SUNZI

# THE ART OF WAR

ILLUSTRATED BY

C. C. TSAI

FOREWORD BY

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

AUTHOR OF *STRATEGY: A HISTORY*

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# Contents

# Foreword

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Sunzi's *The Art of War* is one of the great works of strategy. It represents a coherent approach to all forms of conflict, and the underlying principles are of wide application. Although the focus is on war, and military considerations are to the fore, political and economic considerations are always kept in view. It was addressed to commanders fighting wars in China some 2,400 years ago, yet the advice still appears relevant to anyone caught up in a conflict and seeking to come out on top. This is why Sunzi is now read as much in political and business as in military circles. *The Art of War* also has the advantage of being relatively short. Some of the allusions may seem obscure, but C. C. Tsai's vivid cartoons help explain their meaning as well as bring to life Sunzi's key themes.

Was Sunzi (Master Sun), this wise and successful general, a real person? The consensus view now is that he was, and that he was active around 550 BCE to 500 BCE. This is known as China's Spring & Autumn Period, a time of regular and vicious wars between rival states, when alliances and enmities were fluid. He was said to have served King Helü of Wu who fought regular battles with the neighboring state of Chu, and helped him prevail in a number of battles, including the decisive battle of Boju (506 BCE), although he is not actually mentioned in any of the more authoritative histories. The thirteen sections of the book were put together in the following Warring States Period (481 BCE to 403 BCE), when it acquired its reputation as an essential text for military practitioners. In CE 1080, Emperor Shenzong of Song identified *The Art of War* as the most important of seven classic military texts. This is therefore a book that has helped shape the broad thrust of Chinese strategic thought through the centuries.

It is obviously a challenge for a Western reader to get close to the original meaning and to pick up on all the subtleties. No translation of an ancient script can be straightforward, and there are disagreements about how some words and phrases should be understood. In addition, the book emerged out of a particular spiritual and intellectual context. Greater insights can be expected with more intense study of the origins of the text and the significance of individual words.[1] Yet *The Art of War* has a timeless appeal, speaking to contemporary concerns. Even when it has been taken out of context it can still be read with profit, reminding us of some of the constants of human behavior as well as the changes. As with other great works from centuries ago, it can accommodate a number of interpretations and prompt thoughts relevant to a contemporary reader's immediate concerns.

The distinctive quality of *The Art of War* is that it offers a pure form of strategy with many potential applications. It is holistic in the range of factors it can take into account, expedient in responding to new developments, and yet also conducted with a clear framework of priorities and principles. Unlike in much Western writing on the topic, strategy does not appear as a fixed plan, set at the start of a campaign and pursued regardless of changing circumstances. When addressing issues of war, it does not consider political, economic, military, and geographical factors as separate strands. Instead, the stress is on their interaction in a dynamic setting. There is no suggestion,

for example, that victory should come at any price. When costs are disregarded in pursuit of short-term advantages, a whole campaign might come to a grinding halt because the funds have run out. Close attention is also paid to alliances. Perhaps an army is strong enough to take on all comers, but its task becomes much easier if its coalition is extended or if the enemy loses its partners.

This approach opens up possibilities that are missed by the single-minded focus on battle that is a feature of so much Western strategic thought. Sunzi understands that battles use up strength and carry risks. He would far rather get the enemy into a hopeless position when it has little choice but to surrender or accept slaughter. Deception therefore plays a prominent role in his schema. Much of his advice comes down to doing the opposite of what the enemy is expecting: retreat when he is preparing for an advance, advance when he expects retreat, look strong when he thinks you are weak and weak when he fears you are strong, and so on. Sunzi wants to play on character flaws as much as unwise dispositions. A commander who is prone to anger, for example, should be taunted into rash decisions. To make deception work, it is vital to know as much as possible about the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. Espionage is therefore an important part of this approach, and Sunzi is not too fussy about how vital information is obtained.

At the heart of Sunzi's approach is intellectual preparation. *The Art of War* stresses the possibilities of outsmarting in preference to just out-fighting the opponent. It puts a premium on a dispassionate assessment of the risks and possibilities of alternative courses of action, and then acting with confidence once that assessment has been made.

This was the feature that attracted Basil Liddell Hart, who can be credited with being the first Western strategist to incorporate Sunzi into his own thinking.[2] He contrasted *The Art of War* with Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, as he blamed the latter, or at least its more rigid followers, for the persistent, deadly frontal assaults of the First World War. When introduced to Sunzi in 1927 he appreciated the distaste for protracted war and the urge to adopt strategies based more on indirect maneuvers rather than direct confrontations.[3] The reputation of *The Art of War* was enhanced because it was known to have been embraced by Mao Zedong in China and Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam. Both achieved victories despite the initial weaknesses in their positions. Later, not only was the book seen as providing valuable clues to Eastern military thinking but also as an explanation for the competitiveness of Asian businesses.[4]

*The Art of War* is not without flaws. One of the reasons it has proved to be so durable is that the advice is offered at a high, aspirational level, with very little on what is necessary to make it work. Victory is promised if the right steps are followed properly, but this raises the obvious problem of what happens if the enemy commander is following the exact same steps. When both are disciples of Sunzi, the result could be inconclusive encounters and an impasse. The emphasis on the indirect and implicit at the expense of the direct and explicit could lead to both sides dodging each other rather than risking all-out battle.[5] Although Sunzi's first priority is to finish a war quickly, there is no guarantee that his strategic approach will avoid protracted war. The focus is also on the offensive rather than the defensive. It is about taking the initiative rather than responding to another's aggression. "If you cannot win, do not go to war." But sometimes there is no choice.

Lastly, it is amoral, celebrating ruthlessness as well as cunning. This perhaps explains why Sunzi has become associated with villains in Western fiction (such as Gordon Gekko and Tony

[1] See Derek M. C. Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War* (London: Hurst & Co, 2014).

[2] A Jesuit Father Joseph Amiot published a loose translation in French in 1782. Napoleon might have read it, but there is no indication that it had any major influence on his strategic outlook.

[3] See his foreword to Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[4] I discuss the non-military appeal of Sunzi in Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 508–10.

[5] François Jullien, *Detour and Access; Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece*, translated by Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books, 2004), 35, 49–50.

Soprano). Even when he points to the importance of providing a cause worth fighting for and sustaining morale, the suspicion remains that Sunzi would be satisfied with what works. Any work on strategy highlights choices, and these must be assessed by reference to values as well as effectiveness. As an approach to any conflict, one that avoids lengthy, costly struggles and painful battles by acquiring the best information and analyzing it coolly has much to commend it.

# Introduction

BRIAN BRUYA

## I. THE BATTLE OF THE HUNDRED SCHOOLS

The Imperial Period in China began in 221 BCE, when the First Emperor, hailing from the far western state of Qin, completed his conquest of China. From that time until 1911, there were six subsequent major dynasties: the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing. But what about before the Qin? For 789 years, from 1045 to 256 BCE (much longer than any subsequent dynasty), a single lineage held the throne as Son of Heaven, ruler of China. This dynasty's name is Zhou (pronounced *joe*—see the Pronunciation Index in the back of the book for how to pronounce other Chinese names and terms). The period of the Zhou that concerns us is the second half, when traditional order had broken down.

The traditional order was unique among world civilizations. The Zhou Dynasty begins with the victors over the preceding Shang Dynasty fanning out across the country, taking control of key cities and towns—over 150 in total. We can think of each of these newly formed states as a fief, loyal to the Zhou king. Each enfeoffed ruler had local control but served at the pleasure of the king: visiting the king regularly to renew bonds of fealty, sending tribute to the king, and doing the king's bidding when necessary. Each fief was handed down to the ruler's eldest son. In the beginning, these fiefs were close, either in terms of familial relationships or in terms of military loyalty, and the relationship between king and vassal was viewed as like that between father and son. Over time, however, disputes arose, loyalties frayed, and battles occurred. 250 years in, and ties were stretched to the breaking point.

A traditional story (perhaps apocryphal) is often used to illustrate a key turning point in the dynasty. In 773 BCE, the king had just divorced his primary wife and replaced her with his favorite, who was difficult to please. In order to entertain her, the king arranged for a large feast on the outskirts of the capital, and at nightfall he had the warning beacons on the city wall lit. The beacons went up in flame one after another in a spectacular display that reached to the horizon, and after several hours, troops from neighboring states arrived breathless at the capital to bring aid to the king, whom they thought was in grave danger from invasion. The spectacle delighted the queen, but of course the generals and soldiers who had rushed to help were not amused. This happened more than once.

Not long after, the state of Shen, which nursed a grudge against the king, allied with the Quan Rong tribe and attacked the Zhou capital. When the Zhou warning beacons were lit, the neighboring states ignored them. The capital was laid waste, and the king was killed. The Zhou lineage was allowed to continue, but it was forced to move its capital east, its area of direct control was reduced, and it lost the fealty of the major vassals. From that point on, the various states quickly realized it was every state for itself. For the next five and a half centuries the states gradually swallowed each other up until only seven major states remained at the end of the Spring & Autumn Period (770–481 BCE). As armies increased in size during the Warring States Period (481–221 BCE), the disruption of warfare increased as well. The battle for ultimate supremacy continued until Qin was the last state standing.

In this battle for ultimate supremacy it would no longer do for a ruler to simply rely on his circle of close nobility to act as generals and ministers. Every ruler needed the most capable people around. And so an intellectual ferment began. Not only did rulers look beyond the nobility for brains and talent but people of brains and talent began to promote their own views about how best to govern—theories that blossomed to include all kinds of associated philosophical concerns. Over time, similar lines of thinking coalesced into a variety of schools of thought, such as Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism, Daoism, and so on. The Chinese refer to it as the period of the contending voices of a hundred schools of thought.

The first major Confucian text was the *Analects* of Confucius, a handbook for creating a flourishing society through cultural education and strong moral leadership. Mencius, a student of Confucius' grandson, Zisi, was the second major Confucian thinker. His influential book, *The Mencius*, uses memorable analogies and thought experiments (such as the child on the edge of a well) to drive home subtle points about the goodness of human nature and effective governing. Two short pieces that were important to the revival of Confucianism in the Song Dynasty were also products of this time. They are *Advanced Education* (*Da Xue*) and *The Middle Path* (*Zhong Yong*), traditionally attributed to Confucius' student Zengzi and to Zisi, respectively. *Advanced Education* offers a pithy formula for the self-development of caring, world-class leaders, while *The Middle Path* discusses how to achieve balance both internally and externally.

While the Confucians concentrated on creating moral leaders, others, known to us now as Daoists, preferred to concentrate on becoming as close as possible to the natural way of things. The major Daoist texts from this period are the *Zhuangzi* and Laozi's *Daodejing*. The *Zhuangzi* is one of the great works of world literature, simultaneously a profound philosophical study of metaphysics, language, epistemology, and ethics. It's also loads of fun to read for its colorful characters and paradoxical stories. Laozi's *Daodejing* echoes many themes of the *Zhuangzi*, with an emphasis on the sage as leader, non-action, and emptying the mind. Its poetic language and spare style stand it in stark contrast to the *Zhuangzi* but also allow for a richness of interpretation that has made it a favorite of contemplative thinkers across traditions. A third Daoist from this time period, Liezi, had his name placed on a book a few centuries later. The *Liezi* adopts the style and themes of the *Zhuangzi* and continues the whimsical yet profound tradition.

Other thinkers concentrated on ruthless efficiency in government and came to be known as Legalists. One major Legalist thinker was Han Feizi. His book, the *Han Feizi*, condemns ideas from other schools of thought that had devolved into practices that were considered wasteful, corrupt, and inefficient. In response, he speaks directly to the highest levels of leadership, using Daoist terminology and fable-like stories to make his points, advising rulers on how to motivate people, how to organize the government and the military, and how to protect their own positions of power.

Still other thinkers concentrated their theories on military strategy and tactics. The major representative of this genre is, of course, Sunzi, and his classic *The Art of War*, a text that so profoundly and succinctly examines how to get the greatest competitive advantage with the least harm done that it is still read today by military leaders and captains of industry.

The political, military, and intellectual battles continued throughout the Warring States Period in a complex interplay until Han Feizi's version of Legalism seemed to tip the balance for the Qin. But the victory was short-lived, and soon a version of Confucianism would rise to the top as the preferred philosophy of political elites. But Daoism, and later Buddhism, had their own periods of dominance and influenced many aspects of Chinese culture over the centuries.

## II. SUNZI AND HIS IDEAS

As with many ancient Chinese classics, we don't have a good sense of the original author of this book. In this illustrated version, C. C. Tsai begins by illustrating a key episode in the life of Sunzi that comes from a history of the period but dates to several centuries after Sunzi is said to have lived. We don't know how reliable it is, and although there are quite a few other

historical accounts of the times in which Sunzi is said to have lived, they don't mention him. There is another problem, as well: Sunzi is said to have lived at about the time of Confucius, toward the end of the Spring & Autumn Period, but there are a number of passages in *The Art of War* that reference conditions that did not occur until a couple of centuries later. This suggests that either the book was written later or was revised later. Commentators on the book throughout Chinese history have often remarked on other problems with the book's organization. Some passages appear out of place or read like comments or explanations that later copyists inadvertently incorporated into the text. All in all, it's not a good idea to focus too much attention on the author of the book or on stitching every piece together into a unified argument. Fortunately, in this version C. C. has stitched together all of the key lines of thinking, very close to the order presented in the original text, giving us a nice, well-ordered flow of ideas.

There are many pairs of conceptual opposites used in traditional European philosophy that we don't commonly see in Chinese philosophy, such as: spirit/matter, fact/value, mind/body, reason/emotion, and so on. But the Chinese have their own interesting conceptual pairings, one of which sets the idea of *wen* 文 against the idea of *wu* 武. *Wu* means pertaining to warfare or other kinds of violent conflict. (Add the word *shu* 術 [art] to it, and you get the Chinese word for martial arts.) *Wen* is more difficult to define. On the one hand, *wen* means high culture, like literature and art. On the other hand, *wen* suggests the morality and etiquette of civil society. Ideally, culture and morality contribute to each other in the education and growth of a person. Moral people educate themselves in cultural pursuits, refining their powers of sensitivity and understanding. Cultured people reflect on their social roles, with the goal of self-improvement and the betterment of others.

Traditionally in China, *wen* and *wu* were opposites, like fire and water—they don't go well together but each has its indispensable utility. *Wen* refers to the quality of the people who create a moral, cultured society, and *wu* implies a threat to some part of that society. The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously said that war is politics by other means, meaning that the aims of war and politics are the same: exerting one's will over others. During the Warring States Period, there were plenty of kings and aspiring kings who would have agreed with Clausewitz and who were willing to gain and extend their power by any means necessary. There were others, however, who pondered a little more deeply. To some of them, war and politics were altogether different. Politics is about the organization of society. War is what happens when social organization has broken down.

A statement by a nobleman of Chu, who lived several decades ahead of the time Sunzi is said to have lived, illustrates this idea. The nobleman had just won a significant victory on the battlefield, but instead of being pleased, he regretfully acknowledges the damage he has caused. In a written record of the time, he begins with an analysis of the character *wu* 武, saying that it is composed of the two characters *zhi* 止 and *ge* 戈. *Zhi* means to stop, and a *ge* is a dagger-axe (a popular weapon of the time), so *wu*, he says, means to stop fighting, rather than being about the glorification of fighting. He continues:

> *Wu* should be used to suppress brutality and lay down weapons. It should preserve wholeness, allow confidence for work to resume, restore stability and harmony, and rebuild wealth and abundance. . . . If weapons are not laid down and brutality not suppressed, how can wholeness be preserved? With the enemy in our territory, how can there be confidence for work to resume? If the desires of the people are thwarted, how can there be stability? If morals are set aside in conflicts with other noblemen, how can there be harmony? If I pursue honor through selfish motivations and by raining chaos down on people, how can there be wealth and abundance? (*Zuo Zhuan,* Xuan Gong 12)

The nobleman's point is that warfare should be used only to defend or restore social order, not to create or compound disorder just to satisfy the selfish goals of rulers.

A common idea in early China was that things happen in cycles. Think of a wave 〰 with peaks and troughs. The peaks are good, harmonious times, and the troughs are

disordered, violent times. *Wen* applies to times closer to the peaks, and *wu* applies to times closer to the troughs. In this sense, *wen* and *wu* are tools used by people for maintaining cosmic order, social order being a fundamental element of cosmic order. The larger progression of events in the cosmos occurs as a matter of transformation from one situation to another. The judicious use of alternating now *wen* and now *wu* in facing these transformations can maintain overall balance so that ultimately the people can thrive. These are ideas that Sunzi inherited, and we can see them on full display in *The Art of War*.

In Chapter 4, we see the idea of tactical disposition. In military terminology, tactical disposition refers to placing soldiers on the battlefield in formations that can be used to improve the odds of victory. For example, a commander might place foot soldiers in the middle, with cavalry on both sides. That's one formation.

One of the most famous formations in Chinese history is the Eight Trigrams formation, said to have been used by the brilliant strategist Zhuge Liang during the Three Kingdoms Period (220–280 BCE). He arranged soldiers in regimented placements in an octagon shape. Well-armored foot soldiers would funnel enemy cavalry toward the octagon. Instead of meeting the enemy head on, the octagon would open up and let them in. After they entered, they would lose their bearings and fall prey to the constantly shifting formations within the octagon.

Our main description of the Eight Trigrams formation comes in a work of historical fiction, so we don't know if it actually existed, but it illustrates the idea of tactical disposition. The Chinese term is *xing* 形, which means shape or form. In its military use, it carries the connotation of being tactical because the formations don't come in just any old form for any old purpose. What makes a disposition, or formation, tactical is not just its form or the make-up of the soldiers or their weapons, but their use. Sunzi emphasizes that you must always work toward your own advantage and toward the enemy's disadvantage. This may sound obvious, but it means waiting and preparing for the right moment to attack. For example, Sunzi says that when attacking an enemy crossing a river, you should wait until they are halfway across, then you can use the obstacle of the water against them.

Setting up events to your own strategic advantage is called *shi* 勢, which is translated in the book as force, or momentum (see especially Chapter 5). The idea is that there is an accumulation of force that is unleashed all at once, and because of its overwhelming power, it is unstoppable. Images used by Sunzi, and depicted so adeptly by C. C., include a stone striking an egg and a log rolling down a hill. The image with the strongest sense of strategy is the hawk that attacks from above. It remains unseen, waiting, until the opportune moment, and then strikes like lightning, with perfect speed and inescapable accuracy. Sunzi envisions the ideal battle to be like this: quick to strike and quick to end.

When we think of war, we might think of two armies coming straight at each other on the battlefield, each soldier clearly identified by uniform as a member of one army or the other. Unless one of those armies far outnumbered and outgunned the other, it's hard to think how Sunzi would approve of it as the primary method of warfare. This kind of head-on melee is called frontal warfare. The method of the hawk, on the other hand, is the surprise attack.

According to Sunzi, using frontal and surprise attacks to catch the enemy off guard and create a decisive victory is the most desirable way to battle. It is like the cycles mentioned above and like the constantly changing positions in the Eight Trigrams formation. Using frontal and surprise methods in unpredictable combinations keeps the enemy on their heels, allowing for a decisive strike.

There are many times when Sunzi discusses knowing who will win and who will lose. At first glance, this kind of comment probably seems pretty forgettable, but there is a bigger idea behind it. Going all the way back to the *Yijing*, which began to take shape about five hundred years before Sunzi is said to have lived, we see a great concern in the early Chinese to understand the cycles of nature. To understand a cycle is to be able to make predictions, and therefore to be able to act at the right time to your advantage. The *Yijing* is less about fortune-telling and more about interpreting cycles in order to react

appropriately. Recognizing patterns in order to react to them became a common theme in many strands of Chinese thought.

So when Sunzi says that one can gain knowledge about a battle, he is saying that by following his methods, one can see a few chess moves ahead and be in a position to strike at the opportune moment. We get a vivid sense of recognizing patterns when he discusses how to interpret dust kicked up by the advancing enemy (Chapter 9).

In a book about warfare, we shouldn't be surprised to see talk of killing the enemy, but we also see in Sunzi some pretty harsh methods used on his own soldiers, like putting them in a desperate situation so that they fight to the death. And in the story about Sunzi training the palace women, his method of discipline is, from a contemporary perspective, downright inhumane. This aspect of Sunzi's philosophy represents a line of thinking that gradually gained acceptance during the later pre-imperial period: rigorous discipline, harsh punishment, and generous rewards, meted out in ways that were easy to understand and consistently applied. The idea was to take advantage of basic human motivations around pleasure and fear. This led to well-organized and well-motivated troops.

This disciplinarian and legalistic approach contrasted sharply with the moralistic approach of the Confucians, who favored intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation. In Sunzi's defense, he was not proposing an organizational philosophy for all of society, just for the very specific case of the military—conditions of *wu*. And although he left the *wen* to the noblemen and civil servants, he is very clear that the end goal for *wu* is a peaceful, prosperous state. That's why he is so strongly against rushing into war. Not only should your goals in warfare be clear, they must be clearly achievable. In the end, we see that although Sunzi's methods are harsh, he is a humanitarian underneath—*wu* for the sake of *wen*.

## III. THE ARTIST AND HIS WORK

When I was a kid and the daily newspaper was still a thing, I loved reading the comic strips and the political cartoons. They could be cute, amusing, and insightful all at once. When I came across C. C. Tsai's illustrated versions of the Chinese classics, I recognized the same brilliant combination of wit and wisdom and fell in love with his books.

I would be remiss if I finished this introduction without introducing the inimitable Chih-chung Tsai (蔡志忠), who goes by "C. C." in English, and whose own story is as amazing as anything he depicts in his books. The way he tells it, he knew at the age of five that he would draw for a living, and at the age of fifteen, his father gave him permission to drop out of school and move from their small town to the metropolis of Taipei, where a comic publisher had welcomed him after receiving an unsolicited manuscript, not realizing how young he was. The young C. C. developed his own humorous comic book characters, all the while honing his skills and learning from other illustrators. During a required three-year stint in the military, he devoted all of his free time to educating himself in art history and graphic design. On leaving the military he tested into a major movie and television production company, beating out other applicants with their formal educations. There, he had the good fortune of coming across a cache of Disney films and taught himself animation. Soon he was making his own short films, and then decided to open his own animation studio, winning Taiwan's equivalent of the Oscar just two years later.

Always looking for a new challenge, C. C. began a syndicated comic strip, which quickly expanded to five different strips in magazines and newspapers across Southeast Asia. At the height of his popularity as a syndicated cartoonist, he turned in yet another direction—the illustration of the Chinese classics in comic book format. They were an instant success and propelled him to the top of the bestseller list. That's what you have in your hand.

According to C. C., the secret to his success is not ambition, or even hard work. It's just about having fun and following his interests. One of his interests has been studying the classics. Remember, he dropped out of middle school. By ordinary standards, he should be unable to grasp the language of ancient China. The early Chinese wrote in a language that is to contemporary Chinese as Latin is to contemporary Spanish or Italian. But he is a tireless autodidact, with a nearly photographic memory. He knows as much about the Chinese classics as

# Pronunciation Index

There are different systems of Romanization of Chinese words, but in all of these systems the sounds of the letters used do not necessarily correspond to those sounds which we are accustomed to using in English (for instance, would you have guessed that zh is pronounced like j as in "jelly"—not as in "je ne sais quoi"?). Of course, these systems can be learned, but to save some time and effort for the reader who is not a student of Chinese, we have provided the following pronunciation guide. The Chinese words appear on the left as they do in the text and are followed by their pronunciations. Just sound out the pronunciations as you would for an unfamiliar English word, and you will be quite close to the proper Mandarin pronunciation.

In addition, Chinese philosophical terms have been defined, and page numbers have been provided where every glossed term appears in the book.

## NOTES

–dz is a combination of a d and a z in one sound, without the ee sound at the end; so it sounds kind of like a bee in flight with a slight d sound at the beginning.

–zh is pronounced like the j in "jelly" and not like the j in "je ne sais quoi."

Bingfa 兵法 (principles and tactics of warfare): beeng-faw 2, 53
Boju 柏舉: bwo (o as in more)–jew (ew as in few) vii

Chu 楚: choo vii, viii, 9

Da Xue 大學: daw shweh xii
Dao 道 (moral cause): dow viii, 12, 13, 18
Daodejing 道德經: dow-du (u as in pull)-jeeng xii

ge 戈 : gu (u as in pull) xiii

Han 漢: hon (as in honcho) xi
Han Feizi 韓非子: hon (as in honcho) fay-dz xii
Helü 闔廬: hu (u as in pull)-lew (ew as in few) vii, 2, 9

Jiang Shang 姜尚: jyong shong 125
Jin 晉: jeen 9

Kongzi 孔子: kong (long o)-dz 2

Laozi 老子: lou (as in lounge)-dz xii
Liezi 列子: lyeh-dz xii

Mao Zedong 毛澤東: mou (as in mouse) dzu (u as in pull)–dong (long o) viii
Ming 明: meeng xi
Mengzi 孟子: mung-dz 2

Qi 齊: chee xi, 2, 9
Qin 秦: cheen xi
Qing 清: cheeng xi
Quan Rong 犬戎: chwen rong (long o)

Shang 商: shong xi
Shen 申: shun xi
Shenzong 神宗: shun dzong (long o) vii
shi 勢 (force, momentum): shir xiv, 59–62, 68, 98
shu 術 (technique, method): shoo xiii
Shuairan 率然: shrigh (rhymes with high)-rawn 110
Song 宋: song (long o) vii, xi, xii