow out of meaningful experience, out of real understanding. This is not only a testimony to political irrelevance, but also, precisely because it is manipulative and coercive, a proper tactic only for a movement that aims to maintain an elitist and authoritarian form of organization.

The opposite danger is "co-optation," again, a real problem. Even the most radical program cannot escape this danger. Consider the idea of workers' councils. Attempts at implementation have frequently led not to a radically new form of management by producers, but to administration of welfare programs or even improved factory discipline.[60] This possibility is recognized by those concerned with more efficient "industrial management" as a potential benefit, from their point of view, of council organization. Thus in his introduction to Sturmthal's study, John T. Dunlop, a Harvard economist who has won considerable reputation in industrial arbitration, writes:

> There is keen interest in the plant level, in the relations among the worker, his superior, and the labor representative, in both the ad-

> vanced and the newly developing countries. Governments, managers, and labor organizations everywhere are concerned with ways of eliciting improved effort and performance; they are exploring new ways of training and supervising a workforce, and they seek new procedures to develop discipline and to settle complaints or dissipate protest. The range of experience with workers' councils provides a record of general interest to those shaping or modifying industrial relations and economic institutions.

What can be said of workers' councils is true, a fortiori, of any other attempt at radical reconstruction of existing institutions. In fact, some have even argued that Marxism as a social movement served primarily to "socialize" the proletariat and integrate it more effectively into the industrial society.[61] Those who oppose a plan merely on grounds of the possibility (even likelihood) of co-optation merely signal that they are opposed to everything imaginable.

To an unprecedented extent, the university has become the gathering place for intellectuals and technical intelligentsia, attracting not only scientists and scholars, but even writers and artists and political activists. The causes and consequences can be argued, but the fact is fairly clear. The Port Huron statement of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) expressed the hope that the university can become "a potential base and agency in the movement for social change"; by permitting "the political life to be an adjunct to the academic one, and action to be informed by reason," it can contribute to the emergence of a genuine New Left that will be "a left with real intellectual skills, committed to deliberativeness, honesty, and reflection as working tools."[62] Many in the New Left now think of such ideas as part of their "liberal past," to be abandoned in the light of the new consciousness that has since been achieved. I disagree with this judgment. The left badly needs understanding of present society, its long-range tendencies, the possibilities for alternative forms of social organization, and a reasoned analysis of how social change can come about. Objective scholarship can contribute to this understanding. We do not know, for a fact, that the universities will not permit honest social inquiry over a broad range, scholarship that will, as many of us believe, lead to radical conclusions if conducted seriously and in an open-minded