Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics

Translated
With Introduction and Notes
By

C. D. C. Reeve

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Preface

Readers of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in translation find themselves in territory whose apparent familiarity is often deceptive and inimical to proper understanding: *politikê* isn't quite politics, *epistêmê* isn't quite science, *praxis* isn't quite action, *theôria* isn't quite theory, *eudaimonia* isn't quite happiness, *ergon* isn't quite function, *aretê* isn't quite virtue. Even what the *Ethics* is about isn't quite ethics. A worthwhile translation must try to compensate for this deceptive familiarity without producing too much potentially alienating distance and strangeness in its place.

Accuracy and consistency in translation is essential to achieving this goal, obviously, but so too are extensive annotation and commentary. Much of this, however, can consist, as it does here, of texts selected from other works of Aristotle. While traveling through the region of the Aristotelian world the *Ethics* describes, the reader can thus travel through other regions of it, thereby acquiring an ever widening and deepening grasp of the whole picture—something that is crucial, in my view, to understanding any part of it adequately or, perhaps, at all.

To make the journey a convenient one, footnotes and glossary entries are replaced by sequentially numbered endnotes, so that the information most needed at each juncture is available in a single place. The non-sequential reader interested in a particular passage will find in the detailed Index a guide to places where focused discussion of a term or notion occurs. In the case of key terms, indeed, these passages are quoted so that the entry becomes a sort of glossary by Aristotle himself. The Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what it is about, what it is trying to do, what sort of evidence is relevant to its evaluation, and what sort of person has access to such evidence. It isn't a comprehensive discussion of all the important topics the *Ethics* contains, nor an attempt to situate Aristotle's thought in the history of ethical thought more generally. Many books are readily available that attempt these tasks, including some by me. Nor is it, I should add, an expression of scholarly consensus on the topics it does discuss—insofar as such a thing exists—but rather my own particular take on them.

Some readers will, I have assumed, be new to the *Ethics,* without much background in ancient Greek philosophy, so I have tried to keep their needs in mind. I have also had in mind, though, the needs of more advanced students,

who require an English version that is sufficiently reliable and informed for their purposes.

I have benefited from the work of previous translators, including David Ross, H. Rackham, Martin Ostwald, Terence Irwin, Roger Crisp, and Christopher Rowe. The commentaries by J. A. Stewart in English and by R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif in French, as well as the notes in John Burnet's edition, were an invaluable resource, as was, in the case of Books II–IV, the edition of C. C. W. Taylor; in the case of Book VI, that of L. H. G. Greenwood; and in the case of Books VIII–IX, that of Michael Pakaluk. The collection of essays on Book VII edited by Carlos Natali was also of great assistance. Information on these and other relevant works can be found in Further Reading.

Having often served as reader of other people's translations, I can attest to the hard work it involves when done carefully. I am especially indebted, therefore, to Pavlos Kontos, who has read every line of this translation at least twice and often many more times, suggesting improvements and correcting errors. I am lucky to have had the benefit of his deep knowledge of Greek and of his devotion to a text we both love. I am even luckier that in the process of working together we have become close friends. I include him in the dedication, in inadequate recognition of what his aid and friendship, always unstintingly given, have meant to this book and to me.

Equal devotion to Greek philosophical texts, albeit of a different sort, has been demonstrated by Jay Hullett and Deborah Wilkes and their colleagues at Hackett Publishing Company, who have been my publishers, supporters, and friends for over twenty-five years.

While I was at work on the *Ethics* I had the good fortune to teach joint seminars on it with Mariska Leunissen and Michael Ferejohn and to profit from discussions with them and with some of the students, auditors, and visiting speakers involved—including John Cooper, Pierre Destrée, Daniel Devereux, Gary Gala, Devin Henry, Richard Kraut, Daniel Moseley, Christiana Olfert, and Katja Vogt. Pierre, in particular, sent me many helpful comments on small points and large (that "incontinence" is missing from the translation is due to him) as subsequently on Book I did Mariska and James Lesher. I am grateful to Alex Rosenberg, chair of the Philosophy Department of Duke University, for providing funds for one of the seminars and to Marc Lange, chair of the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for matching those funds, for the grant of a semester's research leave, and for many other kindnesses.

I renew my thanks to ΔΚΕ, the first fraternity in the United States to endow a professorial chair, and to the University of North Carolina for awarding it to me. The generous research funds, among other things, that the endowment makes available each year have allowed me to travel to conferences and to acquire books, computers, and other research materials and assistance, without which my work would have been much more difficult.

All these debts are dwarfed, however, by the debt I owe to Aristotle himself and to his teacher Plato. I have spent much of the past forty years in the company of these great philosophers and in thinking along with them have participated to some extent in the life they—quite reasonably in my experience—thought happiest.

Abbreviations

Aristotle

APo.	*Posterior Analytics*
APr.	*Prior Analytics*
Cael.	*De Caelo (On the Heavens)*
Cat.	*Categories*
DA	*De Anima (On the Soul)*
Div. Somn.	*On Divination in Sleep* (Ross)
EE	*Eudemian Ethics*
Fr.	*Fragments* (Rose)
GA	*Generation of Animals*
GC	*On Generation and Corruption* (Joachim)
HA	*History of Animals* (Balme)
IA	*Progression of Animals (De Incessu Animalium)*
Insomn.	*On Dreams* (Ross)
MA	*Movement of Animals* (Nussbaum)
MM	*Magna Moralia** (Susemihl)
Mem.	*On Memory* (Ross)
Met.	*Metaphysics*
Mete.	*Meteorology*
Mu.	*De Mundo**
NE	*Nicomachean Ethics*
PA	*Parts of Animals*
Ph.	*Physics*
	Peri Ideôn (Fine)
Po.	*Poetics*
Po. II	*Poetics II* (Janko)
Pol.	*Politics*
Pr.	*Problems**
Protr.	*Protrepticus* (Düring)

Resp.	*On Respiration*
Rh.	*Rhetoric*
SE	*Sophistical Refutations*
Sens.	*Sense and Sensibilia*
Somn.	*On Sleep*
Top.	*Topics*

(An asterisk indicates a work whose authenticity has been seriously questioned.)

I cite and translate the *Oxford Classical Texts* (OCT) editions of these works, where available, otherwise the editions noted:

Balme, D. M. *Aristotle: Historia Animalium* (Cambridge, 2002).

Düring, Ingemar, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* (Göteborg, 1961).

Fine, Gail, *On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms* (Oxford, 1993).

Janko, Richard, *Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of "Poetics II"* (Berkeley, 1984).

Joachim, H. H., *Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away* (Oxford, 1926).

Mayhew, Robert, *Aristotle: Problems* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011).

Nussbaum, Martha C., *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretative Essays* (Princeton, 1978).

Rose, V., *Aristotelis Fragmenta,* 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1886).

Ross, W. D., *Aristotle Parva Naturalia* (Oxford, 1955).

Susemihl, F., *Aristotelis Magna Moralia* (Leipzig, 1883).

Plato

Ap.	*Apology*
Chrm.	*Charmides*
Cra.	*Cratylus*
Cri.	*Crito*
Euthd.	*Euthydemus*
Euthpr.	*Euthyphro*
Grg.	*Gorgias*
Hp. Ma.	*Hippias Major*

La.	*Laches*
Lg.	*Laws*
Ly.	*Lysis*
Men.	*Meno*
Phd.	*Phaedo*
Phlb.	*Philebus*
Prt.	*Protagoras*
Rep.	*Republic*
Smp.	*Symposium*
Ti.	*Timaeus*

Other Abbreviations

Aspasius = Aspasius, *On Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" 1–4, 7–8*. Translated by David Konstan (Ithaca, 2006).

DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th ed (Berlin: 1951).

Introduction

Life and Works

Aristotle was born in 384 BC to a well-off family living in the small town of Stagira in northern Greece. His father, Nicomachus, who died while Aristotle was still quite young, was allegedly doctor to King Amyntas of Macedon. His mother, Phaestis, was wealthy in her own right. When Aristotle was seventeen his guardian, Proxenus, sent him to study at Plato's Academy in Athens. He remained there for twenty years, initially as a student, eventually as a researcher and teacher.

When Plato died in 347, leaving the Academy in the hands of his nephew, Speusippus, Aristotle left Athens for Assos in Asia Minor, where the ruler, Hermias was a patron of philosophy. He married Hermias' niece, Pythias, and had a daughter by her, also named Pythias. Three years later, in 345, after Hermias had been killed by the Persians, Aristotle moved to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, where he met Theophrastus, who was to become his best student and closest colleague.

In 343 Aristotle seems to have been invited by Philip of Macedon to be tutor to the latter's thirteen-year-old son, Alexander, later called "the Great." In 335, Aristotle returned to Athens and founded his own institute, the Lyceum. While he was there his wife died and he established a relationship with Herpyllis, also a native of Stagira. Their son Nicomachus was named for Aristotle's father, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* may, in turn, have been named for him or transcribed by him. In 323 Alexander the Great died, with the result that anti-Macedonian feeling in Athens grew stronger. Perhaps threatened with a formal charge of impiety (X 7 $1177^{b}33$n), Aristotle left for Chalcis in Euboea, where he died twelve months later, in 322, at the age of sixty-two.

Legend has it that Aristotle had slender calves, small eyes, spoke with a lisp, and was "conspicuous by his attire, his rings, and the cut of his hair." His will reveals that he had a sizable estate, a domestic partner, two children, a considerable library, and a large circle of friends. In it Aristotle asks his executors to take particular care of Herpyllis. He directs that his slaves be freed "when they come of age" and that the bones of his wife, Pythias, be mixed with his "as she instructed."

Although the surviving writings of Aristotle occupy almost 2,500 tightly printed pages in English, most of them are not works polished for publication but

sometimes incomplete lecture notes and working papers: the *Ethics* itself shows signs of hasty editing (the two treatments of "pleasure" are often cited in this regard). This accounts for some, though not all, of their legendary difficulty. It is unfair to complain, as a Platonist opponent did, that Aristotle "escapes refutation by clothing a perplexing subject in obscure language, using darkness like a squid to make himself hard to catch," but there is darkness and obscurity enough for anyone, even if none of it is intentional. There is also a staggering breadth and depth of intellect. Aristotle made fundamental contributions to a vast range of disciplines, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, ethics, politics, rhetoric, aesthetics, zoology, biology, physics, and philosophical and political history. When Dante called him "the master of those who know," he was scarcely exaggerating.

What the Nichomachean Ethics Is

One thing we might mean by the *Nicomachean Ethics* is what we now find inscribed on the pages that make up Ingram Bywater's Oxford Classical Text (OCT) edition of the Greek text, first published in 1894, which is the basis of the present translation. This is the descendant of texts derived—via manuscripts copied in the Byzantine period (from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries AD)—from manuscripts that derive from the edition of Aristotle's works produced by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC. Bywater's edition, like most other modern editions, records in the textual apparatus at the bottom of the page various manuscript readings alternative to the one he prints in the body of his text. In some cases, I have preferred one of these readings and have indicated this in the notes.

Divisions of the text into books and chapters are the work of editors, not the work of Aristotle himself. In the case of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* indeed, two different divisions into chapters exist, both mediaeval in origin. The one preferred by Bywater and most Anglophone scholars is recorded in the chapter headings together with the book number (for example, VII 2 = Book VII Chapter 2). Also present in Bywater's text, as in all worthwhile modern editions, are the page numbers of Immanuel Bekker, *Aristotelis Opera* (Berlin: 1831 [1970]). Citations of Aristotle's works are standardly made to this edition in the form of abbreviated title, book number (when the work is divided into books), chapter number, page number, column letter, and line number. The page number, column letter, and line number appear between upright lines in the present translation (for example, |1094^{a}1|) at the end of the first line in a column to which they apply, and as line numbers alone thereafter. These numbers refer to the Greek text, however, and so are approximate—though usually closely so—in the translation. Occasional material in square brackets in the translated text is my addition.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* shares three of its central books (V–VII) with another treatise thought to be authentic, the *Eudemian Ethics* (perhaps so called because it was transcribed or edited by Eudemus, a Lyceum member), which is widely, though not universally, believed to predate the *Nicomachean*. A third work, the so-called *Magna Moralia,* or *Great Ethics,* is largely authentic in content but is generally thought not to be by Aristotle himself. There are important differences between these works, to be sure, some of them significant, but there is also a massive and impressive overlap in overall perspective. The spuriousness of a fourth short work, *On Virtues and Vices,* has never been seriously contested.

The second thing we might mean, and are perhaps more likely to mean, by the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the work itself, so to speak, namely, the more abstract thing that is embodied in a good Greek text and (ideally) in any translation of it. Aristotle identifies this as a contribution to "our philosophy of human affairs" (X 9 $1181^{b}15$) and subsequently refers to it as included among "those philosophical works of ours in which we draw distinctions concerning ethical matters" (*Pol.* III 12 $1282^{b}19$–20). In the discussion that begins in the opening chapter of the *Ethics* and ends in its successor, he says that the method of inquiry—the *methodos*—pursued in it is "a sort of politics (*politikê*)" (*NE* I 2 $1094^{b}11$). Since politics is the same state of the soul as practical wisdom (*phronêsis*), politics is presumably a sort of practical wisdom as well or some sort of contribution to it (VI 8 $1141^{b}23$–24).

What is politics, though? What does it consist in? To what evidence is it answerable? How should its success or failure be determined?

Aristotelian Sciences

Aristotle usually divides the bodies of knowledge he refers to as "sciences" (*epistêmai*) into three types: theoretical, practical, and productive (crafts). But when he is being especially careful, he also distinguishes within the theoretical sciences between the *strictly theoretical* ones (astronomy, theology), as we may call them, and the *natural* ones, which are like the strictly theoretical ones in being neither practical nor productive but are unlike them in consisting of propositions that—though necessary and universal in some sense—hold for the most part rather than without exception:

> If all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, natural science must be a theoretical science. But it theorizes only about being that is capable of being moved and only about substance that, in accord with its account, holds for the most part, since it is not separate [from matter]. We must not fail to notice, though, the way the what it is to be [that is, the essence] and its account hold, since without this,

> inquiry achieves nothing. But of things defined, that is, what something is, some are like snub, some like concave. These differ because snub is bound up with matter (for snubness is concavity *in a nose*), while concavity is without perceptible matter. If then all natural things are like snub (for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone and, in general, animal, or leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant; since none of these can be defined without reference to movement but always have matter), it is clear how we must inquire about and define what a natural thing is. It is also clear that it belongs to the natural scientist in a way to provide theoretical knowledge even of the soul, that is, of so much of it as is not without matter. That natural science is a theoretical science, then, is evident from these considerations. But mathematics is also theoretical—although whether its objects are unmoving and separate from matter is not clear at present. But what *is* clear is that some parts of mathematics theorize about them *insofar as* they are unmoving and *insofar as* they are separate. But if there is some being that is eternal and unmoving and separate, the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to *natural* science nor to mathematics but to a science prior to both. . . . If, then, there is no substance other than those beyond those constituted by nature, natural science will be the primary science. But if there is an unmoving substance, the science of this will be prior and will be primary philosophy. (*Met.* VI 1 $1025^{b}25$–$1026^{a}30$)

When we hear, as we quickly do (*NE* I 3 $1094^{b}14$–22), that because the subject matter of politics, which consists of noble, just, and good things and the like, admits of so much difference and variability, its claims hold for the most part, we should bear in mind that all the natural sciences—which for us are the paradigm cases of science—are in a similar boat. Psychology, however, has an interestingly mixed status, part strictly theoretical, part natural (*DA* I 1 $403^{a}3$–$^{b}16$).

When science receives its focused discussion in the *Ethics*, however, Aristotle is explicit that if we are "to speak in an exact way and not be guided by mere similarities" (VI 3 $1139^{b}19$), we should not call anything a science unless it deals with eternal, entirely exceptionless facts about universals that are wholly necessary and do not at all admit of being otherwise ($1139^{b}20$–21). Since he is here explicitly epitomizing his more detailed discussion of science in the *Posterior Analytics* ($1139^{b}27$), we should take the latter too as primarily a discussion of science in the exact sense, which it calls *epistêmê haplôs*—unconditional scientific knowledge. It follows—and we should acknowledge this—that only the strictly theoretical sciences are sciences in the exact sense. Hence politics is not such a science and neither are physics or biology or any other natural science.

Having made the acknowledgement, though, we must also register the fact—since it is a fact—that Aristotle himself mostly does not speak in the

exact way but instead persistently refers to bodies of knowledge other than the strictly theoretical sciences as *epistêmai*. His division of the *epistêmai* into theoretical, practical, and productive is a dramatic case in point. But so too is his use of the term *epistêmê* within the *Ethics*, which we first encounter (*NE* I 1 $1094^{a}7$) being applied to medicine, shipbuilding, generalship, and household management, which are a mix of bodies of practical knowledge (household management) and bodies of productive knowledge (shipbuilding). For that matter, politics itself is introduced in answer to a question about "which of the *epistêmai* or capacities" ($1094^{a}26$) has the human good as its proper end or target, and is implicitly identified as a practical science a few lines later ($1094^{b}4$–5). Even boxing and wrestling are classed as *epistêmai* (*Cat.* 10b3–4).

So the interesting question isn't whether politics is a science, since the answer to that is obvious: it is not a science if we are being absolutely exact about the matter, but it is a science if we allow ourselves to be guided by the similarities between it and the strictly theoretical sciences—or by Aristotle's own general use of the term *epistêmê*, on the assumption that he himself was guided by these. The interesting question—and it *is* interesting—is, what are these similarities? Just how like a canonical or theoretical science is politics?

An Aristotelian science of any sort, including a theoretical one, is a state of the soul, not a body of propositions in a textbook—although the state does involve having an assertoric grasp of a set of true propositions (VI 3 $1139^{b}14$–16). Some of these propositions are indemonstrable starting-points, which are or are expressed in definitions, and others are theorems demonstrable from these starting-points. We can have scientific knowledge only of the theorems, since—exactly speaking—only what is demonstrable can be scientifically known (VI 6). Thus when we read in the *Physics* that we "should not try to resolve everything but only what is falsely drawn from the relevant starting-points" (I 1 $185^{a}14$–15), it seems to be this notion of a science and of a scientist's task that is being presupposed. Yet—in what is clearly another lapse from exact speaking—Aristotle characterizes "the most exact of the sciences," which is theoretical wisdom (*sophia*), as also involving a grasp by understanding (*nous*) of the truth where the starting-points themselves are concerned (VI 7 $1141^{a}16$–18). He does the same thing in the *Metaphysics,* where theoretical wisdom is the *epistêmê* that provides "a theoretical grasp of the primary starting-points and causes"—among which are included "the good or the for sake of which" (I 2 $982^{b}7$–10). Indeed, the grasp we have of such starting-points must result in their being "better known" than the theorems we demonstrate from them if we are to have any scientific knowledge of the exact sort at all (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}34$).

How like that is politics? Are there starting-points here too and theorems demonstrable from them? We might think this is an easy question to answer. After all, the method of inquiry the *Ethics* employs is a sort of politics, yet it doesn't seem to include any demonstrations whatsoever. For a demonstration

is, among other things, a deductively valid argument that is syllogistic in form, and deductions of any sort are scarcely to be found in the *Ethics*. This is also a problem with the vast majority of Aristotle's works, even those that are usually classed as "scientific treatises"—for example, *Meteorology* and *Parts of Animals*. For none of them seems to fit the description of a science as developed in the *Posterior Analytics*. People have certainly tried to find elements of demonstration and axiomatic structure in these treatises, as they have in the *Ethics*, but the results are somewhat underwhelming. In large part, this is because the search is somewhat misconceived from the outset.

If we think of a science in the exact sense as consisting exclusively of what is demonstrable, as we have seen that Aristotle himself sometimes does, we will be right to conclude that a treatise without demonstrations in it cannot be scientific. But if, as he also does, we include knowledge of starting-points as parts of science, we will not be right, since a treatise could contribute to a science not by demonstrating anything but by arguing to the starting-points themselves—an enterprise which couldn't possibly consist of demonstrations from those starting-points, since these would be circular. Arguments leading *from* starting-points and arguments leading *to* starting-points are different (I 4 $1095^{a}30$–32), we are invited not to forget, just as we are told that happiness (*eudaimonia*) is a starting-point (I 12 $1102^{a}2$–4), that a major goal of the *Ethics* is to give a clear account of what happiness really is, so as to increase our chances of achieving it (I 2 $1094^{a}22$–26), and that because establishing starting-points is "more than half the whole" (I 7 $1098^{b}7$), we should "make very serious efforts to define them correctly" ($1098^{b}5$–6). We might reasonably infer, therefore, that the *Ethics* is a sort of science precisely because it contributes to the correct definition and secure grasp of starting-points without which no science can exist. The same idea might be employed in the case of many of Aristotle's other treatises. They too, we might suppose, are scientific in just this sense.

But even if politics has starting-points, it still would not be a science unless it were possible to demonstrate theorems from these. Yet here too we seem to face an obstacle. For Aristotle tells us that we cannot demonstrate things whose starting-points admit of being otherwise (VI 5 $1140^{a}33$–35), that politics is the same state of the soul as practical wisdom (VI 8 $1141^{b}23$–24), and that the starting-points of practical wisdom do admit of being otherwise (VI 5 $1140^{a}30$–$^{b}4$). Elsewhere, though, he allows that there *can* be demonstrations of what admits of being otherwise provided it holds for the most part—as the starting-points and theorems of politics are said to do (I 3 $1094^{b}19$–22):

> What admits of being otherwise is spoken of in two ways: in one, it means what holds for the most part, that is, when the necessity has gaps (*dialeipein*)—for example, a man's turning grey or growing or decaying, or, in general, what belongs to something by nature (for this does

> not belong by continuous necessity, since a human being does not exist forever, although if a human being does exist, it belongs either necessarily or for the most part); in the other, it means what is indeterminate, which is what is capable of being thus or not thus—for example, an animal's walking or an earthquake's taking place while it is walking, or, in general, what is the result of luck (for it is not more natural for it to be that way rather than the opposite). . . . Science and demonstrative deductions are not concerned with things that are indeterminate, because the middle term is irregular, but there is scientific knowledge of what happens by nature, and argument and investigations are pretty much concerned with things that are possible in this way. (*APr.* I 13 $32^{b}4$–21)

Apparently, then, the notion of a demonstration is a bit like that of a science. Speaking exactly, there are demonstrations only in the theoretical sciences, since—speaking exactly again—these alone are sciences. Speaking less exactly, though, there are also demonstrations in other bodies of knowledge. Thus we find Aristotle referring to practical demonstrations (*NE* VI 11 $1143^{b}2$), contrasting the undemonstrated sayings and beliefs of practically-wise people with things they can demonstrate ($1143^{b}11$–13), telling us about practical deductions (VI 12 $1144^{a}31$–32), and contrasting what are clearly theoretical deductions with productive ones (VII 3 $1147^{a}25$–$^{b}1$). We hear too about starting-points in politics and about reaching conclusions from them (I 3 $1094^{b}21$–22), and about supposedly having reached some (see I 8 $1098^{b}9$–10). Finally—and this is as much a reminder as anything else—if we do not allow there to be demonstrations of what admits of being otherwise in the sense of holding for the most part, it isn't just politics that will lose its putative scientific status; natural science will too.

A penultimate problem. Scientific knowledge seems to be exclusively about universals—about what is common to many particulars (VI 6 $1140^{b}31$, X 9 $1180^{b}15$–16). Yet politics, to the extent that it is the same state as—or is a part of—practical wisdom, must also deal with particulars (VI 7–8). It seems an easy inference that politics cannot be a science. The first point to make in response is that even theoretical sciences, though they deal with eternal and unchangeable necessary truths about universals and have no grasp "on any of the things from which a human being will come to be happy" (VI 12 $1143^{b}19$–20), can be "coincidentally useful to us where many of the necessities of life are concerned" (*EE* I 6 $1216^{b}15$–16). Knowledge of astronomy, for instance, helped Thales to make a killing in the olive business (*NE* VI 7 $1141^{b}4$n). The second point to make is that Aristotle allows that sciences dealing with universals can also deal—albeit coincidentally—with (perishable) particulars: "There is neither demonstration nor unconditional scientific knowledge of what is subject to passing away, but only the coincidental sort, because it does not hold of this

universally, but at some time (*pote*) and in some way (*pôs*)" (*APo.* I 8 75^{b}24–26). The scientific theorem that all light meats are healthy may enable me to infer that this meat is healthy now, but it doesn't tell me whether it will still be healthy tomorrow (it may have rotted in the meantime) or whether, though it is healthy for most people, it is healthy for me (I may have a fever that makes meat of any sort a bad choice).

While each of these points does something to take the edge off our problem, even collectively they do not seem to go quite far enough. And the reason they don't is this: It is quite possible to have scientific knowledge of universals without knowing how to apply it in particular cases, but it is not possible to have practical wisdom—or, therefore, a grasp of politics—without knowing this. In fact, it is almost the other way around:

> Nor is practical wisdom knowledge of universals only. On the contrary, it must also know particulars. For it is practical, and action is concerned with particulars. That is why, in other areas too, some people who lack knowledge—most of all, those with experience—are more effective *doers* of action than are others who have knowledge. For if someone knows that light meats are digestible and healthy but is ignorant about which sorts of meat are light, he will not produce health; but someone who knows that bird meats are healthy will produce health more. But practical wisdom is practical, so one must possess both sorts of knowledge—or this one more. (*NE* VI 7 1141^{b}14–21)

At the same time, knowledge of universals is a crucial part of politics. This emerges most clearly in the final discussion in the *Ethics,* where we learn not only about the importance of experience of particulars to politics but also about the need to "take steps toward the universal" (X 9 1180^{b}21), on the grounds that "the best supervision in each particular case" will be provided by the person who has "knowledge of the universal and knows what applies in all cases or in these sorts (since the sciences are said to be—and actually are—of what is common)" (1180^{b}13–16).

Once we register the fact that politics must include both a scientific knowledge of universals and an experience of particulars that enables us to apply those universals correctly to them, we can see that it is something like an applied science as opposed to a pure one. And this seems to be what Aristotle has in mind by classifying it as *practical*—that is to say, as bearing on *praxis*, or action, and so on the particulars with which action is irremediably concerned. When we look for the similarities that may justify him in classifying it as a practical *science*, then, we must look not at its particularist component but at its universalist one, since a science, as we saw, is always of what is universal. A practical science, in other words, might to some extent be usefully thought of as a combination of something like a theoretical science (in any case, in the

sense in which natural science is theoretical) and the experience-based knowledge of how to apply it.

What the universalist component of politics consists in is uncontroversial, since Aristotle tells us plainly that it is *nomothetikê,* or legislative science:

> Maybe, then, someone who wishes to make people—whether many or few—better because of his supervision should also try to acquire legislative science, if it is through laws that we can become good. For producing a noble disposition in anyone whatever—in anyone put before him—is not a matter for some random person, but if indeed anyone can do it, it is a person who knows, just as in medicine and in all other matters that involve a sort of supervision and practical wisdom. (X 9 $1180^{b}23$–28)

What legislative science does, as its name suggests, is to produce a set of universal laws—for "all law is universal" (V 10 $1137^{b}13$)—that will "make citizens good by habituating them" (II 1 $1103^{b}3$–4). Thus one very important subset of these laws bears on education, since "what produces virtue as a whole are the actions that are ordained by the laws concerned with education that looks to the common good" (V 2 $1130^{b}25$–26). Another subset, however, governs the actions of already-educated adults:

> It is not enough, presumably, that when people are young they get the correct nurture and supervision. On the contrary, even when they have grown into manhood they must continue to practice the same things and be habituated to them. And so there will need to be laws concerning these matters as well and, in general, then, concerning all of life. (X 9 $1180^{a}1$–4)

The phrase "concerning all of life" nicely captures the ideal extent of the laws: "It is above all appropriate that correctly established laws themselves define all the things they possibly can and leave the fewest possible to the judges" (*Rh.* I 1 $1354^{a}31$–33), since "human wish . . . is not a safe standard" (*Pol.* II 10 $1272^{b}6$–7).

We are now able to solve a final problem. Theorems in canonical theoretical sciences are not just universal, they are also necessary: they are about relations between universals that do not "*at all* admit of being otherwise" (*NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}20$–21). The theorems of natural science too, although not as strictly necessary as this, also describe relations between universals that are far from simply being matters of luck or contingency. Were it otherwise, there would, as we noticed, simply be no such thing as natural *science.* Obviously the theorems of politics, which are universal laws, are not like either of these, since they govern voluntary action, which, as something whose starting-point is in us, is up to us to do or not to do (III 5 $1113^{b}7$–8). This difference, however, is due to a difference in direction of fit. Theorems of a theoretical science *describe* how

things must be; practical laws *prescribe* how they must be. Thus when Aristotle gives an example of an ethical proposition, it is this: "whether we *should* obey our parents or the laws, if they disagree" (*Top.* I 14 105^{b}22–23). What practical laws prescribe will be correct, if it is what the virtues require of us (*NE* V 2 1130^{b}22–24), and it will be what the virtues require of us if it is what the practical wisdom they presuppose would prescribe, and it will be what practical wisdom would prescribe if it is what best furthers happiness or the human good (VI 9 1142^{b}31–33, 10 1143^{a}8). For the law owes its compulsive force to the fact that it is "reason that derives from a sort of practical wisdom and understanding" (X 9 1180^{a}21–22).

Although it is through laws that we can "become good" (X 9 1180^{b}25), it is not just through any old laws. Rather, we need *correct* laws—laws that really do further happiness by inculcating genuine virtues. The question arises, therefore, of how such laws are to be found. A good place to start, Aristotle thinks, is by collecting the laws and constitutions that are in use in different places, as well as those ideal ones suggested by wise people, such as Plato, who have thought a lot about the topic. But this by itself will not be enough, since selecting the best ones from these requires "correct discernment" (X 9 1181^{a}17), making the collection itself all but useless to "those who lack scientific knowledge" (1181^{b}6). For what selection of the best ones clearly requires is knowledge of what virtue and vice—what goodness—really are, so that we can see which laws and constitutions really do further their acquisition by those brought up and living under them. In Aristotle's view, there is only one such constitution:

> The only constitution that is rightly called an aristocracy is the one that consists of those who are unconditionally best as regards virtue. . . . For only here is it unconditionally the case that the same person is a good man and a good citizen. (*Pol.* IV 7 1293^{b}3–6; compare *NE* V 7 1135^{a}5)

Thus when the topic of the best constitution is taken up in the *Politics*, Aristotle begins by noting that "anyone who intends to investigate the best constitution in the proper way must first determine which life is most choiceworthy" (VII 1 1323^{a}14–17), referring us for a fuller discussion to "external accounts," whose topics significantly overlap those of the *Ethics*. Other constitutions, however—and this is a point that we shall return to in a moment—can come close enough to the best one that something approximating full virtue can be acquired in them; these are the non-deviant constitutions (kingship, aristocracy, and polity) described in VIII 10 and, in greater detail, in the relevant parts of the *Politics*.

It is scarcely a step at this point to see what the *Ethics* contributes to legislative science. After all, the *Ethics* is devoted to defining the virtues of character, which are starting-points of politics (*Met.* XIII 4 1078^{b}17–30, quoted

below), as well as to correctly and clearly defining the yet more fundamental starting-point, happiness, which is the end or target that politics aims at (I 2 1094^{a}26–^{b}7). The *Ethics* is a contribution to the philosophy of human affairs, as we saw, and "the political philosopher is the architectonic craftsman of the end to which we look in calling each thing unconditionally bad or good" (VII 11 1152^{b}1–3)—namely, happiness.

This helps us to understand something that is much more mysterious than is usually recognized, namely, how it is that Aristotle can do the following three things: First, characterize the *Ethics* as "not undertaken for the sake of theoretical knowledge . . . but in order to become good people, since otherwise there would be nothing of benefit in it" (II 2 1103^{b}26–29; also I 3 1095^{a}5–6). Second, insist that we become good in large part through habituation, not through reading books (II 2 1103^{b}23–25). And, third, that we must already have been "nobly brought up if, where noble things, just things, and the topics of politics as a whole are concerned, we are to be an adequate audience" (I 4 1095^{b}4–6). For "argument and teaching . . . do not have strength in everyone," but only in those whose souls have been "prepared beforehand through habits to enjoy and hate in a noble way, like earth that is to nourish seed" and may not even be comprehensible to anyone else (X 9 1179^{b}23–31). The heavy lifting of the *Ethics*' practicality is done, then, not so much by the book itself, which presupposes an already existing noble condition in a comprehending reader, but by the contribution it makes to legislative science, ensuring that the laws it selects will habituate people in genuine virtues and that it will have as its end happiness correctly conceived and clearly defined.

Because the heavy lifting is done by legislation and habituation, it matters enormously that the legislation and habituation in question is not required to be of the ideal or very best sort available only in a true aristocracy of virtue. For such a constitution does not exist, and never has existed. But even if it had, Aristotle was not brought up in it—Stagira and Athens were certainly not such true aristocracies—and his audience and fellow Lyceum members weren't either. What *is* required, though, is that we not be "disabled in relation to virtue" (I 9 1099^{b}19), that we have the natural resources needed to develop it—which may include possession of the so-called natural virtues (VI 13 1144^{b}5–6), that we have been sufficiently well brought up that we do not, like children, pursue each thing in accord with our feelings, but rather form our desires and perform our actions to some extent at least "in accord with reason" (I 3 1095^{a}4–11), and that we have "sufficient experience of the actions of life," since "the arguments are in accord with these and concerned with these" (1095^{a}3–4). Aristotle doesn't go into detail in the *Ethics* about just how much experience of just what sorts of actions we need, but there is a suggestion in the *Politics* that we may not have it until we have reached the age of around fifty. Because our nature, upbringing, and

experience are unlikely to have been ideal, moreover, we must not expect too much, but rather "be content if, when we have all the things through which it seems we become decent people, we achieve some share of virtue" (X 9 1179^{b}18–20).

We turn now to the particularist part of politics, which is concerned with deliberation: "Of the practical wisdom concerned with the city, the architectonic part is legislative science, while the part concerned with particulars has the name common to both—'politics.' This part is practical and deliberative, since a decree is doable in action, as the last thing" (VI 1141^{b}24–28). Precisely because this part is particularist, it cannot itself be a science, since—to repeat—sciences are always (anyway non-coincidentally) about universals. Nonetheless it is some sort of knowledge or ability that makes its possessor a competent deliberator—someone who is reliably able to deliberate correctly by working out the best means to the best end (VI 9 1142^{b}28–33), this being happiness or the human good. Since only a practically-wise person is in this position and since practical wisdom is as much if not more concerned with particulars than with universals, the function of such a person is "most of all . . . to deliberate well" (VI 7 1141^{b}9–10).

Now the sphere of deliberation is the part of what admits of being otherwise that deliberators can change through their own actions (III 3 1112^{a}30–34). Hence it is also the sphere of the practical and productive sciences which help deliberators to make good choices within that sphere. But once these sciences are factored into the equation, the scope of deliberation within the sphere is affected, so that as their scope expands, that of deliberation contracts:

> There is no deliberation, however, where sciences that are both exact and self-sufficient are concerned—where writing the letters of the alphabet is concerned, for example, since we have no hesitation about what way to write them. We do deliberate, however, about those things that come about through ourselves, but not always in the same way (for example, about the things that medicine or moneymaking deals with). And we deliberate more about navigation than about athletic training, insofar as navigation is less exactly developed. Further, deliberation is involved in a similar way where the rest are concerned, but more where crafts are concerned than sciences, since we are more hesitant about them. (*NE* III 3 1112^{a}34–^{b}9)

As Aristotle succinctly puts it at one point: "Craft does not deliberate" (*Ph.* II 8 199^{b}28). He means, as we see, that a craft, insofar as it is exact, fully developed, and self-contained, does not do so.

Even when the productive sciences are less exact or developed, however, as is true, for example, of medicine and wealth acquisition, their universal laws should generally be followed:

> Those who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to actual circumstances. Consequently, it is foolish to rule in accord with written rules in any craft, and doctors in Egypt are rightly allowed to abandon the treatment prescribed by the manuals after the fourth day (although, if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk). It is evident for the same reason, therefore, that the best constitution is not one that follows written rules and laws. All the same, the rulers should possess the universal reason as well. And something to which feeling is entirely unattached is better than something in which it is innate. This element does not belong to the law, whereas every human soul necessarily possesses it. But perhaps, to balance this, it should be said that a human being will deliberate better about particular cases. In that case, it is clear he must be a legislator, and laws established, although they must not be in control insofar as they deviate from what is best, since they should certainly be in control everywhere else. (*Pol.* III 15 $1286^{a}9$–25; also 16 $1287^{a}33$–$1287^{b}5$)

It is when the universal laws fail us—as the Egyptian doctors imagine them doing by the fourth day of a patient's unresponsiveness to the prescribed treatment—that deliberation comes into play. It is then that the practical wisdom possessed by the better practitioners of the science becomes important. We "speak of people as practically-wise *in some area*, when they rationally calculate well about what furthers some excellent end, concerning which no craft [prescription] exists" (*NE* VI 5 $1140^{a}28$–30).

The element in practical wisdom that is particularly involved in the kinds of cases where the end is "living well as a whole" (VI 5 $1140^{a}27$–28) is decency (*epieikeia*):

> All law is universal, but about some sorts of things it is not possible to pronounce correctly in universal terms. . . . So whenever the law makes a universal pronouncement and a particular case arises that is contrary to the universal pronouncement, at that time it is correct (insofar as the legislator has omitted something, and he has made an error in pronouncing unconditionally) to rectify the deficiency—to pronounce what the legislator himself would have pronounced had he been present and would have put into his law had he known about the case. . . . And this is the very nature of what is decent—a rectification of law insofar as it is deficient because of its universality. For this is also the cause of not everything's being regulated by law—namely, that there are some cases where it is impossible to establish a law, so that decrees (*psêphismata*) are needed. For the standard of what is indeterminate is itself indeterminate, just like the lead standard used in Lesbian building. For the standard is not fixed but adapts itself to the shape of the stone and a decree adapts itself to the things themselves. (V 10 $1137^{b}13$–32)

Though this comment applies primarily to the context of political deliberation by members of a city's ruling deliberative body, it is the model for Aristotle's account of an individual agent's deliberation as well. This is particularly clear when an individual's action-controlling beliefs—the guiding premises of his deliberative reasoning—are analogized to decrees (VII 9 $1151^{b}15$, 10 $1152^{a}20$–21). But it is similarly in operation when the last thing reached in deliberation is identified as a decree (VI 8 $1141^{b}26$–28). Practical wisdom is a prescriptive virtue (VI 10 $1143^{a}8$) indeed because it issues in decrees which, like laws, have prescriptive force.

The picture that finally emerges of politics, therefore, is of a science that has three elements. The first is legislative science, which, since it issues universal laws that have the right sort of modal status (allowing for differences of direction of fit), makes politics similar enough to a canonical theoretical science to justify its classification as a science. The second is deliberative ability (*bouleutikê*), which is particularistic enough to justify its classification as practical. The third is the judicial science (*dikastikê*), which is primarily exercised in the administration of legal justice (*dikê*) (VI 8 $1141^{b}33$). But this is a picture of politics that has, as it were, a concealed element, which is the one providing an argument for the starting-points—happiness, the virtues—that are crucial to it. These, we learned, it was the job of the method of inquiry used in the *Ethics* to provide. We must now see what that job consists in.

The Foundations of Politics

We know that scientific starting-points cannot be demonstrated. They are what we construct demonstrations from not to. Of scientific starting-points, therefore, we have understanding, not scientific knowledge (VI 6 $1141^{a}7$–8)—even if, when we do have understanding of them combined with demonstrations from them, what we have is a more exact form of such knowledge (VI 7 $1141^{a}16$–18). It is in this less exact way, remember, that we saw we should speak when considering the scientific status of politics. How, then, do we get this understanding? Where do we start the process? "We must," Aristotle says, "start from things that are knowable. But things are knowable in two ways, since some are knowable to us, some unconditionally. So presumably we should start from things knowable to us" (I 4 $1095^{b}2$–4). For the sake of clarity, let us call these *raw starting-points*. These are what we start from when we are arguing to *explanatory scientific starting-points*. It is crucial not to confuse the two.

In the case of the method of inquiry developed in the *Ethics*, we are told that a raw starting-point is "the fact that something is so" (I 4 $1095^{b}6$; also I 7 $1098^{b}2$–3) and that this fact concerns "noble things, just things, and the topics of politics as a whole" ($1095^{b}5$–6). But since no explicit examples are given

of these starting-points, we need to do some detective work to get a better understanding of what exactly they are.

An important clue to their nature derives from the way that we gain access to them: "it is virtue, whether natural or habituated, that teaches correct belief about the starting-point" (VII 8 $1151^{a}18$–19). Hence Aristotle's insistence on the importance of being well or nobly brought up: "it makes no small difference whether people are habituated in one way or in another way straight from childhood; on the contrary, it makes a huge one—or rather, *all* the difference" (II 1 $1103^{b}23$–25). Equally important is the account of the way that failure to be brought up well affects or blocks our access to raw starting-points:

> Ordinary people naturally obey not shame but fear, and abstain from base things not because of their shamefulness but because of the sanctions involved. For living by feeling as they do, they pursue the pleasures that are properly their own as well as the things through which these come about, and avoid the opposing pains. Of what is noble and what is truly pleasant, however, they have no understanding at all, not having tasted it.
>
> What sort of argument, then, could reform such people? For it is not possible—or not easy—to alter by argument what has long since been locked up in traits of character. (X 9 $1179^{b}11$–16)

By being habituated badly where pleasures and pains are concerned, people are prevented from experiencing what is noble and truly pleasant. When such people read in the *Ethics* that we should sacrifice wealth, power, honor, the satisfaction of their appetites, and other such so-called external goods (I 8 $1098^{b}12$–16n) in order to gain what is noble for ourselves, they should suppose it mere words (X 8 $1179^{a}22$). After all, their own life experience, which is what casts "the controlling vote" ($1179^{a}20$) in practical matters, tells them in no uncertain terms that words is all it is. For ordinary people "judge by external goods, since these are the only ones they can perceive" ($1179^{a}16$), and so when they see someone who lacks these, they cannot see how he could be happy, and when they see him sacrifice these for the sake of what is noble they cannot do otherwise than take him to be sacrificing his self-interest for an empty dream (IX 8).

One kind of raw political starting-point, then, is a belief about the sort of value that noble things (as well as just things) have. People who have been correctly habituated to enjoy and hate in a noble way see correctly that these things are intrinsically valuable or choiceworthy for their own sake and that they are more valuable than external goods. People who have been inadequately habituated cannot see this and so reject one of the raw starting-points of politics right off the bat. When they read the *Ethics*, therefore, they simply cannot see the truth in it, and so it is of no practical value to them. They do

what virtue requires of them to the extent that they do from fear of penalties rather than for the sake of what is noble (X 9 $1180^{a}4$–5).

Happiness is also a raw starting-point of politics (I 12 $1102^{a}2$–4), about which people quite reasonably get "their suppositions . . . from their lives" (I 5 $1095^{b}15$–16). Hence happiness too can seem as variable as good things generally (I 3 $1094^{a}16$–17). As a result, ordinary people—anyway "the most vulgar ones"—suppose that happiness is pleasure, since their bad habituation, especially where bodily pleasures and pains are concerned, leads them exclusively to pursue "money, honors, and bodily pleasures . . . on the supposition that they are the best goods" (IX 8 $1168^{b}16$–18). Yet, as Aristotle points out, they "have an argument for their choice," since people in positions of power, like Sardanapalus, who are able to do what they want, pursue these goods too. It is this argument that makes their views worth examining (I 4 $1095^{a}28$–30). The same goes for people whose upbringings have lead them to pursue honor as if it were the best good.

Raw political starting-points, we now see, are socially mediated and language mediated facts (or putative facts) that are accessible only to properly socialized subjects and so only to subjects who are members of societies—that is, of groups that socialize or habituate their members into some common form of life. Here is Aristotle himself on the topic:

> A voice (*phônê*) is an indicator of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature goes this far: they not only perceive what is pleasant or painful but also indicate them to each other). But rational speech (*logos*) is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust. For it is special to human beings, in comparison to other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city. (*Pol.* I 2 $1253^{a}10$–18)

It follows, then, that the beliefs of properly socialized subjects—or the way things noble, just, and so on appear to them as a result of such socialization—are the rawest data available. It is to these that politics is ultimately answerable. That is why the *Ethics* invariably appeals to what socialized subjects say or think or to how things seem or appear to them (for example, I 8 $1098^{b}9$–12).

It is useful to juxtapose this picture of the *Ethics* to a picture Aristotle gives of the canonical sciences and of the importance in them of experience and ultimately of perception:

> What causes our inability to take a comprehensive view of the agreed-upon facts is lack of experience. That is why those who dwell in more intimate association with the facts of nature are better able to lay down [explanatory] starting-points which can bring together a good many of these, whereas those whom many arguments have made unobservant

> of the facts come too readily to their conclusions after looking at only a few facts. (*GC* I 2 316^{a}5–10)

We might advisedly see "those who dwell in more intimate association with the facts of nature," in other words, as the equivalent in a canonical science of the well brought up or properly socialized and habituated subjects of the *Ethics*, who, "because they have an eye formed from experience, . . . see correctly" (VI 11 1143^{b}13–14). And one reason we might do so is that canonical scientists too are socialized subjects, albeit of a somewhat specialized sort. For it is only within scientific communities or communities of knowledge that, through complex processes of habituation and teaching, canonical scientists are produced: we learn science from other scientists (X 9 1180^{b}28–34). But communities of knowledge, both in Aristotle's view and in reality, are parts of the political community and are regulated and sustained by it. When we first meet politics, in fact, it is as an architectonic science that oversees the others, ensuring that all sciences work together to further human happiness (I 2 1094^{a}26–^{b}7).

Because the things that appear to be so to appropriately socialized subjects are the raw starting-points in canonical sciences just as much as in politics, the only difference between them lying in the sort of socialization involved, we must be careful not to think of an appeal to "the things we say (*ta legomena*)" (I 8 1098^{b}10, VII 1 1145^{b}20) as an appeal to evidence of a sort quite different from the sort appealed to in a canonical science. We are not in the one case appealing to conceptual considerations or "intuitions," and in the other case to empirical facts or findings. We are not looking at analytic matters as opposed to synthetic ones. Instead, what we have in both cases are socially mediated facts, some closer to the conceptual or the analytic, some closer to the empirical or synthetic. Political subjects who disagree about the intrinsic choiceworthiness of what is noble, for example, are not disagreeing about a concept or about the meaning of a word but are disagreeing about a substantive issue concerning how to live. Aristotle's account of happiness and his definition of virtue of character as a sort of medial state are to be evaluated not by appeal to our intuitions but by appeal to the facts of our lives (X 8 1179^{a}17–22).

The significance of these conclusions about raw political starting-points and the kinds of subjects who can detect them is most easily seen when we run across—as readers of the secondary literature on the *Ethics* inevitably will—topics related to the "foundations" of Aristotle's ethics. Often a central exhibit in these discussions is the famous function (*ergon*) argument (I 7 1097^{b}22–1098^{a}20), where it is thought that the notion of a function is introduced into politics as something already so grounded in the facts (or putative facts) of Aristotle's biological or metaphysical investigations that politics then inherits these grounds and becomes hostage to these facts—facts that are not themselves political facts or putative facts. Another frequent exhibit is the use Aristotle

makes, at various junctures, of his own account of the soul—an account supported not by political facts or putative facts, apparently, but by biological or psychological ones (I 13 $1102^{a}14$–26).

What these discussions fail to give proper weight to is the difference between *empirical* foundations, or the facts to which politics or any other body of knowledge is ultimately answerable, and *explanatory* foundations, or the explanatory notions that politics makes use of in explaining those facts. To be sure, these notions may also often play explanatory roles in various other Aristotelian bodies of knowledge, including various theoretical sciences, and may for that reason recommend themselves to Aristotle for use elsewhere. It would be strange if it were otherwise. These notions may well, then, be epistemically sanctioned within these other bodies of knowledge too, providing correct explanations of the relevant sorts of facts. But this does not mean that politics must be committed to them as fixed points of its own explanatory enterprise. Rather it takes them on board wholly and entirely as answerable to raw political starting-points and must reject them if they prove inadequate for those purposes. In the only really important sense, then, politics has political facts as its sole foundations. Biology, metaphysics, and other bodies of knowledge have no foundational role in politics whatsoever.

Explanatory Starting-points and Dialectic

In the case of canonical sciences, the most important explanatory starting-points consist of definitions that specify the genus and differentiae of the real (as opposed to nominal) universal essences of the beings with which the science deals (*APo.* II 10 $93^{b}29$–$94^{a}19$). Since scientific definitions must be apt starting-points of demonstrations, this implies, Aristotle thinks, that the "extremes and the middle terms must come from the same genus" (I 7 $75^{b}10$–11). As a result, a single canonical science must deal with a single genus (I 28 $87^{a}38$–39). The conclusion we reached earlier—that politics deals with and is empirically based only on political facts—thus marks another potential similarity between politics and a canonical science, since it suggests that politics does deal with a single genus and so meets a crucial condition definitive of a canonical science.

It should come as no surprise, then, that in defining the virtues of character, which are the explanatory starting-points of politics and are those states of the soul with which noble and just actions must be in accord, Aristotle first specifies their genus (*NE* II 5 $1106^{a}12$–13). They are, he says, states (*hexeis*)—where a state is a condition "by dint of which we are well or badly off in relation to feelings" ($1105^{b}25$–26). Then, making use of the so-called doctrine of the mean, he goes on to tell us what the differentiae are of the states that are virtues: "Virtue . . . is a deliberately choosing state, which is in a medial condition

in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically-wise person would define it" (II 6 1106^{b}36–1107^{a}1). At that point he implies he has discovered virtue's "essence (*ousia*) and the account (*logos*) that states its what it is to be (*to ti ên einai*)" (1107^{a}6–7). It is just what a definition or account in a canonical science is supposed to do (*APo.* II 3 90^{b}16, 10 93^{b}29).

There is an important difference, though, which Aristotle takes pains to register but whose significance is nonetheless easy to miss. If politics is a science at all, it is a practical one, which aims to make us good. This means that the definitions it produces must be of a sort that can guide the actions of politicians, legislators, and individual agents. They must, in a word, be definitions that can be put into practice. Thus Aristotle's major criticism of Plato's views on the form of the good is that it is impractical: "even if there is some single good predicated in common of all intrinsic goods, a separable one that is itself an intrinsic good, it is clear that it will not be something doable in action or acquirable by a human being. But that is the sort we are now looking for" (*NE* I 6 1096^{b}32–35). Moreover, it is even impractical in a more attenuated sense, namely, as a sort of regulative ideal, unachievable in action yet guiding it from beyond. For to treat it as such results in a clash with the productive sciences as these are actually practiced, since the practitioners of the productive sciences, though seeking some good, ignore the form of the good altogether, "yet for all craftsmen not to know—and not even to look for—so important an aid would hardly be reasonable" (1097^{a}6–8).

It is true that Aristotle's own definition of happiness as activity of the soul in accord with the best and most complete virtue seems to end up entailing that a certain theoretical activity—the contemplation of the god—is the best kind of happiness (X 7–8). But it is not a theoretical definition for all that, if by "theoretical" we mean, as we should, that truth alone is the measure of its correctness. What matters most is that what it defines, unlike Plato's good itself, is something we can put into practice—something we can *do*. That is why the measure of its success is an entirely practical one: "When we examine what has been previously said, . . . it must be by bringing it to bear on the facts of our life, and if it is in harmony with the facts, we should accept it, but if it clashes, we should suppose it mere words" (X 8 1179^{a}20–22). With similar concerns in mind, Aristotle prefaces his definition of virtue of character with an account of how we think such virtue is acquired (II 1) and with a reminder that the goal of the *Ethics* is practical, not theoretical (II 2). When the definition is finally developed (II 5–6), we see that it is in keeping with these prefatory comments, since it is one that can guide us in both inculcating and maintaining the virtues of character in others and in ourselves (II 9).

Nowadays philosophy is for the most part a theoretical subject with few pretensions to having much bearing on practical affairs. So it is easy to forget that Aristotle thinks of some branches of philosophy, anyway, in quite a

different way. His discussion of voluntariness and involuntariness, for example, is intended to be "also useful to legislators regarding honors and punishments" (III 1 $1109^{b}34$–35). When we evaluate that discussion, therefore, we shouldn't just do so in standard philosophical fashion—by looking for clever counter-examples, however far fetched they might be. We should think rather of how well it would work in practical life, where the far fetched seldom occurs and requires special provision when it does. Here the discussion of decency (V 10) should serve as our guide.

Understanding, then, that definitions of starting-points in politics must be practical, let us return to the question of how we arrive at these definitions by beginning from raw starting-points. Well, first we have to have the raw starting-points ready to hand. Aristotle is clear about this, as he is indeed about what is supposed to happen next:

> The method (*hodos*) is the same in all cases, in philosophy as well as in the crafts or any sort of learning whatsoever. For one must observe for both terms what belongs to them and what they belong to, and be supplied with as many of these terms as possible. . . .When it is in accord with truth, it must be from the terms that are catalogued (*diagegrammenôn*) as truly belonging, but in dialectical deductions it must be from premises that are in accord with [reputable] belief. . . . Most of the starting-points, however, are special to each science. That is why experience must provide us with the starting-points where each is concerned—I mean, for example, that experience in astronomy must do so in the case of astronomical science. For when the appearances had been adequately grasped, the demonstrations in astronomy were found in the way we described. And it is the same way where any other craft or science whatsoever is concerned. Hence if what belongs to each thing has been grasped, at that point we can readily exhibit the demonstrations. For if nothing that truly belongs to the relevant things has been omitted from the collection, then concerning everything, if a demonstration of it exists, we will be able to find it and give the demonstration, and if it is by nature indemonstrable, we will be able to make that evident. (*APr.* I 30 $46^{a}3$–27)

So once we have a catalogue of the raw starting-points, the demonstrative explanation of them from explanatory scientific starting-points is supposedly fairly routine. We should not, however, demand "the cause [or explanation] in all cases alike. Rather, in some it will be adequate if the fact that they are so has been correctly shown (*deiknunai*)—as it is indeed where starting-points are concerned" (I 8 $1098^{a}33$–$^{b}2$). But what exactly is it to show a starting-point correctly or adequately? It can't be to demonstrate it, we know that.

Aristotle describes what he is undertaking in the *Ethics* specifically as a "method of inquiry (*methodos*)," as we saw, and as a contribution to the

"philosophy of human affairs." And to the explanatory scientific starting-points of these, he claims, there is a unique route:

> Dialectic is useful as regards the philosophical sciences because the capacity to go through the puzzles on both sides of a question will make it easier to discern what is true and what is false in each. Furthermore, dialectic is useful as regards the first starting-points (*ta prôta*) where each science is concerned. For it is impossible to say anything about these based on the starting-points properly belonging to the science in question, since these starting-points are the first ones of all, and it is through reputable beliefs (*endoxa*) about each that it is necessary to discuss them. This, though, is a task special to, or most characteristic of, dialectic. For because of its ability to examine (*exetastikê*), it has a route toward the starting-points of all methods of inquiry. (*Top.* I 2 $101^{a}34$–$^{b}4$)

Prima facie, then, the *Ethics* should correctly show the explanatory starting-points of politics by going through puzzles and solving them by appeal to reputable beliefs. But before we rush to the *Ethics* to see whether that is what we do find, we need to be clearer about what exactly we should be looking for. Writers on Aristotle's method of ethics often go astray by failing to do this.

Dialectic is recognizably a descendant of the Socratic elenchus, which famously begins with a question like this: *Ti esti to kalon?* What is the noble? The respondent, sometimes after a bit of nudging, comes up with a universal definition, what is noble is what all the gods love, or whatever it might be (I adapt a well-known answer from Plato's *Euthyphro*). Socrates then puts this definition to the test by drawing attention to some things that seem true to the respondent himself but which conflict with his definition. The puzzle, or *aporia,* that results from this conflict then remains for the respondent to try to solve, usually by reformulating or rejecting his definition. Aristotle understood this process in terms that reveal its relationship to his own:

> Socrates occupied himself with the virtues of character, and in connection with them became the first to look for universal definitions. . . . It was reasonable that Socrates should inquire about the what it is. For he was inquiring in order to deduce, and the starting-point of deductions is the what it is. For there are two things that may be justly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, since both are concerned with starting-points of science. (*Met.* XIII 4 $1078^{b}17$–30; also I 6 $987^{b}1$–4)

In Plato too dialectic is primarily concerned with scientific starting-points, such as those of mathematics, and seems to consist in some sort of elenchus-like process of reformulating definitions in the face of conflicting evidence so as to render them puzzle free (*Rep.* VII 532a1–533d1). Aristotle can reasonably

be seen, then, as continuing a line of thought about dialectic, even if in works such as the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations* he contributes greatly to its exploration, systemization, and elaboration.

Think now about the respondent's first answer, his first definition: what is noble is what the gods love. Although it is soon shown to be incorrect, there is something quite remarkable about its very existence. Through experience shaped by acculturation and habituation involving the learning of a natural language the respondent is confident that he can say what nobility is. He has learned to apply the word "noble" to particular people, actions, and so on correctly enough to pass muster as knowing its meaning, knowing how to use it. From these particular cases he has reached a putative universal, something the particular cases have in common, but when he tries to define that universal in words, he gets it wrong, as Socrates shows. Here is Aristotle registering the significance of this: "What is knowable to each person at first is often knowable to a very small extent and possesses little or nothing of what is real [or true]. All the same, we must start from what is but badly knowable to us and try . . . to proceed through this to a knowledge of what is entirely knowable" (*Met.* VII 3 $1029^{b}8$–12).

The route by which the respondent reaches the universal that he is unable to define correctly is what Aristotle calls "induction" (*epagôgê*), or that variant of induction, which also involves the shaping of feelings and the development of character, namely, habituation (*ethismos*). This begins with (1) perception of particulars, which leads to (2) retention of perceptual contents in memory, and, when many such contents have been retained, to (3) an experience, so that for the first time "there is a universal in the soul" (*APo.* II 19 $100^{a}3$–16). The universal reached at stage (3), which is the one the respondent reaches, is described as "indeterminate" and "better known by perception" (*Ph.* I 1 $184^{a}22$–25). It is the sort of universal, often quite complex, that constitutes a nominal essence corresponding to the nominal definition or meaning of a general term. Finally, (4) from experience come craft knowledge and scientific knowledge, when "from many intelligible objects arising from experience one universal supposition about similar objects is produced" (*Met.* I 1 $981^{a}5$–7).

The *nominal* (or analytic, meaning-based) definition of the general term "thunder," for example, might pick out the universal *loud noise in the clouds.* When science investigates the things that have this nominal essence, it may find that they also have a real essence or nature in terms of which their other features can be scientifically explained:

> Since a definition is said to be an account of what something is, it is evident that one sort will be an account of what its name, or of what some other name-like account, signifies—for example, what "triangle" signifies. . . . Another sort of definition is an account that

> makes clear the explanation of why it exists. So the former sort signifies something but does not show it, whereas the latter will evidently be like a demonstration of what it is, differing in arrangement from a demonstration. For there is a difference between giving the explanation of why it thunders and saying what thunder is. In the first case you will say: because fire is being extinguished in the clouds. And what is thunder? The loud noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds. Hence the same account is given in different ways. In one way it is a continuous demonstration, in the other a definition. Further, a definition of thunder is "a noise in the clouds," and this is a conclusion of the demonstration of what it is. The definition of an immediate item, though, is an indemonstrable positing (*thesis*) of what it is. (*APo.* II 10 $93^{b}29$–$94^{a}10$)

A real (or synthetic, fact-based) definition, which analyzes this real essence into its "constituents (*stoicheia*) and starting-points" (*Ph.* I 1 $184^{a}23$), which will be definable but indemonstrable, makes intrinsically clear what the nominal definition made clear to us only by enabling us to recognize instances of thunder in a fairly—but imperfectly—reliably way. As a result, thunder itself, now clearly a natural and not just a conventional kind, becomes better known not just to us but entirely or unconditionally (*NE* I 4 $1095^{b}2$–8). These analyzed universals, which are the sort reached at stage (4), are the ones suited to serve as starting-points of the sciences and crafts: "People with experience know the fact that but not the explanation why, whereas those with craft knowledge know the explanation why, that is, the cause" (*Met.* I 1 $981^{a}28$–30).

Socrates too, we see, wanted definitions that were not just empirically adequate but also explanatory. Thus in telling Euthyphro what he wants in the case of piety, he says that he is seeking "the form itself *by dint of* which all the pieties are pieties" (*Euthphr.* 6d10–11). That is why he rejects the definition of piety as being what all the gods love. This definition is in one way correct, presumably, in that if something is pious, it is necessarily loved by all the gods, and vice versa, but it isn't explanatory, since it doesn't tell us what it is about pious things that makes all the gods love them, and so it does not identify the form by dint of which they are pious (9e–11b).

Let's go back. We wanted to know what was involved in showing a scientific starting-point. We were told how we could *not* do this, namely, by demonstrating it from scientific starting-points. Next we learned that dialectic had a route to it from reputable beliefs. At the same time, we were told that induction had a route to it as well—something the *Ethics* also tells us: "we get a theoretical grasp of some starting-points through induction, some through perception, some through some sort of habituation, and others through other means" (I 7 $1098^{b}3$–4). This suggests that induction and dialectic are in some way or other the same process. It is a suggestion to keep in mind.

What shows a Socratic respondent to be wrong is an example that the respondent's definition does not fit. The presentation of the example might be quite indirect, however. It might take quite a bit of stage setting, elicited by the asking of many questions, to bring out a puzzle. But if the example is one the definition does not fit, it shows that the universal grasped by the respondent and the definition he produces are not entirely or unconditionally knowable and that his state is not one of clear-eyed understanding:

> A puzzle in thought reveals a knot in its subject matter. For thought caught in a puzzle is like people who are tied up, since in either case it is impossible to make progress. That is why one must get a theoretical grasp on all the difficulties ahead of time, both for these reasons and because those who inquire without first going through the puzzles are like people who don't know where they have to go, and, in addition, don't even know whether they have found what they were inquiring about, since the end is not clear to them. But to someone who has first gone through the puzzles it is clear. (*Met.* III 1 $995^{a}30$–$^{b}2$)

But lack of such clear-eyed understanding of a scientific starting-point has serious downstream consequences:

> If we are to have scientific knowledge through demonstration, . . . we must know the starting-points better and be better convinced of them than of what is being shown, but we must also not find anything more convincing or better known among things opposed to the starting-points from which a contrary mistaken conclusion may be deduced, since someone who has unconditional scientific knowledge must be incapable of being convinced out of it. (*APo.* I 2 $72^{a}37$–$^{b}4$; also see *NE* VI 3 $1139^{b}33$–35)

If dialectical examination reveals a puzzle in a respondent's thought about a scientific starting-point, then he cannot have any unconditional scientific knowledge even of what he may well be able to demonstrate correctly from it. Contrariwise, if dialectical examination reveals no such puzzle, then he apparently does have clear-eyed understanding, and his route to what he can demonstrate is free of obstacles.

At the heart of dialectic, as Aristotle understands it, is the dialectical deduction (*dialektikos sullogismos*). This is the argument lying behind the questioner's questions, partly dictating their order and content and partly determining the strategy of his examination. In the following passage it is defined and contrasted with two relevant others:

> Dialectical arguments are those that deduce from reputable beliefs in a way that reaches a contradiction; peirastic arguments are those that deduce from those beliefs of the respondent that anyone must know (*eidenai*) who pretends to possess scientific knowledge . . . ;

> contentious (*eristikos*) arguments are those that deduce or appear to deduce from what appear to be reputable beliefs but are not really such. (*SE* 2 $165^{b}3$–8)

If we think of dialectical deductions in this way, a dialectician, in contrast to a contender, is an honest questioner, appealing to genuinely reputable beliefs and employing valid deductions. "Contenders and sophists use the same arguments," Aristotle says, "but not to achieve the same goal. . . . If the goal is apparent victory, the argument is contentious; if it is apparent wisdom, sophistic" (11 $171^{b}27$–29). Nonetheless, Aristotle does also use the term *dialektikê* as the name for the craft that honest dialecticians and sophists both use: "In dialectic a sophist is so called on the basis of his deliberate choice, and a dialectician is so called not on the basis of his deliberate choice but on the basis of the capacity he has" (*Rh.* I 1 $1355^{b}20$–21). If dialectic is understood in this way, a dialectician who deliberately chooses to employ contentious arguments is a sophist (I 1 $1355^{a}24$–$^{b}7$). We need to be careful, therefore, to distinguish *honest dialectic* from what we may call *plain dialectic*, which—like all crafts—can be used for good and ill (*NE* V 1 $1129^{a}13$–17).

The canonical occasion for the practice of the Socratic elenchus, obviously, is the examination of someone else. But there is nothing to prevent a person from practicing it on himself: "How could you think," Socrates ask Critias, "that I would refute you for any reason other than the one for which I would refute myself, fearing lest I might inadvertently think I know something when I don't know it?" (*Chrm.* 166c7–d2). Dialectic is no different in this regard:

> The premises of the philosopher's deductions, or those of a person who is investigating by himself, though true and knowable, may be refused by the respondent because they lie too near to the original proposition, and so he sees what will happen if he grants them. But the philosopher is unconcerned about this. Indeed, he will presumably be eager that his axioms should be as familiar and as near to the question at hand as possible, since it is from premises of this sort that scientific deductions proceed. (*Top.* VIII 1 $155^{b}10$–16)

What we are to imagine, then, is that the political philosopher, to focus on him, surveys the raw political starting-points (the empirical foundations of politics), constructing detailed catalogues of these. He then tries to formulate definitions of the various universals involved in them that seem to be candidate scientific starting-points (virtue, happiness, and so on), testing these against the raw political starting-points by trying to construct demonstrations from them. But these definitions will often be no more than partial; our political philosopher is on his way to complete definitional starting-points, just as the demonstrations will often be no more than proto or nascent demonstrations. The often rudimentary demonstrations that we find in Aristotle's scientific

treatises are parts of this process of arguing to not from starting-points. We argue to them in part by seeing whether or to what extent we could demonstrate from them.

So, first, we have the important distinction between dialectic proper, which includes the use of what appear to be deductions from what appear to be reputable beliefs, and honest dialectic, which uses only genuine deductions from genuine reputable beliefs. Second, we have the equally important distinction between the use of dialectic in examining a potentially hostile respondent and its use by the philosopher in a perhaps private pursuit of the truth. Third, we have an important contrast between honest dialectical premises and philosophical ones or scientific ones. Honest dialectical premises are reputable beliefs, philosophical and scientific premises must be true and knowable. Fourth, we have two apparently equivalent routes to scientific starting-points, one inductive, which starts from raw political starting-points, and the other dialectic, which starts from reputable beliefs.

According to the official definition, genuine reputable beliefs are "things that are believed by everyone, by the majority, or by the wise—either by all of them, or by most, or by the most well known and most reputable" (*Top.* I 1 $100^{b}21$–23). Just as the scientist should have a catalogue of scientific truths ready to hand from which to select the premises of his demonstrations, so a dialectician ought also to select premises "from arguments that have been written down and produce catalogues (*diagraphas*) of them concerning each kind of subject, putting them under separate headings—for example, 'Concerned with good,' 'Concerned with life'" (*Top.* I 14 $105^{b}12$–15). We should be reminded of the collections of laws and constitutions that enjoy "a good reputation (*eudokimountas*)," from which the legislative scientist selects the best ones (*NE* X 9 $1181^{a}12$–$^{b}12$).

Clearly, then, there will be considerable overlap between the scientist's catalogue of raw starting-points and the honest dialectician's catalogue of genuine reputable beliefs. For, first, things that are believed by reputably wise people are themselves reputable beliefs, and, second, any respondent would accept "the beliefs of those who have investigated the subjects in question—for example, on a question of medicine he will agree with a doctor, and on a question of geometry with a geometer" (*Top.* I 10 $104^{a}8$–37). The catalogues also differ, however, in that not all reputable beliefs need be true. If a proposition is a reputable belief, if it would be accepted by all or most people, it is everything an honest dialectician could ask for in a premise, since his goal is simply this: to reveal by honest deductions that a definition offered by any respondent whatsoever conflicts—if it does—with other beliefs that the respondent has. That is why having a complete or fairly complete catalogue of reputable beliefs is such an important resource for a dialectician. It is because dialectic deals with things only "in relation to belief," then, and not as philosophy and science do,

"in relation to truth" (*Top.* I 14 105^{b}30–31) that it needs nothing more than reputable *beliefs*.

Nonetheless, the fact that all or most people believe something leads us "to trust it as something in accord with experience" (*Div. Somn.* 1 426^{b}14–16), and—since human beings "are naturally adequate as regards the truth and for the most part happen upon it" (*Rh.* I 1 1355^{a}15–17)—as containing some truth. That is why having catalogued some of the things that people believe happiness to be, Aristotle writes: "Some of these views are held by many and are of long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong, but rather that they are right on one point at least or even on most of them" (*NE* I 8 1098^{b}27–29). Later he generalizes the claim: "things that seem to be so to everyone, these, we say, are" (X 2 1172^{b}36–1173^{a}1). Raw starting-points are just that—raw. But when refined, some shred of truth is likely to be found in them. So likely, indeed, that if none is found, this will itself be a surprising fact needing to be explained: "when a reasonable explanation is given of why an untrue view appears true, this makes us more convinced of the true view" (VII 14 1154^{a}24–25). It is in the perhaps mere grain of truth enclosed in a reputable belief that a philosopher or scientist is interested, then, not in the general acceptability of the surrounding husk, much of which he may discard.

The process of refinement in the case of a candidate explanatory starting-point is that of testing a definition of it against reputable beliefs. This may result in the definition being accepted as it stands or in its being altered or modified. The same process applies to the reputable beliefs themselves, since they may conflict not only with the definition but also with each other. Again, this may also result in their being modified, often by uncovering ambiguities within them or in the argument supporting them or by drawing distinctions that uncover complexities in these. Thus Aristotle's view that it is "from oneself that all the features fitted to friendship also extend to others" is in accord with the reputable beliefs embodied in "all the proverbs" (IX 8 1168^{b}5–10). But both conflict with the view that there is something shameful about being a self-lover, since a base person "does all his actions for the sake of himself," whereas a decent one "seems to act because of what is noble . . . and for the sake of a friend, disregarding his own interests" (1168^{a}31–35). As a result, "it is reasonable to be puzzled . . . as to which side we should follow, since both carry conviction." Hence to ease our puzzlement not just in this case but in all others like it, "we need to draw distinctions in connection with the arguments and determine to what extent and in what ways they grasp the truth. If, then, we were to find out what those on each side mean by 'self-love,' perhaps this would be clear" (1168^{b}10–15). By the end of the chapter, this is precisely what has been accomplished. If, as ordinary people do, we think of self-lovers as those who gratify the nonrational part of their soul (as if it were their true self)

with money, honors, and bodily pleasures (as if these were the greatest goods), we can see why they are right to think that "self-love" is a term of reproach. But if we recognize that noble things are better than these other goods, and that the true self is the understanding, we will also see what is wrong in their view and what is right in the opposing one, and agree that we should be "self-lovers" in that sense of the term.

A more extreme possibility, as we saw, is that a reputable belief isn't modified at all but is rejected entirely and has its appearance of truth explained away. This is what happens in the case of bodily pleasures. These are not more choiceworthy, Aristotle argues, yet they appear to be. So we must explain away their false appearance of choiceworthiness, one source of which is that they "knock out pain," and "get their intensity (which is why they are pursued) from the fact that they appear alongside their contrary" (VII 14 $1154^{a}26$–31). Sometimes all the reputable beliefs on a certain topic stemming from a certain group can be excluded *en masse*:

> To investigate all the beliefs about happiness held by different people is superfluous, since little children, sick people, and lunatics apparently have many views, but no one with any understanding would go through these. For these people need not arguments but, in some cases, time in which to mature, in others, medical or political correction [or punishment]—for a drug is no less correctional than a flogging. Similarly there is no need to investigate the beliefs of the majority, since they speak baselessly on pretty much every topic but most of all this one. On it, only the beliefs of wise people need be investigated. (*EE* I 3 $1214^{b}28$–$1215^{a}2$)

We might see Aristotle's account of the distorting effects on beliefs about happiness of inadequate habituation where pleasures and pains are concerned as the justification of this bold claim. Readers who think that Aristotle gives the life of indulgence shrift that is much too short (see *NE* I 5 $1095^{b}19$–22, X 6 $1176^{b}9$–$1177^{a}1$) should not overlook its bearing on their concern. False consciousness, at least in one of its forms, was as familiar to Aristotle as it subsequently became to Hegel and Marx.

The canonical occasion for the use of honest dialectic, as of the Socratic elenchus and plain dialectic, is the examination of a respondent. The relevant premises for the questioner to use, therefore, are the reputable beliefs in his catalogue that his respondent will accept. Just how wide this set of beliefs is in a given case depends naturally on how accessible to the untrained subject the subject matter is on which he is being examined. In this regard our target candidate science, politics, is in a somewhat special position, since all adequately socialized subjects have access to the relevant subject matter and are even likely to have received some—however vestigial—training in politics itself. That is

no doubt why Socrates' respondents are so confident, prior to examination, that they do know how to define the virtues. We might usefully compare the case of religious beliefs about the nature of human beings and the origins of life and cosmos in a society where all the citizens practice the same religion and all the schools teach it. In other more esoteric areas the class of reputable beliefs may be substantially narrower. We may all have some beliefs about thunder and other phenomena readily perceptible to everyone, that are—for that very reason—reputable. But about Mandelbrot sets, Bell's theorem, and messenger RNA we may have none at all.

When a scientist is investigating by himself, the class of premises he will select from is the catalogue of *all* the raw starting-points of his science, despite a natural human inclination to do otherwise:

> Yet . . . people seem to inquire up to a certain point but not as far as it is possible to take the puzzle. It is what we are all inclined to do, to make our inquiry not with an eye to the thing itself but with an eye to the person who says things that contradict him. For even a person inquiring on his own continues up to the point at which he is no longer able to contradict himself. That is why a person who is going to inquire correctly should be able to raise objections to a position by using objections that are proper to the relevant genus, and this will be when he has acquired a theoretical grasp of all the differentiae. (*Cael.* II 13 $294^{b}6$–13)

Hence our scientist will want to err on the side of excess, adding any reputable belief that appears to have any relevance whatsoever, to his catalogue. When he formulates definitions of candidate scientific starting-points from which he thinks he can demonstrate the raw ones, he must then examine himself to see whether he really does in this case have the scientific knowledge he thinks he has. If he is investigating together with fellow scientists, others may examine him: we all do better with the aid of co-workers (*NE* X 7 $1177^{a}34$), among whom time figures as one (I 7 $1095^{a}23$–24). What he is doing is using honest dialectic on himself or having it used on him. But this, we see, is little different from the final stage—stage (4)—of the induction we looked at earlier. Induction, as we might put it, is, in its final stage, (possibly self-directed) honest dialectic.

In a famous and much debated passage of the *Ethics*, Aristotle writes:

> We must, as in the other cases, set out the things that appear to be so and first go through the puzzles, and, in that way show preferably all the reputable beliefs about these ways of being affected, or, if not all of them then most of them, and the ones with the most control. For if the objections are resolved and the reputable beliefs are left standing, that would be an adequate showing. (VII 1 $1145^{b}1$–7)

The specific topic of the comment is "these ways of being affected," which are self-control and its lack as well as resilience and softness. Some people think that the comment applies only to this topic and should not be generalized, even though "as in the other cases" surely suggests a wider scope. And as we can now see, that scope *is* in fact entirely general, since it describes the honest dialectical or inductive route to the starting-points of *all* the sciences and methods of inquiry, with *tithenai ta phainomena* ("set[ting] out the things that appear to be so") describing the initial phase in which the raw starting-points are collected and catalogued.

Earlier we asked whether the *Ethics* took a route like this to the starting-points of politics. Now that we know what exactly it is we are asking, we must follow in Aristotle's footsteps to see what the answer is. If it turns out to be yes, as we have already seen reason to think it will be, that will mark another important point of similarity between politics and a canonical science, increasing our rising confidence that it is in fact a science, albeit a practical one.

The Route the Ethics Takes

On the basis of the function argument (I 7 $1097^{b}22$–$1098^{a}20$), Aristotle defines happiness as (roughly speaking) rational activity in accord with virtue. Although he doesn't explicitly identify this definition in terms of genus and differentiae, as he does in the case of the definition he gives of virtue of character, it seems clear that rational activity is the genus and virtue the differentia. In I 8 he shows that this definition is in accord with reputable beliefs about happiness, which are the relevant raw starting-points, and to that extent explains them. Happiness as so defined, however, "needs external goods to be added" ($1099^{a}31$–32). This is what leads some people actually to identify happiness with good luck ($1099^{b}7$–8). It is also—as the beginning of I 9 notes—what leads people to puzzle about whether happiness is acquirable by learning, habituation, or training on the one hand, or by luck or divine dispensation on the other.

Aristotle's response to this puzzle reveals what truth there is in each of the options and how that core of truth (the refined data) is consistent with his definition. In the process, as we are about to see, the definition gets refined too. The dialectical nature of the process is not quite as obvious here as in the discussion of self-love (IX 8), but it reveals the same need "to draw distinctions" (IX 8 $1168^{b}12$–13).

At the beginning of I 10 a new puzzle, explicitly identified as such ($1100^{a}31$), arises about the bearing of luck on happiness—this one generated by the reputable opinion of Solon that we should wait to see the end of a person's life before calling him happy. In the course of discussing it a third puzzle, again identified as such ($1100^{a}21$), arises about the effects of the welfare of

descendants on the happiness of someone who has died. By the time he has gone through these puzzles and shown what truth there is in the raw reputable opinions, Aristotle is able to produce a subtle and nuanced account of the effects of luck on human life and then, in light of it, to somewhat modify his definition of happiness:

> What, then, prevents us from calling happy the person who is active in accord with complete virtue and is adequately supplied with external goods, not for some random period of time but in a complete life? Or must we add that he will continue living like that and die accordingly, since the future is obscure to us and we suppose happiness to be an end and complete in every way? If so, we shall call blessed those living people who have and will continue to have the things we mentioned—blessed, though, in the way human beings are. (I 10 $1101^{a}14$–21)

The original definition, remember, made no mention of external goods or of the distinctive way, somewhat vulnerable to luck, that human beings are happy.

In I 13, Aristotle introduces some clearly empirical facts about the soul that he will need throughout the rest of the *Ethics,* especially the distinction between the part of the soul that has reason—which will later be divided into the scientific part and the deliberative part (VI 1 $1139^{a}3$–14)—and the desiring part which, though it doesn't have reason itself, can listen to it. The major difference between the self-controlled person and the virtuous one will turn out to be that the desiring part of the former listens less well to the rational part than does the desiring part of the latter (I 13 $1102^{b}13$–28).

Aristotle says that while someone who is to have knowledge of politics must "get a theoretical grasp on what concerns the soul," that is, psychology, his grasp should be for the sake of producing human virtue and happiness in citizens and "of an extent that is adequate to the things being looked for" ($1102^{a}23$–25). The discussion of lack of self-control involves some quite sophisticated material (VII 2–3), as does the discussion of pleasure (X 1–5)—itself a topic on which politics must get a theoretical grasp (VII 11 $1152^{b}1$–2) and with which the entire *Ethics* "both as a contribution to virtue and as a contribution to politics" is concerned (II 3 $1105^{a}5$–6, 10–13). This political psychology, whatever exactly its precise extent and level of exactness, is part of what we earlier called the explanatory foundations of politics, answerable only to raw political starting-points (even if there is also considerable overlap between these and raw psychological ones). In fact, political psychology can even make contributions of its own to psychology—the discussion of lack of self-control may be a case in point (see, for example, VII 3 $1146^{b}31$–$1147^{b}19$).

Many other elements in the *Ethics* seem to have a status similar to that of psychology, although it is sometimes less easy to see what body of knowledge

they belong to or whether they are really part of the explanatory foundations or of the empirical ones. A few examples will show how diverse and hard to categorize these are: some ends are activities while others are works beyond the activities (I 1 $1094^{a}4$–5); some things are knowable to us, others unconditionally (I 4 $1095^{b}2$–3); a human being is by nature political (I 7 $1097^{b}11$); the most estimable sciences are more steadfast, because the blessed live most of all and most continuously in accord with them (I 10 $1100^{b}15$–16); there are three proper objects of choice: what is noble, what is advantageous, and what is pleasant (II 3 $1104^{b}30$–31); the things that come about in the soul are of three types: feelings, capacities, and states (II 5 $1105^{b}20$); in everything continuous and divisible, it is possible to take more, less, and equal (II 6 $1106^{a}26$–27); nature is more exact and better than any craft ($1106^{b}14$–15); the causes of things seem to be: nature, necessity, luck, understanding, and everything that comes about through ourselves (III 3 $1112^{a}31$–33); parts of the soul have knowledge of something on the basis of a certain similarity and kinship with it (VI 1 $1139^{a}8$–11); there are things that are far more divine in nature than human beings—the most evident ones being those from which the universe is composed (VI 7 $1141^{a}34$–$^{b}2$); the objects in mathematics are given through abstraction (VI 8 $1142^{a}18$); it is from particulars that universals come and the perception of them is understanding (VI 11 $1143^{b}4$–5); there are two ways of presenting premises (VII 3 $1146^{b}35$–$1147^{a}1$); hypotheses are starting-points in mathematics (VII 8 $1151^{a}16$–17); all things by nature have something divine in them (VII 13 $1153^{b}32$); the god always enjoys a single simple pleasure (VII 14 $1154^{b}26$); what is lovable is either good, pleasant, or useful (VIII 2 $1155^{b}18$–19); a man and a woman have a different virtue and a different function (VIII 7 $1158^{b}17$–18); the better person should be more loved than loving ($1158^{b}25$); each person would seem to be his understanding part, or it most of all (IX 4 $1166^{a}22$–23); what the producer is in capacity, his work is in activity (IX 7 $1168^{a}7$); a capacity is brought back to its activity (IX 9 $1170^{a}17$–18); being determinate is characteristic of the nature of the good (20–21); every process is in time and is of an end, and is complete when it has produced what it seeks to produce (X 4 $1174^{a}19$–21); the virtue of understanding is separated (X 8 $1178^{a}22$); the gods exercise a sort of supervision over human affairs (X 8 $1179^{a}24$–25). About some of these, Aristotle is clear that we should look elsewhere in his works for an exact account of them (X 4 $1174^{b}2$–3, 8 $1178^{a}23$), but the fact remains that each is a potential target of honest dialectical scrutiny and that each must earn its political keep. It may not be by appeal to raw political starting-points, however broadly conceived, that these explanatory starting-points are best criticized or defended, but in the end it is the political ones they must, as parts of politics, help explain.

In II 1–4, Aristotle argues that we acquire justice and temperance by doing just and temperate actions, and similarly for all the other virtues of character.

Then in II 4 he confronts a puzzle (1105^{a}17) about this that someone might raise on the basis of the apparently sensible claim that to do just or temperate actions we must be already just or temperate. To solve the puzzle Aristotle introduces a distinction between doing just or temperate actions, which is possible without being just or temperate, and doing them as a just or temperate person would do them, which isn't (1105^{b}5–12). This distinction is crucial for understanding how virtue differs from self-control.

The definition of virtue of character formulated in II 5–6 is tested by appeal to reputable beliefs about the individual virtues in III 1–V 8 without explicit mention of puzzles. But when we reach V 9–11, we are again in puzzle land—first, concerning the adequacy of the definition of suffering an unjust action (V 9 1136^{a}10, 23, ^{b}1, 15, and V 10 1138^{a}26–28), then concerning various apparently conflicting truths about justice and decency (V 10 1137^{b}6, 11). Similarly, once the definitions of the virtues of thought have been developed and discussed in VI 1–11, VI 12–13 raises a series of puzzles about what use they are (VI 12 1143^{b}18, 36).

The discussion of self-control and the lack of it in VII 1–10, referred to in the previous section, is a recognized showcase of the importance of puzzles and dialectic in the *Ethics*. Later we have a puzzle about whether friends really do wish the greatest good to their friends (VIII 7 1159^{a}5–7), puzzles about the allocation of goods among friends (IX 2 1164^{b}2) and the dissolution of friendships (IX 3 1165^{a}36), the marvelous puzzle about whether a person should love himself most of all (IX 8 1168^{a}28), and finally the puzzle about whether friends share our burden when we are suffering (IX 11 1171^{a}30). The mark of all these puzzles—indeed the defining marks of a puzzle as opposed to some other sort of problem—is that there is a conflict between views, all of which carry conviction (IX 8 1168^{b}10–12), which cannot be resolved simply by appeal to explanatory starting-points because it is these they challenge.

The fact that the *Ethics* explicitly refers to puzzles over thirty times is one measure of the importance of honest dialectic in it. But if we take this as the only measure, we are likely not to recognize the honest dialectic present in the many discussions in which no puzzles arise because none are encountered. This would be a mistake, as we saw, that our understanding of the *Ethics* would inherit from a mistake we had already made about the nature of honest dialectic and its role in all canonical sciences. When appearances, or what appears so, or what is evident to properly socialized subjects is appealed to—as happens hundreds of times in the *Ethics*—honest dialect is silently there, even if no puzzles are present.

With that caveat in mind, let us return to the question we started with. Does the *Ethics* take an honest dialectical route to the theoretical starting-points of politics? Now that we have traveled that route armed with a proper

understanding of honest dialect, we can see that it does. Hence politics is, in this respect too, similar to a canonical Aristotelian science.

Is politics, then, sufficiently similar to count as a science—provided that we *are* guided by similarities and are not speaking in an exact way? If we look, as we should, to politics' universalist component, the answer is that politics is as much like a canonical theoretical science as a natural science is. If we look to politics' particularist component, the answer is that it is not a science. All of which is to say that politics is a *practical* science, one with both a universalist and a particularist component. The contribution the *Ethics* makes to this science, so conceived, is to give it its capstone or "head"—a clear-eyed understanding of its primary starting-points (VI 7 $1141^{a}19$) that is at once true and (unlike Plato's form of the good) practical. But a contribution to politics is also perforce a contribution to practical wisdom, since politics and practical wisdom are the same state of the soul (VI 8 $1141^{b}23$–24). It isn't just to the politician that the *Ethics* speaks, therefore, but to every properly socialized ethical agent.

Where the Route Leads

The *Ethics* begins with the raw political starting-points available to properly socialized subjects, and follows a route to properly scientific explanatory starting-points, a route that is in essence inductive and dialectical. But to where does that route finally lead?

What scientific investigation of ourselves and the world tells us, Aristotle thinks, is that our understanding (*nous*) is a divine element in us, and the one with which we are most identified:

> It would seem too that each person actually *is* this, if indeed it is the controlling and better element. So it would be strange if he were to choose not his own life but that of something else. Moreover, what we said before will fit now as well. For what properly belongs to each thing by nature is best and most pleasant for each of them. For each human being, then, the life in accord with understanding is so too, if indeed this most of all is a human being. Hence, this life will also be happiest. (X 7 $1178^{a}2$–8; also *Protr.* B58–70)

Active understanding in accord with theoretical wisdom, moreover, as our function brought to completion in accord with the best and most complete virtue, is the best kind of happiness, provided it extends through a complete life (X 7 $1177^{b}24$–26). Since practical wisdom has happiness as its defining target and teleological starting-point, it must aim to further contemplation, the leisure time required for it, and the relevant sort of completeness of life—at any rate, when circumstances permit.

When practical wisdom finds itself in such circumstances, the universal laws it must enact in its guise as politics include those pertaining to the education

of (future) citizens in the virtues of character and thought and to the various so-called external goods, such as wealth and so on, needed for virtuous activities, long life, and, indeed, for life itself (VI 13 $1145^{a}6$–11). Practical wisdom should maximize the cultivation of the character and its virtues, since "a happy life for human beings is possessed more often by those who have cultivated their character and thought to an extreme degree" (*Pol.* VII 1 $1323^{b}1$–3). As to activities, practical wisdom should aim to have us spend the greatest possible amount of time on the leisured ones, and of these, contemplation in accord with theoretical wisdom, since "those to whom it more belongs to contemplate, it also more belongs to be happy, not coincidentally but rather in accord with contemplation, since this is intrinsically estimable" (*NE* X 8 $1178^{b}29$–31).

But a human being is a political animal. He needs family, friends, fellow citizens, and other external goods if he is to be able to contemplate, and cannot survive on a diet of contemplation alone, since his nature, unlike a god's, is not self-sufficient for it (X 8 $1178^{b}33$–$1179^{a}9$). Insofar as he is human, therefore, he will deliberately choose to do actions that are in accord with virtue of character. If, as may happen because of uncontrollable circumstances, such actions fail to achieve the leisure needed for contemplation, they nonetheless, as intrinsically valuable themselves, constitute a kind of happiness second in quality only to the best kind of happiness constituted by contemplation itself. The life in which it is achieved, even if no better kind of happiness is thereby furthered, is, Aristotle says, "happiest, but in a secondary way . . . since the activities in accord with it are [merely] human" (X 8 $1178^{a}9$–10).

The life consisting of unleisured practical political activity in accord with practical wisdom and the virtues of character is thus the altogether happiest one, when—because it is led in a city with the best constitution, ideally situated and provisioned with external goods—it succeeds in achieving the best kind of happiness for its possessor. This complex life—part practical, part contemplative—is the best human life that practical wisdom, which is the best kind of practical knowledge, can arrange.

How well does this conclusion fit with our own conception of happiness and happy lives? The first point to make is that our conception is unsettled and disputed. Nonetheless being happy seems to be a favorable emotional state or state of feeling of some sort. If someone emotionally endorses his life so that he is cheerful or joyful rather than sad, is engaged in it so that he is absorbed by it rather than bored or alienated, and is attuned to it so that he is relaxed rather than anxious or stressed—or is these things more than their contraries—he is happy. Perhaps those who think that *eudaimonia* is pleasure (I 4 $1095^{a}22$–23) come close to thinking of it as we think of happiness. Yet pleasure doesn't seem to be happiness, even if it is somehow involved in it. One can be unhappy even though one is regularly experiencing pleasures. An intense pleasure, such as orgasm, need not make one very happy. Being

in constant pain is not the same as being unhappy, although it can, of course, be a source of unhappiness. Those who think the *eudaimôn* life is the political life or the contemplative one seem yet further away from thinking of them as happy lives. For nothing about these lives seems to ensure that those who live them will necessarily be in a favorable emotional state—an excellent politician or philosopher can be sad, alienated, or anxious. Worthwhile lives they may be, but a life can be worthwhile without being happy.

Aristotle's own account of *eudaimonia* avoids some of these problems of its fit with happiness, in part because it intentionally incorporates elements of the other conceptions, since these—simply because of their appeal to the many or the wise—amount to *endoxa,* or reputable opinions about *eudaimonia*, which sound dialectical methodology must respect:

> Again, all the things that are looked for where *eudaimonia* is concerned apparently hold of what we have said it is. For to some it seems to be virtue, to others practical wisdom, to others some sort of theoretical wisdom, while to others it seems to be these, or one of these, involving pleasure or not without pleasure. Other people include external prosperity as well. Some of these views are held by many and are of long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong, but rather that they are right on one point at least or even on most of them. (I 8 $1098^{b}22$–29)

As a result Aristotle sees as an important point in favor of his account of *eudaimonia* as activity in accord with the best and most complete virtue, that it makes pleasure intrinsic to the *eudaimôn* life:

> The things that are pleasant to ordinary people, however, are in conflict because they are not naturally pleasant, whereas the things pleasant to lovers of what is noble *are* naturally pleasant. And actions in accord with virtue are like this, so that they are pleasant both to such people and intrinsically.
>
> Their life, then, has no need of a pleasure that is superadded to it, like some sort of appendage, but has its pleasure within itself. (I 8 $1099^{a}11$–16)

Although he is not equally explicit that his account also incorporates such truth as there is in the view of those who make *eudaimonia* reside in honor—the virtue of character that attracts it, and the practical wisdom that goes along with it—or in theoretical wisdom, he is explicit that any adequate account would have to do so. In any case, his own two-tiered conception—consisting of the second-best sort of *eudaimonia* (activity in accord with full virtue of character) that is for the sake of the very best sort (activity in accord with theoretical wisdom)—does seem designed to meet this adequacy condition.

Because the Aristotelian *eudaimôn* life is intrinsically pleasant or enjoyable, it is plausibly seen as cheerful or joyful, especially since—as in accord with correct reason, whether deliberative or architectonic—it would seem to be reflectively endorsed by the agent in a way that these emotions evidence. For the same reason, the *eudaimôn* person seems unlikely to be bored, alienated, or anxious about living the life he has been trained and habituated to live and has chosen as best. Although *eudaimonia* is an activity, not a favorable emotional state, it wouldn't be *eudaimonia* if it did not involve such a state by being the actualization of it. In this regard, *eudaimonia* is like the simple pleasures it may at times involve—pleasant and valuable in part because evoking desire. Nonetheless, the activity itself in which *eudaimonia* consists is relatively more important than the enjoyment of it, since it is better to do the noble things that the virtuous person would do, even if it makes one sad, bored, and anxious (as might be true of the self-controlled person), than to do something else that inspires the contrary feelings (as might be true of the one who lacks self-control). For Aristotelian *eudaimonia,* the noble activity counts for more than the emotional state it evokes in the agent. That is why Aristotle cites with approval the words of Hesiod:

> Best of all is the one who understands everything himself,
> Good too is that person who is persuaded by one that has spoken well.
> But he who neither understands it himself nor listening to another
> Takes it to heart, that one is a useless man. (*NE* I 4 $1095^{b}10$–11)

Because happiness does consist in a favorable emotional state, moreover, what evokes it can vary from person to person, and—arguably—the person himself or herself is the final authority on its existence: if someone feels happy, he is happy. These, too, are important points of difference with Aristotelian *eudaimonia.* A further difference seems more important still. When we say that someone is happy, we describe his life in psychological terms. We do not in the relevant sense evaluate it. A happy life needn't be successful or accomplished or admirable. It need not amount to much. The very modest can be very happy, while the driven, the brilliant, the heroic, the creative, and even the saintly may have a much harder time of it. Children can be happy, dogs, too, it seems, but neither can be *eudaimôn.* Aristotelian *eudaimonia* has a large perfectionist element, in other words, that happiness seems to lack.

We might want to acknowledge this element by translating Aristotelian *eudaimonia* as "flourishing." But one advantage of "happiness" over these alternatives is that it highlights the importance of a favorable emotional state—of endorsement and engagement—to the *eudaimôn* life. In addition, what evokes that emotional state should be the best good for a human being—a kind of active living in accord with virtue, in which the state is realized and

expressed. So conceived, *eudaimonia* surely has a lot to recommend it as the goal of life.

When we see what Aristotle thinks *eudaimonia* consists in, however, a question arises: how seriously can we take that recommendation? Could contemplation really be happiness of the best kind? At the end of the *Ethics,* Aristotle tells us, as we saw, that we should evaluate his account by "bringing it to bear on the facts of our life, and if it is in harmony with the facts, we should accept it, but if it clashes, we should suppose it mere words" (X 8 1179^{a}20–22). But that just seems to make matters worse. For who among us lives the contemplative life or can claim on the basis of experience that it is the happiest of all? At the same time, few will want to consider the *Ethics* mere words on these grounds. They will be more inclined to turn toward the second best kind of *eudaimonia,* which consists in activity in accord with practical wisdom and the virtues of character. For them, Book VI and not Book X might reasonably be treated as the argumentative culmination of the work—the place where the account of the virtues of character is completed by the account of the correct reason with which they must be in accord. There is an important sense, then, in which practical wisdom—politics—is not simply a central topic of the *Ethics* but its most valuable legacy.

Nicomachean Ethics

Book I

I 1

Every craft and every method of inquiry and likewise |**1094a1**| every action and deliberate choice seems to seek some good.[1] That is why they correctly declare that the good is "that which all seek."[2]

A certain difference, however, appears to exist among ends.[3] For some are activities while others are works of some sort beyond the activities themselves.[4] |5| But wherever there are ends beyond the actions, in those cases, the works are naturally better than the activities. But since there are many sorts of actions and of crafts and sciences, their ends are many as well. For health is the end of medicine, a ship of shipbuilding, victory of generalship, and wealth of household management.[5]

Some of these fall under some one capacity, however, as |10| bridle making falls under horsemanship, along with all the others that produce equipment for horsemanship, and as it and every action in warfare fall under generalship, and, in the same way, others fall under different ones.[6] But in all such cases, the ends of the architectonic ones are more choiceworthy than the ends under them, since these are pursued |15| for the sake also of the former.[7] It makes no difference, though, whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves or some other thing beyond them, just as in the sciences we have mentioned.[8]

I 2

If, then, there is some end of things doable in action that we wish for because of itself, and the others because of it, and we do not choose everything because of something else (since if *that* is the case, it will go on without limit |20| so that the desire will be empty and pointless), it is clear that this will be the good—that is, the best good.[9] Hence regarding our life as well, won't knowing the good have great influence and—like archers with a target—won't we be better able to hit what we should?[10] If so, |25| we should try to grasp in outline, at least, what the good is and to which of the sciences or capacities it properly belongs.[11]

It would seem to be the one with the most control, and the most architectonic one.[12] And politics seems to be like this, since it is the one that prescribes which of the sciences need to exist in cities and

which ones each group in cities should learn and up to what point.[13] |1094ᵇ1| Indeed, we see that even the capacities that are generally most honored are under it—for example, generalship, household management, and rhetoric.[14] And since it uses the other practical sciences and, furthermore, legislates about what must be done and what avoided, |5| its end will circumscribe those of the others, so that it will be the human good.[15]

For even if the good is the same for an individual and for a city, that of a city is evidently a greater and, at any rate, a more complete good to acquire and preserve.[16] For while it should content us to acquire and preserve this for an individual alone, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation and city. And so |10| our method of inquiry seeks the good of these things, since it is a sort of politics.[17]

I 3

Our account will be adequate if its degree of perspicuity is in accord with its subject matter.[18] For we must not look for the same degree of exactness in all accounts, any more than in all products of the crafts.[19]

Noble things and just things, which are what politics investigates, admit of so much difference and |15| variability that they seem to exist by conventional law alone and not by nature.[20] Good things seem to admit of variability in the same way too, because they result in harm in many cases, since some have in fact been destroyed because of wealth, others because of courage. So it should content us, in an account that concerns and is in accord with such things, to show the truth roughly and in outline, |20| and—in an account that concerns things that hold for the most part and is in accord with them—to reach conclusions of the same sort too.[21] It is in the same way, then, that we also need to take each of the things we say. For it is characteristic of a well-educated person to look for the degree of exactness in each kind of investigation that the nature of the subject itself allows.[22] |25| For it is evident that accepting persuasive arguments from a mathematician is like demanding demonstrations from a rhetorician.[23]

But each person correctly discerns the things he knows and is a good discerner of these. Hence a person well educated in a given area is a good discerner *in that area,* while a person well educated in all areas is an unconditionally good discerner.[24] |1095ª1| That is why a young person is not a suitable audience for politics.[25] For he has no experience of the actions of life, and the accounts are in accord with these and concerned with these.[26]

Further, since he tends to follow his feelings, it will be pointless and not beneficial for him to be in the audience, since the end is not |5| knowledge but action.[27] And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or immature in character, since the deficiency is not a matter of time but is due to living and pursuing each thing in accord with his feelings. For to people like that, knowledge turns out to be profitless in just the way it does to those who lack self-control.[28] For those who form their desires and do their actions in accord with reason, however, |10| it will be of great benefit to know about these things.

So much for the prefatory remarks concerning the audience, how our discussion is to be received, and what we are proposing to do.

I 4

Let us, then, resume our account. Since every sort of knowledge and every deliberate choice reaches after some good, let us say what it is |15| politics seeks—that is, what the topmost of all the good things doable in action is.

About its name, most people are pretty much agreed, since both ordinary people and sophisticated ones say it is "happiness" and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy.[29] Concerning happiness, however, and what |20| it is, they are in dispute, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as wise ones. For ordinary people think it is one of the plainly evident things, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some taking it to be one thing, others another. And often the same person thinks it is different things, since when he gets a disease, it is health, whereas when he is poor, it is wealth. But when these people are conscious of their own ignorance |25| they are wonder-struck by those who proclaim some great thing that is over their heads. And some people did used to think that, beyond these many good things, there is another intrinsically good one that causes all of them to be good.[30]

Now it is presumably quite pointless to inquire into all these beliefs, and enough to inquire into those that are most prevalent or that seem to have some argument for them.[31]

We must not let it escape our notice, however, |30| that arguments leading from starting-points and arguments leading to starting-points are different.[32] For Plato too was rightly puzzled about this and would inquire whether the route was leading from starting-points or to starting-points—as, in a stadium racecourse, that of the athletes may lead away from the starting-point toward the boundary or in the reverse

direction. |1095b1| We must indeed start from things that are knowable. But things are knowable in two ways, since some are knowable to us, some unconditionally.[33] So presumably we should start from things knowable to us.

That is why we must be nobly brought up if, where noble things, just things, and the topics of politics as a whole are concerned, |5| we are to be an adequate audience.[34] For the starting-point is the fact that something is so, and, if this is sufficiently evident, we do not also need the explanation of why it is so.[35] A nobly brought up person, then, either has the starting-points or can easily get hold of them. And as for someone who neither has nor can get hold of them, he should listen to Hesiod:

> Best of all is the one who understands everything himself, |10|
> Good too is that person who is persuaded by one that has spoken well.
> But he who neither understands it himself nor listening to another
> Takes it to heart, that one is a useless man.[36]

I 5

But let us take up our account at the point where we digressed.[37] People seem (which is not unreasonable) to get their suppositions about the good—that is, happiness—from their lives.[38] |15| For ordinary people, the most vulgar ones, suppose it to be pleasure. And that is why the life they like is the life of indulgence. For there are three lives that stand out: the one we just mentioned, the political, and, third, the contemplative.[39]

Now ordinary people do seem wholly slavish, because the life they deliberately choose is one that is characteristic of grazing cattle. |20| They have an argument for their choice, though, because many of those in positions of authority feel the same as Sardanapalus.[40]

Sophisticated people, on the other hand, and doers of action, deliberately choose honor, since it is pretty much the end of the political life. It, however, is apparently more superficial than what we are looking for, since it seems to be in the hands of the honorers more than of the honorees, whereas |25| we have a hunch that the good is something that properly belongs to us and is difficult to take away.[41] Further, people seem to pursue honor in order to be convinced that they are good—at any rate, they seek to be honored by practically-wise people, among people who know them, and for virtue.[42] It is clear, then, that according to them, at least, virtue is better.

Maybe one might even suppose that *it* is more |30| the end of the political life than honor is. But even virtue is apparently too incomplete, since it seems possible to have virtue even while sleeping or being inactive throughout life or while suffering evils and bad luck of the worst sort. Someone who was living like *that*, however, |**1096ª1**| no one would call happy unless he was defending a thesis at all costs.[43] That is enough about these issues, since they have also been adequately discussed in the works that are in circulation.[44]

The third life is the contemplative one, which we shall undertake to investigate in what follows.

The life of a moneymaker |5| is in a way forced, and wealth is clearly not the good we are looking for, since it is useful and for the sake of something else.[45] Hence we might be more inclined to suppose that the things already mentioned are the end, since they are liked because of themselves. But they are apparently not the end either—indeed, many arguments have been presented against them. So we may set them aside.[46] |10|

I 6

But perhaps we had better investigate the universal good and go through the puzzles concerning the way in which it is said of things, even if this sort of inquiry is an uphill one because the men who introduced the forms were friends of ours.[47] Yet it would seem better, perhaps, and something we should do, at any rate when the preservation of the truth is at stake, to confute even what is properly our own, most of all because we are philosophers. |15| For while we love both our friends and the truth, it is a pious thing to accord greater honor to the truth.

Those, then, who introduced this view did not posit forms for things among which they spoke of prior and posterior, which is why they did not furnish a form of the numbers.[48] But the good is said of things in the categories of what it is, quality, and relation, and |20| what is intrinsically—that is, substance—is naturally prior to relation (for a relation would seem to be an offshoot or coincidental attribute of what is), so that there will not be some common form set over these.[49]

Further, good is said of things in as many ways as being. For it is said of things in the category of what it is (for example, the god and the understanding), in that of quality (the virtues), in that of quantity (the |25| moderate amount), in that of relation (the useful), in that of time (the opportune moment), in that of place (a livable dwelling), and so

on.[50] Thus it is clear that it will not be some common universal—that is, a "one."[51] For then it would not be said of things in all the categories but only in one.

Further, if of things that are in accord with one form there is also one science, then of all goods there would also be some one science.[52] |30| But as things stand there are many, even of goods in one category—for example, of the opportune moment (for in war it is generalship but in disease medicine) and of the moderate amount (in food it is medicine but in physical exertion athletic training).

We might also raise puzzles about what they even mean by *each-thing-itself* if indeed of both human-itself |35| and human there is a single account—namely, that |**1096ᵇ1**| of human.[53] For insofar as each is human, they will not differ at all, and neither will the corresponding "ones," insofar as each is good.

Neither will the good-itself be more of a good by being eternal, if indeed a long-lasting white thing is no whiter than an ephemeral one.

The Pythagoreans seem to have something more convincing to say |5| about this, since they place the One in the column of goods—indeed, Speusippus seems to have followed their lead.[54]

But let us leave these topics for another discussion.

A controversial point, however, does lie concealed in what we have said, because their arguments are not concerned with *every* good. Those said of things in accord with one form are those pursued and liked |10| as intrinsic goods, whereas those that tend to produce or safeguard these, or to prevent their contraries, are said to be good because of these and in a different way.[55] It is clear, then, that "good" would be said of things in two ways, that is, of some as intrinsic goods, of others as goods because of these. So let us separate off the intrinsic goods from the ones that produce a benefit, and investigate whether |15| intrinsic goods are said to be good in accord with a single form.

The intrinsic ones, though, what sorts of things should we suppose them to be? Or aren't they the ones that are pursued on their own as well, such as thinking, seeing, and certain pleasures and honors? For even if we do pursue these because of other things, we might nonetheless suppose them to belong among the intrinsic goods. Or does nothing else belong there except the form? In that case, the form will be pointless.[56] |20| But if these other things belong among the intrinsic ones, the same account of the goodwill have to show up in all of them, just as that of whiteness does in snow and white lead. In fact, though, the accounts of honor, practical wisdom, and pleasure differ and are at variance regarding the very way in which they are goods.

Hence the good is not something common and in accord with a single |25| form.

But how, then, is it said of things? For at least it does not seem to be a case of homonymy resulting from luck.[57] Is it, then, that all goods at least derive from or are related to a single thing? Or is it more a matter of analogy? For as sight is in the case of body, so understanding is in the case of soul, and so on for other things in other cases.[58]

But perhaps we should leave these questions aside for now, since an exact treatment of them more properly belongs to a different branch of philosophy.[59] |30| Similarly in the case of the form. For even if there is some single good predicated in common of all intrinsic goods, a separable one that is itself an intrinsic good, it is clear that it would not be doable in action or acquirable by a human being.[60] But that is the sort that is being looked for.

Maybe someone might think it better to get to know |35| the form in connection with the goods that *are* acquirable and doable in action. |**1097ª1**| For they might think that by having it as a paradigm, we shall also better know those things that are good for us and—knowing them—aim at and hit them. This argument certainly has some plausibility but it seems to clash with the sciences. For each of these, though it seeks some good and looks for how to supply whatever is lacking, |5| leaves aside knowledge of the form. And yet for all craftsmen not to know—and not even to look for—so important an aid would hardly be reasonable.

There is a puzzle too about how a weaver or a carpenter will benefit, as regards his own craft, from knowing the good-itself or how anyone will be a better doctor or a better general from having seen the form-itself. |10| For the doctor does not even seem to investigate health in that way but, rather, human health, or perhaps, rather, the health of this human being, since it is the particular human being that he treats.

So much, then, for these topics.

I 7

Let us return to the good we are looking for and |15| what it could possibly be. For it is apparently different in different actions and different crafts, since it is one thing in medicine, a different one in generalship, and likewise for the rest. What, then, is the good characteristic of each? Or isn't it the thing for whose sake the rest of the actions are done? In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in building a house, and in other crafts something else, and in |20| every action and deliberate choice it is the end, since it is for the sake of the end that everyone does

the rest of the actions. So if there is some end of all the things doable in action, this will be the good doable in action, and if there are more than one, it will be these.

Taking a different course, then, our account has reached the same conclusion.[61] But we should try to make this yet more perspicuous.

Since there are evidently many |25| ends, and we choose some of them because of something else, as we do wealth, flutes, and instruments generally, it is clear that not all ends are complete. But the best one is apparently something complete.[62] So if one thing alone is complete, this will be what we are looking for, but if there are more, it will be the most complete of them.

We say that |30| what is intrinsically worth pursuing is more complete than what is worth pursuing because of something else, that what is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than things that are both intrinsically choiceworthy and choiceworthy because of it, and that what is unconditionally complete, then, is what is always intrinsically choiceworthy and never choiceworthy because of something else.

Happiness seems to be most like this, since *it* we always choose because of itself and never because of something else. |**1097ᵇ1**| But honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue, though we do choose them because of themselves as well (since if they had no further consequences, we would still take each of them), we also choose for the sake of happiness, supposing that because of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, |5| no one chooses for the sake of these things or because of anything else in general.

The same conclusion also apparently follows from self-sufficiency, since the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. By "self-sufficient," however, we mean not self-sufficient for someone who is alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, |10| since a human being is by nature political.[63] Of these, some defining mark must be found, since, if we extend the list to ancestors and descendants and to friends' friends, it will go on without limit.[64] But we must investigate this on another occasion. In any case, we posit that what is self-sufficient is what, on its own, makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing, and this, |15| we think, is what happiness is like.

Further, we think it is the most choiceworthy of all things, when not counted among them—for if it is counted among them, it clearly would be more choiceworthy with the addition of the least of goods. For what is added would bring about a superabundance of goods, and of goods, the greater one is always more choiceworthy.[65]

Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient, |20| since it is the end of what is doable in action.

But to say that happiness is the best good is perhaps to say something that is apparently commonplace, and we still need a clearer statement of what it is. Maybe, then, this would come about if the function of a human being were grasped.[66] For just as for a flute player, a sculptor, |25| every craftsman, and in general for whatever has some function and action, the good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function, the same also seems to hold of a human being, if indeed there is some function that is his.

So are there some functions and actions of a carpenter and of a shoemaker but none at all of a human being? And is he by nature inactive? Or, rather, just as of eye, |30| hand, foot, and of each part generally there seems to be some function, may we likewise also posit some function of a human being that is beyond all these?[67]

What, then, could this be? For living is evidently shared with plants as well, but we are looking for what is special.[68] Hence we must set aside the living that consists in nutrition and growth. Next in order |**1098ª1**| is some sort of perceptual living.[69] But this too is evidently shared with horse and ox and every animal.

There remains, then, some sort of practical living of the part that has reason. And of what has reason, one part has it by dint of obeying reason, the other by dint of actually having it and exercising thought.[70] But "living" is said of things in two ways, |5| and we must take the one in accord with activity, since it seems to be called "living" in a fuller sense.[71]

If, then, the function of a human being is activity of the soul in accord with reason or not without reason, and the function of a sort of thing, we say, is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (as in the case of a lyre player and an excellent lyre player), and this is unconditionally so in all cases when we add to the function |10| the superiority that is in accord with the virtue (for it is characteristic of a lyre player to play the lyre and of an excellent one to do it well)—if all this is so, and a human being's function is supposed to be a sort of living, and this living is supposed to be activity of the soul and actions that involve reason, and it is characteristic of an excellent man to do these well and nobly, and each is completed well when it is in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it |15|—if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete.[72] Furthermore, in a complete life, for one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day.[73] Nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make someone blessed and happy.[74]

10

Let the good, then, be sketched |20| in this way, since perhaps we should outline first and fill in the details later. It would seem, though, that anyone can develop and articulate the things in the outline that have been correctly done, and that time is a good discoverer and co-worker in such matters. This is even the source of advances in the crafts, since anyone can produce what is lacking.[75] |25|

We must also remember what was said before and not look for the same exactness in everything but, in each case, the one that is in accord with the subject matter and the degree sought by the method of inquiry that properly belongs to it.[76] For a carpenter and a geometer inquire differently about the right angle. A carpenter does so to the degree that is useful |30| for his work, whereas a geometer inquires about what it is or what sort of thing, since he is a contemplator of the truth.[77] We must do things in just the same way, then, in other cases, so that side issues do not overwhelm the works themselves.[78]

Nor should we demand the cause in all cases alike.[79] Rather, in some cases it will be adequate |**1098ᵇ1**| if the fact that they are so has been correctly shown—as it is indeed where starting-points are concerned.[80] And the fact that something is so is a first thing and a starting-point.[81]

We get a theoretical grasp of some starting-points through induction, some through perception, some through some sort of habituation, and others through other means.[82] In each case we should follow the method of inquiry suited to their nature and make very serious efforts |5| to define them correctly. For they are of great and decisive importance regarding what follows. It seems indeed that the starting-point is more than half the whole and that many of the things we were inquiring about will at the same time become evident through it.

I 8

We must investigate it, however, not only in accord with the conclusions and premises of our argument but also in accord with the things we say |10| about it.[83] For all the data are in tune with a true view, whereas they soon clash with a false one.[84]

Goods, then, have been divided into three sorts, with some said to be external, some relating to the soul, and some to the body.[85] The goods relating to soul are most fully such, and, we say, are goods to the highest degree, and we take the actions and activities of the |15| soul to be goods relating to soul.[86] So what we have said is correct, according to this view at least, which is long standing and agreed to by philosophers.[87]

It is correct even in saying that actions and activities of some sort are the end, since that way the end turns out to be one of the goods relating to soul, and not one of the external ones.

The saying that someone who is happy |20| both lives well and does well is in tune with our argument too, since happiness has been pretty much defined as a sort of living well and doing well.

Again, all the things that are looked for where happiness is concerned apparently hold of what we have said it is. For to some it seems to be virtue, to others practical wisdom, to others some sort of theoretical wisdom, while to others it seems to be these or one of these involving pleasure or not without pleasure. |25| Other people include external prosperity as well. Some of these views are held by many and are long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong but, rather, that they are right on one point at least or even on most of them.[88]

Now with those who say that happiness is virtue or some sort of virtue, our argument is in tune, |30| since activity in accord with virtue is characteristic of that virtue.[89] But it makes no small difference, presumably, whether we suppose the best good to consist in virtue's possession or in its use—that is, in the state or in the activity.[90] For it is possible for someone to possess the state while accomplishing nothing good—for example, if he is sleeping |**1099ª1**| or out of action in some other way. But the same will not hold of the activity, since he will necessarily be doing an action and doing it well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the noblest and strongest who get the victory crown but the competitors (since it is among these that the ones who win are found), so also |5| among the noble and good aspects of life it is those who act correctly who win the prizes.

Further, their life is intrinsically pleasant. For being pleased is among the things that belong to soul, and to each person what is pleasant is that thing by reference to which he is said to be a lover of such things—as, for example, a horse in the case of a lover of horses, and a play in that of a lover of plays. In the same way, just things |10| are pleasant to a lover of justice and the things in accord with virtue as a whole are pleasant to a lover of virtue.

The things that are pleasant to ordinary people, however, are in conflict because they are not naturally pleasant, whereas the things pleasant to lovers of what is noble are naturally pleasant. And actions in accord with virtue are like this, so that they are pleasant both to such people and intrinsically.

Their life, then, has no need of a pleasure that is superadded to it, |15| like some sort of appendage, but has its pleasure within itself. For besides what we have already said, the person who does not enjoy doing noble

actions is not good. For no one would call a person just who did not enjoy doing just actions, or generous if he did not enjoy doing generous ones, and similarly as regards the others. |20|

If that is so, however, actions in accord with virtue will be intrinsically pleasant. But they are also good, of course, and noble as well. Further, they are each of these things to the highest degree, if indeed an excellent person discerns them correctly—and he does discern them that way.[91]

Hence happiness is what is best, noblest, and most pleasant. And these qualities are not distinguished in the way |25| the Delian inscription says:

> The noblest thing is the most just; the best, to be healthy.
> The most pleasant, however, is to get the thing we desire.

For the best activities possess them all.[92] And it is these—or the one among them that is best—that we say is happiness. |30|

All the same, it apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said, since it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies.[93] For just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political |1099b1| power. Then again there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding, good children, and noble looks.[94] For we scarcely have the stamp of happiness if we are extremely ugly in appearance, ill-bred, living a solitary life, or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad or |5| were good but have died.

Just as we said, then, happiness does seem to need this sort of prosperity to be added.[95] That is what leads some to identify good luck with happiness and others to identify virtue with happiness.[96]

I 9

It is also what leads people to puzzle about whether happiness is something acquirable by learning or by habituation or by some other sort of training, or whether it comes about in accord with some divine dispensation or even by luck.[97] |10|

Well, if anything is a gift from the gods to human beings, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is also god given—especially since it is the best of human goods. Perhaps this topic properly belongs more to a different investigation, yet even if happiness is not a godsend but comes about through virtue and some sort of learning or |15| training, it is evidently one of the most divine things, since virtue's prize and end

is evidently something divine and blessed.[98] At the same time, it would also be something widely shared, since it is possible for it to be acquired through some sort of learning or supervision by all those not disabled in relation to virtue.[99]

If it is better to acquire it in that way than to be happy by luck, |20| however, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how we do acquire it, if indeed what is in accord with nature is by nature in the noblest possible condition. Similarly with what is in accord with craft or with any cause whatsoever—above all, what is in accord with the best one. To entrust what is greatest and noblest to luck would strike a very false note.

The answer we are looking for is also entirely evident from our argument. |25| For we have said that happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue, while of the remaining goods, some are necessary conditions of it, others are by nature co-workers and useful as instruments. This also would agree with what we said at the start.[100] For we took the end of politics to be the best end. And its supervision aims above all at producing |30| citizens of a certain sort—that is, good people and doers of noble actions.[101]

It makes perfect sense, then, that we do not say that an ox, a horse, or any other animal whatsoever is happy, since none of them can share in this sort of activity. This is the |**1100ª1**| explanation of why a child is not happy either, since he is not yet a doer of such actions because of his age. Children who are said to be blessed are being called blessed because of their prospects, since for happiness there must be, as we said, both complete virtue and a complete life.[102] For many reversals of fortune |5| and all sorts of lucky accidents occur in life, and the most prosperous may meet with great disasters in old age—just as is said of Priam in the story of the events at Troy.[103] And no one counts someone happy who has suffered strokes of luck like that and dies in a wretched way.[104]

I 10

Are we then to count no other human being happy either, |10| as long as he is still living but—in accord with Solon's advice—must we see the end?[105] And if we are indeed to accept his view, is it really that someone is happy only when he *is* dead? Or is that, at any rate, a completely strange notion—most of all for those who say, as we do, that happiness is a sort of activity?

Even if we do not say that the dead are happy, however—and this is not what Solon means either, |15| but only that when a human being has died it will at that point be safe to call him blessed (since he is then

outside the reach of bad things and misfortunes)—that is also something we might dispute to some extent. For to some extent it does seem that something may prove good or bad for someone who is dead, if indeed there are also good or bad things for someone who is living but not actively perceiving them—for example, honor and dishonor, and children |20| or descendants generally who do well or who suffer misfortunes.

But this also raises a puzzle. For it is possible for many reversals of fortune involving his descendants to befall someone who has lived a blessed life until old age and died accordingly. Some of his descendants may be good people and get the life they deserve while to others the contrary may happen. |25| And it is clear that the degree of separation between them and their ancestors admits of all sorts of variation. But it would be strange, surely, if the dead person changed along with them and was happy at one time and wretched at another. Yet it would also be strange if what happens to descendants did not affect their ancestors to any extent or for any period of time. |30|

But we should go back to the first puzzle. For maybe from it we will also be able to get a theoretical grasp on what we are now inquiring about. Suppose that we must wait to see the end in each case and at that point call someone blessed—not as then being blessed but because he was so before. Would it not be strange, then, if when he is happy, we cannot truly attribute to him what he actually possesses, because of our not |35| wishing to call the living happy because of reversals of fortune, |**1100ᵇ1**| and because we suppose that happiness is something steadfast and in no way easy to reverse, whereas the same person's luck often turns completely around? For it is clear that if we were to be guided by luck, we would often have to say that the same person is happy and then wretched turn and turn about, |5| thereby representing the happy person as a sort of chameleon and as someone with unsound foundations.[106]

Or is it that to be guided by luck is not at all correct? For it is not in *it* that living well and living badly are to be found but, rather, a human life needs this to be added, as we said, whereas it is activities in accord with virtue that control happiness and the |10| contrary ones its contrary.[107] The puzzle we are now going through further testifies to our argument for this. For none of the functions of human beings are as stable as those concerned with activities in accord with virtue, since they seem to be more steadfast even than our knowledge of the sciences. And of these sciences themselves, the most estimable are more steadfast, because the blessed |15| live most of all and most continuously in accord with them.[108] This would seem to be the cause, indeed, of why forgetfulness does not occur where they are concerned.[109]

What we are inquiring about, then, will be characteristic of the happy person, and throughout life he will be as we say. For he will always or more than anyone else do actions and get a theoretical grasp on things in accord with virtue, and will bear what luck brings in the noblest way and, in every case, |20| in the most suitable one, since he is "good, four-square, beyond blame."[110]

Many things happen in accord with luck, however, that differ in greatness and smallness. But small strokes of good luck or similarly of the opposite clearly will not have a strong influence on his way of living, whereas great and repeated ones, when |25| good, will make his life more blessed, since by nature they help to adorn it, and his use of them is noble and excellent. If they turn out the reverse, though, they reduce or spoil his blessedness, since they involve pain and impede many activities. All the same, even in these cases nobility shines through |30| when someone calmly bears repeated strokes of great bad luck—not because he is insensitive to suffering but because of being well bred and great-souled.

If, however, it is activities that control living, as we said, no blessed person will ever become wretched, since he will never do hateful or base actions.[111] For a truly |35| good and practically-wise person, we think, will bear what luck brings graciously |**1101ª1**| and, making use of the resources at hand, will always do the noblest actions, just as a good general makes the best uses in warfare of the army he has and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides he has been given, and the same way |5| with all other craftsmen.

If this is so, however, a happy person will never become wretched—nor *blessed* certainly—if he runs up against luck like Priam's. He will not, then, be variable or easily subject to reversals of fortune, since he will not be easily shaken from his happiness by just any misfortunes[112] that chance to come along but only by great |10| and repeated ones. And from these he will not return to being happy again in a short time but—if indeed he does do so—in a long and complete one in which he achieves great and noble things.

What, then, prevents us from calling happy the person who is active in accord with complete virtue and is adequately supplied with external goods |15| not for some random period of time but in a complete life? Or must we add that he will continue living like that and will die accordingly, since the future is obscure to us and we suppose happiness to be an end and complete in every way? If so, we shall call "blessed" those living people who have and will continue to have the things we mentioned—blessed, |20| though, in the way human beings are.[113]

So much for our determinations on these topics.

I 11

The view that the luck of someone's descendants and all his friends have not the slightest effect on him is evidently a view too inimical to friendship and one that is contrary to the beliefs held on the subject.[114] But since the things that happen are many and admit of all sorts of differences, and some of them get through to us more and |25| others less, it is evidently a long—even endless—task to distinguish all the particular cases, and it will perhaps be enough to speak about the matter in universal terms and in outline.

If, then, of even the misfortunes that affect the person himself, some have a certain weight and a strong influence as regards his life, whereas others seem to have a lighter one, the same also holds for what affects all his friends. |30| And for each incident, it makes a difference whether it involves the living or the dead—much more than whether the unlawful and terrible deeds in tragedies have happened beforehand or are enacted on the stage.

Our deductive argument, then, must also take account of this difference, but even more account, perhaps, of the results of going through the puzzles about whether the dead share in any good thing |35| or in any of the opposite ones.[115] For it seems likely from these considerations that even if |**1101ᵇ1**| anything at all does get through to them, whether good or the opposite, it is something feeble and small, either unconditionally so or so for them. Or if it is not like that, it is of a size and sort, at any rate, that does not make happy those who are not happy or take away the blessedness of those who are. It does, then, contribute |5| something to the dead, apparently, when their friends do well and similarly when they do badly, but something of such a sort and size that it neither makes the happy ones unhappy nor does anything else of this sort.

I 12

Having made these determinations, let us investigate whether happiness |10| is included among praiseworthy things or, rather, among estimable ones, since it is clear at least that it is not included among capacities.[116]

Well, apparently all the things that are praiseworthy are praised for being of a certain quality and for standing in a certain relation to something. For we praise the just person and the courageous one—in fact, the good person and his virtue generally—because of his actions and his |15| works, also the strong person and the good runner, and so on in

each of the other cases, because he is naturally of a certain quality and stands in a certain relation to something good or excellent.[117] This is also clear from awards of praise involving the gods. For these are evidently ridiculous if it is by reference to us that they are awarded. But this happens because awards of praise involve |20| such a reference, as we just said.[118]

If praise is of things like this, it is clear that of the best things there is no praise but something greater and better—as is in fact evident. For we call the gods both blessed and happy and call the most divine of men this as well. Similarly in the case of goods too. For we never |25| praise happiness as we praise justice, but call it blessed since it is a more divine and better thing.[119]

It seems, in fact, that Eudoxus advocated in the correct way the cause of pleasure in the competition for supreme excellence.[120] For not to praise pleasure, while including it among the goods, is to reveal, he thought, that it is better than things that are praised, in the way that the god and the good are, |30| since it is to these that the others are referred.[121]

For praise is properly given to virtue, since we are doers of noble actions as a result of it, whereas encomia are properly given to its works, in like manner both to those of the body and those of the soul.[122] But perhaps an exact treatment of these topics more properly belongs to those who work on encomia. It is clear to us from what |35| we have said, however, that happiness is included among things both estimable and complete. |**1102ª1**|

This also seems to hold because happiness is a starting-point, since it is for the sake of it that we all do all the other actions that we do, and we suppose that the starting-point and cause of what is good is something estimable and divine.[123]

I 13

Since happiness is some activity of the soul in accord with |5| complete virtue, we must investigate virtue, since maybe that way we will also get a better theoretical grasp on happiness. It seems too that someone who is truly a politician will have worked most on virtue, since he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.[124] A paradigm case is provided by the Cretan |10| and Spartan legislators and by any others there may have been that are like them.[125] If this investigation belongs to politics, however, it is clear that our present inquiry will be in accord with the deliberate choice we made at the start.[126]

It is also clear that the virtue we must investigate is human virtue. For it is in fact the human good we are looking for, and human happiness. |15| By "human virtue," though, we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness, we say, is an activity of the soul. But if all this is so, it is clear that a politician must in a way know about what pertains to the soul, just as someone who is going to take care of people's eyes must know about the body generally—more so, indeed, to the extent that politics is more estimable |20| and better than medicine—and that doctors (the ones who are more sophisticated) occupy themselves greatly with knowing about the body.[127] It is also for a politician, then, to get a theoretical grasp on what concerns the soul. But his theoretical grasp should be for the sake of the things in question and of an extent that is adequate to the things being looked for, since a more exact treatment is perhaps harder work than |25| the topics before us require.

Enough has been said about some aspects of the soul in the external accounts too, and we should make use of these—for example, that one part of the soul is nonrational whereas another part has reason.[128] Whether these are distinguished like the parts of the body or like anything else that is divisible or whether they are two in definition but inseparable by nature (like |30| convex and concave in a curved surface) makes no difference for present purposes.[129]

Of the nonrational part, one part seems to be shared and vegetative—I mean, the cause of nutrition and growth. For this sort of capacity of soul is one that we suppose is present in all things that take in nourishment, even embryos, and that this same one |**1102ᵇ1**| is also present in completely grown animals, since that is more reasonable than to suppose a different one to be present in them.

Hence the virtue of this capacity is apparently something shared and not distinctively human. For this part and this capacity seem to be most active in sleep, and a good person and a bad one are least clearly distinguished during |5| sleep (leading people to say that the happy are no different from the wretched for half their lives, which makes perfect sense, since sleep is idleness of the soul in that respect with reference to which it is said to be excellent or base), unless—to some small extent—some movements do get through to us and, in this way, the things that appear in the dreams of decent people are better than those of any |10| random person.[130] But that is enough about these things, and we should leave the nutritive part aside, since by nature it has no share in human virtue.[131]

Another natural constituent of the soul, however, also seems to be nonrational, although it shares in reason in a way. For we praise the reason—that is, the part of the soul that has reason—of a person with

self-control and of a person without it, since |15| it exhorts them correctly toward what is best. But they also have by nature something else within them besides reason, apparently, which fights against reason and resists it. For exactly as with paralyzed limbs (when their owners deliberately choose to move them to the right, they do the contrary and move off to the left), so it is in the case of the soul as well, |20| since the impulses of people who lack self-control are in contrary directions. In the case of the body, to be sure, we see the part that is moving in the wrong direction, whereas in the case of the soul we do not see it. But presumably we should nonetheless acknowledge that in the soul as well there is something besides reason, countering it and going against it. How it is different, though, is not important.

But this part |25| apparently also has a share of reason, as we said, at any rate, it is obedient to the reason of a self-controlled person.[132] Furthermore, that of a temperate and courageous person, presumably, listens still better, since there it chimes with reason in everything.

Apparently, then, the nonrational part is also twofold, since the vegetative part does not share in reason in any way but the appetitive part (indeed, the desiring part as a whole) does so |30| in some way, because it is able to listen to reason and obey it.[133] It has reason, then, in the way we are said to have the reason of our fathers and friends and not in the way we are said to have that of mathematics.[134] The fact, though, that the nonrational part is persuaded in some way by reason is revealed by the practice of warning people and of all the different practices of admonishing and exhorting them.

If we should say that it too has reason, |**1103ª1**| however, then the part that has reason will be double as well—one part having it fully and within itself, the other as something able to listen to it as to a father.

Virtues are also defined in accord with this difference, since we say that some are of thought, others of character. Theoretical wisdom, comprehension, |5| and practical wisdom are virtues of thought; generosity and temperance virtues of character.[135] For when we talk about someone's character we do not say that he is theoretically-wise or has comprehension but that he is mild-mannered or temperate. But we do also praise a theoretically-wise person with reference to his state, and—among the states—it is the praiseworthy ones that we call virtues. |10|

|5| be concerned with these, since whether someone enjoys or is pained well or badly makes no small difference in his actions.

Further, it is more difficult to fight against pleasure than to fight against spirit, just as Heraclitus says, and both craft and virtue are always concerned with what is more difficult, since to do well what is more difficult is in fact a better thing.[161] So that is also why |10| our entire work, both as a contribution to virtue and as a contribution to politics, must be concerned with pleasures and pains, since someone who uses these well will be good and someone who uses them badly will be bad.

Let us say, then, that virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, that the things from which it comes about are also the ones by which it is increased and (if they come about differently) ruined, and that the things from which |15| it has come about are also the ones concerning which it is active.

II 4

Someone might raise a puzzle, however, about how we can claim that people must do just actions to become just, and temperate ones to become temperate. For if people are doing what is just or temperate, they are already just and temperate, in the same way that if they are doing what is grammatical |20| or musical, they already know grammar or music.

Or doesn't that hold in the case of the crafts either? For it is possible to produce something grammatical either by luck or on someone else's instruction. Someone would be a grammarian, then, if he produced something grammatical and produced it in the way a grammarian would. And this is to do it in accord with the craft knowledge of grammar that is internal to himself. |25|

Further, the case of crafts is *not* similar to that of virtues. For the things that come about by means of the crafts have their goodness internal to them, and thus it is enough if they come about in such a way as to be in a certain state. The things that come about in accord with the virtues, by contrast, are done justly or temperately not simply if they are in a certain state but if the one who does them |30| is also in a certain state. First, if he does them knowingly; second, if he deliberately chooses them and deliberately chooses them because of themselves; and third, if he does them from a stable and unchangeable state.[162]

Where the various crafts are concerned, these factors do not count, except |**1105ᵇ1**| for the knowing itself. Where the virtues are concerned, however, knowing has little or no strength, whereas the other factors

143a25 [s. tending in the same direction], b24, 26 [resulting from a s. vs. producing it], 144a29 [the s. pertaining to this eye of the soul], b9 [natural s.], 13, 22, 25, 27 [s. in accord with vs. state involving], 145a25, 26 [s. more estimable than virtue], b1, 146a14, 149b19 [beast-like s.], 150a15, 151a28, b29, 152a26, 35, b28, 34+ [restorations to our n. state], 153a15 [activity of a natural s.], 21 [no s. is impeded by the pleasure specific to it], b10, 29 [best s.], 154a13 [of some s. and processes there cannot be an excess that is better], 34 [being in the good s. is better that coming to be in it], 157b6+ [some people are called good with regard to a s., others with regard to an activity], 9+ [friendship seems to be a s.], 157b31 [deliberate choice stems from a s.], 174b32 [a s. completes an activity by being present in something], 176a34 [happiness is not a s.], b26 [the s. that properly belongs to someone], 181b5, 10

State, bad (*kachexia*), 129a20, 22

State, good (*euexia*), 119a16, 129a19+

Statue (*agalma*), 175a24. *See also* sculptor

Steadfast (*monimos*), 100b2, 14, 15, 156b12 [virtue is s.], 18, 158b9, 22, 159b1, 4, 164a11

Stone (*lithos*), **103a20**, 111a13, 114a17, 137b31, 174a23

Straight, straightaway, by their very nature (*euthus*), 103b24, 104b10 [habituation s. from childhood makes all the difference], 107a9 [names of some actions by their very nature connote baseness], 137b19 [practical subject matter of ethics by their very nature hold for the most part], 140b17 [when someone is corrupted by vice, s. the starting-point of things doable in action does not appear as such], 144b6 [disposed to virtue s. from birth], 161b25, 162a22, 165b17

Strange (*atopos*), 110a13, 26, 29, 34, 111a29, b3, 119a4, 136a12, 21, 137b3, 147a9, 149a15 [s. sexual pleasure], 165a12, b2, 21, 169b8, 16, 175b34, 176b28, 178a3, b14, 179a15

Stranger (*othneios*), 126b27, 160a6, 162a8 [friendship of s.], 32, 165b34, 169b12, 21

Strength (*ischus*), 99a4, 101b16, 104a14+, 30, 33, 105b2 [where the virtues are concerned knowing has little or no s.], 116b15, 124b23, 128b28, 140a28, 141a20, 145b36 [s. supposition], 146a3 [s. appetites], 6 [very s.], 10, 148a22 [s. pain], 150b7 [s. or excessive pleasures and pains], 154b14 [pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure and by any random one, provided it is a s. one], 179b8 [s. of arguments], b24 [argument and teaching do not have s. in everyone], 180a18+ [s. of understanding and constitutional arrangement], b4 [laws and habits have s. in cities]

Strife (*eris*), 155b6

Strike back (*antiplêgênai*), 132b29

Strong, too (*agan*), 146a12

Stubborn people (*ischurognômones*), 151b5, 12

Stumbler (*prosptaisas*), 138b4

Stupid, be (*môrainein*), 148b2

Stupid people (*axunetoi*), 151a9

Substance, essence (*ousia*), **96a21**, **107a6**, **120a1** [= wealth], 2, b7+, 119a18, 121a18, 165b20

Sudden, suddenly (*ta exaiphnês*), 111b9, 117a22

Suffer (*algein*), 113b28, 117a5, 166b20

Suffer together with, share sufferings (*sunalgein*), 166^{a}7, 27, ^{b}18, 171^{a}7, 30, 32, ^{b}11
Suffering (*kakopathein*) 96^{a}1, 176^{b}29
Suitable (*emmelês*), 100^{b}21, 122^{a}35, 124^{a}31, 127^{b}8, 128^{a}1, 9, 170^{b}21
Suits, what (*to prosophoron*), 180^{b}12
Superficial, prevalent (*epipolaios*), 95^{b}24 [honor too s. to be happiness], 167^{a}3
Superfluous (*periergos*), 170^{b}27
Superiority (*huperochê*), 98^{a}11, 124^{a}22, 133^{a}21, ^{b}2, 161^{a}12, 20, 164^{b}4
Superiority, in accord with (*kath' huperochên*), 158^{b}12, 24, 162^{a}36, 163^{a}24
Supervision, supervise, take care of (*epimeleia*), 99^{b}20, 30, 114^{a}3, 4, 121^{b}12, 138^{b}26, 161^{a}13, 167^{b}22, 179^{a}24, 28, 180^{a}1, 25, 29, 34, ^{b}8, 13, 17
Supplied with (*kechorêgêmenos*), 101^{a}15 [adequately s. external goods], 177^{a}30 [s. with the things necessary for living], 179^{a}11 [moderately s. external goods]
Supplies (*chorêgia*), 99^{a}33 [without s.], 178^{a}24 [theoretical wisdom has little need for external s.]
Supposition (*hupolêpsis*), **139^{b}17**, 140^{b}13 [what is pleasant or painful does not corrupt or distort every sort of s.], 31 [scientific knowledge is s. about universals], 145^{b}36 [strong s.], 146^{b}28 [act contrary to their s.], 147^{b}4 [universal s.]
Surgery (*tomê*), 137^{a}15
Surpassed, easily (*euuperblêton*), 123^{a}17
Sweet (*gluku*), 113^{a}28, 147^{a}29, 31, 154^{b}29, 173^{b}24, 176^{a}12
Sweets in theaters, eat (*tragêmatizein*), 175^{b}12
Sympathetic consideration (*suggnômê*), VI 11 and 109^{b}32, 110^{a}24, 111^{a}2, 126^{a}3, 136^{a}5+, 146^{a}2, 3, 149^{b}4, 150^{b}8
System, complex (*sustêma*), 168^{b}32

Table of opposites, **96^{b}6**
Target (*skopos*), **94^{a}24** [like archers with a t.], 106^{b}32 [it is easy to miss the t. but difficult to hit it], 119^{b}16 [in a temperate person, the t. of both appetite and reason is what is noble], 138^{b}22 [there is some t. on which a possessor of the correct reason keeps his eye as he tightens or loosens], 144^{a}8 [virtue makes the t. correct], 25 [cleverness is able to do the things and to hit upon them that further hitting a proposed t.], 26
Taste (*geusis*), **118^{a}26**, 148^{a}9, 150^{a}9, 176^{a}1
Tastelessness (*apeirokalia*), 107^{b}19, 122^{a}31
Teach, teacher, teaching (*didaskalia*), **103^{a}15** [virtue of thought results from t-ing], ^{b}12, 139^{b}25 [all scientific knowledge seems to be t-able], 26 [it is from things already known that all t. proceeds], 151^{a}17 [reason does not t. starting-points], 179^{b}21 [nature, habit, t-ing], 23 [argument and t-ing do not have strength in everyone], 180^{a}35 [sophists profess to t. politics], 181^{a}13 [sophists are a long way from t-ing politics]
Tearing asunder (*diaspônta*), 166^{b}22
Temperance (*sôphrosunê*), III 10–12 and 103^{a}6, 104^{a}19, 25, 107^{b}5, 109^{a}3, 19, 140^{b}11, 147^{b}28, 148^{b}12, 149^{a}22, ^{b}30, 151^{b}31; people disposed to t. (*sôphronikoi*), 144^{b}5
Temperate person (*sôphrôn*), III 10–12 and 102^{b}27 [in a t. the nonrational part chimes with reason in everything], 103^{a}8, ^{b}1, 19, 104^{a}34, ^{b}6 [someone who abstains from

bodily pleasures and enjoys doing just this is t.], 105a18+, 108b20, 119b24, 123b5, 125b13, 129b21, 145b14, 15, 146a11, 12, 148a6, 14, 149b31, 150a23, 151a19, b34, 152a1, 152b15, 153a27+, 177a31, 178a33, b15
Temperately (*sôphronôs*), 105a30, 179a12, b33; act t. (*sôphronein*), 172b25, 173a22
Temple (*hieron*), 122a6, 123a10
Temple (*naos*), 174a24, 25
Tense, inclined to be (*suntonos*), 125a15
Term (*horos*), 131b5+, 142a26 [the t. for which there is no reason], 143a36 [the primary t. and the things that come last], b2 [the unchanging and primary t.]. *See also* defining-mark
Terms, on specified (*epi rhêtois*), 162b26, 31, 163a5
Terrible (*deinos*), 101a33, 103b16, 110a27, 115a26, 166b12. *See also* clever, cleverness
Test, testing (*dokimasia*), 118a28 [t. wines], 157a22, 162a14
Textbooks (*suggrammata*), 181b2 [it is evident that we do not become doctors from reading t.]
Thales of Miletus, **141b4**
Theft (*klopê*), 107a11, 131a6
Theodectes, **150b9**
Theognis of Megara, **129b29–30** [quoted], 170a12, 179b6 [quoted]
Theoretical grasp, theoretical, theory, contemplate (*theôria*), **95b19**, [c. life], 96a4, 31 [c. of truth], **98b3** [we get a t. of some starting-points by means of induction, some by means of perception, some by means of some sort of habituation, and others by other means], 100a31 [t. of whether we should call no one happy until he is dead], b19 [t. that is in accord with virtue], 102a7 [we must investigate virtue, since maybe that way we will also get a better t. on happiness], 23 [a politician must get a t. on what concerns the soul], 103b26 [the present work is not undertaken for the sake of t. knowledge], 104a11 [we must get a t. on the fact that states like these are naturally ruined by deficiency and excess], 106a25 [t. on the sort of nature that virtue has], 122a35 [a magnificent person is like someone with scientific knowledge, since he is able to get a t. on what is appropriate], b17 [wondrous to c.], 139a7 [t. on those among the beings whose starting-points do not admit of being otherwise], 27 [thought that is t.], b22 [in the case of things that do admit of being otherwise, whenever they fall outside our t., it escapes notice whether they hold or not], 140a11 [every craft is concerned with getting a t. on how something may come to be that admits of being and of not being], 140a24 [get a t. on what sort of person we say is practically-wise], 140b9 [we think Pericles and people of that sort to be practically-wise because they have a t. on what is good for themselves and for human beings], 141a25 [the one that has a t. on of the good of a given sort of being], 143b19 [t. of things from which a human being will come to be happy], 146b14 [t. investigation], 149a25 [t. on the fact that spirit's lack of self-control is less shameful than that of the appetites], 152b1 [it belongs to a political philosopher to have a t. on pleasure and pain], 177a32 [a theoretically-wise person, even when by himself, is able to

c.], 180^{b}21 [a person who wishes to become expert in a t. science should proceed to the universal], 181^{b}8 [collections of laws and constitutions are of good use to people who are able to get a t. on them], 18 [we should get a t. on what sorts of things preserve and destroy cities]
Theoretical wisdom (*sophia*), VI 7 and 98^{b}24 [happiness seems to be some sort of t.], 103^{a}5 [t. is a virtue of thought], 7 [when we talk about someone's character we do not say that he is t.], 9 [we do also praise a t. person], 139^{b}17 [t. is a state by which the soul grasps the truth by way of assertion and denial], 141^{a}2 [no t. of starting-points only, since it is characteristic of a t. person to have a demonstration of certain things], 5 [t. never in error], 7, 142^{a}17 [a child can become a mathematician but not a theoretically-wise person], 19 [the starting-points in t. come from experience], 143^{b}15, 19 [t. will not have a theoretical grasp on any of the things from which a human being will come to be happy (since it is not concerned with *anything's* coming to be)], 34 [practical wisdom inferior to t.], 144^{a}5 [by being possessed and actualized, t. produces happiness], 145^{a}7 [t. not controlled by practical wisdom], 177^{a}24 [the most pleasant of the activities in accord with virtue is the one in accord with t.], 29 [a t. needs the things necessary for living], 32 [the t. person, even when by himself, is able to contemplate]
Thesis (*thesis*), **96^{a}2**
Thetis, **124^{b}15**
Thief (*kleptês*), 134^{a}18, 22. *Also*, theft
Thing, thing itself, subject itself (*pragma*), 94^{b}5 [nature of the s.], 106^{a}28 [mean in t. opp. mean in us], 109^{a}6, 12 [explanation derives from t. opp. from us], 137^{b}18 [source of error in t. opp. in us], 147^{a}5, 171^{a}13
Things that cannot come to be or pass away (*agenêta kai aphtharta*), 139^{b}24
Things we say, things that are said (*legomena*), 94^{b}23, **98^{b}10**, 145^{b}20, 152^{b}23, 174^{a}11
Think, thinking, be practically-wise (*phronein*), 96^{b}17 [t. is an intrinsic good], 142^{a}3, 152^{b}16, 166^{a}19 [the element with which he t.], 177^{b}32
Thirst (*dipsa*), 148^{a}8, 154^{b}3
Thought, thinking (*dianoia*), 103^{a}5+, 14+ [virtues of t.], 112^{a}16 [deliberate choice involves reason and t.], 117^{b}31 [t. affected by certain pleasures but not body], 139^{a}1 [virtues of t.], 21 [what assertion and denial are in the case of t.], 27 [theoretical t.], 26 [practical t. and truth], 29 [part involving practical t.], 33 [understanding and t.], 35 [t. and character], 35 [t. by itself moves nothing], ^{b}5 [t-involving desire], 142^{b}12 [good deliberation is correctness of t.], 146^{a}25 [t. is tied up], 166^{a}17 [each of us seems to be the t-involving element in him], 26 [his t. is well supplied with objects of contemplation], 170^{b}12 [sharing in talk and t.], 174^{a}1 [a child's level of t.], 174^{b}21 [pleasure connected to t.], 175^{a}7 [t. is called forth and is intensely active], 14 [a lover of learning is active with his t. in relation to objects of contemplation], 27 [activities of t. differ in form from those of the senses], ^{b}34 [pleasure does not seem to *be* t.], 176^{a}3 [pleasures of t.], 181^{a}2

[politicians seem to practice politics by means of some sort of ability and experience rather than by means of t.]
Thought, exercising (*dianooumenon*), 98ª5
Throw overboard (*apoballetai*), 110ª9
Tickle (*gargalizesthai*), 150ᵇ22
Tidal race (*euripos*), 167ᵇ7
Tightens and loosens (*epiteinei kai aniêsi*), 138ᵇ23, 173ª27
Tight-fisted people (*glischroi*), 121ᵇ22
Time, moment (*chronos*), 95ª7 [deficiency not a matter of t.], 96ª26 [category of t.], 98ª20 [a short time does not make someone happy], 23 [t. is a good co-worker], 100ª30 [t. and the effect of a person's ancestors on his happiness], 101ª12 [complete t.], 16, 103ª17 [virtue of thought requires t.], 109ᵇ16 [not easy to define how long a t. we should be angry], 117ª25, 126ª1, 11, 20, 25, 28, 142ª16 [quantity of t. produces experience], ᵇ4 [deliberate for a long time], 26, 147ª22 [what they have learned must grow to be a natural part of them, and that takes t.], 156ᵇ26 [t. needed for friendship], 34 [complete as regards t.], 157ª22, ᵇ11, 158ª17, 24, 159ᵇ9 [depraved people become friends for a short t.], 161ᵇ24, 25, 162ª14, ᵇ27, 167ª11, 169ª22 [an excellent person will choose intense pleasure for a short t. over weak pleasure for a long t.], 174ª15 [seeing seems at any m. to be complete], 18, 19 [every process takes t.], 21, 22, 28, 174ᵇ8, 175ᵇ14, 31 [both in t. and in nature]
Timocracy (*timokratia*), 160ª36 [t. = polity], ᵇ17, 18
Tipsy (*oinomenos*), 147ª14, ᵇ7, 12, 152ª15, 154ᵇ10. *See also* drunk
Touch (*haphê*), **118ª26**, 31, ᵇ1+, 148ª9, 150ª9, 176ª1
Tragedies (*tragô(i)diai*), 101ª33
Trainer (*aleiptês*), 106ᵇ1
Training, acquirable by training (*askêsis, askêton*), 99ᵇ10, 16, 170ª11 [a certain t. in virtue comes about from living with good people]
Transactions (*sumbolaia, sunallagmata*), 103ᵇ14, 131ª1, ᵇ25, 33, 135ᵇ29, 164ᵇ13, 178ª12
Transfer a term from one thing to another (*metapherein*), 115ª15, 119ᵇ3, 137ᵇ1, 138ᵇ5, 149ª23, ᵇ32, 167ª10
Treasure (*thêsauros*), 112ª27
Triangle (*trigônon*), 140ᵇ14, 142ª29
Tribe, members of (*phuletai*), **160ª18**, 165ª30
Triglyph (*trigluphos*), **174ª26**
Trireme, equip a (*triêrarchos*), 122ª24, ᵇ23
Troublesome, most (*ochlêrotatoi*), 126ª25
Troy (*Ilion*), 100ª8, 139ᵇ7
Truth, truthful (*alêtheia*), 94ᵇ20, 96ª15+ [preservation of the t.], 98ª31 [a geometer is a contemplator of the t.], ᵇ11 [all the data are in tune with a t. view, whereas they soon clash with a false one], 107ª31 [accounts concerned with actions that apply to a part are t-er], 108ª11 [the t. in words and action], 12 [concern with t. vs. with pleasure], 113ª23 [unconditionally and in t.], 114ᵇ11 [complete and t. natural discernment], 127ª19+ [being t. in word and actions], 128ᵇ6 [concern with t. vs. with pleasure], **139ª18+** [practical t. vs. theoretical t.], 140ᵇ5 [t. state], 21, 142ᵇ11 [of belief the correctness is t.], 33 [t. supposition], 146ᵇ24 [t. belief], 151ª34 [t. reason], 172ᵇ1 [when accounts clash with what is in accord with the perceptible facts, they are despised and undermine the t. as well],

179a18 [the t. in practical matters must be discerned from the facts of our life]
Truth, grasp the, be truthful (*alêtheuein*), 139b13 [virtues as states that g.], 15 [the five states of the soul that g. by way of assertion and denial], 141a3, 151b20, 168b13 [which of two accounts of friendship g.], 169b23, 173a9
Truthful sort of person (*euparakolouthêtos*), IV 7 and **108a19+**
Turn completely around (*anakukleisthai*), 100b3
Turn over something to someone (*epitrepein*), 164a24, b15, 16
Turn pale (*ôchriôsin*), 128b14 [those who fear death t.]
Tutor (*paidagôgos*), **119b14**, 121b11 [left un-t.]
Tyranny, tyrant (*turannis*), 110a5, 120b25, 122a5, 134b1, 8, 160b1, 2, **160b7** [t. is the worst constitution], 11, 160b28, 30, 161a32, b9, 176b13

Ugly, very (*panaischês*), 99b4
Unanxious (*adeês*), **115a33**, b1
Unbearable (*aphorêtos*), 126a13
Unbiased (*adekastoi*), 109b8 [we are not u. discerners of pleasure]
Unclear (*adêlon*), 112b9 [u. and so requiring deliberation], 178a30 [wishes u.]
Unconditional, unconditionally, simply (*haplôs*), **95a1** [u. good discerner], b3 [knowable u.], 97a33 [u. complete], 98a10, 101b3 [u. so vs. so for them], 104b25 [say this u.], 105b33 [s. gets angry], 106a8 [capacity s. to feel things], 107a17 [s. to do any of these things is to err], 108b7 [justice is not said of things only u.], 110a9 [u. speaking, no one throws cargo overboard voluntarily], 18 [u. speaking mixed actions are involuntary], 110b1 [u. forced], 113a23 [u. and in truth the proper object of wish is the good], 115a8 [u. speaking frightening things are bad things], 123a12 [u. most magnificent], 129b3 [u. speaking always good, but for this or that person not always so], 5 [we should pray that u. good things will also be good for us], 8 [u. bad things], 26 [u. vs. in relation to another person], 130a13 [insofar as it is u. a state of a certain sort it is virtue], b27 [u. a good man], 132b21+ [u. just], 134a10 [u. beneficial], 25 [u. just vs. politically just], 34+ [u. good, u. bad], 136a31 [to do what is u. an unjust action], b21 [u. noble], 137a26 [u. good things], 33 [neither u. the same nor different in genus], b22+ [made an error in pronouncing u.], 138a33 [complete and u. vice], 139b2 [what is u. an end vs. in relation to something and for something else], 24 [u. necessary], 141b13 [u. good deliberator], 142b29+ [deliberate well u. vs. to further a specific end], 145a1 [u. good person], 146b5+ [u. lacking in self-control], 19+, 147b20+, 148a4 [u. or partial], b16 [u. pleasant], 149a2 [u. vs. by resemblance], 16+ [u. depravity], 24 [u. vs. by transference], b18, 151a25 [not u. base], b2+ [what is u. = what is intrinsically], 152b3 [the end to which we look in calling each thing u. bad or good], 27+ [u. good or bad vs. for some particular person], 153a4+ [u. pleasant], 30 [in what way u. good], b2 [u. bad vs. being in some way an impediment to activity], 14, 155b24 [u. lovable vs. lovable to each person], 156b14+

[u. good and good to his friend], 23 [what is u. good is also u. pleasant], 157^{b}4 [u. friends], 11, 27 [u. good or pleasant]
Undaunted (*anekplḗktos*), 115^{b}11
Understand, understanding (*nous*), **96^{a}25** [the god and the u.], ^{b}29 [as sight is in the case of body, so u. is in the case of soul], 97^{b}2 [we choose u. because of itself and for the sake of happiness], 110^{a}11, 112^{a}21 [a proper object of deliberation is what a person with u. would deliberate about], 33 [u. is one of the causes of things], 115^{b}9 [these *are* frightening to everyone—at any rate, to everyone with u.], 119^{b}9 [the desire for pleasure is insatiable and indiscriminate in someone who lacks u.], 123^{b}4 [no one who is in accord with virtue is silly or lacks u.], 139^{a}18 [u. is one of the things in the soul that controls action and truth], 33 [without u. there is no deliberate choice], ^{b}4 [desiderative u.], 12 [of both of the parts that involve u., the function is truth], ^{b}17 [u. is one of the states in which the soul grasps the truth by way of assertion and denial], 141^{a}5 [u. is one of the states by which we grasp the truth and are never in error about what cannot—or, indeed, can—be otherwise], 8 [u. is of starting-points], 19 [theoretical wisdom must be u. plus scientific knowledge], ^{b}3, 142^{a}25 [practical wisdom stands opposed to u.], 26 [u. is of the terms for which there is no reason], 143^{a}26+ [we attribute consideration, comprehension, practical wisdom, and u. to the same people], 28 [u. is concerned with things that come last, that is, particulars], 35 [u. is concerned with things that come last in both directions], ^{b}1 [concerning the primary terms and the things that come last, there is u. but no reason], 1 [in the case of demonstrations, u. is of the unchanging and primary terms; in the case of those that are practical, it is of the last thing and the one that admits of being otherwise and the other premise], 5 [of the particulars from which universals come we must have perception, and this is u.], 7, 9 [a particular stage of life brings u. and comprehension, as if nature were the cause], 10 [understanding is both starting-point and end, since demonstrations are from these and concerned with these], 144^{b}9 [without u. natural virtues are evidently harmful], 12 [u. + natural virtue = full virtue], 150^{a}5 [u. is the starting-point], 152^{b}18 [active u. impossible while having sex], 155^{a}16 [we are better able to u. together with friends], 166^{a}22 [each person would seem to be his u. part, or it most of all], 168^{b}35 [a person is called self-controlled or lacking in self-control depending on whether or not his u. is in control, on the supposition that this is what each person *is*], 169^{a}17 [every u. chooses what is best for itself, and a decent person obeys his understanding], 170^{a}17+ [living is defined in the case of human beings by a capacity for perception or u.], 32+ [if we are u., we are perceiving that we are u.], 173^{a}2 [creatures without u.], 175^{a}33 [pleasure increases u.], 176^{b}18 [virtue and u. are the sources of excellent activities], 177^{a}13 [u. by nature rules, leads, and u. what is noble and divine,

whether by being itself something divine or the most divine element in us], 20 [u. the best element in us, and of knowable objects, the ones that u. is concerned with are the best ones], 177^{b}19 [the activity of u. seems to be superior in excellence, because it is contemplative], 30 [u. is something divine in comparison with the human element], 178^{a}5 [the life in accord with u. is best and most pleasant], 22 [virtue of u., is separate], 179^{a}23 [the person whose activity is in accord with u.], 27 [u. most akin to the gods], ^{b}15 [ordinary people have no u. of what is noble and truly pleasant, because they have had no taste of it], 180^{a}18 [a sort of u. and correct constitutional arrangement]. *See also* intelligible

Unexamined (*anereunêton*), 181^{b}12

Unfair (*anisos*), 129^{a}33, ^{b}1, 132^{a}7, 159^{b}2, 162^{b}4

Unfree (*aneleutheros*), **121^{b}33**. *Also*, acquisitive

Unimpeded (*anempodistos*), 153^{a}15 [u. activity = pleasure], ^{b}10

Unit, consisting of units (*monas*), 131^{a}30 [numbers u.], 174^{b}12 [no coming to be of u.]

Universal, universal terms (*katholou*), 96^{a}11+ [u. good], **96^{a}28** [common u.], 101^{a}27 [u. terms and in a sketch vs. distinguishing all the particular cases], 104^{a}5 [u. account vs. account dealing with particular cases], 107^{a}28, 30 [in accounts concerned with actions, whereas the u. ones are common to more cases, the ones that apply to a part are truer], 110^{b}32 [ignorance of the u. in deliberate choice is blameworthy], 126^{b}28 [u. terms], 134^{a}16 [what, in u. terms, is just and what unjust], 135^{a}8 [each type of what is legally just is like a u. in relation to particulars], 137^{b}13+ [all law is u., but about some sorts things it is not possible to pronounce correctly in u. terms], 139^{b}29 [induction leads to the starting-point, that is, the u., whereas syllogism proceeds from u.], 140^{b}31 [scientific knowledge is supposition about u.], 141^{b}15 [practical wisdom is not knowledge of universals only], 142^{a}21 [error in deliberation may be about the u.], 143^{b}5 [it is from particulars that u. come], 147^{a}3+ [the u. premise vs. the partial one], 25 [u. belief vs. one concerned with particulars], 31 [u. premise], ^{b}4 [u. supposition vs. imagination and memory of particulars], ^{b}14 [the last term is not u. and is not knowable in the way the u. is], 165^{a}3 [u. terms], 180^{b}8 [u. terms vs. for a particular patient], 14 [the best supervision in each particular case will be provided by the one who has knowledge of the u.], 21 [someone who wishes to become expert in a craft or in a theoretical science should proceed to the u.]

Universe (*kosmos*), 112^{a}22 [no one deliberates about the u.], 141^{a}22, **^{b}1** [the beings from which the u. is composed], **173^{a}33** [the movement of the u.]. *See also* adornment

Unjust action, do an, suffer an (*adikein, adikeisthai*), [possible to suffer u. voluntarily] 136^{b}1, 138^{a}4+ [to do u. to oneself]. *See also* act of injustice

Unlawful, (*paranomos*), 101^{a}32, 129^{a}32, ^{b}1, 11, 130^{b}8+

Unlearned (*amathês*), 151^{b}13, 159^{b}13

Unleisured (*ascholos*), 177^{b}5 [we do u. things ourselves in order to be at l.], 8, 11 [the activity of a politician is u.], 17. *See also* leisure

Unobjectionable (*anepitimêton*), 154^{b}4 [practice of contriving pleasant thirsts for oneself]
Unpleasant, unpleasantness, displeased (*aêdês*), 108^{a}30, 124^{b}15, 175^{b}18, 171^{b}26
Unrestrained in his actions (*anosiourgos*), 166^{b}5
Unscrupulousness (*panourgia*), **144^{a}27**, 28
Unseemly (*aschêmôn*) 119^{a}30, 123^{a}33, 126^{b}33, 127^{a}13
Unsound foundations (*sathrôs hidrumenos*), 100^{b}7
Unsparing of his life (*apheidês tou biou*), 124^{b}8
Unsupervised (*exameleisthai*), 180^{a}27, 30
Untutored (*apaidagôgêtos*), 121^{b}11
Unweariness (*atruton*), 177^{b}22
Unwritten (*agraphos*), 162^{b}22 [u. justice], 180^{b}1 [u. laws]
Up to us, up to ourselves (*eph' hêmin, ep' autois*), 111^{b}30, 32, 112^{a}31, 113^{a}10+, ^{b}6+, 21 [things that have their starting-points in us are u.], 26, 114^{a}29+, ^{b}29, 115^{a}2, 133^{a}31, 137^{a}8+, 179^{b}22
Use, utility (*chrêsis*), 98^{b}32 [does the best good consist in virtue's possession or its u.], 100^{b}27 [a virtuous person will make noble u. of good luck], 120^{a}8, 129^{b}31 [complete u. of complete virtue], 130^{b}20 [u. of virtue as a whole in relation to another person], 131^{a}4, 133^{a}31 [u-less], 141^{b}7 [worthy of worship but u-less], 165^{a}33, 167^{a}18, 170^{b}23
Use, of good (*euchrêsta*), 181^{b}9
Useful (*chrêsimon*), 96^{a}7 [wealth is u. for the sake of some other end], 26 [u. is the good in the category of relation], 98^{a}30, 99^{b}28 [some goods u. as instruments], 109^{b}34 [discussion of voluntariness u. to legislators], 143^{b}29 [practical wisdom of no u. to those who are excellent?], 155^{b}19 [u. is lovable], 155^{b}20 [u. is that because of which some good or some pleasure comes about], 156^{a}1, 10+ [friendship because of u.], 157^{a}2+, 158^{a}8+, 162^{a}8, 24, ^{b}1+, 163^{a}16, 164^{a}7, 165^{b}2, 5, 167^{a}13, 168^{a}17, 169^{b}23 [ordinary people think of friends as being those who are u.], 171^{a}25 [u. friends needed in bad fortune], 172^{b}5 [true accounts seem to be most useful not only with regard to knowledge but also with regard to our life]
Useless (*achreios*), 128^{b}2, 163^{a}28, 181^{b}6

Variability, travels (*planê*), 94^{b}16, 155^{a}21
Variable (*poikilos*), 101^{a}8
Variation (*parekklinon*), 103^{a}18
Vegetative (*phutikon*), 102^{a}32, ^{b}29
Verbal abuse (*kakêgoria*), 129^{b}23, 131^{a}9
Vice (*kakia*), 104^{b}28 [v. is the contrary state to virtue], 105^{b}29+ [v. not feelings], 106^{b}33 [excess and deficiency are characteristic of v.], 107^{a}2 [some v. are deficient in relation to what the relevant feelings and actions should be and others excessive], 113^{b}7+ [v. is up to us], 114^{a}28 [v. of the body], 130^{a}10 [part of v. vs. v. as a whole], ^{b}20 [the use of v.], 138^{a}33 [complete and unconditional v.], 140^{b}19 [v. is corruptive of the starting-point], 145^{a}15 [the things having to do with character that are to be avoided are v., lack of self-control, and beastliness], 25 [neither v. nor virtue of a wild beast or a god], 148^{a}3 [a sort of v.], 149^{a}1 [outside the marks definitive of v.], 5 [excesses of v.], 20 [in a way, v.],

150[b]35 [v. escapes its possessor's notice], 151[a]7 [v. is in accord with deliberate choice], 152[b]5 [v. of character is concerned with pains and pleasures], 160[b]12 [aristocracy changes to oligarchy due to the v. of the rulers], 170[a]9
Victor, victory (*nikê*), 94[a]9 [the end of generalship], 97[a]20, 111[b]24, 117[a]11, 147[b]30, 35, 148[a]26 [v. is naturally choiceworthy], 150[a]36, 151[b]14, 160[a]17
Virtue (*aretê*), **95[b]29**, 30, 33 [v. too incomplete to be happiness], 96[a]25 [v. in the category of quality], 97[b]2 [we choose v. because of themselves but also for the sake of happiness], 98[a]11+ [v. and function], [b]24, 30, 32 [it makes no small difference whether we suppose the best good to consist in v.'s possession or in its use], 99[a]11 [v. as a whole], 14 [actions in accord with v.], 20, 99[b]8, 15 [because of v. and some sort of learning or training], 15 [v.'s prize], 19 [those not disabled in relation to v.], 26, 100[a]4 [complete v.], 100[b]10, 14, 101[a]15 [complete v.], 101[b]15, 30 [praise is properly given to v.], 102[a]6 [complete v.], 16 [human v.], [b]3 [v. of vegetative part], 12, [dependability of v. activities], 20 [a theoretical grasp on things that is in accord with v.], 103[a]30, [b]7, 14, 27, 34, 104[a]19, 28, 33, 103[a]17 [v. results from habit], 19+ [no v. comes about in us naturally], 104[b]9 [v. is concerned with pleasures and pains], 13 [v. is concerned with actions and feelings], 24, 27 [v. is the sort of state concerned with pleasures and pains that does the best actions, and vice is the contrary state], 105[a]9 [both craft and v. are always concerned with what is more difficult], 13, 26+ [the case of crafts is *not* similar to that of v.], [b]2 [where v. is concerned, knowing has little or no strength], 19+ [what v. is], 106[a]1 [the vs. are not without deliberate choices], 11 [the genus of v. is states], 14+ [what sort of state v. is], 107[a]1+ [v. is a deliberately choosing state, which is in a medial condition in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically-wise person would define it], 108[b]10 [the vs. of reason], 115[b]13 [for the sake of what is noble, since this is the end characteristic of v.], 116[a]28, 117[b]7 [the more a courageous person is possessed of v. in its entirety and the happier he is], 15 [it is not true in the case of all the v. that it is pleasant to actively exercise them, except insofar as doing so attains the end], 24 [courage and temperance seem to be the v. of the nonrational parts], 120[a]6 [the best user of each thing is the one who has the v. concerned with it], 7, 11 [it is more characteristic of v. to be a benefactor rather than a beneficiary and to do noble actions rather than not to do shameful ones], 22 [of all v. people, generous ones are pretty much the most loved, since they are beneficial and their being so lies in their giving], 23 [actions in accord with v. are noble and for the sake of what is noble], 27 [what is in accord with v. is pleasant or without pain, and least of all is it painful], [b]31, 121[a]3 [it is characteristic of v. to be pleased and pained at the things we should and in the way we should], 122[a]19, [b]7 [for the sake of what is noble: this is a feature common to the vs.], 15 [the v. of a possession and of a work

are not the same], 18, 29, 123b3 [no one who is in accord with v. is silly or lacks understanding], 30 [great in each v.], 35 [honor is a prize of v.], 124a2 [a sort of ornament of the vs.], 8 [v. that is complete in every way], 26, 28 [v. that is complete in every way], 30 [without v. it is not easy to handle good luck in a suitable way], b4, 125b1, 24, 127a16, b1, 128b10 [shame is not properly a sort of v., since it is more like a feeling than a state], 31, 34, 129b16, 23, 26 [this sort of justice is complete v.—not unconditionally but in relation to another person], 28, 30 [it is complete v. in the highest degree, because it is the complete use of complete v.], 32 [use v. in relation to another person, and not solely as regards oneself], 130a4, 7 [the best sort is not the one who uses his v. in relation to himself but in relation to another person, since *that* is difficult work], 9 [not a part of v. but v. as a whole], 13, 14 [part of v.], b7 [v. as a whole], 18 [v. as a whole], 23 [v. as a whole], 25 [what produces v. as a whole are the actions that are ordained by the laws concerned with education that looks to the common good], 131a29, 133b34 [justice is something medial not in the same way as the other vs., but because it is productive of a mean], 138a6, b14, 139a22 [v. is a deliberately choosing state], 144a7 [our function is completed in accord with practical wisdom and v.], 8 [v. makes the target correct], 10, 20 [v. makes the deliberate choice correct], 22 [not the business of v. to discover effective means], 30 [the state pertaining to this eye of the soul does not come about without v.], 144b1+ [as practical wisdom is related to cleverness, so natural v. is related to full v.], 14 [if someone should acquire understanding his natural v., will then be full v.], 15 [full v. does not come into being without practical wisdom], 27 [it is not the state that is only *in accord with* the correct reason but the one that also *involves* the correct reason, that is v.], 32 [it is not possible to be fully good without practical wisdom nor practically-wise without v.], 34+ [the separation of the vs.], 144a5 [v. produces acting that is itself the end], 145a18, 19 [v. that is beyond us], 20 [v. of a heroic even a divine sort], 24 [an extreme form of v.], 26 [no v. of a wild beast or god], 145b1, 146a9, 28, 151a15 [v. preserves the starting-point], **18** [v., whether natural or **habituated**, that teaches correct belief about the starting-point], 152b5, 155a4 [friendship is a sort of v.], 156b7+ [complete friendship is that of good people who are alike in v.], 157b5, 158a30, 35 [superior in v.], 158b7, 18 [husband and wife etc. have different vs. and functions], 33 [great disparity in v.], 159a35 [loving seems to be the v. characteristic of friends], b3, 161a2, 161a23 [the friendship of a man and a woman is in accord with v.], 162a25, 26, b7, 163a21, 23 [the controlling element of v. resides in deliberate choice], b3 [honor is the privilege appropriate to v.], 14, 164a36, b2, 165a33, b24, 166a12 [v. and the excellent person would seem to be the measure in each case], 167a19, 168b26, 169a11, b12, 170a9, 12 [a sort of training in v. also comes about from living together with good people], 171a19,

172a22+ [with regard to v. the biggest thing is enjoying what we should and hating what we should], b15, 173a18 [people have more or less of the vs.], 176a18 [it is v. and a good person that are the measure of each thing], 30, b7, 18 [v. and understanding, which are the sources of excellent activities, do not depend on holding positions of power], 27, 177a2, 10, 12 [the best v.], 13 [v. of the best element], 17, 24 [the most pleasant of the activities in accord with v.], 177b6 [practical v.], 16, 29, 178a9, 11, 16 [v. of character seems in many ways to be intimately attached to feelings], 17 [practical wisdom is couple together with v. of character, and it with practical wisdom], 18 [the starting-points of practical wisdom are in accord with v. of character and the correctness of these v. is in accord with practical wisdom], 20 [the v. of the compound are human], 22 [the v. of understanding is separate], 25, 33, 35 [it is disputed whether it is deliberate choice or action that is the more controlling element in v.], 178b6 [insofar as he is a human being and is living with many other people, he chooses to do the actions that are in accord with v.], 179a6 [even from moderate resources a person can act in accord with v.], 9, 33, b2 [knowing about v. is not enough, but rather we must try to have and use it], 9 [make ready to be possessed by v. a character that is well bred and that truly loves what is noble], 20, 30 [a character properly suited for v. must in some way be there beforehand, loving what is noble and repelled by what is shameful], 32 [it is difficult for someone to get correct guidance toward v. from childhood if he has not been nurtured under laws that provide it], 180a7, 32

Voice, shrillness of (*oxuphônia*), 125a15

Voice, utterance, lowing, sound (*phônê*), 109b11, 118a20, 21, 125a13

Votive offerings (*ananthêmata*), 122b20, 123a5

Voluntary (*hekôn*), III 1, V 8–9, and 111b7+ [v. vs. deliberately chosen], 112a14, 113b5, 14+, 114a13+ [virtues and vices of soul and body are v.], 117b8 [courageous person suffers pains inv.], 119a21+ [intemperance seems more v. than cowardice], 28 [v. cowardice vs. v. acts of cowardice], 128b28, 131a2+ [v. and inv. transactions], b13, 132b30, 138a9+, 140b23 [v. errors in crafts vs. in virtues], 146a7, 152a15 [a person who lacks self-control acts v.], 163a2, 164b13, 169a1 [it is actions involving reason that people seem most of all to do themselves and v.], 180a17

Voyage, course (*plous*), 109a35, 160a16

Vulgar (*phortikos*), 95b16, 124b22, 128a5, 178b16

Vulgarity, vulgar (*banausia*), 107b19, 122a31, 123a19

Wage (*misthos*), 134b6, 164a27, 33, 179b5

Walk, walking (*badisis*), 129a16, 173b1, 174a29+

Wanton aggression, commit w. (*hubris*), **115a22**, 124a29, 125a9, 129b22, 148b30, 149a32, b20, 21, 149b23, 33

War, warfare (*polemos*), 96a32, 101a4, 115a30, 35, 116b6, 117b14, 119b24, 160a17, 164b24, 177b7+

Warning, practice of (*nouthetêsis*), 102b34

Wasteful, wastefulness (*asôtia*), 107^{a}10, ^{b}12, 108^{b}22, 32, 119^{b}27+, 120^{b}25, 121^{a}8+, 122^{a}15, 151^{b}7
Weak (*hêrema*), 111^{a}6, 126^{b}8, 148^{a}18, 150^{a}28 [w. vs. intense appetite], 146^{a}1 [w. supposition], 169^{a}23 [w. vs. intense pleasure], 175^{b}11
Weak, weakness (*astheneia*), 114^{a}25, 124^{b}22, 146^{a}15, 150^{b}19 [w. = one sort of lack of self-control], 155^{a}14, 161^{a}8, 176^{a}14
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