The Cambridge Companion to THE STOICS



EDITED BY
BRAD INWOOD

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THE STOICS

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Brad Inwood

University of Toronto

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BRAD INWOOD

Introduction: Stoicism, An Intellectual Odyssey

Stoicism has its roots in the philosophical activity of Socrates. But its historical journey began in the enrichment of that tradition with other influences by Zeno of Citium almost a century after Socrates' death, and it continued in the rise and decline of the school he founded. An apparently long pause followed during the Middle Ages, although it seems clear that its philosophical influence continued to be felt through a variety of channels, many of which are difficult to chart. In the early modern period, Stoicism again became a significant part of the philosophical scene and has remained an influential intellectual force ever since.

In the middle of the last century, Max Pohlenz, in a book whose value was always limited by the cultural forces of its time and place (Pohlenz 1948), described the school as an 'intellectual movement.' 'Intellectual movement' captured something of the longevity and protean variability of Stoicism. The dynamic connotations of that metaphor are apt, but I prefer the metaphor of a special kind of journey. An intellectual engagement with Stoicism is an odyssey in three ways. First, the historical trajectory of the school itself and its influence is replete with digressions, narrative ornament, and improbable connections, yet moving ultimately toward an intelligible conclusion. Second, the task of recovering the history of Stoic thought is an adventure in the history of philosophy. It can be a perilous journey for the novice, one requiring guides as varied in their skills and temperaments as was Odysseus, whose epithet *polutropos* ('man of many talents') indicates what is called for. And third, for those readers who find the central ideas of Stoicism appealing either in a purely intellectual way or in the moral imagination, the ongoing confrontation with Stoicism is one which refines philosophical intuitions, challenges

both imagination and analytical talents, and leads ultimately to hard philosophical choices which, if taken seriously, define the kind of life one chooses to lead.

This *Companion* is intended as a resource for readers of various kinds as they approach Stoicism along any of these paths, whether they do so for the first time or after considerable prior experience. The authors contributing to this volume are all masters of their fields, but they are as different in their intellectual and literary styles as were the Stoics themselves. I hope that the variety of talents and approaches brought together in this *Companion* will serve the reader well.

Since this book is to serve as a guide to an entire philosophical tradition and not just to one philosopher, it has an unusual structure. It begins with two chapters that chart the history of the school in the ancient world. David Sedley (Chapter 1) takes us from the foundation of the school to the end of its institutional life as a school in the conventional ancient sense, and Christopher Gill (Chapter 2) picks up the story and takes it through the period of the Roman Empire, an era often thought to have been philosophically less creative but, paradoxically, the period which has given us our principal surviving texts written by ancient Stoics. It is therefore also the period which most decisively shaped the understanding of Stoicism in the early modern period, when philosophers did not yet have access to the historical reconstructions of early Stoicism on which we now rely.

The central part of the book is a series of chapters on major themes within the Stoic system. We begin with epistemology (Chapter 3, R. J. Hankinson) and logic (Chapter 4, Susanne Bobzien), two areas in which the philosophical influence of Stoicism has been particularly enduring. Ancient Stoicism produced the most influential (and controversial) version of empiricism in the ancient world, and the logic of Chrysippus, the third head of the school, was one of the great intellectual achievements of the school, though it was not until the modern development of sentential rather than term logic that its distinctive merits became visible. Natural philosophy is, of course, founded on cosmology and the analysis of material stuffs, so in Chapter 5 Michael J. White sets out the framework in which the following three chapters should be read. Theology (Chapter 6, Keimpe Algra), determinism (Chapter 7, Dorothea Frede), and metaphysics (Chapter 8,

Throughout the *Companion*, the reader will find a wide variety of philosophical approaches, from the reflective explorations of ethics by Malcolm Schofield to the magisterial exposition of logic by Susanne Bobzien. Authors have been encouraged to write in the manner that best suits their topic, and the result is as varied as the paths taken by the Stoic tradition itself. Similarly, no attempt has been made to impose a unified set of philosophical or historical presuppositions on the authors, as is apparent in the differing assessments of Aristotle's influence on early Stoicism made by Sedley (who tends to minimize it) and by White and Frede, who see the early leaders of the school as reacting rather more directly to Aristotle's work. A similar variation will be found in the handling by various authors of some of the more specialized technical terms coined or used by the ancient Stoics, since the best translation of any such term is determined by the authors' interpretations. Take, for example, the term *kathêkon* in Stoic ethics. In Chapter 10, Brennan explains it without translating it; Sedley renders it 'proper action'; Gill as 'appropriate' or 'reasonable action'; Hankinson as 'fitting action'; and Brunschwig follows Long and Sedley (1987) in rendering the term 'proper function'. In such cases the authors have made clear the original technical term so that themes can be followed easily across the various chapters where it might occur. And the reader will certainly find significant overlap and intersection of themes in this *Companion*. The Stoic school in antiquity prided itself (rightly or wrongly) on its integration and internal consistency. The 'blended exposition' (DL 7.40) that characterized their teaching of the three parts of philosophy is bound to replicate itself in any modern discussion of their work.

The variety of interpretation found in this *Companion* is, the reader should be warned, typical of the current state of scholarship in the field. There is little orthodoxy among specialists in the study of ancient Stoicism – and that is wholly appropriate in view of the state of our evidence for the early centuries of the school's history. But although a standard 'line' is not available on most issues, there has developed a broad consensus on the most important factors that contribute to the study of Stoicism, as they do for any past philosophical movement: the sources for understanding it, the external history which affects it, and the leading topics to be dealt with. This growing consensus is reflected in a number of excellent works of which the

reader of this book should be aware. Without pretending to provide a guide to further reading – a virtually impossible task – I merely indicate here some of the key resources about which any reader will want to know. Bibliographical details appear after Chapter 15.

A fuller and more authoritative account of the school during its Hellenistic phase is in the *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Algra et al. 1999), in the context of a comprehensive account of other movements in the period. English translations of primary texts are scattered in various collections and other publications, many of which will be difficult to use for readers who are limited to English. But two particularly useful collections are Long and Sedley (1987), which includes extensive philosophical discussion, and Inwood and Gerson (1997). There have been several highly influential volumes of essays in the area of Hellenistic philosophy; for example, Schofield et al. (1980), Schofield and Striker (1986), and Brunschwig and Nussbaum (1993). Collections of papers by Brunschwig (1994a), Long (1996), and Striker (1996a) are also excellent sources for challenging detailed discussions. But, inevitably, the only way for a newcomer to find his or her way around the primary and secondary sources for Stoicism is to dive in – and this *Companion* aims to make that plunge more inviting and less hazardous than it would otherwise be.

I am hopeful that many readers will find this plunge worth taking; if they do, the labours of the authors and editor will not have been in vain. Stoic philosophy is a curious blend of intellectual challenges. It will reward those whose strongest interests are in the historical evolution of ideas, but it will bring an even greater reward to those whose concern with Stoicism lies in the wide range of still challenging philosophical problems they either broached for the first time or developed in a distinctive way. There are also rewards for those who, like Lawrence Becker (1998), are convinced that a fundamentally Stoic approach to the role of reason in human life is worth exploring and developing in the present millennium, just as it has been during the last three.

As editor, I have many debts to acknowledge. The first is to the authors of the chapters that follow. They have been genuinely companionable throughout the long gestation of this project, devoting time and thought to its overall well-being, often at the cost of personal and professional inconvenience. The expert assistance of Rodney Ast made it possible to prepare the final manuscript in far less time

than I could otherwise have hoped for. Financial support for the editorial work has come from the Canada Research Chair programme of the Canadian government and from the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada. I am particularly grateful to the Cambridge University Press for its patience and flexibility (and for permission to include the chapter by A. A. Long, which also appears in *Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy*).

But my greatest debt is to my family, especially to my wife, Niko Scharer. The compilation of this *Companion* took place during an unusually busy stretch of our life, one beset by more distractions and activities than are normally compatible with Stoic *tranquillitas*. Without her tolerance for an often-absent domestic companion, this Stoic *Companion* might never have been completed.

Brad Inwood
Toronto, June 2002

2. ATHENS

The history of Stoicism in its first two centuries is that of a marriage between two worlds. The major figures who founded and led the Stoic school came, with remarkably few exceptions, from the eastern Mediterranean region. Yet the city that gave their school not just its physical location but its very identity was Athens, the cultural metropolis of mainland Greece.

According to Socrates in Plato's *Theaetetus* (173c–e), the true philosopher is blissfully unaware of his civic surroundings. Not only does he not know the way to the agora, he does not even know that he does not know it. Yet, paradoxically, it was Socrates himself, above all through Plato's brilliant literary portrayals, who created the indissoluble link between the philosophical life and the city of Athens. There the leading schools of philosophy were founded in the fourth and third centuries B.C. There the hub of philosophical activity remained until the first century B.C. And there, after two centuries of virtual exile, philosophy returned in the second century A.D. with the foundation of the Antonine chairs of philosophy, to remain in residence more or less continuously for the remainder of antiquity. During all this time, only one other city, Alexandria, was able to pose a sustained challenge to Athens' philosophical preeminence.[1]

The founder of Stoicism, Zeno, came to Athens from the town of Citium (modern Larnaca) in Cyprus. His successor Cleanthes was a native of Assos, in the Troad (western Turkey); and *his* successor, Chrysippus, the greatest of all the Stoics, came from Soli, in Cilicia (southern Turkey). In the generation after Chrysippus, the two leading figures and school heads were of similarly oriental origin: Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus. Nor does this pattern – which could be further exemplified at length – distinguish the Stoics from members of other schools, who were almost equally uniformly of eastern origin. Rather, it illustrates the cultural dynamics of the age. Alexander the Great's conquests had spread the influence of Greek culture to the entire eastern Mediterranean region and beyond. But among those thus influenced, anyone for whom the

[1] The many valuable studies relating to the history and nature of philosophical schools include (in chronological order) Nock (1933), Ch. XI, 'Conversion to philosophy'; Lynch (1972); Glucker (1978); Donini (1982); Natali (1996); and Dorandi (1999).

philosophical tradition inaugurated by Socrates held a special appeal was likely to be drawn to the streets and other public places of the city in which Socrates had so visibly lived his life of inquiry and self-scrutiny. (In this regard, philosophy stood apart from the sciences and literature, for both of which the patronage of the Ptolemaic dynasty in Alexandria offered a powerful rival attraction.) So deep was the bond between philosophy and Athens that when in the first century B.C. it was broken, as we shall see in Section 8, the entire nature of the philosophical enterprise was transformed.

3. ZENO

The early career of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, eloquently conjures up the nature of the Hellenistic philosophical enterprise. He was born in (probably) 334 B.C. at Citium, a largely Hellenized city which did, however, retain a sufficient Phoenician component in its culture to earn Zeno the nickname 'the Phoenician'. Nothing can be safely inferred from this latter fact about Zeno's intellectual, ethnic, or cultural background, but what is clear is that, at least from his early twenties, he was passionately addicted to the philosophical traditions of Athens, encouraged, it was said, by books about Socrates that his father, a merchant, brought back from his travels. He migrated there at the age of twenty-two, and the next decade or so was one of study, entirely with philosophers who could be represented as the authentic living voices of Socrates' philosophy. If Stoicism emerged as, above all, a Socratic philosophy, this formative period in Zeno's life explains why.

His first studies are said to have been with the Cynic Crates, and Cynic ethics remained a dominant influence on Stoic thought. Crates and his philosopher wife, Hipparchia, were celebrated for their scandalous flouting of social norms. Zeno endorsed the implicitly Socratic motivation of this stand – the moral indifference of such conventional values as reputation and wealth. The most provocative of Zeno's own twenty-seven recorded works – reported also to be his earliest, and very possibly written at this time – was a utopian political tract, the *Republic*. In characteristically Cynic fashion, most civic institutions – temples, law courts, coinage, differential dress for the sexes, conventional education, marriage, and so forth – were to be abolished. What was presumably not yet in evidence, but was

and the school he had founded was to become the dominant school of the Hellenistic Age.

Soon after the emergence of Zeno's school, the minor 'Socratic' movements headed by his teachers Stilpo (the 'Megarics') and Diodorus (the 'Dialecticians') seem to have vanished from the scene. The impression is that the Stoa, having absorbed their most important work, had now effectively supplanted them.[2] There is, in fact, evidence that the Stoics themselves were happy to be classed generically as 'Socratics'.[3] And with good reason: their ethical system, characterised by its intellectualist identification of goodness with wisdom and the consequent elimination of non-moral 'goods' as indifferent, was thoroughly Socratic in inspiration. True, the standard of perfection that they set for their idealised 'sage' was so rigorous that even Socrates himself did not quite qualify in their eyes. But there can be little doubt that, even so, the detailed portrayals of the sage's conduct which generation after generation of Stoics compiled owed much to the legend of Socrates. A prime example is the sage's all-important choice of a 'well-reasoned exit' from life, an ideal of which Socrates' own death was held up as the paradigm. Roman Stoics like the younger Cato and Seneca even modeled their own deaths on that of Socrates.

As for the Academy, Zeno's other main source of inspiration, within a few decades it had largely shelved its doctrinal agenda and, under the headship of Arcesilaus, become a primarily critical and sceptical school. The main target of this 'New Academy' was, by all accounts, none other than the Stoa, and the two schools' polemical interaction over the following two centuries is one of the most invigorating features of Hellenistic philosophical history. In Zeno's own day the Peripatetic school, founded by Aristotle and now maintained by his eminent successor Theophrastus, retained much of its prestige and influence, but for the remainder of the Hellenistic Age only the philosophically antithetical Epicurean school could compete with the Stoa as a doctrinal movement.

[2] Likewise another minor Socratic school, the hedonist Cyrenaics, was eclipsed by the Epicureans.

[3] Philodemus, *De Stoicis* XIII 3: the Stoics 'are willing (*thelousi*) also to be called Socratics'. This should not, as it sometimes is, be misinterpreted as expressing a positive preference on their part for 'Socratics' as a school title.

One apparent feature of early Stoicism that has caused controversy is the surprising rarity of engagement with the philosophy of Aristotle. Even some of the most basic and widely valued tools of Aristotelian philosophy, such as the distinction between potentiality and actuality, play virtually no part in Stoic thought. Although there is little consensus about this,[4] the majority of scholars would probably accept that, at the very least, considerably less direct response to Aristotelianism is detectable in early Stoicism than to the various voices of the Socratic-Platonic tradition. It is not until the period of Middle Stoicism (see Section 7) that appreciation of Aristotle's importance finally becomes unmistakable. Yet Aristotle and his school were among the truly seminal thinkers of late-fourth-century Athens and, in the eyes of many, Aristotle himself remains the outstanding philosopher of the entire Western tradition. How can a system created immediately in his wake show so little consciousness of his cardinal importance? One suggested explanation is that Aristotle's school treatises, the brilliant but often very difficult texts by which we know him today, were not at this date as widely disseminated and studied as his more popularising works. But an alternative or perhaps complementary explanation lies in Zeno's positive commitment to Socratic philosophy, of which the Peripatetics did not present themselves as voices. Either way, we must avoid the unhistorical assumption that Aristotle's unique importance was as obvious to his near-contemporaries as it is to us.

Zeno's philosophy was formally tripartite, consisting of ethics, physics, and logic. His ethics has already been sketched above as a socially respectable revision of Cynic morality. His physics – stemming in large part from Plato's *Timaeus* but with an added role for fire which appears to be of Heraclitean inspiration, and which may reflect the input of his colleague Cleanthes – posits a single, divinely governed world consisting of primary 'matter' infused by an active force, 'god', both of them considered corporeal and indeed depending on that property for their interactive causal powers. As probably the one good and perfectly rational thing available to human inspection, this world is a vital object of study even for ethical

[4] Views range from that of Sandbach (1985) that Aristotle's school treatises were all but unknown to the early Stoics, to those of others, such as Hahm (1977), who give Aristotelian philosophy a very significant role in the formation of Stoicism.

purposes. 'Logic', finally, includes not only the formal study of argument and other modes of discourse, but also what we would broadly call 'epistemology'. Here, in a clean break with his Platonist teacher, Zeno developed a fundamentally empiricist thesis according to which certain impressions, available to everybody through their ordinary sensory equipment, are an infallible guide to external truths and, therefore, the starting point for scientific understanding of the world.

Zeno appears to have been more an inspirational than a systematic philosophical writer, and it was left to later generations to set about formalising his philosophy (see especially Section 5).

4. THE FIRST-GENERATION SCHOOL

The temporary title 'Zenonians' must have reflected Zeno's intellectual dominance of the group gathered around him, more than any formal submission to his leadership on their part, or for that matter any official institutional structures (on which our sources are eloquently silent). For during Zeno's lifetime there is no sign of the phenomenon that, as we shall see, was to hold the Athenian school together after his death, namely, a formal commitment to his philosophical authority. His leading colleagues were a highly independent and heterogeneous group. It would be wrong to give the impression that *no* degree of doctrinal conformity was expected: when, for example, one of Zeno's eminent followers, Dionysius of Heracleia (later nicknamed 'Dionysius the Renegade'), was induced by an excruciating medical condition to reject the doctrine that physical pain is indifferent and so to espouse hedonism, he left the school altogether. Nevertheless, by contrast with later generations, it is the lack of conformity that stands out.

This difference should not cause surprise, since it reflects the broad pattern of philosophical allegiance in the ancient world. The evolution of a formal school around a leader was likely to be, as in Zeno's own case, a gradual process, during which emerging differences of opinion would continue to flourish. It was, typically, only after the founder's death that his thought and writings were canonised, so that school membership would come to entail some kind of implicit commitment to upholding them. Plato's school, the Academy, is an excellent illustration of this pattern. In Plato's own lifetime,

There are signs of philosophical independence also in other figures of the first-generation school. Herillus of Carthage, who had unorthodox views on the moral 'end', is specifically reported to have included critiques of Zeno in his writings.[7] And Persaeus, himself a native of Citium and undoubtedly a close associate of his fellow citizen Zeno, nevertheless wrote dialogues in which he portrayed himself arguing against him (Athenaeus 162d). The one first-generation Stoic who clearly appears in the sources as committed to endorsing Zeno's pronouncements is Cleanthes; and, for all we know, the evidence for this may entirely represent the period after Zeno's death in 262, when Cleanthes himself took over the headship of the school. It is to that second phase that we now turn.

5. THE POST-ZENONIAN SCHOOL

Given what we will see (Section 6) to have been the apparent lack of an elaborate institutional framework, it was perhaps inevitable that the school's sense of identity should come from a continuing focus on its founding figure, Zeno. Without his personal engagement in its debates, teaching, and other activities, it may have been equally inevitable that his defining role should be prolonged by a new concern with scrutinizing his writings and defending and elaborating his doctrines. At any rate, doctrinal debates between leading Stoics quickly came to take the form of disputes about the correct interpretation of Zeno's own words. Numerous disputes of this type are evident between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the latter of whom went so far as to teach outside the Stoa before eventually returning to succeed Cleanthes as school head on his death in 230. A typical case concerns the nature of *phantasiai* (i.e., 'impressions', 'presentations', or 'appearings').[8] Cleanthes took these to be pictorial likenesses of their objects, imprinted on the soul, itself a corporeal part of the living being. Chrysippus, insisting on the impossibility of the soul simultaneously retaining a plurality of these imprints, argued that they were modifications of the soul but not literal imprints. What is significant in the present context is less the details of the debate than its form. For Zeno, following a tradition inaugurated by the famous

[7] DL VII 165.
[8] S. E. *M* VII 227–41. Cf. Ch. 3, Hankinson, this volume.

image of the mind as a wax tablet in Plato's *Theaetetus*,[9] had defined impressions as mental 'imprints', and the respective positions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus were presented and developed as rival interpretations of Zeno's own words. Although there is no reason to doubt that their competing arguments were in fact focused on the philosophical merits of their respective cases, the formally exegetical character of the exchange speaks eloquently of the authority that Zeno, once dead, came to exert in the school. Various other debates seem likely to have taken on the same formal framework. Consider, for instance, the controversy between (once again) Cleanthes and Chrysippus about whether Zeno's definitions of each virtue as wisdom regarding a certain area of conduct made all the virtues identical with one and the same state of mind, wisdom – as Cleanthes held – or left each – in line with Chrysippus' doctrine – as a distinct branch of wisdom.[10] Even the most high-profile and enduring of all Stoic debates – regarding the correct formulation of the moral 'end' (*telos*) – seems to have started from Zeno's laconic wording of it as 'living in agreement' (although he may himself have subsequently started the process of exegesis by adding 'with nature'), bequeathing to his successors the unending task of spelling out its precise implications.[11] Even where intraschool disputes were not a factor and the criticisms came from outside, Zeno's formal assertions and arguments had to be defended and vindicated. Thus, a number of his extraordinarily daring syllogisms were defended against his critics. Many of these were defences of theistic conclusions that no Stoic would hesitate to endorse;[12] but one – his syllogistic defence of the thesis that the rational mind is in the chest, not the head – had a conclusion which itself became increasingly untenable in the light of Hellenistic anatomical research – despite which Chrysippus and other leading Stoics resolutely kept up their championship of it.[13]

In all this, the actual source of authority was Zeno's writings, now recast in the role of the school's gospels. Although the works that were preserved under his name undoubtedly conveyed some

[9] Plato, *Tht.* 191–5.
[10] Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 441a–c, *St. rep.* 1034c–e.
[11] See, e.g., Stobaeus *Ecl.* II 75–76.
[12] For these syllogisms, and later Stoic defences of them, see Schofield (1983).
[13] For Zeno's syllogism and the defensive reformulations of it by Chrysippus and Diogenes, see Galen, *PHP* II 5. See also on Posidonius, n. 16.

in the school's history largely for his skillful handbook-style definitions of dialectical and ethical terms, and for his formal defences of Zeno of Citium's controversial syllogisms. The main area in which Diogenes can be seen to go beyond mere consolidation of the school's achievements – and this may well be a sign of the intellectual fashions of the day – is aesthetics: Philodemus preserves evidence of major contributions by Diogenes to musical and rhetorical theory.

6. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

Even less is known about the institutional character of the Stoa than about that of other Athenian schools. We have no evidence that Zeno bequeathed to his successor any kind of school property, financial structure, or organisational hierarchy. What is well attested, however, is that – as in other philosophical schools – there was a formal head (the 'scholarch'). Whether he was nominated by his predecessor or elected after his death is unknown but, once appointed, he certainly held the office for life.

Although the school's institutional structure remains obscure, the question of finance clearly bulked large. Not all school adherents were wealthy; Cleanthes in particular was reputedly impecunious and is reported to have charged fees.[17] His successor Chrysippus wrote in support of the practice, which he himself plainly adopted,[18] as did at least one of his own successors, Diogenes of Babylon.[19] In his work *On livelihoods*, Chrysippus enlarged the question, asking in how many ways a philosopher might appropriately earn a living. The only three acceptable means, he concluded, were serving a king (if one could not oneself be a king), reliance on friends, and teaching. There is no evidence that Chrysippus adopted the first of these practices, and Zeno was said to have explicitly declined invitations to the Macedonian court.[20] Other leading Stoics did adopt it, however: Persaeus took up the invitation to Macedon in Zeno's stead, and Sphaerus, a younger contemporary, had strong links with both the Alexandrian and Spartan courts.

[17] Philodemus, *Ind. St.* 19 with Dorandi (1994) *ad loc.*
[18] Plut. *St. rep.* 1043b–1044a.
[19] Cic. *Acad.* II 98.
[20] DL VII 6.

Quite apart from financial considerations, some of these dynastic links were undoubtedly of considerable political significance for the long-term fortunes of the Stoa.[21] In Athens itself, too, the school's public standing seems to have been high. After the brief period in 307 during which the philosophers were exiled from the city (ironically, a symptom of their growing political importance), all the signs are that they enjoyed considerable public esteem. Although, other than Epicurus, virtually all the Hellenistic philosophers of whom we hear were non-Athenians, it seems clear that many were granted Athenian citizenship.[22] In addition to citizenship, other recognitions of eminence were conferred on philosophers. Zeno of Citium, for instance, although he is said to have refused the offer of citizenship out of respect for his native city, was formally honoured by the Athenians in a decree at the time of his death:[23]

> Because Zeno of Citium spent many years philosophising in the city, and furthermore lived the life of a good man, and exhorted those young men who came to join him to virtue and self-discipline and encouraged them towards what is best, setting up as a model his own life, which was one in accordance with all the teachings on which he discoursed, the people decided – may it turn out well – to praise Zeno of Citium the son of Mnaseas and to crown him with a golden crown, as the law prescribes, for his virtue and self-discipline, and also to build him a tomb in the Kerameikos at public expense.

(The decree then continues with details of the commissioners appointed to oversee the work.)

It is from the mid second century onward that the philosophers' civic standing seems to have been at its most remarkable. In 155, the current heads of the Stoa (i.e., Diogenes of Babylon), the Academy, and the Peripatos were chosen as ambassadors to represent Athens in negotiations at Rome, pleading for remission of a fine imposed on

[21] This aspect is explored by Erskine (1990).

[22] Cf. Philodemus, *Hist. Acad.* XXXII 6–8 Dorandi (1991), where the Academic Charmadas, returning to Athens from Asia, 'easily obtained citizenship, and opened a school in the Ptolemaeum . . .' For the epigraphic evidence on this honorific practice, see Osborne (1981–3).

[23] DL VII 10–11. The decree was, rather pointedly, exhibited in both the Academy and the Lyceum.

the city for the sack of Oropus.[24] The occasion was of especial historical importance because of the packed lectures that the philosophers gave while in Rome, causing shock waves among the Roman establishment, but doing more than any other single event to ignite at Rome a fascination with philosophy which was to remain undiminished for the remainder of antiquity and to have special importance for the future fortunes of Stoicism.

7. THE INTEGRATION OF PLATONISM

From the mid second century B.C. onward, a new trend in the Stoic school's orientation becomes visible: a revised recognition of its Platonic heritage. Some have traced this trend back to Diogenes of Babylon (see Section 5), but the best evidence points to his successor Antipater of Tarsus (school head in the 150s and 140s B.C.) as its true instigator. Antipater, notable among other things for his innovative work in logic, wrote a treatise entitled *On Plato's doctrine that only what is virtuous is good* (SVF 3 [Antipater] 56), in which (we are told) he argued that a wide range of Stoic doctrines in fact constituted common ground with Plato. We do not know his motivation, but a plausible conjecture links the treatise to his well-attested engagement with his contemporary critic, Carneades, the greatest head of the sceptical Academy, with whom he fought a running battle over the coherence of the Stoic ethical 'end'. There were obvious tactical gains to be made by showing that Stoic ethical and other doctrines, under fire from the Academy, were in fact identical to the doctrines of the Academy's own founder.

Be that as it may, the new interest in exploring common ground with Plato[25] gathered pace in the late first century B.C. with Antipater's successor Panaetius (scholarch 129–110), and Panaetius' own eminent pupil Posidonius (lived c. 135–51 B.C.). By this stage, the motivation was certainly much more than polemical. Plato's *Timaeus* in particular had exerted a seminal influence on early Stoic

[24] The absence of an Epicurean representative among them attests the apolitical stance adopted and promoted by this school.

[25] One area where Antipater seems likely to have been doing just this is metaphysics: he is the first Stoic recorded (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 209.11ff., 217.9ff.) as writing about *hekta*, 'properties', a theme which here and elsewhere involves comparison between Platonic Forms and the entities equivalent to them in Stoicism.

Gorgias.[29] It was Posidonius' *tri*partition of the soul that first clearly went beyond what the Stoics recognized as 'Socratic' and invoked an earlier, allegedly 'Pythagorean', tradition.[30]

Leaving aside this last development, most other features of Panaetius' and Posidonius' work show an impressive harmony of approach. Both, for example, are said to have made regular use of early Peripatetic as well as Platonist writings.[31] One way in which their Aristotelianism manifested itself was in an encyclopedic polymathy which had not been at all characteristic of their Stoic forerunners. Beyond the usual philosophical curriculum, both wrote widely on historical, geographical, and mathematical questions, among many others. Posidonius' history alone – it was a continuation of Polybius' – ran to fifty-two volumes. Both, but especially Posidonius, traveled widely in the Mediterranean region, and both became intimates of prominent Roman statesmen (Scipio the Younger in Panaetius' case, Pompey and Cicero in Posidonius').

There are a number of aspects in which this reorientated Stoicism points forward to the school's future character, as will become increasingly evident in the following discussion. It is also of vital relevance to the history of Stoicism to mention the impact of this new approach on the Academy. For what Panaetius and Posidonius had brought about was a pooling of philosophical resources among what could be seen as three branches of the Platonist tradition: early Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. This 'syncretism', as it has come to be known, had a visible impact on a younger contemporary of Panaetius, Antiochus of Ascalon.[32] Antiochus was a member of the Academy – at this date still formally a sceptical school but increasingly interested in the development of positive doctrine. From his side of the divide, he came to share the Middle Stoa's recognition of a common heritage, differing only in that he reclaimed it – or at any rate all that was best in it, which for him excluded some central

[29] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 493a–d. Importantly, it could also be presented as the correct interpretation of Zeno of Citium, as indeed it was by Posidonius (Galen, *PHP* V 6.34–7 = F166 EK).

[30] In addition to these remarks on Posidonius and the *Timaeus*, note that Chrysippus already regarded tripartition as Plato's own contribution rather than Socrates' (Galen, *PHP* IV 1.6), and that at least one tradition (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* IV 10, DL VII 30) located the antecedents of Platonic tripartition in Pythagoras.

[31] For Panaetius, see Philodemus, *Ind. St.* 51, Cicero *Fin.* IV 79. For Posidonius, Strabo II 3.8 = Posidonius T85 EK.

[32] On Antiochus, see Barnes (1989) and Görler (1994).

aspects of Stoic ethics – for the Platonist school. How influential Antiochus was on the later history of Platonism is disputed, but what is not in doubt is that he became enormously influential in late republican Rome, where he won many followers, among them such leading intellectuals as Varro and Brutus. Cicero, too, knew him personally and, although probably never an Antiochean by formal allegiance, showed Antiochus' philosophy special favour in his own writings. Thus it is that a significant part of the influence that Stoic thought achieved at Rome in the first century B.C. arrived indirectly, through Antiocheanism. A symptom of this is that when Cicero in his *Academica* presents what to all intents and purposes is Stoic epistemology, its formal guise is as Antiochus' theory of knowledge. Similarly, Varro's surviving writings illustrate how Antiocheanism helped to establish in the intellectual bloodstream of the ancient world the fundamental contributions of Stoicism to linguistic theory. The syncretism that Panaetius had inaugurated became, in these and comparable ways, a vital factor in the broad dissemination of Stoicism.

It remains to ask whether this 'Middle Stoicism' marks a clean break from the preceding Stoic tradition. Panaetius did, it is true, abandon several of the older Stoic dogmas. Notably, he rejected the thesis of the world's periodic dissolution into divine, creative fire (the 'conflagration'), and instead advocated the Aristotelian thesis of the world's eternity. In doing so, he may have been consciously aligning himself with the Stoa's Platonist forerunners – for the thesis that the world is in fact eternal had been adopted by some of Plato's immediate successors as the correct reading of the *Timaeus*. But he was not thereby severing a link to the Stoic tradition. On the contrary, doubts about the conflagration had already been expressed by his predecessors Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes of Babylon;[33] and, because the theory may well have originated as Cleanthes' Heraclitean importation to early Stoic cosmology, no doubt there were ways in which it could be rejected without formally repudiating the authority of the school's founder, Zeno himself.[34] At all events, Panaetius' view on

[33] For the plausible proposal that Antipater too had denied the conflagration, see Long (1990), 286–7. The apparent counter-evidence at DL VII 142, which Long considers, can be disarmed: it almost certainly refers to the scholarch's namesake, Antipater of Tyre (see *ibid.* 139; I am grateful to Thamer Backhouse for pointing this out). Long argues persuasively that Carneades' critiques influenced this Stoic retraction.

[34] Diogenes' strong commitment to defending Zeno's explicit arguments (see nn. 12–13), placed alongside his eventual rejection of the conflagration, strengthens the

Athenion's brief reign as tyrant that Athens suffered a crippling siege by Sulla's army, at the end of which the city was sacked.

It is unclear how much physical damage was done during the siege to the traditional public meeting places of the schools (both the Academy and the Lyceum, being outside the city walls, had been plundered for timber by Sulla).[37] It is possible that the war made it too difficult to recruit pupils, especially from abroad, and also that the philosophers' high political profile in these years made Athens too dangerous a place for some of them. But whatever the precise reasons may have been, after Sulla's capture of the city in 86 many if not most philosophers left, and the Athenian schools seem to have lost their institutional importance. We have, for example, little information on any successions of their scholarchs after this date. Philo of Larissa and Antiochus, who fought for Plato's mantle, conducted their battles from Rome and Alexandria, respectively, and it was primarily in these cities that new philosophical departures occurred in the following decades.

If the philosophical centre of gravity now shifted away from Athens, one possible explanation is the dispersion of the school libraries. Philodemus, who moved from Athens to Italy around this time, brought with him a fine old collection of Epicurus' own writings, possibly inherited from his master Zeno of Sidon.[38] It is conceivable that Philo, the current Academic scholarch, likewise brought the Academy's book collection with him when he moved to Rome. Sulla, at all events, probably carried more than one book collection back to Rome with him as part of his war booty (including, according to the story,[39] some long-lost copies of Aristotle's school treatises). Just as the Athenian Peripatos had gone into decline after Theophrastus, on his death c. 287, had bequeathed his books to Neleus of Scepsis, who promptly removed them from Athens, it is a tempting hypothesis that disruption of school libraries in the 80s B.C. was a leading cause of Athens' decline as a philosophical centre. What better explanation of the fact that Alexandria, with its magnificent library, was now to outshine it for many years? In

[37] Posidonius (*ap.* Athenaeus 213d) presents Athenion in 88 speaking of the gymnasia being in a squalid condition and the philosophical schools silent, but no causes are mentioned.

[38] See Dorandi (1997).

[39] Strabo XIII 1.54; Plut. *Sulla* 26.

the light of this pattern, we may legitimately suspect a similar hemorrhage of books from the Stoic school after Panaetius' death, when, as we shall see, its centre of gravity shifted from Athens to Rhodes.

The fate of the Stoic school during this era of decentralisation is a matter on which we lack solid information. From Cicero,[40] describing a nostalgic return to the Athenian schools in 79 B.C., we hear mainly of past glories, along with some indication of what few philosophical lectures and classes remain available. These include no mention of Stoic teaching, and there is every reason to assume that the Athenian Stoa was effectively defunct by this date.

As a matter of fact, it remains a strong possibility that its effective demise had occurred two decades earlier. There is no clear evidence of the Stoa's survival as an institution after the death of Panaetius in 110 B.C., and Panaetius' own frequent absences in Rome may well both reflect and help account for Athens' diminishing importance as a Stoic centre at this time. Philodemus' history of the Stoa (the fragmentary so-called *Index Stoicorum*) closes with the scholarchate of Panaetius and a survey of his pupils, and appears in an incomplete closing sentence to claim that *all* the successors to Zeno have now been covered. Posidonius, undoubtedly Panaetius' most distinguished pupil, never became head of the Athenian school but taught in Rhodes. Since Rhodes was Panaetius' but not Posidonius' native city, it is a reasonable guess that Panaetius – reported to have retained his Rhodian citizenship and even his family's priesthood in the Rhodian town of Lindos, and to have refused the offer of Athenian naturalisation[41] – had himself already been fostering the Stoic school there *in absentia*, especially if (as may be conjectured) he owned property in or around the city. To all appearances, this Rhodian school in effect now eclipsed or even replaced the Athenian one. For in addition to Hecato – another eminent Stoic of the day who, as a Rhodian, may be guessed to have been at least associated with the Rhodian school[42] – we can link at least two other individuals with it, neither of them a Rhodian. Paramonus of Tarsus, a follower of Panaetius,

[40] *Fin.* V 1–6.

[41] Fr. 10 Alesse.

[42] Other known Rhodian Stoics of the same generation are a certain Plato (DL III 109), Stratocles (Philodemus, *Ind. St.* 17), and possibly Leonides (Strabo XIV 2.13). For a valuable catalogue of philosophers associated with Rhodes (albeit lacking Paramonus), see Mygind (1999).

seems to have moved to Rhodes, as has been persuasively proposed on the evidence of a Rhodian statue base dedicated by him.[43] And the fully institutional character of the Rhodian school is further confirmed by the fact that Posidonius' own grandson, Jason of Nysa, eventually succeeded him as its head.[44] This presence in the early first-century B.C. Rhodian school of a non-Rhodian contingent is a striking feature, and suggests that what we are witnessing is not yet the *de*centralisation of philosophy that was to become the hallmark of philosophy in the Imperial Age, but rather its attempted *re*centralisation to a new headquarters, which at least for a while imitated the metropolitan role previously played by Athens. Although the choice of Rhodes for this role may be suspected to have depended at least in part on the geographical accident of Panaetius' birth, it is perhaps no coincidence that around the same time we hear of an Epicurean school in Rhodes, whose members showed a degree of independence from the school's Athenian headquarters sufficient to shock at least one of the latter's adherents.[45]

Meanwhile, the leading Stoics at Athens in this post-Panaetian period are named by Cicero as Mnesarchus and Dardanus.[46] Since these two were both born around 160 B.C.,[47] there is no reason why they should not between them have remained active until 88–86 B.C., the period of the great philosophical exodus from Athens. But there is no evidence that either, let alone both, became scholarch,[48] and the fact that they are named jointly in this way may even count against any such hypothesis (if one had been scholarch, we would expect Cicero to privilege him over the other). Their being, in Cicero's words, the leading Stoics *at Athens* must surely be linked to the further fact – hardly a coincidence – that both were in fact themselves Athenians, who therefore had personal motives for remaining in Athens even when others were leaving. This, along with the new prominence of the Rhodian school, is strong evidence that, as far as the Stoa is concerned, the process of regionalisation was already far advanced by the end of the second-century B.C.

[43] Ferrary (1988), 461–2.
[44] Posidonius T40 EK.
[45] The evidence comes from Philodemus, *Rhetoric* II, and is presented in Sedley (1989).
[46] They were '*principes Stoicorum*' at Athens at a time when Antiochus could, had he wished, have defected to them (Cic. *Acad.* II 69), which must certainly be after – perhaps twenty years after – the death of Panaetius.
[47] Dorandi (1999), 41.
[48] Ferrary (1988), 457–64, Dorandi (1994), 25.

of the Stoa, Posidonius and other members of the Athenian school's last generation are usually the latest philosophers deemed worthy of inclusion. Although we know of numerous significant Stoics of later date, their doctrines are rarely ranked and discussed alongside those of the school's golden age. It is almost as if the history of philosophy was felt to have come to an end with the demise of the Athenian schools. Instead of continuing to take it forward, the primary task of the philosopher was now to interpret and understand it, and to enable others to do the same. The new pattern of philosophical teaching, involving the scholarly study of school texts, is an integral part of this picture. Needless to say, the tendency toward such an outlook did not in practice prevent the emergence of much significant new philosophical work, especially in the Platonist camp but also among later Stoics. Yet, even the most innovative thinkers more often than not saw their own work as that of recovering, understanding, and living the wisdom of the ancients.

Seneca is considerably less beholden to the ancients than most philosophical writers of his period, but there is little doubt that even for him, as for at least some approximately contemporary Stoics such as Cleomedes,[51] the philosophers of the Athenian school – especially its last major spokesman, Posidonius – remained objects of intense study. But there is reason to suspect that there were competing views as to which member of the Athenian school had really been its final, summative spokesman. I say this because Athenaeus,[52] writing in the second-century A.D., knows of rival Stoic clubs calling themselves 'Diogenists', 'Antipatrists', and 'Panaetiasts'. Since Diogenes, Antipater, and Panaetius had been the last three formal heads of the Athenian school, it is a tempting inference that the split between these groups represented differing views as to which authority represented the culmination of the Athenian Stoic tradition before its decline.[53] If that conjecture is correct,[54] it remains a matter for further

[51] See Ch. 13, Jones, this volume.

[52] Athenaeus 186a.

[53] This explanation is suggested by the analogous attitude of Antiochus, who, in order to present himself as heir to the early Academy, placed especial emphasis on the legacy of Polemo, not as the greatest of the early Academics, but as (to all intents and purposes) the last scholarch before the school deserted Plato, hence as its best summative spokesman.

[54] A recently discovered papyrus (PBerol. inv. 16545) which discusses Antipater's epistemological views (see Backhouse [2000]), even comparing variant readings of his manuscripts, could well be the work of an 'Antipatrist'.

speculation whether Posidonius, whose influence remained so strong in later generations, could have represented for some the figurehead of a fourth faction, or whether – more plausibly – he was appropriated by the Panaetiasts as an authentic spokesman for his mentor Panaetius. Unfortunately, we have too little evidence about the factional structure of imperial Stoicism for any such approach to be profitably pursued at present.

Whereas the new philosophical decentralisation had a dramatic impact on the great cultural centres – Athens, Alexandria, and to a lesser extent Rome – in the regional capitals the change was no doubt more gradual. A good illustration is offered by Tarsus in Cilicia. Strabo[55] judged that in his own time, the late first century B.C., the educational establishments at Tarsus, including the schools of philosophy, were outstripping those of Athens and Alexandria, even though he conceded that they differed from the latter two in attracting only local residents as pupils. As a matter of fact, the city had produced eminent Stoics for at least the previous two centuries – including two scholarchs: Zeno of Tarsus and Antipater of Tarsus (even the greatest of the Stoics, Chrysippus [see Section 5], was the son of a Tarsian father) – and it may well be that it had had its own Stoic school long before Strabo's day. But its new growth in importance as a philosophical centre does represent the changing intellectual world of the first century B.C. Further testimony to this growth, and to the high standing which such regional schools achieved, is Augustus' choice of two philosophers in succession, both natives of Tarsus and one of them (Athenodorus) a Stoic, to govern the city. Strabo is able to recite a long list of Tarsians, past and present and of various persuasions, who have become professional philosophers, and most of whom have ended up working abroad: Rome, he informs us, is packed with them.[56]

By the mid to late first century B.C., Rome had acquired what is probably as strong a claim as any city's to being a hub of Stoic activity. It is often remarked that the value system of patrician Romans made them natural Stoics. Admittedly, we know of surprisingly few Romans in this period who became Stoics, whereas these did include the most celebrated of all the Roman Stoics, Marcus Cato. We

[55] Strabo XIV 673.
[56] Strabo XIV 5.14–15.

Much the same can be said of Arius Didymus. Like Athenodorus a Stoic, and like him a court philosopher who gained Augustus' confidence, he achieved eminence as an exponent of practical moral philosophy. His consolation to Augustus' wife, Livia, on the death of her son Drusus is portrayed by Seneca[60] as a classic of emotional therapy, and other legends abounded concerning Augustus' deep trust in him. However, once again the roles of moral adviser and scholar of philosophy prove not to be mutually exclusive: Arius Didymus is widely, if controversially,[61] identified with the Arius whose *Epitome* – summarising large areas of Stoic, Peripatetic, Platonic, and other philosophy – is excerpted *in extenso* by Stobaeus. Such engagement by a leading Stoic in the compilation of philosophical history is another sign of the times (compare, in the Epicurean school, his older contemporary Philodemus, whose histories of philosophical schools were probably his best-known prose works). To some extent it may reflect the fact that probably already by this date, as certainly in subsequent centuries,[62] a full philosophical education was understood ideally to involve a training in all four of what were now recognised as the principal sects – Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism. Although this need not in itself entail the fashion of philosophical 'eclecticism' that has sometimes been associated with the age,[63] it is at the very least symptomatic of a constructive softening of school boundaries.

It was in such a philosophical milieu – one in which someone could be simultaneously a scholar of philosophical history, an author of ethical treatises, and a counselor to dynasts, and in which narrow philosophical sectarianism was starting to look outmoded – that the 'Roman' phase of Stoicism began life.[64]

[60] Sen. *Ad Marc. de cons.* 4.2–6.1.

[61] Against, see Göransson (1995); cautiously in favour, Mansfeld and Runia (1997).

[62] Apollonius of Tyana (Philostratus, *Vit. Ap.* I 7), in the early to mid first century A.D., is said to have found for himself at nearby Aegae teachers of all four main philosophical systems, and for good measure a Pythagorean teacher too. Galen (*De cognoscendis curandisque animi morbis* 8 [*Scripta minora* 1.31.23ff.]), in the mid second century, was able to study with representatives of those same four schools at his native Pergamum.

[63] Dillon and Long (1988)

[64] My thanks to Brad Inwood for his valuable help in drafting this chapter.

CHRISTOPHER GILL

2 The School in the Roman Imperial Period

1. THE STEREOTYPE

According to a stereotypical view, Stoicism in the period of the Roman Empire was philosophically uncreative. The 'school' had an ill-defined institutional status and there was a good deal of eclecticism and merging of different philosophies. The dominant theme was ethics, and the main surviving works consist of exercises in practical moralising based on ideas mapped out centuries before. Unsurprisingly, in the later part of this period, Stoicism was replaced as a living philosophy by a revived Platonism and by a form of Christianity that was increasingly more sophisticated and theoretically aware.

Like all stereotypes, this one contains an element of truth; but it obscures important respects in which Stoicism continued as an active philosophical force for at least the first two centuries A.D. Although there was no institutional 'school' as there was in the Hellenistic Age, there were numerous Stoic teachers, and the distinctive three-part Stoic educational curriculum was maintained, with important work continuing in all three areas (i.e., logic, ethics, and physics). As well as being the dominant philosophical movement in the period, Stoicism was also strongly embedded in Greco-Roman culture and, to some extent, in political life, and the ideal of living a properly Stoic life remained powerful. In the third and fourth centuries A.D. and later, Neoplatonic and Christian writers built on key Stoic ideas and absorbed them into their systems.

2. PHASES

It is not possible to demarcate distinct phases of institutional and intellectual development within this period as it is in the Hellenistic Age (see Chapter 1). However, we can highlight ways in which the different phases of imperial rule and cultural life influenced Stoic philosophical activity. This also serves to bring out the prominence of Stoicism in the political arena in the first two centuries A.D.

The Julio-Claudian era (from Augustus to Nero) was, in broad terms, a positive context for Stoic and other philosophical activity. As noted in Chapter 1, Augustus maintained two Stoic philosophers, Athenodorus of Tarsus and Arius Didymus, who combined the roles of moral adviser and philosophical scholar.[1] Under Nero, Seneca (1 B.C. – A.D. 65) also combined these roles but was a much more important figure politically and philosophically. Seneca was first tutor, then adviser, to the young Nero, and is thought to have been a key restraining influence on the emperor during the first, more successful, period of his realm (54–62)[2]. Subsequently, he fell out of favour, was suspected (with other Stoics, including his nephew Lucan) of organising a conspiracy against Nero, and committed suicide in 65. His death, vividly described by Tacitus (*Ann.* XV 62–4), and partly modeled on the death of Socrates, as presented in Plato's *Phaedo*, was conceived as a gesture of defiance and of heroic fortitude. During his life and especially in his years of retirement, Seneca was an immensely prolific writer of (largely) Stoic philosophical works, mainly on ethics but also on meteorology (*Natural Questions*). He also composed a series of tragedies, which show Stoic influence.[3]

Seneca's life encapsulates two striking features of the first century A.D. On the one hand, significant numbers of upper-class Romans found in Stoicism a guiding ethical framework for political involvement. On the other hand, Stoic ideals could also provide a theoretical basis for moral disapproval of a specific emperor or his actions and for principled disengagement or suicide.[4] This pattern can be found

[1] See Ch. 1, Section 8; the summary of Peripatetic ethics ascribed to 'Arius' in Stobaeus is discussed later in this chapter.

[2] All further dates A.D. unless otherwise indicated.

[3] See Rosenmeyer (1989).

[4] For some striking examples, see Plin. *Ep.* III 11, 16, Tac. *Ann.* XVI 25, XVI 34.3 (see André [1987], 24 and 37–8). On deaths inspired by Stoicism, see Griffin (1986). On Seneca as politician and philosopher, see Griffin (1976 [1992]) and (2000). Since

on (largely) Stoic principles to construct a framework to meet the challenges of human life as he experienced it.

It is more difficult to trace clear indications of Stoic activity in the third century, particularly in its second half. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers* is a major source for ancient philosophy, including Stoicism, probably lived in the first half of the third century but discusses no thinker later than the second century. However, Stoicism, particularly as expressed in Epictetus' *Discourses*, remained influential in the thought of later antiquity and beyond. Plotinus (205–270) drew on Stoic as well as Aristotelian ideas in his version of Platonism, whereas the sixth-century Neoplatonist, Simplicius, wrote a massive commentary on Epictetus' *Handbook*. Epictetus' austere moralism attracted the interest of early church fathers, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen – an interest that persisted among medieval Christian ascetics.[7]

3. BEING A STOIC TEACHER

What in this period did it mean for someone to be a 'Stoic teacher'? Clearly, in the absence of an institutional 'school', there is no question of a central authority accrediting teachers. To this extent, being a Stoic teacher is a matter of presenting oneself in that light and having others accept the claim. But there were some recognised defining characteristics. One was that Stoic teaching was based on a well-established canon of written treatises. Although Zeno continued to have a special status as the founder of the school, the substantial body of works by Chrysippus – the great systematic thinker of Stoicism – formed the core of the Stoic corpus in this period. It is clear from Epictetus, especially, that 'expounding Chrysippus' and 'being a Stoic teacher' had come to mean much the same thing.[8] The second key feature was the distinctive integrated three-part philosophical curriculum (i.e., logic, ethics, and physics). Although the Stoics we know about in this period did not necessarily take an equal interest

[7] On Epictetus' influence, see Spanneut (1962), esp. 633–67. On Neoplatonic and Christian responses to Stoicism, see below. See most recently Sorabji (2000).

[8] See, e.g., Epictetus, *Diss.* I 4.6–9, I 17.13–18. This partly reflects the emphasis in Epictetus' school on logic, in which Chrysippus' works were fundamental; see Long (1996), 89–106. On Chrysippus as the great systematizer of Stoicism, see Chapter 1, Section 5.

in all three areas,[9] the curriculum itself continued to be recognised as a special defining characteristic, with important theoretical implications.[10]

Not all the figures noted earlier as Stoics would have regarded themselves as Stoic 'teachers', at least not in the same sense. Musonius Rufus and Epictetus were well recognised as teachers with an identifiable body of students; in Epictetus' case, we can reconstruct a picture of an institution (at Nicopolis) with a determinate programme of studies.[11] Others were recognised teachers but operated primarily within a single household, as advisers to an emperor (as Athenodorus or Arius Didymus did for Augustus) or to Roman aristocrats.[12] Seneca was himself a Roman aristocrat at the centre of power; although he thought of himself as a Stoic and composed a series of important Stoic essays, he would not have characterised himself as a 'Stoic teacher'. Similarly, Marcus Aurelius (who studied under a Stoic teacher in his youth and continued his studies in adult life)[13] would not have regarded himself as a teacher but rather as someone who tried to apply the Stoic message to help him live a good life.

This variation of status has a bearing on the question (discussed in Section 6) of Stoic orthodoxy and eclecticism. A related point is the distinction between (1) formal exposition of Stoic texts in a curricular context; and (2) public lectures, speeches, or discussions based on Stoic doctrines but formulated in non-technical style, with audiences or participants who are not necessarily adherents of Stoicism. Epictetus' *Discourses* constitutes good evidence for this distinction and also provides a striking example of Stoic semi-public discourse.[14] Seneca's moral essays and letters represent written versions of the second type of activity. Although both types can be characterised as

[9] Seneca was dismissive of logic (*Ep.* 45.5, 49.5); Marcus had a limited grasp of logic and physics (*Meditations* I 17).

[10] On the three-part Stoic curriculum, see LS 26. There are various versions of the order of studies; the main point seems to be that they should be integrated. Middle Platonists adopted this view wholesale, Annas (1999), 108–12; Lucian (second century) parodied the linkage of ethics and logic (*Sale of Philosophies* 20–5).

[11] On the role of logic in his curriculum, see Long (1996), 104–6; Barnes (1997), Ch. 3; on the teaching-methods in general, see Hijmans (1959).

[12] See Donini (1982), 32–34.

[13] *Meditations* I 7–8; see further Birley (1987), Chs. 2–5.

[14] See, e.g., *Diss.* I 7., I 17, II 25, which underline the value of logic (in an integrated curriculum) but which do not set out to teach formal logic.

terrestrial geography. It provides access to types of argument (e.g., on the measurement of the earth) and on the epistemology of astronomy which are unknown to us from other Stoic sources.[18]

Can we tell whether these treatises merely provide access to areas of Stoic theory that had already been developed in earlier Stoic thinking or whether they are substantively original? What would 'originality' mean in this connection? The relevant kind of originality is not, I take it, putting forward a completely new set of ideas, but rather making a new and significant move in a continuing debate based on an existing (Stoic) framework of thought. The Stoic essays outlined differ in this respect. Cornutus' work is explicitly presented as a school text; it seems designed for young men in their late teens moving from literary and rhetorical studies to philosophical ones (as Cornutus' pupil, the poet Persius, did at sixteen). One would expect in such a work not originality but rather a clear and comprehensive exposition of existing Stoic thought on allegorical interpretation of myth. This is what we seem to find, even though the contents do not have exact parallels elsewhere.[19]

Cleomedes' work on astronomy, by contrast, is an essay or treatise, not a school text; it seems also to have a distinct theoretical position, developing Posidonius' view that the role of physics is to provide explanations for the data provided by specialist sciences such as astronomy. Cleomedes also uses the essay to engage in debate with other schools about conceptually demanding issues in physics. He debates with Peripatetics about the infinite void and the stability of the cosmos, and with Epicureans about the size of the sun and our knowledge of this. To this extent, the treatise seems to have a partially innovative aim, although the style of exposition is brief and schematic.[20] In Seneca's *Natural Questions*, the independence of approach and project is more evident, especially in Books VI–VII, I–II (which seems to be the correct order). Seneca sets out to show that phenomena such as earthquakes, meteors, and lightning – traditionally taken as indications of supernatural intervention by gods – are amenable to rational explanation based on careful analysis of empirical evidence. This line of argument seems virtually Epicurean, but

[18] See Ch. 13, Jones, this volume.

[19] See Most (1989), esp. 2023–34; there may be more innovation in the implied links with Neronian ideology (Most, 2034–44).

[20] See Todd (1989), 1367–71.

it has a fundamentally different objective. Whereas the Epicureans want to show that the natural universe is free from divine influence, Seneca wants to bring out the divinity of the world. The fact that the universe is rationally intelligible as a coherent nexus of cause and effect is precisely what makes it 'divine', in Stoic terms.[21]

Hierocles' *Elements of Ethics* seems also to be advancing fresh points within the ethical area. The analysis of animal development and psychophysical cohesion in terms of self-perception rather than self-awareness seems to be new. Also, we can detect within this analysis a considered attempt to meet objections, whether actual or imagined, to the explanation of animal development by self-perception.[22] Another area in which we seem to find innovation in this period is in Stoic thinking on fate and responsibility, a subject that embraces logic, ethics, and physics. A powerful recent treatment of this subject (Bobzien 1998) suggests that there are only two major Stoic theories on this topic: one deriving from Chrysippus, which dominated Stoic thinking for several centuries; and one emerging in the first or second century A.D., which Bobzien attributes to Philopator (active c. 80–120). The distinctive feature of the latter theory is a hierarchical analysis of types of natural motions, which is used as the basis of a new account of what it is about human actions that makes them 'depend on us'. Philopator has the same overall objective as Chrysippus: to demonstrate the compatibility of fate and human responsibility; however, he supports Chrysippus with this new form of analysis.[23]

5. PRACTICAL ETHICS

One area in which Stoic philosophy is clearly creative in this period is that of practical or applied ethics. The area itself is not new within Stoicism. Its origins lie in two crucial doctrinal moves made by Zeno, and adopted by Chrysippus but rejected by Aristo, in the formative years of the school. According to Zeno and Chrysippus, advantages such as health and wealth are naturally 'preferable', even though their value is substantively different from that of virtue, which alone can count as 'good'. A related distinction (again not adopted by Aristo) is that between the perfectly right actions (*katorthômata*)

[21] See refs. in n. 17, esp. Inwood (2002).
[22] See LS 53B, 57C; Inwood (1984), Long (1996), Ch. 11.
[23] Bobzien (1998), Ch. 8.

of the perfect wise person and the 'appropriate' or reasonable actions (*kathêkonta*) that can also be performed by imperfect, non-wise people.[24] These distinctions provided the basis both for extensive theoretical debate about these different types of value and for certain kinds of practical advice. The practical advice (directed at non-wise people who want to become wise) centred especially on determining what types of actions were, indeed, 'appropriate' and in determining, in one's life, the right relationship between gaining 'preferable' advantages and acting virtuously (at least, making progress toward virtue).

The richest source in the pre-Imperial period for this type of Stoic material is Cicero's *On Duties* (*De officiis* = about *kathêkonta*). This is substantially based on a book of Panaetius' on this topic, but it also draws on advice and casuistry (i.e., the analysis of key examples) going back at least to Diogenes and Antipater. A special feature of Panaetius' approach, reflected in Cicero, is the use of the theory of the four *personae* to differentiate our ethical and social roles, thereby providing the basis for more closely specified advice about what is 'appropriate' for us.[25] A second area of practical advice relates to the emotions or passions (*pathê*). These are understood in Stoicism as products of a specific kind of error; namely, that of treating merely 'preferable' advantages as if they were absolutely good, which only virtue is. This type of mistake produces intense reactions (passions), which constitute a disturbance of our natural psychophysical state. These disturbances are treated as 'sicknesses' that need to be 'cured' by analysis of their nature and origin and by advice. Cicero, again, is the best pre-Imperial source for this area of Stoic thought (in his *Tusculan Disputations* Books III–IV), which goes back to Chrysippus.

There are substantial works of practical ethics from the Imperial period, drawing on both these areas. For instance, Seneca's *On Benefits* and Musonius' diatribes (based on oral teaching) draw on Stoic advice about appropriate actions in specific types of situations, and Seneca's *On Anger* uses Stoic thinking about the nature and therapy

[24] LS sections 58–9 (LS translate *kathêkonta* as 'proper functions'), esp. Vol. 1. pp. 358–9; also Sedley (1999a), 130–3. In Ch. 1, n. 35, Sedley translates 'proper actions'. On Aristo's role in the development of the Stoa, Ch. 1, Section 4.

[25] Cicero, *Off.*, esp. I 107–21 (four-*personae* theory), III 51–7, 63 (Stoic casuistry); also Inwood (1999), 120–7.

a stress on adopting what we might call 'the cosmic perspective' as part of the desired set of beliefs and attitudes.[31]

It is sometimes suggested that the threefold pattern in Epictetus represents a version of the complete Stoic curriculum (corresponding to the order, physics, ethics, and logic).[32] But it may be better to interpret all these typologies as subdivisions of ethics and, specifically, of applied or practical ethics. The relationship between ethical theory and practical advice was itself a subject of discussion in this period, notably by Seneca. Seneca stresses that both parts of ethics are distinct but interdependent, and he insists (in contradiction to Aristo, for instance) that both parts have their own validity.[33]

These indications of fresh thinking about genres of practical ethics go along with creativity in the forms of instruction, both literary and oral. For instance, Seneca's extended series of letters of ethical guidance to a single addressee (i.e., Lucilius) represents an original use of the letter genre, designed to display the lifelong shared quest of two philosophically minded adults for ethical perfection.[34] Epictetus' oral teachings, as preserved by Arrian, do not simply constitute (practical) lectures. Rather, whether couched in monologue or dialogue form, they serve as a means of directed discourse to lead the listener or interlocutor through the threefold ethical programme outlined previously. Epictetus' repeated stress on 'examining your impressions' and recognising what is and is not 'up to us' can be understood in the light of that programme. Epictetus uses these formulae to lead the interlocutor to (1) reexamine the overall goals of his desires; (2) adjust his impulse to action and his view of his social commitments in the light of thought about goals; and (3) aim at complete consistency in belief, attitude, and state of mind.[35] Epictetus' use of directed, systematic questioning is strongly reminiscent of Socrates (as presented in the early Platonic dialogues). Also Socratic is the conviction that seems to underlie his procedure, that such reexamination

[31] *Meditations* VIII 7, and III 11; also P. Hadot (1995), 195–6.

[32] See, e.g., P. Hadot (1995), 193–5.

[33] *Ep.* 94.2, 31, 50–1, 95.10–12, 61, 63–4 (= LS 66I–J); on Aristo's (absolutist) ethical position, see Ch. 1, Section 4. On subdivisions in Stoic ethics, see LS 56, 66.

[34] Seneca's usage is, presumably, partly inspired by Cicero's (real) series of letters to his friend Atticus. His *On Mercy* (*De clementia*) is also original in its focus on Nero; on distinctive features of this work and *Ben.*, see Griffin (2000), 535–43, 545–51.

[35] For these formulae, see, e.g., *Handbook* 1; for the three-fold programme, see above and n. 29.

of basic beliefs will lead any interlocutor to the same conclusion; namely, to the 'preconceptions' that underlie human thought and discourse.[36] In some ways still more remarkable is the form of Marcus' *Meditations*. Although apparently written for his eyes only, as a kind of notebook or diary, the work has a distinctive literary-philosophical character and power. Each of the isolated comments, evocative of the oracular fragments of the Presocratic thinker, Heraclitus, seeks to express a profound truth. In content, the sayings encapsulate the outcome of the (highly Stoic) programme of practical ethics noted previously. However, the style is informed by a range of less Stoic influences (including Cynic and Platonic colouring) by which Marcus conveys, in particular, a cosmic perspective on human life, including his own life.[37]

6. DOCTRINAL ORTHODOXY AND ECLECTICISM

In previous scholarship, it has been quite common to see the late Hellenistic and Imperial periods (when the great philosophical schools of Athens were defunct or scattered) as eras of widespread philosophical eclecticism. 'Eclecticism' has often been interpreted negatively, as suggesting a kind of individualistic 'pick-and-mix' approach to philosophy. However, as the thought of this period has been scrutinised more closely and as the concept of 'eclecticism' has itself been examined, scholars have become much more cautious about making this type of claim.[38] In this period as in others, most philosophically committed thinkers saw themselves as having a determinate intellectual position and (unless someone was himself the founder of a new movement) an allegiance to a specific school with its own founder and conceptual framework.[39] This is not to deny that someone might interpret what it meant to be a Stoic or Academic,

[36] Long (2002) stresses especially the quasi-Socratic project of many of the *Diss.*, e.g., I 17; see also Long (1996), Ch. 12; on 'preconceptions', see LS 40.

[37] On the form of the *Meditations*, see R. B. Rutherford (1989), esp. 143–7, 155–67; on the Heraclitean influence, see Long (1996), 56–7; on Marcus' philosophical position, see Section 6.

[38] See Dillon and Long (1988), esp. Introduction and Ch. 1.

[39] See Sedley (1989), also Ch. 1, Section 5. However, caution is needed to avoid over-assimilating allegiance to an ancient philosophical school to that to a modern monotheistic religion (to that degree, it is misleading to describe Zeno's works as the 'gospels' of Stoicism).

of the relationship between technical and non-technical discourse, and also that of the audience being addressed (and the further question of whether this makes a difference to the orthodoxy of the ethical content). I begin with the work of those who presented themselves explicitly as Stoic teachers. In the teachings of Musonius Rufus, a striking feature (and one of special interest to modern readers) is the high valuation he places on marriage and family life. For instance, he presents women as equally capable of virtue (and of philosophy) as men; he also criticises double standards about male and female sexual activity outside marriage. He presents marriage as a context for 'shared life' and mutual concern as well as child-rearing, and claims that marriage and child-rearing are compatible with doing philosophy. He also advises people to have large families rather than to dispose of unwanted children in infancy.[44] He combines this positive view of the institution of marriage, perhaps surprisingly, with commendation of the austere Cynic way of life. The marriage of two Cynics, Crates and Hipparchia, as well as that of Socrates and Xanthippe, are presented equally as exemplars of philosophy practised within marriage; there is also praise of the simple or austere life associated with Cynics as well as Socrates.[45]

These emphases, taken in isolation, might seem unorthodox and to reflect Musonius' personal views. But, in fact, the view of women as equally capable of virtue and the idea of marriage as a context for fully shared life have parallels in much earlier Stoic thinking.[46] Musonius' views on the value of women and family life have roots in such central Stoic ideas as that 'all human beings have the starting points of virtue' and that the parent-child relationship is a central paradigm of human sociability and of the desire to express virtue in action.[47] Similarly, the idealisation of the Cynic lifestyle has its foundation in the Cynic contribution to the origins of Stoicism (Crates was supposed to be one of Zeno's teachers), though this is also

[44] See *Diss.* 3–4, 12, 13A–B, 14–15; for text and translation, see Lutz (1947); also Gill (2000), 601–3.

[45] See *Diss.* 14 and 19.

[46] See, e.g., DL VII 175 (Cleanthes), and Stobaeus IV 503.18–512.7 (Antipater, and also Hierocles).

[47] See LS 61L (my translation) and LS 57F(1–2), also (8), on the wise person's natural desire for marriage and rearing children as well as for political engagement. See Geytenbeek (1963), 56–8, 64–5, 67.

a specially strong theme in first-century Roman culture.[48] Where Musonius is innovative is in developing these ideas and spelling out their implications for practical life in a way that is not fully paralleled in our other sources.

Epictetus' *Discourses* raises the issue of eclecticism in a more acute form. Bonhöffer, whose books were for many decades the most substantial studies of Epictetus (only recently augmented by Long, 2002), argued strongly that he presented a thoroughly orthodox version of Stoic ethics.[49] More recent scholars have been more inclined to see at least partial innovations, although within a consistently Stoic framework of thought. For instance, his special emphases on 'what is up to us' and on the human capacity for 'choice' or 'rational agency' (*prohairesis*) have been taken to imply a (more Aristotelian) indeterminist concept of free will or to anticipate the modern concept of 'will'.[50] In addition to underlining the quasi-Socratic method of at least some of the *Discourses*, Long also sees Epictetus as adopting a Socratic conception of god as one who urges humans to express 'the god within' by exercising their rational critical faculties.[51] One can also see Epictetus as the exponent of a particularly 'tough' version of Stoicism, which de-emphasizes the role of selecting 'preferable' advantages in ethical life and which favours the austere Cynic ideal rather than the practice of virtue within more conventional life-styles.[52]

In considering this question, it is important to keep in mind that the *Discourses* do not represent detailed, technical exposition of Stoic ethics (which Epictetus also offered within his school), but rather an attempt to spell out the core messages of Stoic ethics for a

[48] The linkage of Cynics and Socrates as ideals (Musonius 14 start) is paralleled in Epictetus; e.g., IV 1.114–16, 156–8, 159–69. On the Cynic role in the origins of Stoicism, see above, and on the Cynic ideal in the first century A.D. see nn. 52, 56, and 76–9.

[49] Bonhöffer 1890 and 1894 (now translated as 1996).

[50] For these views, see, respectively, Dobbin (1991) and Kahn (1988); also Inwood (1985), 116–19, on innovations in Epictetus' psychological terminology.

[51] Long (2002); see, e.g., *Diss.* I 3, I 14.11–14, II 8.12, 22; also Plato, *Apology* 28e, 30a–b (Socrates' mission to promote rational enquiry presented as a 'divine' one), 40 a–b (the *daimonion* or inner divine voice).

[52] Epictetus' dismissive attitude to 'externals', such as health and wealth (e.g., *Diss.* I 1, *Handbook* 1) might seem to suggest the position of Aristo, rather than Zeno or Chrysippus (Chapter 1, Section 4 above); for the idealisation of the Cynic life-style, see, e.g., III 22, III 24.

more general audience. Epictetus' reiterated contrast between what is and is not 'up to us' and on exercising our *prohairesis* (rather than being concerned with our body and 'externals') may best be understood as a way of conveying these messages. What he is underlining, perhaps, is the importance of shaping your life around the search for virtue (which is, in principle, 'up to us') rather than around trying to obtain 'preferables' (something which is not 'up to us').[53] His use of the term *prohairesis* (not a standard one in Stoic terminology) need not carry any psychological significance not already implied in Stoic thinking about human rationality and agency.[54] Bobzien, considering Epictetus within the history of Stoic thinking about determinism, finds no clear indications in the *Discourses* of an Aristotelian concept of indeterminist freedom of choice. 'Freedom' for Epictetus, and in Stoicism generally, is, rather, a moral ideal.[55] Epictetus' use of the Cynic teacher (especially Diogenes, the founder of Cynicism) as an ideal is certainly an index of a relatively 'tough' or radical version of Stoicism. But this can be paralleled in a number of other first-century Stoic-inspired thinkers, as well as in the Stoic tradition more generally. It is combined with the theme, prominent in Musonius too, that the search for virtue can also be practised while maintaining conventional social and family roles.[56]

So it may be that what are sometimes seen as innovative or heterodox ideas are better interpreted as accessible ways of encapsulating key standard themes of Stoic ethics. This is not incompatible with signaling the kind of version of Stoic ethics being adopted; in this case, a relatively tough and uncompromising one.[57] It is to be noted that, in Epictetus and other writers on practical ethics in this period, the objective seems to be to reach out to a more general audience without diluting the fundamentals of Stoic ethics; for

[53] Cf. the first topic in the three-fold programme of practical ethics, outlined above.

[54] Stoic theory implies a highly unified view of human psychology, in which emotions are integrally linked with beliefs and reasoning; hence, if *prohairesis* suggests 'will', this need not be a new idea in Stoicism.

[55] Bobzien (1998), Ch. 7; contrast Dobbin (1991).

[56] See Griffin (1976 [1992]), 111–12, on admiration in Stoic circles, including that of Seneca, for the Cynic Demetrius; on Dio's combination of Cynicism and Stoicism, see below. On Epictetus' commendation of the virtuous maintenance of conventional roles, see, e.g., *Diss.* I 2, II 10.

[57] See Gill (1988), 187–94, contrasting Epictetus' way of using the idea of roles from Cicero's more conventionalist approach; also Gill (1995), xxi–iii.

aim: thinking out philosophical ideas *in Latin*, including rethinking the terminology and imagery.[62] This is not 'eclecticism', exactly, but it may give the impression of being so.

How much of a Stoic is Marcus Aurelius in his *Meditations*? On the one hand, apart from his explicit allegiance to Stoicism (e.g., I 7–8), the dominating themes are strongly Stoic and there are clear signs of the influence of Epictetus' ethical programme. On the other hand, the style is idiosyncratic, with strong Heraclitean, Cynic, and Platonic colouring.[63] His psychological language seems to reflect a version of Platonic dualism rather than the orthodox stress on psychological unity.[64] Most puzzling of all, despite his frequent adoption of a cosmic perspective on ethical life, he sometimes expresses indifference about which worldview is correct: the Stoic providential one or the Epicurean view that the universe is a fortuitous collection of atoms. In Marcus' case, there is no *a priori* reason to demand doctrinal consistency. But we can explain these features in a way that makes sense within his predominantly Stoic standpoint. The contrast between mind (or ruling divinity) and body can be taken, like some comparable language in Epictetus, as an expression of the central Stoic ethical theme of the importance of pursuing virtue rather than bodily advantages.[65] The 'providence or atoms' theme is more puzzling, though in some passages the question seems more open than in others.[66] But it may be important that Marcus acknowledges, in *Meditations* I 17, that he has not himself actually completed the three-part Stoic curriculum (including logic and physics) that would yield the cosmic understanding he seeks to apply to his own life. Hence, the Stoic worldview has to be, in this respect, taken on trust (though Marcus overwhelmingly does take it on trust) – a fact perhaps acknowledged in his use of the 'providence or atoms' theme.[67]

[62] This process may generate what some see as internal tensions in Seneca's writings (e.g., between using violent or militaristic language and aiming to extirpate the passions); see Nussbaum (1994), Ch. 11, and Wilson (1997).

[63] See n. 37.

[64] The division is, roughly, between mind, soul (or breath), and body; see, e.g., *Meditations* II 2, III 16, VI 32, XIII 3.

[65] Cf. Gill (1997a), xi–xii.

[66] In *Meditations* IV 27, X 6, XI 18, the question (though posed) seems to presuppose a providential (Stoic) answer; elsewhere (e.g., II 11, VI 10, VII 32), the question is left more open.

[67] See Annas (forthcoming); for other approaches, Rist (1983), 29–30, Asmis (1989), 2250–1; for a survey of the question, Gill (1997a), 181–200.

7. RELATIONS WITH OTHER SCHOOLS

Questions of orthodoxy and eclecticism lead naturally to that of relations with other schools. Two aspects are explored here: active debate and controversy, and the assimilation of Stoic thought by members of other schools. The fact that there was controversy about Stoic ideas is evidence of their continued significance in the intellectual life of the period; it also shows that Stoic theory had clearly defined boundaries on certain issues. The adoption of Stoic ideas by thinkers of different allegiance highlights a more fluid side of intellectual life at this time, but this need not be taken to mean that allegiance is meaningless or that boundaries have vanished entirely.

One important area of debate in this period concerns the emotions or passions and, more broadly, ethical psychology.[68] Three questions tend to be linked in this debate: whether emotions should be moderated or 'extirpated', whether human psychology is to be understood as a combination of rational and non-rational aspects or as fundamentally unified and shaped by rationality, and whether ethical development is brought about by a combination of habituation and teaching or only by rational means. On these issues, thinkers with a Platonic or Peripatetic affiliation tend to adopt the first of these two positions and Stoics the second.[69] Plutarch's essay, *On Moral Virtue*, encapsulates this debate; Plutarch articulates the first (Platonic-Aristotelian) position and criticises the Stoic one. This view is, on the whole, characteristic of Plutarch (c. 45–125), who regards himself as a Platonist, although a more Stoic view on the passions is sometimes adopted elsewhere.[70]

Galen takes a broadly similar line to Plutarch in Books IV–V of *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, but explores the issues more thoroughly, thereby providing the main primary source for the Stoic theory of the passions (see Chapter 10, Brennan). In Books

[68] See Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), on Hellenistic philosophy of emotions and the continuation of this in the Imperial period.

[69] For a similar contrast between positions, but here expressing the Stoic side and criticising the Peripatetic, see Cicero, *Tusc.* III 22, IV 39–46; Seneca, *On Anger* I 7–14. However, Platonic and Stoic positions were sometimes linked, for instance, by Eudorus and Philo.

[70] For instance, in less doctrinaire essays, such as *On Peace of Mind* and *On Freedom from Anger*, Plutarch sometimes praises the (Stoic ideal) of *apatheia* (freedom from passions) rather than moderation of the passions. See Dillon (1977 [1996]), 189, 193–8; also Babut (1979), 298–301, 316–17, 321–33.

by those whose primary allegiance lies elsewhere. An intermediate case, taken first, is that of a thinker who probably regarded himself as a Stoic, but whose formulation of this embraces Cynic and Platonic themes. Dio Cocceianus of Prusa (later called 'Chrysostom', the 'golden tongue', c. 40 – c. 110) is a complex and enigmatic figure whose career embraced both rhetoric and philosophy. He studied with Musonius in the 60s; later he repudiated and publicly criticised his former teacher. When banished from Rome and Bithynia by Domitian (c. 82), he presented his exile as bringing about a 'conversion' to philosophy (Oration 13) and traveled around the Eastern Empire as a Cynic-Stoic teacher. Subsequently, he became an intellectual adviser to the emperors Nerva and Trajan, and resumed his former position as a wealthy leading provincial.[76]

Many of his eighty surviving speeches have philosophical themes. The dominant position is a type of Cynic-Stoic one, of a kind that is broadly similar to that of Musonius and Epictetus but which also incorporates Platonic ideas. For instance, in the fourth Kingship Oration (couched as a dialogue between Diogenes the Cynic and Alexander the Great), Dio argues for a thesis with Cynic, Stoic, and Platonic resonance: that kingship depends not only on status, but also on the possession of kingly qualities, including mastery over self.[77] A dialogue on slavery argues for an idea with similar connotations: that real 'freedom' is only conferred by virtue and, hence, even great kings are not 'free' to act as they wish.[78] In a third speech (36), Dio defines the ideal state by reference to two models: one, primarily Platonic, is that in which the rulers alone are wise (21); the other (more Stoic) is 'governed by a king according to law in complete friendship and harmony' (31). The king, in the latter model, seems to derive from a fusion of the Platonic ideal monarch with the Stoic idea of the universe as unified by reason, identified with Zeus (35–6). The overall moral seems not to be advocacy of Roman imperial monarchy but rather the idea that any state (even in the remote city of Olbia where the speech is set) should be governed by objective, universal standards.[79]

[76] See further Jones (1978), Ch. 6; Moles (1978); Russell (1992), 4–6.
[77] Oration 4.44–75; cf. Moles (1990).
[78] Oration 14; cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 467a–471e, *Republic* 579b–e, Epictetus, *Diss.* IV 1.
[79] For a fuller summary, see Gill (2000), 606–7; on the background in Stoic political thought, see LS 67; Schofield (1991), Ch. 3.

Dio does not offer a theoretical justification of the kind of fusion he offers, but we can find more explication of this type of move in the thinkers associated with 'Middle Platonism'.[80] The prototype is offered by the Academic (sometimes regarded as the first Middle Platonic thinker), Antiochus of Ascalon (130–69 B.C.). Although claiming to be reviving the original form of Platonism, he actually introduces substantial Stoic, as well as Peripatetic, elements. His justification was that Aristotle and Zeno were simply developing ideas that were implicit in Plato's dialogues.[81] This kind of view was adopted by two Platonic thinkers in Alexandria: Eudorus (active c. 25 B.C.) and Philo (c. 20 B.C. – 45 A.D.). Eudorus made a further move, taken up by some later thinkers, of presenting Plato's thought as a development of that of Pythagoras (a move accompanied by the growth of pseudo-Pythagorean documents[82]). Philo further expands the lineage, claiming that Pythagoras gained his wisdom from followers of Moses. This legitimated the interpretation of the first five books of the Old Testament in Platonic-Stoic terms, in part through the extensive use of Stoic allegorical interpretation.[83] These moves may seem bizarre or disingenuous and to reduce to absurdity the notion of philosophical allegiance to an original founder (Sedley [1989]). But they imply an idea associated in modern philosophy with the suggestion that various thinkers or thought systems, despite their different starting points, may 'converge on the truth'.[84]

The dominant themes in Middle Platonism are, unsurprisingly, more Platonic than Stoic. They include the idea of God as thinking himself (or the Forms), as a unified or perfect intellect, as a demiurge or the *logos*; in ethics, there is a preference for the Antiochean conception of perfect happiness (as including external goods) and for the moderation rather than extirpation of passions.[85] But some Platonic thinkers favour Stoic versions of these theses; Atticus (150–200),

[80] That is, Platonism between the period of strongly institutional life (the Old and New Academy), ending with Philo (in 88 B.C.) and the Neoplatonism of Plotinus (204–69).

[81] See, e.g., Cicero, *Fin.* IV 3, V 22. The Stoic ideas adopted include that of active and passive principles in the universe, that of the goal as 'life according to nature', and of development as 'appropriation' (*oikeiôsis*). See Dillon (1977 [1996]), Ch. 2.

[82] See Sedley, Chapter 1, Section 7.

[83] Dillon (1977 [1996]), 117–21, 143–4.

[84] See further, Williams (1985), Ch. 8.

[85] See Dillon, 'Platonism' in Zeyl (1997), 416–17.

for instance, adopts the Stoic view that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness, rather than the Antiochean view.[86] Philo's theses also come close to Stoicism; but even when they do not, he adopts a highly Stoic conceptual vocabulary, so that his texts are widely used as sources for Stoic terminology. The idea that philosophy consists of an integrated system of ethics, logic, and physics was widely accepted by Middle Platonists.[87] The tendency of Platonism to absorb Stoic themes and language leads to the appearance of these in works of popular philosophising with (broadly) Platonic roots, such as the *Dialexeis* (lectures) of Maximus of Tyre (second century) and the *Tablet* of Cebes (first century B.C. or A.D.).[88]

The tendency of Platonic philosophers to absorb elements of Stoicism persists in Neoplatonism, at a period when Stoicism seems to have stopped being a living philosophy. Thus, Plotinus shared with Stoicism the idea that a rational force unifies and organises matter, but identifies this force with the world soul of Plato's *Timaeus* and analyzes it in terms of Aristotle's hierarchy of natural functions.[89] In one of the most elaborate of such appropriations, a long commentary on Epictetus' *Handbook*, Simplicius (c. 490–560) presents this summary of key themes of Stoic practical ethics as an introduction for students new to philosophy of the complex system of Neoplatonic metaphysics.[90] Middle Platonism had a strong influence on the evolution of Christian doctrine, from Clement of Alexandria (c. 200) onward, and through that route Christian thinkers absorbed Stoic ideas such as the cosmic role of *logos* (reason) and the sufficiency of virtue, but understood in Middle Platonic terms.[91] This process was accompanied by the adoption by Christian thinkers of the view propagated by Philo, that philosophy simply provides the means of interpreting authoritative texts which embody divine wisdom.[92]

[86] See Dillon (1977 [1996]), 251–2.
[87] See Dillon (1977 [1996]), index, 'philosophy, divisions of', and Annas (1999), 109–12. This tripartition was itself borrowed by Stoics from the early Platonist Xenocrates (Sextus *M* VII 16).
[88] On Stoic touches in these works, see Trapp (1997), 1948, n. 12, and (1997a), 170–1.
[89] O'Meara, 'Plotinus', in Zeyl (1997), 423.
[90] I. Hadot (2001), Chs. 3–4.
[91] On Christian responses to Stoic thinking on the passions, see Sorabji (2000), Chs. 22–6.
[92] Bos, 'Christianity' in Zeyl (1997), esp. 130–1. See also Boys-Stones (2001), Chs. 8–9, who sees this process starting in Stoicism.

way that is deeply Stoic) the expression of vice in psychological, bodily, and social styles.[96]

The question of Stoicism and Roman epic poetry is more complex. There is little question that for Virgil, Lucan, Silius Italicus, and possibly Statius, Stoicism helps to shape the conceptual framework of the poems. But to what extent can we say that the poetic vision of any of these poems directly reflects the Stoic world-view? In all the poems, there are two main possible points of contact: the picture of divine-human causation of events (including the role of Fate), and the ethical and psychological portrayal of the characters.

In Virgil's *Aeneid*, elements that evoke Stoicism include the emphasis on Fate (which is, as in Stoicism, compatible with and brought about by human actions); also Stoic is the stress on accepting Fate as a key part of the virtuous response. Another important factor is the characterisation of key figures in terms of the contrast between virtue (or reason) and passion. An important strand in this mode of portrayal is the presentation of the surrender to passion as bringing about a descent into a kind of madness, a strand that forms part of the portrayal of Dido and Turnus as well as Aeneas. But does this mean that the poetic vision of the poem is essentially Stoic? Some scholars argue that the psychology and ethics are to be understood as Aristotelian or Homeric rather than Stoic. We should remember that Euripides' *Medea* also embodies this theme and, for that very reason, caught the interest of Chrysippus. It is perhaps futile to ask whether Virgil's use of the idea owes more to literary or philosophical sources. Moreover, even if we see the conceptual language of the *Aeneid* as strongly coloured by Stoicism, there remains a question of whether a poem whose vision is, for many readers, deeply tragic can express the (ultimately positive) world view of Stoicism.[97]

Similar though less profound questions are raised by the other epics. Lucan (39–65) was Seneca's nephew and another of Cornutus' students; like his uncle, he died because of his supposed involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy against Nero. His *Pharsalia*, describing the civil war that ended the Roman republic, is deeply political. Its Stoic colour comes out mainly in the presentation of Cato as an

[96] See Colish (1985), 194–203, and, for a penetrating study of *Satire* 1, Bramble (1974).
[97] See Colish (1985), 225–52, Gill (1983), Gill (1997), with references to other relevant studies.

Each volume in this series of companions to major philosophers contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, together with a substantial bibliography, and will serve as a reference work for students and nonspecialists. One aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker.

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