

RADICAL AXIOLOGY

A First Philosophy of Values

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Gradually it has become clear to me what every philosophy so far has been...that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown. Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does he) aim? Accordingly I do not believe that a “drive to knowledge” is the father of philosophy...

It is especially the sight of those hodgepodge philosophers who call themselves “philosophers of reality” or “positivists” that is capable of injecting a dangerous mistrust [of philosophy] into the soul of an ambitious young scholar: these are at best scholars and specialists themselves...

—they are losers who have been brought back under the hegemony of science, after having desired more of themselves at some time without having had the right to this ‘more’ and its responsibilities—and who now represent...the unbelief in the masterly task and masterfulness of philosophy. Philosophy reduced to “theory of knowledge”...a philosophy that never gets beyond the threshold and takes pains to deny itself the right to enter—that is philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony, something inspiring pity.

—Nietzsche

PREFACE

At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophers proposed a new field of philosophy, namely, axiology. They produced a considerable literature in which the central problematic for philosophy consists of issues in value and value theory. However, the prominence of value theory at the beginning of the twentieth century has been so eclipsed that this history is almost lost to contemporary philosophy. Since the time that the project of this book was conceived, over twenty-five years ago, the submerged problematic of values has become even more removed from the central focus it should have. A tacit consensus has emerged in many quarters that the issues raised by value theory are not of fundamental importance and of little but personal interest. The fate of value theory in our age has been its eventual trivialization under the regime of metaphysical epistemology in its latest incarnation as “philosophy of science.”

The attempt has been made by science worshippers to capture philosophy: a new Scholasticism in which philosophy is reduced to a handmaiden of science. These figures have been so bedazzled by their New God that they have extended their vision across all the divisions of traditional philosophy. In this view “science” should define the field of modern philosophy even as the latter pretends to “humanism,” a concern with the entire field of human endeavors as a field in the humanities. Quine stated that “philosophy of science is philosophy enough.” Husserl characterized his phenomenology as a “strict science.” Of course, Heidegger and his followers reversed this evaluation. Heidegger’s judgment that philosophy is an “art” is a model that rivals philosophy as a science (Husserl) or handmaiden of science (the positivists, explicit and latent). However, both rivals define philosophy by a field outside it. Heidegger remains very much within the tradition of metaphysical epistemology, despite his critique of it. The problematic of being that he attempted to resurrect and that provided his central focus is an echo of the Aristotelian model, of being *qua* being. Thus it cannot provide a true alternative to the tradition by which it is determined.

What is the relation of “philosophy of science” to the tradition of metaphysical epistemology? Philosophy as science envy is the descendent of Aristotle’s model of contemplative wisdom as *episteme*. Wisdom as science is the origin of the model of “philosophy as a strict science” of Husserl and the positivists. Aristotle invented the notion of philosophy as science and thereby is the ancestor of all attempts to reduce the former to the latter. Of course Aristotle had a different notion of science than the modern one. Nevertheless, his formal notion of a science as a distinct field of study remains. The tendency to fall into such an instrumental role in relation to the reigning

problematic of an age, the cheerleader view of philosophy, whether the queen be theology or physics, the model science or art, is latent in the problematic of metaphysical epistemology. The model of first philosophy created by Aristotle and its subsequent transformation into a metaphysic of the subject is problematic. It would seem that this also requires marginalization of value to a reduced and ever shrinking sphere: Aristotle failed to distinguish value from science.

Philosophy has again been forced into a handmaiden role, playing servant to the queen, by these attitudes. Philosophy in this mode is narrow, dependent, and even parasitical: it is not viewed as having its own problems, methods, and insights, as it did in its origin and much of its now considerable history. The envy of the physical sciences that has fueled such attitudes, despite the origin of these same sciences in “natural philosophy,” has resulted in a truncated, instrumental philosophy. Truncated because if philosophy is itself a “science” it is one branch of the sciences, thus not distinctly philosophic: what is distinctly philosophic is lost and philosophy merges with science. Philosophy as autonomous, independent of the problematic of science, can never emerge from the “physics envy”¹ prevalent in many quarters. Philosophy as “philosophy of science” can never be genuine philosophy but only crypto-science, an apologetic mutant. Only now is it possible to begin to question these evaluations of the role of philosophy.

The attempt to ignore issues of value has meant that philosophers debate issues of little value to anyone, with little purpose, no meaning, and few results. Some kinds of philosophy in our age have become so removed from the problems of everyday life that they have become trivial. The subtle linguistic abstractions that form its stock in trade are meaningless, since they do not even affect lexicography or actual usage. Such philosophy is soon forgotten: it does not matter if it had ever been written. The result is that the “death of philosophy” is seriously debated in both analytic and Continental circles. The handmaiden role, the envy of physics, and the Continental attempt to reduce philosophy to fable are indeed the prelude to the death of such philosophy. This narrow view in which everything must pass through the reduced lens of an ideological model of science is a misreading of science and a distortion of the actual world. The idea never seems to have occurred to these philosophers that maybe philosophy is neither a science nor an art. That perhaps philosophy is a field without a rival, *sui generis*.

The wisdom that philosophy pursues in its proper role as philo-*sophia* has been subordinated and forgotten by both of these handmaiden approaches. The issue this raises is whether such a model for philosophy is wise. The capture of philosophy by neo-scholastics has meant that these cannot guide human life, as guiding principles are neither studied nor elaborated: rather, scholastic interests are. The exclusive pursuit of scholastic interests has meant irrelevance. But if philosophy in its critical role is not liberation from such

subordination to a reigning authority, then what value does and can it have? How can an unexamined subordination—unexamined because accepted dogmatically on faith, and without question—be the basis for a worthwhile life? What would such a philosophy look like?

Philosophy's history has included a long dialogue on the proper role of philosophy as "love of wisdom": is love of wisdom merely contemplative (Aristotle, Epicurus) or does it have practical implications? Is it primarily theoretical or practical, science or a way of life, which can include the insights of knowledge in a broader context of a plurality of values? Is it a "detached gaze" or can it provide guidance, and an ethic, a way of life reflecting a love of wisdom?

The most important distinction in Western philosophy is the separation of *theoria* as wisdom and *praxis* as moral virtue in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Heidegger argued that the distinction that was decisive for later Western thinking was the separation of being and becoming which occurs in Plato's *Republic*. However, this involves an idiosyncratic reading of ancient philosophy: it was Parmenides, the originary philosopher of "being," who conceived of being completely removed from becoming. I would argue that this distinction is also less important than the theory-practice distinction. Wisdom is autonomous from morals in the light of the latter view and love of wisdom, equated by Aristotle with metaphysics, involves intellectual virtues without reference to moral virtue. In this model contemplation has its autonomous realm free of moral constraints: the origin of the model of "value-free" science. Epistemological metaphysics begins with the fatal equation of wisdom with knowledge and the later equation of knowledge and science. The denouement of this way of thinking is Auschwitz, the Gulag, Hiroshima, and the "value-free" knowledge of mass destruction. It is also the view of Mengele. Logical Positivism is merely a late phase of this most unwise love, which brings the implicit logic of epistemological metaphysics to its inevitable conclusion.

The fatal equation of wisdom and knowledge developed through the separation of theory and practice into the exclusive emphasis on knowledge, in which wisdom is forgotten. The outcome is the perverse notion of "value-free" knowledge, as if knowledge and truth are not themselves values in contradistinction to falsity, error, and lies. Such a dichotomy is foreign to Plato, for whom wisdom is a moral virtue. The latter view is more complete as it is larger than a mere vision: it includes a vision actualized in a way of life. Mere contemplation contains a narrow vision of philosophy and of life. If the objection is made that philosophy as science is the *vita contemplativa*, then the narrowness and impotence of this way should be stressed. The *vita contemplativa* is less a way of life than the contemplation of one: of an object of the contemplative gaze. Despite Aristotle's attempt to portray the contemplative life as a form of activity, it is not a life valuable for its own

sake. Contemplation is a spectator view of life in which life is not lived but observed. Life is sacrificed to the contemplation of the other. Thus it is not, contra Aristotle, self-sufficient, as other-dependent and as aiming at something beyond itself: knowledge of something else. Aristotle could be interpreted as following Socrates' connection of virtue as knowledge and the Pre-Socratic cosmocentric speculations. However, as Aristotle himself noted, Socrates was "mainly concerned with ethics," and did not separate wisdom as knowledge from practice, as in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The same can be said of the Pre-Socratics, as even Heidegger admits.

Philosophers have lost the vocation of wisdom, since the very idea of wisdom has become problematic in our age. The idea of living a philosophy, of wisdom as a way of life strikes us as perhaps quaint, at best a remote ideal to be invoked at convocations, then hastily forgotten. Philosophy today is careerist: "professional" on the model of detached experts, or fee-for-service specialists rather than generalists. The ancient notion of the wise sage as knowing the ultimate principles and reality of the world, and being able to treat human life in terms of it, wise foresight, of living in accordance with philosophy, appears archaic. This idea of philosophy as special way of life, and not a "career" is likely to bring smiles of dismissal to our more sophisticated contemporary philosophers. The result has been that philosophy is not a love of wisdom for contemporary philosophy. In an echo of a previous captivity, it has become for most the handmaiden of science.

Of all things to forget, philosophy, the love of wisdom, has forgotten wisdom. Yet practical wisdom is needed in our time, perhaps as never before. No previous age had the equivalent of such evils as concentration camps, mass extermination, and "total domination" of the earth. The ancients did not have philosophers out of the contemplative tradition endorsing genocidal irrationalism and being hailed as great thinkers. Philosophy now has the chance to influence the moral debate over the fundamental issues, pivotal for future human development, which face us: genetic transformation, cloning, managerial-corporate and consumer society, overpopulation, and the increasing disappearance of the wild. As ethics it can influence the debate over the total transformation of the world that technology has made possible. Or it can retreat to a stance of "changing nothing," of doing nothing, and thus hastening the retreat into irrelevance: in effect cheerleading this fundamental and pivotal transformation of the world without influencing it. It can cling to the past as the latest version of "philosophy of science," or it can bring critical evaluations to bear on public events in the world as ethical philosophy. Much of the writing in "applied ethics" has already gone beyond the "scientific" model without acknowledging it: the debate is framed over norms, values, rights, and different ethical approaches, that is, axiological issues. Thus there is a subtle sea change in the air...

The question facing us in the twenty-first century is what philosophy as the love of wisdom means to us. Wisdom as problematic for philosophy in its present state means that what it is to be wise must be worked out for the twenty-first century, or any other century, as a pro-ject. Wisdom sets its eye on the future, knowing the past cannot be changed, as much as this past may provide lessons in folly. Insight into the future is of the character of wisdom, for if wisdom cannot guide our future, what is its value? and what could replace it? The form wisdom takes in our time is axiological, including critical evaluation and morals as regulative of all value, actual as well as potential. The problematic of our age is ethical, centered around environmental ethics. The ancients, who knew the meaning of wisdom, viewed ethics as a way of life,² not as a study in abstract concepts or manners. In Plato's dialogue *Parmenides*, Parmenides tells the young Socrates that he thinks that philosophy has not yet gotten its hold on him but that he thinks it will. Philosophy as love of wisdom, the pursuit of wisdom as a project in which he has not yet attained wisdom is a lifelong quest. Socrates has the promise and prospect of becoming wise, but is not yet wise. He has the courage of his convictions in loving wisdom and pursuing this beloved by rising above his surroundings and developing as a philosopher.

Ethics was a way of life for the ancients: the sage lived by a critical ethic, which could be justified. For ethics is the ultimate guide to our future conduct.³ Historicism, another influential force in the philosophy of the twentieth century, dwells on the past. But the past cannot prescribe the future—the past is mere “evidence.” By contrast with historicism in its various forms, radical axiology is oriented toward the future. Radical axiology evaluates future consequences as practical changes, which will include actual changes in moral practice.

Philosophy as a love of wisdom involves an evaluation of the best in life and the priorities of life as lived by philosophers, if only for culture, the life of the mind, and enlightenment over barbarism. Philosophy should cease its “physics envy,” and the attempt to become a science without a field, “linguistic analysis,” the odd hybrid of semantics and logic, and return to its roots. As it stands it has become trivial, with the unseemly obsequiousness involved in its claim to be a science in the face of the accomplishments of the genuine sciences. Such philosophy has delegitimized itself, while envy at the results of science has subverted the philosophic task and function. A genuine philosophy evaluates what is most worthwhile in distinction from spurious values. A genuine philosophy must issue from an ethic, which gives life meaning. Ethics as a wise way of life should not be restricted to petty, personal affairs, as it has largely been treated by certain contemporary philosophers, but ought to be expanded beyond the self as the basis for wise institutions. As a general field philosophy should have practical consequences.

The wisdom of the philosopher involves evaluation of what is ultimately good for humans, and more, of what is good for the world. Wisdom is not restricted to intellectual life, or to knowledge alone, which is only one category of good. The idea that wisdom only means being educated, in the sense of having a degree and mastery of a technical field, is a misappropriation of wisdom. Wisdom should include justice to all the values in life, in all aspects of life, not only the cravings of curiosity or the need for practical information. Philosophy is the love of wisdom and wisdom guides life and the decisions within it. Wisdom should be critical of inferior decisions, evaluative, and evaluation involves a valuetive schema in terms of its ground and what should be brought about, made actual. Ethics regulates both potential and actual values, the supreme values in wisdom and critical evaluation of superior consequences. Wisdom, then, is primarily evaluative: questioning received and conventional values is the precondition of projects and activities of worth: the examined life. What is the value of thinking, science, reason, and so on for humans? How can their use in particular circumstances be wise?

Our actions ultimately require the use of wisdom: of wise evaluation of alternative choices. Evaluation involves a critical appraisal of alternatives, the office of wisdom. Critical evaluation is within moral limits and utilizes categorial standards of value in appraisal. Wisdom includes the evaluation of pragmatics in the sense of foreseen consequences that can be brought about, created. Since what is actualized is created in some sense, wisdom has a part in creation of world. If it does not it should. The creative life aims at something valuable in itself. Wisdom can be characterized as excellent evaluation of the novel: good judgment in decisions regarding value conflicts in relation to the future. As such, wisdom is oriented toward future possibilities, not merely present realities. Wisdom is timely, not timeless.

Wise priorities should replace apologies for knowledge as the new philosophic problematic. Wisdom should evaluate the more important and valuable priorities through critical evaluation of alternatives. Ethics and values are not a province, but apply to the whole: they are general. Wisdom makes optimum use of them. The narrowing of philosophy, whose genealogy originates in "know thyself" and ends in physics envy, is, from this perspective, ideological: the part represented as the whole, reduction of philosophy to another field, whether science or art. Radical axiology includes a thoroughgoing evaluation and reevaluation of this epistemological problematic. Science is a problematic value, not a self-evident value in this view. Otherwise, philosophy has surrendered its critical independence. The question for radical axiology is not "what is knowledge," but why do we value knowledge?⁴ Why is knowledge valued most highly by some philosophers? Is pursuit of knowledge to the exclusion of all other values always a good? A truly radical philosophy would break completely with the viewpoint that

culminates in the “death of philosophy”: it would not linger in the metaphysical problematic of knowledge in its latest incarnation as philosophy of science. Radical axiology goes to the root in a comprehensive break with this tradition and involves a comprehensive and systematic alternative: a thoroughgoing reevaluation. This book is an attempt at such a radical philosophy, at a reevaluation of metaphysics and knowledge. The attempt at a radical reevaluation subsumes metaphysical problematics in the process of reevaluating them. Their reevaluation involves the radicalization of value in a radical axiology: values as the root of philosophy.

Values at the root also imply reevaluation of the relation of contemplation and action: of theory less detached from practice, a pragmatic outlook. The dichotomy by which contemplative philosophies divorce theory and practice has, of course, been noted and criticized before, especially by Dewey. Contemplative or “pure” philosophy—which includes purely theoretical paradigms, that is, being, the subject, and language as removed from practice—builds formal systems in the mind that have no relation to practice and the actual world created by it. The ultimate form of subjectivity: the imaginary is taken as the actual! Actual humans are not some dubious, detached subjects of theory but practicing agents who create valued solutions to problems. Formal, “pure” philosophy is a metaphysic, a “beyond” neither applicable nor relevant to the world of cultural and historical values. In actuality, “reality” is cultural and historically created, not a priori. The absorption of history into philosophy in the nineteenth century is the attempt to make the latter more concrete and relevant, a project that unites very different philosophers, including Hegel, Comte, Marx, and Nietzsche.

The stipulative metaphysical world created by ideological epistemology, in its obsession with an ideal world of pure theory, has little resemblance to the actual world. The priority of action in value theory over mere perception has created the actual world of value, of goods. In this actual world, values are not derivative but at the root: the ultimate ground. The field created by action—the actual practical world of humans, civilization, and science—is the proper domain of values. To accept the alien model of metaphysical epistemology based on Cartesian premises for values ignores the actual world, the world constructed by practice, for a fictitious, ungrounded, thus false world of misplaced theory. With a few exceptions, covered in chapter one, previous ethics and value theory has been derivative from ontology and epistemology: an alien model imposed on values. The project of a radical axiology is insubordinate: to reverse this relation to contemplative philosophy, a project first suggested by the English pragmatist, F.C.S. Schiller.⁵

In chapter one I discuss the history of philosophy conceived systematically as a succession of historical problematics. My argument is that no philosophy is free of system, structure, or a historical context (or

paradigm). This chapter also introduces the problematic of first philosophy in the notion of different paradigms of first philosophy, a notion borrowed from Apel. I have attempted to establish the legitimacy of treating such paradigmatic first philosophies topically and thematically in subsequent chapters by showing in brief outline the history of such paradigms and their internal logic in relation to identity and difference. As paradigms are historical, foundations are historical, but independent of historical determination. Chapter one also includes an argument against Rorty's notion that philosophy can be non-foundational in the sense of paradigm-free or free of system. The paradigms of first philosophy constitute an argument that all philosophy is systematic, although as I will note, it would be better to keep the "foundation" metaphor for a specific philosophical structure, and not as a generic term, which is how Rorty uses it.

The notion of paradigms of philosophy includes the Platonic-Sophistic project of "the Good" as well as the more recent and related project of a philosophy of value. The project of a radical axiology is not entirely new, although I would argue that it has never actually been carried through thoroughly or with consistency. It shares a first philosophy of value with Platonism but rejects the ontological treatment of values in Platonism as well as the structure of hierarchy in Platonic transcendence and its mathematically influenced theory of values. Prior attempts at a first philosophy of values made too many compromises with competing paradigms, whether being (Plato), or the subject (Lotze and the Neo-Kantians). A truly radical axiology would not involve ontology or a subject but would evaluate these free from a metaphysical perspective.

I will outline the hidden archeology of the contemporary marginalization of value, due to the emphasis on the value of knowledge, in chapter two of this book. The history of the problematic of knowledge as metaphysical is rarely acknowledged or discussed. However, the more recent history of this tendency—in the rise of the neo-positivist outlook in Austria, spreading slowly to Germany, Britain, the United States, and finding echoes in the epistemological school in France from Bachelard onward—is the latest development of this outlook. The epistemological problematic even lies in the background of figures who are not positivists, for example, Husserl and his numerous followers on the Continent and Latin America.

With a few exceptions, axiologists accepted the systematic place assigned to value by the psychological school of Meinong and Von Ehrenfels, also Austrian in origin, namely, that value can be reduced to desire, feeling, or other subjective, psychological states. Even so-called value naturalists contributed to this subjectivization and internalization of values, for example Perry's "interest" theory of value. The implicit Cartesian metaphysics of this school remained as the basis of value theory long after the critique of the

Cartesian model in psychology, epistemology and metaphysics had made subjective-psychologistic philosophizing in the Cartesian mode obsolete.

Chapter two attempts to radically revalue the fields of philosophy and present a comprehensive alternative to metaphysical epistemology. In this chapter I have outlined a systematic philosophy of values without recourse to ontology, psychology, or the subject. Radical means avoiding such a metaphysical grounding for values: values are independent of metaphysics and, in a radical revaluation, a ground for metaphysics. Values as the ground also entails that values are the historical context for the other paradigms. Values are not in an ideal, trans-historical realm of theory. They are the basis for historical changes. Revaluation explains change. Values as the ground of action mediate the possible and the actual: what can be actualized. Values are not primary only in the order of discovery, in the form of the ultimate justification of philosophy as an activity that philosophers pursue. Instead, the value of an inquiry must in some sense be stipulated or projected, for example, as a pursuit of knowledge, in satisfying curiosity, practical consequences, and so on. Philosophy has the task of articulation and critique of values, either its own, or those implicit in a culture. This task includes examination of the value of a value: critical evaluation.

Philosophy cannot be equivalent to science in this view, for it deals with the wise actualization of the possible, including the ethics of actualizing alternative "options." The realm of the "ought" or norms, of ideals, and standards, and also of possible changes and alternatives, differentiate evaluation from science: the potential from actual knowledge. The possible along with the actual also encompasses a larger realm than the "real," the province of metaphysics. The metaphysical problematic of knowledge consists in only one field, one problem: knowledge is but one category of value. To read all value through this lens is unjust to other values: unjustified. Philosophy is larger than science for it includes evaluation of the possible, the normative, and the ideal. Since I am including ideals, I am bound to be read as an idealist, but this would be an error. The inclusion of ideals as within the province of philosophy does not make anyone an idealist. In the model of philosophy as the most general discipline, all fields of human endeavor involve the evaluation of competing possibilities, none of which are value-free as evaluated. Business "philosophy" and economic life are as subject to philosophic wisdom as science and art: special cases of the wise evaluation of possibilities. Economic life involves the pursuit of specialized values to the exclusion of others, for example, profit, prosperity, wealth, and so on. These activities involve strategies for evaluating optimum outcomes in relation to these overall ends. Philosophy is the wise evaluation of new possibilities: the possibly valuable and the possibilities that will become actualized based on judgments of value. Only such a model of philosophy can be general enough to do justice to the tradition of philosophy as the most general discipline.

In the modern period, values were reduced to a small part of the inner world of the subject—their emotions and desires—in a strange Stoic internalization of the modes and dimensions of value. Value was trivialized by this reduction in which its derivative place was systematically based on an epistemological interest with dubious premises. A further consequence was devaluation of the world, especially the world of non-human animals and plants, since value was confined to a limited kind of subjective state. Value was marginalized in a meaningless universe.

Why should values be radicalized? The other paradigms have proven inadequate, whether as paradigms or as “the basis” of value. The modern subordination of the issues raised by a comprehensive philosophy of values follows from treating values as systematically derivative, not of basic importance as the measure of importance. Such an eclipse of the problematic of value echoes a prior episode in philosophy with striking similarities: Aristotle’s subordination of good to being in the *pros hen* relation⁶ of attribute to substance. In effect, values have been treated from a non-axiological and often hostile, skeptical perspective that has been arbitrarily hoisted upon them, precisely because they are based on first philosophies that were not first philosophies of value, including the “metaphysical basis” of value, the “ontology” of value, or the “experience” of value. This book will make a sustained case that the metaphysical approach to value is a mistake. Contemporary discussions in axiology have made this mistake at the root, since they locate value metaphysically beyond value, whether in being, the subject, or language. Value has been subordinated to alien and inadequate grounds for value.

In chapter three, I have defended evaluation in relation to and in the context of competing paradigms of philosophy. Axiology separated from the confines of another paradigm must be radical axiology. *The book does not present a metaphysical notion of value*, since it constitutes a critique of the metaphysical approach to value. In this project, values must be separated and retrieved from being, the subject, and analytic treatments of language that treat values in terms of being. The priority of values as regulative of practice includes the judgment that what “is” now in the world reflects past values and norms, in some respect, even for theory. I have made the case for value as ultimate grounding, not being or the subject; issues of ultimate grounding cannot be separated from issues of value.

As soon as a philosopher ranks the ontological model of the “given” as having ultimate importance, and evaluates “being” prior, the game is up and values are marginalized. The fundamental mistake of most value theory—and its most important philosophic domain, ethics—was to accept the logic connected with “things,” whether being, *res extensa*, the perceived, facts and so on. Even Plato made this error. He lived at a time when the ontological

problematic was paramount, despite the critique of Sophists like Gorgias of the whole problematic of being. The Platonic school, including the Neo-Platonists, never overcame this problematic, as one of the last major works of the school indicates. John Scotus Eriugena's magnum opus spoke of God in terms of being, not the Good as Plotinus and Augustine (*De Natura Boni*) had conceived him. Radical axiology argues against this approach, which ultimately trivializes value by judging theory of greater value than practice, and being of more importance than the good, the measure of importance.

The subjective-objective distinction presumes a Cartesian model, that is, the metaphysics of the subject as a first philosophy. The objectivity of the object or the objectivity of value, as in Scheler, is an object for a subject: a subject conceiving or perceiving objects. Offering a new value theory within the Cartesian problematic of a subject confronting an object is not enough. Values are neither "subjective" nor "objective" in a radical axiology, as such a dichotomy is axiologically false. "Subjects" in the actual world are reflective of historical values, not a fictional world of subjects detached from the world. Radical axiology as radical involves the rejection of such a Cartesian problematic and framework at the root. A radical philosophy of values would abandon this subject-object dichotomy as inadequate for, alien to, and a distortion of value. An approach to value that uses a model of value that is not itself axiological, based on value problematics, cannot do justice to value.

At its origin, analytic philosophy argued that the good was a "non-natural predicate," but also that everything is natural. This fundamental contradiction meant that values were suspect to the analytic school: they were treated as irrational and thereby beyond the scope of philosophy. However, the "naturalistic fallacy" is itself fallacious since it contradicts the naturalistic thesis. More, naturalism itself has never been questioned by this school.⁷ However, to ask, "what are values?" implies a relation between the copula and the world: that is, presumes an Aristotelian framework or approach to issues of value, which means the paradigm of being as determinative of language. To ask, "what are values" in any form reduces questions of value to ontology (or in a later version, consciousness or concepts: substance as subject). To think or conceive value in terms of such questions validates of the priority of the relation between "to be" and the world, or unmediated language and the world. To raise the question of the "ontological status" of values, or whether they are "subjective or objective," or "what we mean" by the "concept of value" is concedes the *value* of another paradigm: the legitimacy of treating value in its terms.

Such questions do not arise for radical axiology, but only for other paradigms. Radical axiology requires that values be examined without reference to being, desire, nature, and so on. Certain issues are thereby ruled out by the project of radical axiology. The subordination of values to being as attributes; the reduction of value to desire, feeling, will, and other subjective

states (a problematic derived from the paradigm of the subject: a subject who wills, desires, or feels value); or “meta-ethical” conceptual analysis (the paradigm of language); or the naturalist, non-naturalist debate of Moore, which is Sophistic in origin, are pseudo-issues for a radical axiology.

Chapter four will cover value analysis: the archaeology of hidden values. Value analysis reveals disguised value judgments and covert justifications in superficially value-neutral philosophic propositions and in scientific models. The endless disputes between the schools reveal hidden evaluations: the buried value judgments in the cheerleader model of philosophy, which has emerged from the tradition of metaphysical epistemology, have been disguised. Such models for philosophy have covered up a value dispute over the role of philosophy itself. The attempt to create a separate field for philosophy as “conceptual analysis” has not ended the essentially normative and axiological disputes over philosophic issues. A value conflict with many levels has been disguised by philosophy in this mode, including professional standards vs. social relevance, intellectual vs. other needs, and so on.

One of the hidden value judgments made by proponents of the model of philosophy based on a field outside philosophy is that only science, among all human endeavors and activities, is worthy of philosophic concern and treatment; or it is more worthy than the others, thus of first rank, a standard of values. An ostensive epistemology actually consists in an evaluation. The judgment also involves a value fallacy in that special values are revalued as general: a revaluation of subordinate values as basic. “Science” as knowledge, and art are special fields that are ranked supreme in this model, despite their specialized role. They are not general and therefore cannot be philosophical. Finally, I have engaged the debate over “value-neutral” science; the argument will be made for the universality of value.

The remaining three chapters present a critical evaluation of the paradigmatic metaphysical first philosophies: being, the subject, and language. I begin by arguing against their inadequacies as first philosophies by their own standards. Then their defects are evaluated. This insubordinate approach of questioning the value of metaphysical first philosophy has rarely been attempted in philosophy except by Nietzsche, a reflection of the marginalization of value theory. That it follows from the project of a radical axiology should be evident from what a radical project entails.

In the conclusion, the argument will be made for value as the ground of change, and thereby of transformation of the world. What “is” will be analyzed in terms of prior evaluations: the “real” as a consequence of a prior ground, a first: evaluations of potential worth. Radical axiology separates first philosophy from the “real” as its ground, and evaluates the relation of potentiality and actuality as prior to a *pros hen* relation to the “given.” I will

then sum up by arguing that value measures superiority in comparative terms, and provides the ultimate ground of evaluation.

A second part of radical axiology will be written next. I will cover value theory proper. *The primary topic of the present work is first philosophy, not theories of value*, although the latter are treated also, where appropriate. A *first philosophy* of values is logically independent of a *theory* of values, since different theories of value could be used as first philosophies. But also, such theories of value need not be first philosophies, as they are not for most of the tradition. Similarly, a theory of evaluation could be formulated that is not part of a (first) philosophy of values. In the present work, I have incorporated a theory of values and evaluation into a whole philosophy of values. But the book is primarily a critical examination of first philosophy and the presentation of a philosophy of values. The argument in the book is a sustained critical evaluation of first philosophy and the “metaphysic of value” it entails. Subsequent books will cover freedom and determinism, evaluation, psychology, ethics, and other topics. These will be treated in terms of a radical philosophy of values.

Anyone who reads this work in the light or from the perspective of another paradigm—who sees an implicit ontology, psychology or any other basis for value in radical axiology—will miss the spirit in which I have worked. I have engaged in a prolonged intellectual struggle to evolve a value philosophy that did not refer back to existents, being, and so on. My attempt has been to search out the hidden values in all other paradigms, and to develop evaluation as a method, as a prelude to philosophical reevaluation and reform.

When the handmaiden version of philosophy as “philosophy of science”—explicit or latent—is evaluated against the liberated and liberating philosophy exhibited by the ancients, taken as a whole, it is obvious which has greater value. A philosophy with a healthy, independent status takes a more critical stance toward science and technology. Unfortunately, the more detached attitude toward science that evolved in the sixties has not survived, and many younger philosophers have also become, in effect, cheerleaders of scientists. This evaluation should not be taken as a critique of science itself, apart from the use some philosophers have tried to make of science, scientism. Nor do I object in the least to philosophy of science as one field within philosophy, as opposed to all of philosophy. Ancient philosophy gave us the model of wisdom free from subordination to something of lesser importance and worth and of smaller scope. Whatever its shortcomings, this model provides a far more inspiring and intriguing standard than philosophy as subservient to religion, as physics envy, or as a branch of literature, and philosophers as the uncritical apologists and cheerleaders of science, theology or poetry. Toward a resurrection of that wisdom, that free spirit in the origin of philosophy as a love of wisdom, I hope my philosophy is a contribution.

One

SYSTEM AND PARADIGM

Structures and the History of Philosophy

I am indebted to an anonymous reader for many of the clarifications in this chapter and for a chart on the systems and paradigms, located at the end of the chapter.

The idea that the history of philosophy can be divided into periods or epochs, such as Ancient, Medieval, Modern, and Contemporary, each with distinctive problems and approaches¹ is a commonplace in treatments of the history of philosophy. Similarly, philosophers have treated issues and topics systematically.² Such systems contain underlying structures, which tend to crop up again and again in the history of philosophy. Though the central focus or problematic changes in different epochs, the structure of the systems tends to be repeated. Terms like “idealism” and “foundation” can be applied to figures in widely different epochs of the history of philosophy. In this chapter I propose to combine these approaches through an analysis of the logic of systematics. The history of philosophy will be treated in relation to a limited number of structures and their systematic relations. “System” has been viewed in some quarters with suspicion after the decline of neo-Hegelianism, since Hegel viewed the development of ideas as a logical progression. While my approach to systems is not Hegelian, I will argue that identity and difference are the central concepts separating systems. Next, the history of philosophy will be divided into epochs with a central problematic. This problematic surrounds what Karl-Otto Apel, following Kuhn, has called “paradigms of first philosophy.”³ Since newer systems tend to carry over systematic structures from earlier periods and reapply them to new paradigms, a table of systems and paradigms can be constructed. Finally, individual philosophers are examined who are representative of a system within a particular historical paradigm, such as monism in the period of modern philosophy. The “children” of philosophy in the form of the sciences also carry over the systematic structures of philosophy and incorporate them into their architectonic. Since this treatment is fairly compact, I have included a chart on the systems and paradigms at the end of the chapter.

Paradigmatic and systematic differences, it will be argued, preclude the resolution of many ancient and difficult philosophic disputes. I would agree with Watson⁴ that pluralism is structurally grounded in the activity of philosophy. The paradigms of first philosophy, despite a tendency to exclude

rival forms of discourse, are historical and open. This tendency is consistent with a pluralistic and open future for philosophy.

It could be argued that philosophy is too complex to be placed in such a rigid, narrow schema, and that the history of philosophy cannot be treated as proposed. In part, I would agree with this objection, so I am treating systematic relations in general apart from any one philosophy. However, I will take the original explication of the system in Greek philosophy as normative. I will outline the systematic relations implied by the logical relation of parts. Then points of similarity to later philosophies will be noted, as well as points of divergence. I will argue, however, that structures involve systematic relations that order parts of a system into superordinate and subordinate parts. In many cases, divergences from what are apparently the logically entailed doctrines are subordinate in importance. The reasons for such divergences may be interesting, especially with respect to an investigation of the logic of individual figures, but are often of minor importance for the system as a whole. While present, they are part of a larger, ordered structure. Thus they can be interpreted in relation to a more consistent structure at the same time that the divergence is noted.

Skepticism about our models may, ironically, constitute evidence for them. It may reflect systematic skepticism, which denies the validity of philosophic knowledge in all spheres, including knowledge of systematic relations, or the significance of paradigm shifts in the history of philosophy. It will be shown how and why this stance follows from one of the structures that will be discussed. Skeptical objections may reflect the pluralism of philosophy and may also be irreconcilable. Yet we can still account skepticism by our approach.

Some figures in the history of philosophy do not fit easily into our schema. These include figures who lived and wrote during one of the transitional periods of paradigm change and utilized elements of the older paradigm and also the newer. Russell and Moore may be such figures in the twentieth century. Russell began his career during the period in which absolute idealism was the predominant paradigm in Britain, but was instrumental in bringing about a paradigm shift to the philosophy of language, which has largely replaced it. Nevertheless, he never quite abandoned the paradigm of his youth, and was critical of the purer form of the philosophy of language of the later Wittgenstein. Similarly, eclectics combine structures, and appeal now to one system with its relations, and later to another. Positivism is an example, in its classical, Comtean form and in the more recent resurrection as Logical Positivism. Many of the analytic philosophers mix the philosophy of language proper with elements of an older paradigm. For example, the positivists mix philosophy of language with appeals to empirical experience, while Quine has done ontological studies from the perspective of language in *Word and Object*. It might be argued that this invalidates our schema, and that

such “eclectic” structures are systems articulated against the very notion of paradigmatic systems. We would respond that usually such thinkers begin from one paradigm, and subordinate the other. This approach constitutes one form of first philosophy, the starting point of the system. I will discuss this point more fully below, after the basic systems and paradigms have been covered.

Finally, minor figures, who address only a few issues or only one area of philosophy, such as political thought, are sometimes difficult to place, as they did not address crucial issues that are necessary to identify their system. Often minor figures can be placed within our schema based on a few details in their small output; for example More’s *Utopia* borrows from the Utopian tradition, which began with Plato’s *Republic*. Sometimes, however, minor figures cannot be easily placed, for example Montesquieu. Yet analysis of the complex philosophies of the transitional, eclectic and minor figures often reveals systems and paradigms within, which are combined in novel and significant ways. I will argue that such figures usually appeal to systematic relations in the relation of “philosophy of.” These do not invalidate our schema, then. However, the schema should be used judiciously, with an eye to the complexity and diversity of philosophy, and the unique spirit of each philosopher. Our emphasis will be on the more “pure” types whose consistency better represents the basic patterns that we are attempting to uncover and demonstrate.

I will argue against such thinkers as Rorty that no philosophy is non-systematic. Rorty argues, for example, that Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger were not “systematic” philosophers. Dewey, however, used experience as the basic framework or ground for all his works, as indicated in the title of two of them: *Experience and Nature* and *Art as Experience*. Wittgenstein applied insights from language systematically: to psychology, art, ethics and religion. Heidegger, concerned with the problem of being *qua* being borrowed the ontological problematic of Aristotle, did the same with ontology. All three were systematic in that they used experience, language, or being, respectively, as a framework for raising issues and treating the fields of philosophy. Such a framework becomes a first philosophy, that is, the ultimate ground of the system, since as the ultimate explanation, it is a first, not grounded in something more ultimate, a still more prior ground, or even more ultimate framework. Indeed, despite his denials, Rorty himself is a systematic philosopher. For he combines a materialistic metaphysics, including the denial of mind and behavioral psychology, with a therapeutic view of philosophy. Far from being non-foundational, he is a modern Epicurus, recommending non-foundationalism as therapeutic within a materialistic framework.⁵

I will argue below that only one systematic structure can be accurately described as “foundational,” in the *architectonic* sense of building a system

from a foundation. However, “foundation” can also mean or imply a *ground* of knowledge, since the “foundation” is what knowledge is of, especially in correspondence theories and their varieties. In this sense all metaphysical systems provide a “foundation” or ground of knowledge. The term “foundation” is a metaphor and has been used in still a third sense by such critics of foundationalism as Rorty and Taylor. In the *epistemological* sense, a foundation consists in “self-evident” data or some “given” basis for knowledge. In this epistemological sense, foundationalism includes some atomists, empiricists, and linguistic non-formalists, but also includes figures such as Aristotle, and Descartes, neither of whom are architectonic foundationalists in the sense of atomists, that is structurally. Descartes, for example, sought an “unshakeable foundation” for knowledge. Rorty opposes this epistemological type of foundationalism to holism, and a type of coherentism.⁶ I am taking “foundation” in the more structural sense as primary, rather than the epistemological sense of an indubitable foundation for knowledge. In the former sense a “foundation” is by metaphor the basis of a structure. “Higher” elements form the “superstructure” built on this “substructure.” In the latter sense, atomism of any type is foundational, even if percepts or concepts are the basis of the system, replacing atoms as the content. Thus philosophy is not foundational in one sense, as alternative *structures* to “foundationalism” in the history of philosophy occur, a point I will cover below; and also alternative epistemological structures. In the sense that all systems are within a historical paradigm, however, no philosophy is paradigm-free and all incorporate a structural relation to knowledge as its ultimate ground, its “foundation” in the systematic sense.

1. System.

A. Structure.

The number of structures that systematic philosophy has utilized in its history appears to be limited. This has yet to be argued, but setting that point aside for the moment, the question can be posed as to whether there might be logical limits to the basic number of structures possible within any system of relations. If the latter is the case, then systems may be capable of analysis in terms of basic logical concepts. We will begin, then, with identity and difference, as these are basic logical terms (same and different). If our hypothesis is correct, then purely in terms of structure, and disregarding for the moment changes in historical epochs, structures would be logically limited to philosophies of identity, to philosophies of difference, or to some combination of identity and difference. This may have an initial plausibility in terms of history as well: the origin of philosophy includes the study of foundations and first principles by the Greek philosophers, who sought the one in many, identity in difference. Judging by the number of different

philosophies, a vast number of combinations are possible with even two such concepts and there could be thousands of possible permutations of identity and difference. It is equally true that these would also be instances or varieties of pure identity, pure difference, or some combination of identity and difference. It could be argued that non-logical structures might stand outside this analysis. I would reply that such structures would be instances of pure difference, as they contain no logically similar features.

I will argue below that five basic types of relations are possible that identity can have to difference. Other relations are variations or combinations of these. These relations are (1) pure identity without any difference; (2) pure difference without any identity, (3) a combination of identity and difference in which they form a composite and neither element is predominant, (4) a combination of identity and difference in which the identity element is predominant, and (5) a combination of identity and difference in which the difference element is predominant. Each of these relations of identity to difference has been represented in Western philosophy. I will examine these systematic structures below as combining identity and difference. However, the basic logical relations of identity and difference should not be confused with the five systematic structures. Instead, I will treat each of the five systematic structures in terms of the logical relations outlined above, that is, involving some relation of identity and difference. Each of the five different relations of identity and difference that systematic structures can take will be given a name, namely, monism, transcendence, compositism, foundationalism, (in the architectonic not the epistemological sense: see above), and flux.

Pure or absolute identity, containing no difference elements will be called "monism." Monism consists in pure identity without any differentiation. Identity in monism, in which "the one" is an undifferentiated sameness, is pure and absolute, as there is no relation to difference, no admixture of identity and difference. All of reality is one and the same. Its "structure" consists in an absolute unity or "one," without plurality, as plurality consists in at least quantitative differentiation. In pure monism, this undifferentiated structure is not a "one-in-many," for the many would dilute the purity of the unity. The inventor or discoverer of monism in the West is Parmenides,⁷ with his rigorous argumentation for undifferentiated Being. In India, Vedanta may constitute a pure Monism, although it may contain impure types.⁸ My argument here is not that there cannot be different types of Monism, for monism is a type and the content of it may vary. Rather, this structure is a pure type of system, which excludes elements of difference. There is at least one philosophic system that is monistic in this sense of absolute or pure identity.

A less pure monism still posits an overriding unity or oneness to reality, but seeks to compromise with the apparent plurality. The identity is still

insisted upon, but impurely comprehended in impure monism. In impure monism, a subsidiary many and an absolute one are substituted for the “one-in-many.” Plotinus, with his notion of “emanation” from the One, best exemplifies this structural approach. The emanation is downward from the unity of the One to the plurality of the many in a metaphysical hierarchy of degrees of being. This structural hierarchy is the mark of all philosophies that combine identity and difference.

A philosophy of pure, that is, absolute difference would be the denial of all identity. As opposed to the unity of pure identity, pure difference counterpoises a structure of pure flux or change. No identity can endure in the ceaseless change. No higher principle or element unites the unformed flux, not even individuation (nominalism), as such a principle would constitute something identical between different changes. This structure is “flat” or horizontal, then, as there is no higher principle, or hierarchy of principles. Each change is different and none serves as an identical ground for the others. Heraclitus, the first philosopher of flux, sought the “logos” of the change in the principle of change *per se*. His more consistent disciple, Cratylus, reputed to have been one of Plato’s teachers, denied that we can step into the same, the identical river once, much less twice. These two philosophers are representatives of, respectively, looser and stricter forms of a system of absolute or pure difference, that is difference without identity.

The denial of any differentiation, or any identity is consistent on one level, avoiding admixture. However, there is a sense in which it is inconsistent, involving what I will term the correlativity of identity and difference. Pure difference is still identified as difference, or as flux, to take one example. Pure difference is without identity except in its term of differentiation, “flux,” “change,” and so on. Yet this term still constitutes an identifying mark, identifying all change as change. Identity and difference are correlative: they are not mutually exclusive, but coordinate terms. Similarly, terms of pure identity, such as “the One,” differentiate from plurality. Thus it is consistent to use structures in which identity and differentiation are involved.

The correlativity of identity and difference has consequences for the structure of philosophy. Some common factor can always be found at a higher level of abstraction--between things, events, factors, cultures, epochs, and so on. Similarly, some difference can always be found at a more fundamental or “lower” level, that is, upon more minute analysis or division. One can analyze or divide to infinity; words can be divided into senses then phonemes, then sound units, and so on; individuals into parts, then tissues then molecules, then atoms, then sub-atomic particles, and so on; experiences into sense data, then “occasions of experience,” and so on. The correlativity of identity and difference thereby allows for levels of analysis, and hierarchical structures. Structures that combine identity and difference in some manner are usually

hierarchical in structure, and treat the elements of the structure and the systematic relations hierarchically. The basic structures are differentiated by opposing hierarchies that involve identity and difference in different relations. A stress on identity involves higher order elements and a resulting structure of layers descending from the top down. A stress on the differentiating element involves analysis into the most minute, basic, lower order elements, and subsequently builds a foundational structure with equal “horizontal” elements at the bottom from which higher order elements are “constructed.” These opposing hierarchies, vertical and descending, horizontal and ascending involve increasing generality of concepts taken in both cases as hierarchical principle, namely, element, individual, species, genus, transcendental, and first principle. (The order of presentation would be reversed for identity-based structures.)

Most systems combine identity and difference in some distinctive respect. However, all the combinations are varieties of three basic types. Firstly, identity and difference can be combined and equal importance can be given to each. Our generic term for such structures, which form a middle position between pure identity and pure difference, is “compositism” as the content of such systems is a composite of an identity element and a differentiating element (#3 above). Another basic type lies between compositism and monism. This latter structure recognizes some plurality and differentiation, but subordinates these to the identity element. The identity element is independent of the differentiating element, and regulates it, like a principle. Systems of this type are not absolutely but only relatively identical as the identity element rules the difference element, and does not exclude it as in monism, but the two elements are not of equal importance as in compositism. Our generic term for such structures will be “transcendence,” as the identity element transcends the difference element in some respect (#4 above). Commentators frequently refer to transcendence as “idealism.”⁹ The latter is an equivocal term, however, for “idealism” may sometimes be used to differentiate epochs, namely, the modern period in the history of philosophy, or the nineteenth century, rather than structures. Plato has been called an idealist as well, due especially to his use of “*eidei*.” “Idealism” as a norm should be applied to systems rather than paradigms.

Finally, the third structure combining identity and difference reverses the transcendent relation, and recognizes identities only after they are built up out of a differentiating element. This structure lies between compositism and pure difference; the ruling element or principle is the differentiating element. By contrast with transcendence the identity element is not a principle independent from the differentiating element, but dependent upon it. Thus such systems are relatively different, compared with pure difference, and with the composite of identity and difference in equal proportion. Our generic name for such structures will be “foundationalism,” as we often use the metaphor of a

foundation to describe the building up of higher, identity elements, out of lower, differentiating ones. Again, “foundation” is a metaphor that has been used for non-foundational structures. But the many varieties within this structure all have a systematic hierarchy beginning from the “base” of discrete units upon which the “higher” principles are “built” in an architectonic metaphor. In all three cases that combine identity and difference, and do not exclude either identity or difference, the generic label covers a host of related structures that differ in content, as I will argue below.

Identities can differentiate out of the undifferentiated, the undetermined reality or “indifferent,” only by means of hierarchies of identities, which can identify differences. Consequently, identity hierarchies involve a differentiated relation of subordination, which determines the undifferentiated. Even flux philosophies involve the use of this procedure, and bring all instances are under the identity concept, flux, and thereby identify all differences as pure difference. In the form-content systems, that is, those in which the structure involves an explicit relation of an identity element to a difference element, and do not exclude identity or difference, the hierarchy proceeds from “above,” in transcendence; by emergence, through development or synthesis in compositism; or from “below,” from a foundation in foundationalism. Above and below refer to differentiated levels or hierarchies that such identification creates from the undetermined reality, for example genus and species in logic, form and content in metaphysics, duty and case in ethics, and so on. Such hierarchical elements occur in all structures based on the combination of identity and difference, that is, transcendence, compositism, and foundationalism. For example, foundationalism proceeds from the “lowest” level to larger formations, from the smallest elements or units to the larger bodies, creating a hierarchy from “below,” from atoms or other basic units to the heavenly bodies. Transcendence proceeds from above, creating a downward hierarchy from the highest principle to the merest instance. The term “structure” is appropriate for such architectonics, as the hierarchies whose levels are differentiated by the different combinations of identity and difference are similarly structured into levels, but differentiated by the starting point that is their first principle. I have taken the metaphor of “structure” from the system of “foundation,” which builds structures based upon a foundation, that is, from the bottom upwards. However, all the systems that combine identity and difference exhibit structures, hierarchical levels differentiated in accord with an identity element or principle.

“Transcendence” refers to hierarchically structured philosophies that allow of differentiating elements only by “participation” in, or “resemblance” to a unifying identity. The structure is hierarchical, from the one down to the many; hence the basic relations within the system are vertical, with several degrees in between. As in monism, “the One” forms the supreme identity, but

difference is admitted at lower levels. The identity element is a universal covering its instances, and giving them their “nature.” Identity is independent from its instances, not generated by them, for the identity principle regulates them. Aristotle notes that for Plato, who is the most prominent early philosopher of transcendence, the forms “exist apart,”¹⁰ and principles transcend, that is, are independent of instances. This identity can be quantitative, lawlike, conceptual, or formal. The method of this structure connects best to deduction from self-evident or axiomatic first principles. That is, it proceeds methodologically “downward” from the general to the instance, in accord with its structure. In the West, the Pythagoreans discovered transcendence. However, this structure first received its most thoroughgoing treatment in Plato. For Plato, “the Good” is the supreme principle, independent and beyond being, and gives being to being. The derivative forms receive their being from the Good in a hierarchical relation in which the most general, the Good, gives the more particular forms being. The hierarchy of generality corresponds to the hierarchy of reality. As the lower and particular receives being from the higher and general, the metaphysical hierarchy proceeds from the higher, identity, or most universal element, the Form of the Good, to the lower elements participating in the forms.

Foundationalism exhibits a similar structural pattern, but it proceeds in a reverse direction, ascending from the base or foundation of the structure and proceeding upward. Foundationalism takes change and plurality as given, but unlike philosophies of absolute difference, does not deny that identities can be established on this basis. Differentiation of discrete units is basic; “higher” order phenomena are cumulations, formations, or subjective orderings or patterns based on the “lower.” Foundationalism does not grant independent status to higher level principles; there is no separate forming principle. Reversing the “archeocracy” of transcendence, the methods of foundationalism involve generalization from discrete instances to consequent principles. The principle can only be generated out of the foundation, and does not exist independently. It can be known through induction from like instances. Such induction can proceed from variously named instances or differentia, for example atoms, matter, individuals, sense data, phenomena, facts, “speech acts,” and so on. The lower explains the higher as the cause of the higher levels. But although the most basic level consists in the differentiation of discrete instances, there is still an identity in difference, a “one in many” in the form of one type of foundational unit, whether atoms, phenomena, facts, and so on. Nature is conceived as mechanically¹¹ building the higher out of the lower. The ancients, of course, did not use the mechanical metaphor, as they had little exposure to mechanisms. But the atomists, for example, did see higher level beings as built up out of atoms by the mere collision of atoms in motion, without higher principles. Pre-eminence or quality is an emergent phenomena that arises from competition, or some

other relation among discrete individuals, for example atoms, individual things, forces, and so on which are quantitatively equal. In competitive relations, the best emerge: hierarchy comes from interaction and build up. In the West, foundationalism dates back at least to the atomists and perhaps longer. The most complete surviving text of ancient atomism, Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, visualizes a universe gradually built up out of atoms and the void. The world, the planets, the stars are all results of the collision of atoms. Human beings, a higher form, are a complex combination of atoms and will disintegrate back into atoms upon death. Higher forms, then, are not independent principles, but emerge from the lower, the atoms, over time.

Compositism, the intermediate between identity and difference, combines transcendence and foundationalism. The higher and lower are independent causes, but only occur as a composite. Form and content combine a differentiating particular with an identifying nature. The higher is the ultimate cause of instance of the lower and is independent of it, although always embodied in the lower. The resulting structure is hierarchical, for the higher proceeds out of the lower over time and in a lawlike, principled way. Unlike foundationalism, compositism views the higher as independent of the lower, even if, as opposed to transcendence, it develops through the lower. Consequently, nature is not blind, or "mechanical," but purposive, since the end and the form are often identical in nature. The end is achievement of the formal identity. Quality is an attribute of more primitive substance in composite systems, an essential attribute, not relational as for foundationalism. In the West, composition was first conceived in Aristotle's "system of development." Pepper calls this structure "organicism," while Windelband calls it the "system of development."¹² Non-organic forms of composition occur, however; so the more generic label I will use for this system is compositism.

We would argue that these five basic structures are the main logical combinations of identity and difference. While we can conceive of differences of degree from these five basic structures, and philosophers have articulated systems that fall between these types, pure identity, pure difference, or various combinations of identity and difference, in which one or the other predominates or they are equal, cover the relation of identity to difference generically. These are the basic types of a relation of parts in a structured whole. Other differences from these types are usually differences in content or paradigm, which will be treated below.

B. Systematic Relations.

Secondarily structure applies to systematic relations. In this sense, philosophy consists not only in a basic structure, but differentiation into parts that stand in a systematic relation to one another. In a system, the philosopher applies the

basic structural model to all the different “parts,” “areas,” “spheres,” or “fields” within a philosophy. All the practical or applied parts thereby obtain a structural similarity to the theoretical or speculative philosophy in a system. System is the differentiation of the parts of a philosophy into an order and, as in the relation of identity to difference in the basic structure, identifies levels at which the different parts of a philosophy are related and incorporates the structural relation into the derivative field. The basic structure orders relations in knowledge, psychology, ethics, politics, and esthetics. Systematic relations follow basic structures and in this section I will examine system in relation to structure, as reflecting the structure. Philosophy is also systematic in the sense that the philosopher applies a paradigm to all of reality and discusses science or knowledge as well as practical issues in terms based on the historical paradigm. I will cover this historical aspect of systems in the next section.

A systematic philosophy recognizes divisions of knowledge, of fields, and of practices as justified. Monism and flux do not recognize such divisions; actual divisions in the world are “unreal” for a strict, consistent monism and illicit identities for a pure philosophy of flux. Thus systematic philosophy is distinct from strict monism, for example that of Parmenides, or pure flux. The distinction can be seen as following the distinct principles of “all is one” for monism; and “one in many” for systematic philosophy.¹³ Although systematic philosophy applies one principle, mediated by a paradigm, to discrete fields, it rejects the reduction of actual divisions of fields and practices to an all-encompassing One. Virtually all philosophy shares the “one-in-many” model to some degree, even philosophies of difference, such as the Heraclitean flux (“*panta rei*”; or “difference” as an identical principle for “deconstruction” of different philosophies in Derrida). The architectonic or structure of philosophy is also systematic in this sense as are universal terms (“transcendentals,” genera, species, concepts). “One-in-many” evolved into the problem of universals at an advanced stage, although these remain distinct issues.

The relation of parts to the whole is the relation of the particular areas covered by the field to the whole covered by first philosophy. For Aristotle, the whole is being *qua* being or being in general; the parts, particular kinds, aspects, or attributes of being. First philosophy is the whole, the most general field as its truths apply to all fields. For Plato this role belongs to the Form of the Good, as the latter gives being to the particular forms. For atomism, atomic theory is the whole, while particular formations of atoms—man, mind, animals, and so on—are parts or particular. The relation of the parts to the whole is essential to the system: the relations of participation, *pros hen*, chance combination, and so on. To take the Aristotelian relation, the fields delimited by the “transcendental” attributes of being, such as goodness and beauty refer back to being as attributes to a substance, in the relation of subject and predicate. Other hierarchies are subordinated to this structure systematically, as categories, or as lower order studies systematically

dependent upon first principles. Quality, quantity, and other categories refer back to substance for Aristotle, in a *pros hen* relation¹⁴ of referring back to a first; while mathematics, ethics, and politics are judged second, fourth, and fifth philosophy, also dependent upon and in some way reflecting first philosophy, that is, the basic structure of the system.

As more than one critic has pointed out, the *pros hen* relation may not be known to the average reader, or even to philosophers. Aristotle's *pros hen* relation is the relation of equivocal terms, terms with more than one meaning, to a first term to which they "refer back": "refer back to a first." For example, being is "spoken in many ways," but the being of the attributes refers back to the substance. "Grass is green," asserts the "being" of the green, which is dependent on the "being" of the grass that "stands under" (sub-stance) changes in color. Since substance endures through changes, it has being more fully. As Dr. Owen has noted, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is a study of such *pros hen* equivocals, which are used as evidence for the substance-attribute metaphysics delineated by Aristotle.¹⁰ In practical philosophy, the value of instruments refers back to the intrinsic value of the end as its source of value. In turn this creates a basis for a hierarchy of value, with the highest end, including the subject, as the one to which instrumental value refers back in a *pros hen* of value.

This relation was retained by the subject-object metaphysics of Descartes in that the object refers back to the subject as knower.¹¹ The *pros hen* relation is also the basis for the epistemological form of foundationalism that was discussed above. The "given" or the foundation is the first, that which is indubitable, and justifies second order knowledge. The subject is also the basis for the *summum bonum* or apex of a value hierarchy, whichever subjective state constitutes the *summum bonum*, whether feelings, desires, attitudes, and so on. Moore also retained the relation in the move to language in *Principia Ethica*, which, as in Aristotle, examines "what is said" as evidence for what is. As Moore retained the subject-predicate relation, and used it as the basis for analysis, the *pros hen* relation is the surreptitious basis for "meta-ethics." Thus analysts often begin an analysis by asking "What x term means" or "what is x" as if questions of meaning were equivalent to questions of what something "is".

A commonplace in systematic philosophy is the doctrine that ethics is "based on" metaphysics and, further, that politics is based on ethics, for example in the classification of states into good and bad types in Plato and Aristotle. How the parts are treated reflects the relation of identity to difference in the basic structure. The levels at which the parts are treated stands in a systematic relation to the hierarchy of identity and difference elements in the first principles. However, "based on" should not necessarily be read as foundational in our sense of a philosophy of relative difference, for it may imply logical derivation from first principles in the relation of ground

and consequent. At least three levels are differentiated in such an ordering, with “first philosophy” the logical ground of ethics and the latter the basis for politics. The parts of a philosophy identify coherent subjects or fields that are differentiated from the other parts of the system but stand in a relation to the whole by reflecting the basic structure in the distinct parts. This may be ordered in different ways reflecting the relation of identity and difference in the basic structure. The particularization of fields of study in philosophy is another aspect of systems, then, and the *sine qua non* of their relation in a whole, and thereby as a system.

This relation involves identity and difference as the parts are differentiated from one another and identified as such and such a part, whether epistemology, ethics, and so on. The differentiation of fields is a consequence of the relation of identity and difference in the basic structure. Systematic philosophers invented fields of philosophy such as politics and physics, for example *Politeia* by Plato and *Physis* by Aristotle. Such parts were constituted as fields by their separation from other areas of inquiry: they were differentiated as fields. The differentiation of such a field was done in accordance with first principles. The very differentiation of ethical from political problems reflects a systematic ordering of differences in relation to similarities, for example. The emphasis on moral problems as such, differentiated from political problems, and treated on their own, constitutes ethics as inclusive of politics in some sense and reflecting the relation of ethics itself to first philosophy. The systematic ordering of a discrete part establishes or constitutes the identification of a field. For identity philosophies of transcendence, for example Plato in his *Republic*, politics must participate in ethics, and politics tend to be less separated or differentiated as states directly participate in, or reflect the Form of the Good more or less well, in a hierarchical arrangement. For compositism, the difference is one of degree and, while ethics and politics are distinguished, the differentiation involves levels, instead of subject matter (Aristotle, Hegel). The state emerges developmentally out of more simple social arrangements reflecting an ethical order. The relative stress on identity and difference in the different structures tends to be carried through in construction of the system, evidence for the argument that there cannot be any non-systematic philosophy. The division of fields, and the identification and treatment of problems proceeds systematically. However scrambled the writings of particular philosophers may appear, for example those of Nietzsche and the later Wittgenstein, there is an underlying structure reflecting the relation of identity and difference. The relation of these in the philosophy structure hierarchical relations of abstract elements in the system.

At its origin among the Greek philosophers of Ionia, however, the “one” of one-in-many was not an abstraction but a cosmic principle. The “one” was the most universal principle governing over or constitutive of the rest. The

Greek philosophers sought a single first principle in the many phenomena or kinds, whether water, the indeterminate, atoms, numbers, and so on. Such a first principle was basic to the rest, their rule, and the key to their interaction. As such it could be used to explain other principles that were systematically or logically derivative.

The concept or norm “principle” connects discrete phenomena, fields, activities, events, and the like. It unifies admittedly separate instances in a single rule, formula pattern, or concept. Systematic philosophy has probed higher and higher levels of abstraction and more and more basic principles to attain unifying firsts. This has included unification of seemingly unrelated fields such as nature and art at high levels of abstraction. “Natural right” is such a principle: the use of a “natural law” as a norm for political life.¹⁷ Perhaps the greatness of the great systems lies in their ingenuity at connecting what might seem at first sight unrelated realms, to comprehensively articulate relations of principles, causes, events, categories, activities, and sciences. Virtually all philosophical schools accept this model for philosophy. For evidence we may take the widespread recognition of different fields designated by “philosophy of...” as justified areas of study. “Philosophy of” involves application of a first philosophy to different fields or categories, for example philosophy of art, of science, of language, of spirit, and so on. Philosophy’s own subjects: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, esthetics, and logic—are viewed as distinct fields of study in which first principles are systematically applied.

System is a demand of method. The foundational method of tackling little problems first, and then proceeding to a larger view can lead a philosopher to wonder whether this method cannot be applied to all issues, questions, and problems. Again, idealists proceed from one overarching theory to interpret the whole. Nietzsche speaks of this as the methodological economy of tracing “one cause” to its “utmost limit.”¹⁸ Similarly, Greek philosophy has been interpreted as the problem of “one-in-many,”¹⁹ that is, one cause in relation to many effects, systematically carried through, which is the identity element applied to the different parts of the philosophy. A system is the ordering of the hierarchy in terms of one cause, ground, or reason: the identical cause as absolute (monism), transcendent (idealism), emergent/immanent (compositism), foundational (atomism, nominalism), or as not identical (flux). Grounding the many in the one creates a completeness, and an intellectual elegance as well as a thoroughness in systems.

Political philosophy provides an example. Political philosophy contains the composite fields and principles of politics and philosophy. In distinguishing this field, the judgment is made that politics is a distinct human endeavor or activity—distinct, for the most part, from art for example. But there is also the implied connection between politics and philosophy, that philosophy can supply and investigate principles proper to politics as well as

perhaps the basic content or realm of the political.²⁰ Political philosophy is not ideological as its ground does not derive from politics, a part,²¹ but derives systematically from first philosophy or first principles. The latter are in turn derived from or applicable to the whole as the one principle covering the many.

Another methodological basis for system is the limitation of human intelligence, what Reiner Schurmann would have called our “finitude.” Systematic philosophy must begin at some point, for our minds are not infinite and we cannot consider our system entire at a single moment. Some part must always be examined by itself and its relations to the rest considered subsequently or consecutively. Thus Descartes recommends the examination of knowledge from beginning to end, as the whole cannot be considered all at once.²² Where the analysis stops may seem arbitrary, just as where genealogical analysis in terms of causes stops. But philosophers usually argue that the basic content, the differentiating element, is irreducible, a first principle. More, the chain of causes cannot be traced back infinitely; Aristotle argues that there must be a first cause and that an explanation must stop at some point, the ultimate ground. Human limitations support methods that consider reality systematically, as different parts of the system can be treated or examined one by one.

Systematic grounding grounds consequent and thereby derivative parts of the system. The ground is not necessarily a cause, only logically prior in the sense of ground and consequent. The relation of ground and consequent is no different than that involved when scientists present or ask for “evidence” for conclusions or statements. “Evidence” constitutes grounds, not reasons, as science does not appeal to self-evident certainties but actual events or instances in the world, including laboratory results and experiments. The “basis” or “reason” for a scientific conclusion or consequent is actual grounds, that is, evidence in the world

Systematic philosophy also has a distinctive “architectonic” or structure, indicated by such expressions as “emanation” from above, “development” into perfected forms, “basis” of a system or of thought, “foundation” of a philosophy, “analysis” into “elements,” and the like. The systematic relation often seems to work into a structural one, the first principle a basis (atomism, nominalism) or goal (development, hierarchy). Again, “analytic” philosophy is implicitly foundational, as analysis into composite elements is a metaphor in which larger molecules or units are broken down into elements or more basic units. The structure and the relation of fields or parts of the system are in close relation. The basic systematic relation often derives from the relation of structure to fields. There is a hierarchical relation of transcendence to participating lower principles, a composite relation of substance and attribute, and a foundational relation of elements to formations. In the case of Plato, politics participates in the Form of the Good in the best state. For Aristotle,

the good refers back to being, in the *pros hen* relation. For atomism, the world is built up out of more basic elements, the indivisible atoms.

An ultimate ground must be universal in some respect. For Aristotle, the study of being constitutes first philosophy, as being is the most universal predicate: everything that is, is a being. Aristotle's model prioritizes the subject of any attribution or predicate and thus the real referent of all speech, perception, or reference. However, there are other relations to the universal ground. Systematically, the Form of the Good in Plato is universal, as it is the cause of the formation of all that is real. In the paradigm of the subject, the real must be an object for consciousness or perception, at least potentially. In the paradigm of language, language universally mediates reality. The claim implicit in such paradigms is not that every real object is subjective or linguistic, but that their relation to a first is universal and the ground of their recognition or constitution as real. Finally, atomism views the world as universally having been built up out of atoms. Just as atoms form the individual body, so, by analogy, individual citizens form the social body, the political "atoms," if you will. The basis for the stress on individual rights is historically connected with this model. Philosophers can treat other fields systematically, then, as they are cases or species of a more universal principle.

The justification of universality is that some statements in philosophy are of more general extension than others. Just as physics is more general than geology, its laws, principles, theories, and predictions applying to planetary masses but also to other masses; so is the universality of first philosophy of general extension to particular fields. All the competing systems and paradigms implicitly accept the universality of "first principles," for example Aristotle's "true for all being," Heraclitus' "*panta rei*," Berkeley's "*esse est percipi*," the universality of scientific laws, facts, "states of affairs," and so on. First principles are true for particular fields as well as beyond, encompassing all reality, or as providing a ground of the possibility of experiencing or constituting reality. Statements about politics or art are true only for that field, they are narrower in extent. The universal is proper to first philosophy as other fields of philosophy are specific and in a systematic relation to the more universal as the latter holds true for all such fields.

The importance of being as a universal ground as delineated by Aristotle is as a general category that he can apply to many fields. Many issues are dealt with simultaneously on a general level while a distinct field, first philosophy, is delineated. Its truths hold for particular fields insofar as they study particular beings. Aristotle considers universal demonstration superior,²³ as it is logically coherent, more certain, and unlike truths of more limited extent, comprehensive. The same universality marks the extension of first principles in other models of philosophy.

The universality of first principles also generates the intellectual or logical hierarchy in proportion to the generality of *logos*. This includes

instance or singular, species, genus, category, transcendental, and first principle. Insofar as structure corresponds to such a logical hierarchy, first principles also generate structure. Being for Aristotle is the central content of a field of study involving the most abstract and basic causes and principles. Being is “first” in the logical hierarchy as the most universal subject of predication and the ultimate ground of the structure of reality. Nature and number are somewhat less general as predicated of being.²⁴ Later “logocentric” theories presume this logical hierarchy just as being as a universal is assumed even by competing paradigms, for example Berkeley’s *esse est percipi*.

For Aristotle, first philosophy, ontology, is also a methodological paradigm. The ground for the principle of non-contradiction is not itself logical but ontological: being cannot bear contrary attributes.²⁵ In turn, the principle of non-contradiction is basic to discourse or speech, knowledge, and, by extension, particular fields. Paradigms of first philosophy provide ultimate grounds for theory, as they are paradigmatic for method as well. The method grounded in philosophy can be extended to particular fields systematically.

Finally, first philosophy delimits the relation of theory and practice as the relation of particular fields, or as the overarching principle. For Aristotle, being was a theoretical study distinct from practice, although with implications for practice. For Plato, first principles grounded knowledge as theory and provided guidance for practice.²⁶ For Descartes, philosophy as a whole aimed at practical results in the form of useful knowledge and also of principles relevant to practice.²⁷

I mentioned above that philosophy examines causality in general as well as principles. Causality as a principle is a one-in-many, a universal cause. A principle is universal even if it is a limited, particular principle, as it applies universally to all requisite instances. Principles are one rule, law, norm, or identity actualized in many instances. First philosophy as in some respect universal involves the extension of a first principle to all particular logical differentia, principles, and fields. First philosophy is inseparable from principles as the latter constitute or generate the universality of logical grounds. That each instance is one of a multiple of such instances of a logical kind is a basic presupposition of all knowledge. Skepticism and relativism do not avoid use of such principles as they involve the use of universal concepts and the universal denial of knowledge claims, that is, the universality of the truth of relativism. Even philosophies of difference, for example those of Heraclitus and Nietzsche, rely on principles to identify universal change, becoming and will to power.

Philosophers reformulate these systems to accord with the prevailing paradigm, which provides the context for approaching issues, that is, the historically determinate starting point or ultimate ground. As a result, the system is inseparable from the mediation of a prevailing paradigm. Even

philosophies that appear unsystematic or discontinuous often have underlying connections that give them coherence. They apply a first principle to discrete fields by logical inference, even when, as in Nietzsche's case, there is a polemic against logic, and inconsistencies or paradoxes which are extremely difficult to resolve (compare, *inter alia*, the "fact" of the "Eternal Recurrence" with the explicit denial that there *are* facts).²⁸ For Aristotle, the division of fields is a division of being or modes of being. Physics studies "moving" beings, for example. Art concerns beings that have been made. Conceiving of being as something represented, as something perceived, marks the systematic relation in philosophies of the subject. This paradigm applies the subjective principle to all the fields of philosophy, conceiving of ethics as the study of the relations of subjective states, such as reason, will, desire, feeling, pleasure, interest, and the like. In this view, we study art not as works but as the pleasure it generates in the subject. In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the "language of" becomes a systematic approach, spawning a swarm of studies with the prelude "the concept of x." Conceiving of morals as a "language game" is a systematic relation, which treats one field, morals, in terms of a more universal but different and distinctive one, namely, language. "The language of morals" stipulates that there is something linguistic about morals, just as the paradigm of subjectivity conceived of morals in terms of subjective states. "Meta-ethics" is, if anything, more systematic than its predecessors as it generally excludes normative questions in favor of the "rigorous" systematic approach of "conceptual analysis" applied to discrete fields. In this view, art should also be approached as a "concept."

In our century, "metaphysics" has become a polemical badge of opprobrium that all eschew and try to accuse their philosophical rivals of engaging in. Heidegger and his followers "deconstruct metaphysics" even as they continue with the Aristotelian problematic of examining the "being of beings." This is an odd stance, since "metaphysics" or first philosophy was constituted as a distinct *episteme* by Aristotle precisely to mark off the study of being *qua* being! The positivists judge metaphysics "meaningless," but in their examination of the "logic of science" and the empirical foundations of knowledge are following right in Aristotelian footsteps. Similarly, the recent attention paid to "philosophy of mind" since Ryle is systematic, that is, examines a field, psychology, with respect to first principles derived not from psychology itself, but from more basic studies, that is, philosophy. The metaphysical conclusions that have been urged from certain quarters regarding the subsequent work in this line, namely, the critique of dualism, are metaphysical, for example Rorty's arguments for behaviorism in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Despite the disdain which some philosophers ostensibly hold for it, metaphysics and its systematic application to all fields of study remains the covert model. For what is metaphysics in the Cartesian sense if not (1) ontology (cf. *res cogitans* and *res extensa* with Heidegger's

study of the being of *dasein*); (2) epistemology (cf. philosophy of “science” = philosophy of “knowledge” = the basis of knowledge = Aristotle’s model of first philosophy); (3) grounded in the mind of the subject (cf. Ryle’s investigations in *The Concept of Mind*, the “Australian materialists,” and the recent revival of consciousness studies, for example Searle’s)? “Analytic” philosophy usually has a metaphysical framework, or an implicit assumption involving a metaphysical commitment as when values are analyzed in terms of “subjectivity” or “objectivity,” Cartesian categories; or the “existence” of mind is debated, presuming a universe of beings or matter. Materialists disguise the metaphysics as “conceptual analysis.”

What of philosophic works that from a systematic point of view are fragments, such as More’s *Utopia*; or the piecemeal approach to issues of some contemporary philosophers; or the approach to morals in terms of discrete “problems” apparently unconnected with systematic philosophy? Do these constitute an explicit or implicit challenge to the prevalence of system as a model for philosophy? “Moral problems” takes the point of view of distinct historical contexts or situations as basic in treatment of ethical dilemmas, for example what historical situations justify war, or what situation calls for civil disobedience? But from reasoning universally about a case in hand, such approaches appeal to systematic ethics and universal principles in spite of themselves, as also in their appeal to rights, duties, values, and goods. Similarly, piecemeal approaches to issues in philosophy end by appealing to, or noting similarities to traditional, systematic philosophies. For example, Moore appealed to and defended utilitarianism after articulating “meta-ethics,” Hare incorporated on Kant’s imperativism, Quine nodded to pragmatism in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Chomsky appealed to Descartes doctrine of innate ideas, and Putnam to realism. This connection to the tradition is not accidental; most philosophers finally recognize elements of systematic philosophy in their work. Systems provide the first principles that are the basis for discussion of “philosophy of,” the model for philosophic examination, consideration, or analysis of discrete fields. For example, More’s *Utopia* is possible because of the model provided by Plato’s *Republic*. System offers the coherence, comprehensiveness, and consistency missing from fragmentary philosophies. Further, the contradictions, ambiguity and, in some cases, incomprehensibility of philosophies that try to avoid systematizing are avoided. Above all, system provides the relation of discrete fields necessary for examination at the general level of philosophy.

Not all philosophers accept the idea of system. I will argue that the reason they do not is structural. Neither monism nor flux can allow of systematic divisions. For monism, the systematic division of philosophy into fields, issues, and problems is invalid. This division would permit difference to intermix with pure identity. Monism denies all differences within the “one”

all-pervasive reality. Differentiation into systematic fields is impossible and the parts of a system cannot logically differ from the one reality. They are illusion, *maya*.

Monists also deny the differentiation of practice from theory. We too are part of the one. Withdrawal from the unreal snares of the apparent world is the consequence of this philosophy. Knowledge of the ultimate reality is its epistemological goal; mystical union with the "one" its only "ethical" imperative.

Strangely, philosophies of pure difference end in a similar inaction. Monism views systematic division as illicit differentiation into fields or parts. But each field also unifies phenomena under an identity. The flux becomes identified as "political" phenomena, "art," and so on. This systematic identification of the flux under *topoi* is unacceptable for a philosophy of pure difference. The pure cases of such philosophies deny all identities in the all-pervading flux. All is change: no identities, no unities, and no sameness. Any aspects of reality identified in a systematic relation are denied by philosophies of difference. Systematics concede too much to identity. To unite the flow as phenomena under "theory" or "practice" is impossible. No practical consequences follow for a philosophy that denies the identity of practices. Only Stoical or fatalistic acceptance of the flux is possible.

Philosophies of difference are skeptical about the knowledge claims of more dogmatic systems. They deny knowledge systematically. Relative skepticism should be distinguished from such absolute forms. All systems are relatively skeptical, that is, critical of the claims of competing systems, for example empiricism of the claims of reason, or rationalists of the "misleading" senses. But this systematic competitiveness is at far remove from the thoroughgoing skepticism described by Sextus Empiricus. The latter type is a system in itself, and has rightly been described as "dogmatic," as it is *a priori*. Systematic skepticism does not examine evidence of whether a science, study, or method can yield knowledge, but rejects knowledge claims in advance. The forms of thoroughgoing skepticism described by Sextus Empiricus are tied to fatalism and through Stoicism to the metaphysics of flux. Skepticism about the claims of the philosophers is ancient. The point here is that this approach not coincidental, but that systematic skepticism follows from a particular structure, and thereby is systematic in a negative sense.

Skepticism about systems of philosophy is a systematic extension of the skeptical principle to all areas and fields of knowledge in philosophy. Skepticism is an epistemological form of pure difference in which identities forming the basis of knowledge are denied. In common with the other systems, then, skepticism shares the problematic developed from the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi by Socrates, "know thyself." The problematic of knowledge is a priority for systematic philosophers in every structure, and first principles

are the ground of knowledge. They then apply this ground to practical affairs, in knowledge of duty, of statecraft, and so on. The problematic of knowledge is the motive of first philosophy, and this can be traced back to Socrates' encounter with the inscription over the building at Delphi described in Plato's *Apology*.²⁹ Skepticism reverses the judgement about knowledge made by competing systems by denying we can have theoretical, moral, political, aesthetic, and so on knowledge, but the problematic of knowledge conditions this judgment.

Transcendent philosophies, for which identities are supreme over difference, that is, for which the formal element is independent of the content and "exists apart" in Aristotle's phrase, aim at certain knowledge as their ideal standard.³⁰ Two principles of difference occur in transcendence: differences in rank, which are also differences in degree of reality; and differences in kind, that is, species. Differences in time, space, and between individuals are differences in kind, not especial differences. The method usually associated with this system often involves synthesis: it does not reduce to basics, as in analysis, but subsumes the lower under the higher in a strong rationalist tendency. Only then are lower elements considered as instances of such higher principles. As principles, the higher elements transcend and rule the instances that come under them. Science has a unified structure, reflective of the supreme identity, so one method suffices for all knowledge, and, ideally, methods that result in uncertainties are avoided. Knowledge proceeds by deduction from laws, principles and causes that are self-evident or known with certainty. Thus deduction proceeds from the more general, the identity element, downward to subordinate content, the instance. Mathematics provides the model science, with the certainty of its deductive rigor. Reason is the faculty of knowledge, for it deals with universal concepts, true for all instances that come under it. Universal concepts transcend their instances for most philosophers within this structure, to the point that they are considered more real than their instances ("realism" in one sense of that term). Each concept has one basic meaning (univocity), due to the hierarchical priority of identity. As instances are united by their transcendent identity, their external relations to each other as instances of the identity are of greater significance than their internal relations. Universal form is prior and superior to individual content.

For transcendence, ultimate reality is hidden behind the misleading whirl of appearance. Reality is an unchanging, static transcendent, of which appearance is at best a mere copy. Nature is form, not flux: fixed laws, axioms, and principles more or less accessible to the attendant intellect. The "physics" of this system involves the informing of the flux with a determinate form, which transcends the flux. The closer appearance and the flux approximate this ultimate reality the more "real" they are. Just as identity is separate from and independent of difference, so is reality from appearance,

mind from matter. The ruling part of the mind is the eternal part, which is the part that can grasp universals, namely reason. While different individuals may perceive differently based on the senses, reasoning is certain and universally valid for all. The eternal part survives death by transcending the body and reforming it in reembodiment (metempsychosis or transmigration).³¹ Reason is the formative element of the soul, the identity element regulative over subsidiary faculties. Reason also gives access to illumination from above, and grasps higher levels of reality inaccessible to the senses. Reason is the key to the hierarchy, in which different levels are “hypostatized” as different degrees of reality.³² In the ascent to the highest principle, which is identified with God for Neo-Platonism, the lower, man, ascends to the higher, God, by seeking illumination from above.

The priority of universals over the particular instance, of reason over other faculties, of transcendent ideals over particular conditions carries over into practical life. Ethics consists in conformity of the individual to transcendent principles and ideals. As the external relation involved in a relation to an identifying principle is of greater significance than internal relations, the systematic correlates of transcendence in practical life are practical principles that place relations to others before self, that is, duties. Universal duty rules over the lower and individual principle of pleasure or desire. In consequence, the moral good as such should receive higher priority than other goods, such as pleasure, as the identity element--rules, principles, the moral law--is regulative over individual differences. Ideally, duty is identical for all and can be determined with certainty in all instances, as the contents of duty, the cases that come under it, are subordinated to it. The individual looks beyond self to others in altruistic transcendence. Reason in psychology has its counterpart in intellectualism in value theory. We grasp the good as a form of knowledge; only the knowledgeable are blamable. The good is realized or embodied in the intent to conform to duty, that is, bringing the case in line with the identical norm, instead of individual acts or consequences. Inner conflict should be resolved by the appeal to higher principles, and desire and passion are brought into harmony by reason.

In politics, the outlook is Utopian. Again, the many states must identically conform to the transcendent model. One identical model is universally valid for all cultures; one ruler, for all subjects. The basis of the state is a constitution imposed from above by a supreme lawgiver. As different functions involve different duties, social classes, rather than individuals in association, are the units of composition, that is, kinds not instances. The classes are formally structured in a distinct hierarchy differentiated by class identity. Justice consists in giving each class its due, that is, justice is distributive in character in accordance with a hierarchy from above. The goal is identity ruling individual differences, the unity of particular functions in a higher whole. History exhibits a cyclical pattern from one to

another identical type, the participation in different forms, an advance or decline from the ideal. The temporal orientation is toward the present, the static identity in which we now participate, not the move towards or from this in the past or future. The underlying reality is static and can be grasped at any time, so time and its different dimensions are not an important principle for this system.

In esthetics, timeless, formal standards rule particular content. One transcendent standard serves for all art. The best focus for such transcendent standards is on spatially oriented arts, which are not dynamic, at least as finished products. The arts in which a work consists in a static non-temporal creation would be favored, such as a painting, sculpture, or architectural monument. The work is more important than the artist, as it embodies the transcendent identity, while the artist is transient.

Transcendence, as an ideal, must be optimistic in outlook. Certain knowledge can be sought; the best or the perfect can be realized. The ideal can be put into practice. The lower, though anarchic, can be ordered and regulated by higher principles. The world is a field for practice, the application of principle. As ideals can be put into practice, and the world can be re-formed, this system can be said to be anthropocentric in a very qualified sense. That is, blind cosmic forces do not determine human life, and life can be improved through conformity to ideals that transcend the flux of the world.

Philosophies of relative difference, foundational in structure, are often the reverse of transcendent philosophies in their systematics. Knowledge is only probable, not certain, for knowledge is not a necessary deduction from the self-evident, but built up from particulars by induction. The model science is physics, especially mechanics, which gives empirical knowledge of nature. Yet each science is separate, ruled by its distinct content. Foundationalists are skeptical about a unity of method. They concentrate on particular data or facts instead of unifying theories. Far from “misleading,” the senses are the primary faculty of knowledge, and reason must proceed from data gathered by the senses—the higher out of the lower. Concepts are not judged “real,” but generalizations from real instances. They are but a “name” and may not even denote a meaning; if they do, such names entail no higher order meaning. Nominalism views concepts as arbitrary conventions because it begins from the model of difference: different languages have different symbols for the same thing and which convention we adopt to conceptualize is ultimately arbitrary. Instances cannot refer beyond themselves if they are ultimate, so their relations can only be internal. The instance is ultimate, or internal units of it are: atoms or elements.

Reality must be accessible to the senses if we are to obtain any knowledge of it. Appearances are real, although we may interpret them differently. Motion and change are basic, and the condition of building up higher order phenomena out of more basic units. The “physics” of

foundationalism emphasizes a particular content, whether atoms or sensed particulars. Nature involves becoming or change, even if particular cycles can be identified. Foundationalism is retrospective in outlook, searching for the origins of the present in the past, by tracing what present, as subsequent, back to past changes. This system gives a genetic account of reality, in which the past determines the present, and analysis of phenomena into fundamental components is also a look into their origin as larger wholes are built up over time from smaller, simpler units. The closer to individual or basic differences we come the more we approach reality. General laws, identical principles of all kinds are products of individual minds, built up out of close attention to particulars. Reason must follow, not lead the senses. The mind is not independent of the body, but “epiphenomenal” to it, or the same as the rest of nature.

The ethics that is systematically connected to foundationalism in terms of structure echoes the emphasis on sensuous particulars in the metaphysics. As particulars are ultimate, rather than principles that transcend any particular, relations are basically internal to the individual. The individual’s senses reveal what is good in the form of internal states such as pleasure, desire, or other internal states. Perception of pleasure or other internal feelings according to individual taste is the ultimate good. Duties follow from this value theory, rather than regulate it; the stress is on difference over identity even in value theory. Pleasures, for example, differ; perception of what is pleasurable differs. Individual judgment reigns paramount in matters of taste, for someone else cannot feel my pleasure. By contrast with the altruistic flavor of deontological transcendence, then, foundationalism is allied with egoism. I judge for myself, not in accord with universal reason, but individual taste, which is different for each person. Pleasure, for example, is not known, but felt. Good is the object of desire, will, or passion, not reason. Reason is the “slave of the passions.” Foundational ethics is consequentialist, and consequences involving valued internal states are paramount over intrinsic moral goodness. Relativism in matters of taste is one consequence of this view. Absolute relativism is implicit in egoism, as no higher order principle can claim an obligation over individual preference. The subject legislates according to individually chosen ends. Duty is left to individual discretion. However, particular consequentialist theories incorporate social factors, for example in the principle of the “greatest good of the greatest number,” which is more majoritarian than egoistic. This theory is consistent with the method of induction of this system, for the general good is not the sum of individual goods, but an inductive generalization from such individuals.

Politically, foundationalism has a realistic outlook. Perception reveals multiple political arrangements, and political judgements vary as well. No transcendent standard can serve to judge any one of these paramount, and different types of states may achieve worthwhile political ends.

Systematically, the higher, in this case the ruler, derives his power from the lower: the basis of the state is a contract between equal individuals, or alternatively, democratic utility, the greatest good for the greatest number of them. As each individual atom is basically equal, equalitarian and democratic relations are superior forms of political association. The units of political action are individuals instead of classes. Society is a voluntary association, a self-regulating mechanism. Justice tends toward equality, the reassertion of equal relations among individuals. The goal of politics is an increase in freedom based on cooperation, and avoidance of the anarchy of the pre-contractual period. The temporal orientation lies in the past, in the determinate causes and origins of the present. The view of history is as inevitably leading to a particular outcome. Historical events do not necessarily constitute an advance, but embody a determinate sequence of cause and effect. Further, with its stress on individual units and difference, the singular in history, the unique, which is not repeatable, would be the basic subject of history, while general laws of history would be treated with cautious skepticism, or as following from such unique cases, not ruling them.

Strangely, little systematic work in esthetics has emerged from foundationalism. Yet its aesthetic orientation is evident, given its value theory. The beautiful is what gives pleasurable feelings, or is the object of desire in a direct and compelling manner. The particular content moves a person, not as an instance of a transcendent identity, but because its distinctive beauty gives the person good feelings, or some other valued internal state. As this system takes change seriously, arts that impart a non-cerebral pleasure over time would be favored, including music, dance, and other performing arts. The aesthetic experience would be stressed over artistic creation, as the former involves individual taste.

With its realism, its close logical relation to the pure difference of pure flux philosophies with their fatalistic outlook, and its determinism, foundational philosophies tend toward pessimism in outlook. Perception reveals true evils in the world, but these are the inevitable result of natural causes, and there is little that can be done to alleviate them. Life is a struggle with a parsimonious and competitive nature over the material conditions of life. High-mindedness is delusion, "tender," or "soft." The best that can be hoped for is an undisturbed tranquil and quiet life of withdrawal from the world, an aesthetic existence in which pains and over-excitement are to be avoided. In general, this system is cosmocentric, as opposed to the more anthropocentric viewpoint of transcendence. Human life is to be interpreted in view of the cosmic whole, and can best be understood in terms of determining natural forces.

Philosophies of composition combine transcendence and immanence, identity and difference. The result is not an eclectic combination of idealism and materialism, however, but novel and unique systematic positions.

Knowledge differs for different fields, theory being more certain than practice. Both forms of inference, deduction and induction have a place in knowledge acquisition; their correct ordering is what is vital. Induction often provides premises for deduction and vice-versa. Knowledge is a composite of particular and universal. Sense data are organized, and knowledge is proven by logic. There is no paradigm science, for each science has methods appropriate to it. Yet philosophers utilizing this structure are often fond of models based on one particular science, especially biology. While many compositists are realists with respect to the status of universals, they do not accord real status to all concepts, but only to essential ones, and subordinate other concepts in the “*pros hen*” relation of referring back to a first.³³ Qualities, accidents, and so on refer back to the composite substance, and are subordinate to it. Still others are conceptualists: generality is valid, but not *in rem*. Concepts are equivocal in meaning, for the many perceived meanings refer back to a primary, superordinate meaning. Hierarchies in composite systems are not the result of identity regulating difference, or identity as a by-product of difference, for the hierarchies consist in internal relations of composition. Relations are external, but do not transcend embodiment in particulars: there is no transcendent identity element.

Though the evidence of the senses cannot be ignored, hints of identity arise within these. Species and kinds are real, not just individuals. The changes we perceive take place in the context of an unchanging substratum; reality is an interplay between change and duration. The “physics” of this system emphasizes motion, including the change from potential to actual in the form of maturation. Nature exhibits determinate change in fixed, lawlike patterns, as particulars develop into essential types. Neither form nor content are prior as they are fused or synthesized in reality. Identity and difference are combined in composite individuals, individuals of a kind. Mind is distinct from body, but not separable: it works through or by means of the body. No single psychological faculty or part of the soul is supreme over the others. Each situation calls for one or another capacity; each has a place in the whole.

The ethics of a composite system reflect the identity embodied in individual difference that structures their metaphysics. The particular embodies the relation to identical kinds; ethical improvement takes place for the individual in relation to standards of virtue or excellence common to all. One’s self in the best condition is the fully developed, fully realized self. The development from potency to act as a perfection of being provides the model for the development of the virtuous individual through training and habituation in youth in Aristotle. This model is also the basis for Green’s *Prolegomena to Ethics*, and other classics in the ethics of self-development and self-realization, including the unfortunately named “virtue ethics.” Individuals develop moral virtue and in so doing realize their potential. Individuals must realize common or identical standards of virtue through their