The Deep Ecology Movement

An Introductory Anthology

Edited by

Alan Drengson & Yuichi Inoue

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Bill Devall's "The Ecological Self" from his *Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology*, Gibbs Smith, Salt Lake City, © 1988, 38–72;

Freya Mathews, "Conservation and Self-Realization: A Deep Ecology Perspective," from *Environmental Ethics* 10 (1988), 347–55;

Warwick Fox's "Transpersonal Ecology and the Varieties of Identification," from his *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism*, Shambhala, Boston, 1990, 249–268 (From *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* by Warwick Fox. © 1990 by Warwick Fox. Reprinted by arrangement with Shambhala Publications, Inc., 300 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, MA 02115);

David Rothenberg's "A Platform of Deep Ecology" from *The Environmentalist* 7 (1987), 185–190;

Michael Zimmerman's "Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics" from *Environmental Ethics* 9 (1987), 21–44;

Patsy Hallen's "Making Peace with Nature: Why Ecology Needs Feminism" from *The Trumpeter* 4 (1987), 3, 3–14;

Dolores LaChapelle's "Ritual is Essential" from Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered*, Gibbs Smith, Salt Lake City, 1985, 247–250, originally published in *In Context* 5 (1984), rights held by the author;

Pat Fleming's and Joanna Macy's "The Council of All Beings" from *Thinking Like a Mountain: Toward a Council of All Beings*, John Seed et al., Editors, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1988,

79–90 (Permission by New Society Publishers, 4527 Springfield Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19143, ph. 1-800-333-9093);

Gary Snyder's "Ecology, Place, and the Awakening of Compassion" from *Turning Wheel*, Spring 1994, 12–15, was also given as a talk at a Village Council of All Beings in Leh, Ladakh (This article is included in Snyder's forthcoming volume: *A Place in Space* [Washington, D.C., Counterpoint Press, 1995]);

John Rodman's "Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered" from *Ethics and the Environment*, D. Scherer and T. Attig, Editors, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1983, 82–92;

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The Ecoforestry Institute is a nonprofit, charitable, educational institution organized in the U.S. and Canada committed to teaching ecologically responsible forest use. See their addresses at the end of the Introduction to this book.

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Preface

For several years we have both independently thought of putting together an anthology of readings on the Deep Ecology Movement. Such an anthology has been very much needed in environmental studies and philosophy courses, but also as a resource for a wider audience.

When Prof. Inoue came to the University of Victoria he suggested to Prof. Drengson that they work on an introductory anthology of deep ecology literature which could be translated into Japanese. The collection slowly evolved and became a dual language project. The first edition of this collection will appear in English. It will later appear in Japanese.

We are happy to offer readers this sustained introduction to issues and problems of great substance and urgency. The philosophical and other analyses presented herein are not dull reading. The topics discussed are of fundamental human importance.

Arne Naess has remarked that one feature of the deep ecology movement is that its supporters ask deeper questions. We trust that the essays in this collection will stimulate readers to do their own deep questioning and begin to explore their own ecological Selves, if they have not already been doing so. If they have made these discoveries on their own, let these essays stimulate their further journeys and explorations.

But above all, we hope that this brief survey of some of the literature of the deep ecology movement will lead to support for the integrity of the natural order so that all beings may flourish. In this we hope that reflections stimulated by this book will lead to practical actions and changes in lifestyle compatible with ecocentric values and respect for all life.

An important note to readers: The authors of the essays included in this book have asked us to inform readers that in many cases they

would not articulate their views today in the way presented by these papers. In some instances these essays were written more than thirty years ago. The authors' views have evolved, times have changed. We wanted nonetheless to offer to readers a sense of the historical development of recent work in support of the deep ecology movement. The bibliography at the end of this book will aid readers on their further explorations. Items are marked to indicate different levels of immersion in the literature.

Introduction

Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue

1. Formation

In 1973, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess published the summary of a lecture delivered at the third World Future Research Conference (Bucharest, September 1972). In it, he articulated the distinction between the shallow and the deep approaches to environmentalism. He characterized the latter by seven major points. This summary, the opening article of this anthology, is regarded as the "original" paper on the grassroots movement to ecocentrism. It introduced the term *Deep Ecology Movement* and presented a basic characterization of it. Thus, the words "deep ecology" have been identified with this movement since the early 1970s. The first Earth Day was commemorated in 1970. The United Nations Conference on Human Environment was held in Stockholm in 1972, and the first "Oil Crisis" came in 1973.

2. Arne Naess

Arne Naess is a highly respected and distinguished person. He is a prominent scholar, internationally recognized for his voluminous, innovative, and insightful work on general and specific questions in philosophy. He was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Oslo at the age of twenty-seven in 1939, and retained that position until 1969, when he took early retirement. Naess has led academic work in philosophy and social research in Norway for a long time. After his resignation of the professorship, Naess put specific emphasis on developing professional work on ecosophy

(ecological philosophy and wisdom). One of his major publications on ecosophy is *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* (translated and edited with the help of David Rothenberg).

Naess is well known for his dedication to nonviolent civil resistance. He has practiced Gandhian nonviolence, under such critical conditions as the Norwegian resistance to Nazi occupation, as well as in ecological protest actions against large-scale development projects. Naess is a distinguished mountaineer, known for leading the first ascent of the highest peak (7692 meters) in the Hindu Kush, among other climbs. He is an ardent hiker and skier with a deep love and sense of wonder for nature. Finally, it should be noted that Naess has fascinated many people with his warm-hearted friendliness and humor, multifaceted interests and knowledge, ardent love of and devotion to nature and truth, and his fairness and open-mindedness. George Sessions' paper in this anthology describes with a personal touch major characteristics of Naess' philosophy and lifestyle.

3. Introduction to North America

Despite the 1973 publication of Naess' original paper, the term "deep ecology" was barely referred to in North America until the 1980s. Warwick Fox divides the development of the deep ecology movement into three stages: the latency period (1973 to 1980); the honeymoon period, when virtually all responses were positive (1980 to 1983/84); and the mature period, when the deep ecology movement began to attract critical as well as positive commentaries, during which the framework for the movement has been substantially deepened and enlarged (1983/84 to today).

George Sessions and Bill Devall were two of the first people to become aware of the importance of Naess' original paper. They started referring to and elaborating on deep ecology ideas in their own writings in 1977. They thereby helped to introduce the concepts of the deep ecology movement to North America. *Deep Ecology*, their joint work published in 1985, was the first major book on the deep ecology movement by writers other than Naess. It played a significant role in popularizing the ideas of the movement. The two most important journals in which writings on the deep ecology movement appear

are: *Environmental Ethics* (Department of Philosophy, PO Box 13496, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203-3496, USA) which started in 1979, and *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* (LightStar: PO Box 5853, Stn. B, Victoria, BC V8R 6S8, Canada) which is devoted to the deep ecology movement and began publishing in 1983.

4. What is Deep Ecology?

Naess' distinction between the shallow and the deep approaches, made more than twenty years ago, has become even more relevant today. In the decade of the 1990s, environmental issues have become widely seen as one of the greatest challenges facing humankind, and no one, not even the expansionist (i.e., economic-growth oriented), can ignore this. This fact was highlighted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992. So-called corporate ("shallow") environmentalism still dominates the mainstream. It advocates continuous economic growth and environmental protection by means of technological innovation (such as catalytic converters), "scientific" resource management (such as sustained yield forestry), and mild changes in lifestyle (such as recycling). It avoids serious fundamental questions about our values and worldviews; it does not examine our sociocultural institutions and our personal lifestyles. This mainstream technological approach has to be clearly distinguished from the deep ecology approach, which in contrast examines the *roots* of our environmental/social problems. The deep approach aims to achieve a fundamental ecological transformation of our sociocultural systems, collective actions, and lifestyles.

Unfortunately, the two approaches, shallow and deep, are too often confused in the public mind, and this confusion adversely affects efforts to achieve an environmentally sustainable, socially equitable, and spiritually rich way of life. It is true that supporters of the deep ecology movement and those of the shallow technological approach share many of the same concerns, and they should cooperate where necessary and appropriate. This is well understood by environmentalists and so the term "reform" is often used as an alternative to "shallow." Such confusion, however, can divert attention from what

needs to be done. Therefore, it is important to understand how supporters of the deep ecology movement have elaborated, developed and applied the elements of their views in relation to Naess' original distinction. This helps us to develop clarity so we can concentrate our best efforts on practical solutions.

Gary Snyder's paper on reinhabitation is a seminal essay like Naess' summary paper. There are strong lines of connection between the two. Snyder's articulations helped to inspire the back to the land movement in North America. The reinhabitation paper published here was seminal to bioregionalism (an important element in the ecology movement that originated in North America) and it implicitly conveys the shallow-deep continuum for discovering the inherent values of nature. Snyder's writings crystalized the Eastern influence on the Pacific side of North America. We can detect this coastal-montane voice in other writers in this anthology, such as Alan Drengson and Bill Devall.

Alan Drengson's article in this anthology, published in 1980, is an early, original exposition of Naess' distinction. In it, Drengson contrasts the person-planetary and technocratic paradigms, in terms of the deep-shallow typology. His paper was written in 1978 developing the distinctions between the technocratic and pernetarian (*per*sons in *net*works of plane*tary* relationships) paradigms. When the editor of *Environmental Ethics*, Eugene Hargrove, sent him a copy of Naess' summary paper in 1979, Drengson realized that the shallow-deep description fit his own discovery of the same value continuum but was verbalized in simpler terms. He incorporated this into his paper. The paper received wide distribution and helped to bring a number of different approaches and fields together in interdisciplinary studies of the environmental crisis as a deep cultural one. In 1983 Drengson founded *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* specifically to disseminate ecosophies in support of the deep ecology movement.

In 1984, Naess and Sessions jointly developed a preliminary platform or a set of basic principles, which was offered as a minimum description of the general features of the deep ecology movement. We can understand this platform (and the characterization made in

Naess' 1973 paper) as the core tenets of the movement. These describe the general, broad meaning of "deep ecology" as a world-wide, grass-roots movement. However, the term "deep ecology" has also been used in a more narrow sense, that is, to refer to Naess' own "Self-realization" thesis, a particular approach (or ecosophy) within eco-centric, deep environmentalism. This approach to ecosophy has been the narrow meaning of "deep ecology." Because of this dual use, the term "deep ecology" has seemed confusing to those unfamiliar with this historical background. Naess explained early that many ecoso-phies, or ultimate premises, could support the platform principles, and the platform principles could yield many sorts of practical appli-cations (see Chapter 2).

Naess has been careful in his own use of these terms. He uses the term "deep ecology movement" to refer to a broad ecocentric grass-roots effort, as contrasted with an anthropocentric, technocratic approach, to achieve an ecologically balanced future. He sees this effort as a social and political movement. On the other hand, he reserves the term "deep ecology" (but more often uses "Ecosophy T") for referring to his own specific ecological philosophy of ulti-mate premises centered on "Self-realization" achieved through wider identification with one's ecological context. *Here, "deep ecology" is used to refer to a philosophy, not a movement*. The distinction between these two phrases is important, but in the environmental literature people often use the term "deep ecology" to refer to what Naess and other supporters call "the deep ecology movement." Peo-ple also use "deep ecology" to refer to "Ecosophy T," "the identifi-cation thesis," and "the Self-realization thesis," that is, Naess' own ecological philosophy. (Warwick Fox calls Naess' own ecosophy a form of transpersonal ecology.) To avoid ambiguity, it would be bet-ter if we used the whole phrase "deep ecology movement" when referring to the movement and the other terms (not "deep ecology") when referring to specific ecosophies.

5. The "Apron" Diagram

The "Apron" Diagram included in this anthology is highly useful for understanding the relationship between Naess' own "deep ecology"

philosophy and "the deep ecology movement." It was developed by Naess to represent a *total view* of the deep ecology movement. It is composed of four levels: 1. ultimate premises (philosophies/religions), 2. platform principles, 3. general views, and 4. practical/concrete decisions, presented in order of logical derivation. Naess advocates unity at the level of platform principles (Level 2), allowing plurality/diversity at the other levels. If we accept his formulation, we can say that the deep ecology movement involves efforts on four different levels, but it also can be represented by the above-mentioned "platform" principles alone, which belong to Level 2. On the other hand, the Self-realization thesis (Naess' own specific ultimate philosophy) belongs to the level of ultimate premises, Level 1. Thus, the Self-realization thesis is primarily a *philosophical* undertaking, whereas support of the platform principles is a political and social undertaking.

The Apron Diagram helps to clarify the whole spectrum of activity within the deep ecology movement, ranging from philosophical inquiries to concrete judgments and daily actions. It helps us to understand the relationship of a particular effort to the total framework of the movement. This understanding, then, lets us concentrate on any particular level without thereby losing the larger context and solidarity of the movement.

6. Self-Realization and Ecosophy T

The "Self-realization" thesis distinguishes Naess' philosophy from other ecocentric philosophical (mostly axiological) approaches. Naess advocates a psychological rather than a moralistic approach to environmentalism. His approach is to work on our inclinations, rather than preaching the subordination of our personal interest to an environmental ethic. He thinks that this can be done through expanding self beyond the boundaries of the narrow ego through the process of caring identification with larger entities such as forests, bioregions, and the planet as a whole. Naess' 1987 paper in this anthology explains in plain language what is meant by "self" with a small s (ego-self), "Self" with a capital S (ecological Self), and also what is meant by "extension of identification" to larger entities. His paper

gives us a basic understanding of his own philosophy as an ecological way of being and his use of Gandhian philosophy as a source of personal inspiration, especially for non-violence in word and deed.

The norm of "Self-realization" and extension of identification is widely shared by many *explicit* supporters of the deep ecology movement, several of whom appear in this collection. Again, however, it must be stressed that it is not necessary to accept the Self-realization thesis to be a supporter of the deep ecology movement, because the thesis belongs to Level 1 (ultimate premises) but yields support for the broader deep ecology movement. At Level 1 pluralism is presupposed. One can support the platform from Shinto, Buddhist, or Christian ultimate premises, for example.

The Self-realization thesis has been widely studied and extensively elaborated upon by some supporters of the deep ecology movement. Three contributions in *Section II* of this anthology give examples of these efforts. Bill Devall develops the concept of "ecological self," as contrasted with "minimal self," and explicitly links the deep ecology movement with bioregionalism through the thesis of wide identification. Freya Mathews constructs an analysis to solve the seeming incompatibility between identification with the "ecocosm" (identification with the widest possible whole—the cosmic self) and conservation of individual life-forms, local ecosystems, and biosphere, thereby introducing a deeper dimension to conservation by means of the identification thesis. Warwick Fox advances Naess' Self-realization thesis by articulating the strengths and weaknesses of three forms of wide identification processes: the personal, the ontological, and the cosmological. Fox calls all of these approaches *transpersonal ecology*.

Naess' own Ecosophy T is a philosophical system composed of norms and hypotheses, with "Self-realization" as the ultimate norm; it represents Naess' own philosophical basis for his support of the deep ecology movement. Naess reached these basic norms by means of deep questioning, and he derives other norms from the basic ones in conjunction with factual hypotheses. The overview of Ecosophy T in this anthology helps us to understand the norm of "Self-realization!" (here the exclamation point is used to signal that this is a

moral imperative) in its relationship to other important norms (such as Diversity!, Complexity!, Symbiosis!, Local autonomy!, No exploitation!, and Self-determination!). It serves to integrate Naess' 1973 and 1987 papers into a unified vision.

The term "ecosophy" is Naess' favorite alternative to "ecological philosophy," made up of eco- (originally means "house" or "habitation") as in ecology, and -sophy ("wisdom") as in philosophy (philo-sophia, love of wisdom). "T" is taken from Tvergastein, the name of Naess' tiny mountain hut in Norway. Over years of dwelling at Tvergastein, he has developed a deep spiritual kinship with the hut and its surroundings. This kinship constitutes an important part of his own ecosophy. By calling his ecophilosophy "Ecosophy T," Naess emphasizes that it is only his own ultimate philosophy, and that there can be other versions developed by others, such as Ecosophy A, Ecosophy B, and so on, each of which could support the platform principles of the deep ecology movement.

7. Platform Principles

As mentioned above, in 1984, Naess and Sessions prepared a preliminary platform composed of eight major principles. They thought that it appropriately characterized the deep ecology movement in a 200-word formulation. A recent version of it is included in this anthology. As with any political platform its main object is to bring into focus principles of general agreement on the wide range of issues facing the movement. The platform helps to inspire a sense of solidarity among local efforts in different contexts, which could otherwise appear isolated in a sea of divergent and global views. It also helps a wider public to understand the aims of the movement and to encourage grassroots support and participation in related efforts. Therefore, the platform principles avoid academic language and jargon. The aim of the platform is to promote clarity and consensus about the core principles shared by supporters of the deep ecology movement *despite their different backgrounds, whether these are philosophical, religious, occupational, or cultural.*

Naess and Sessions do not claim that their particular version of the platform is fixed or absolute. They emphasize its *preliminary*

nature, and also invite others to propose their own version of the platform. David Rothenberg's paper in this anthology was a response to this invitation. Rothenberg's platform is compatible with the Naess/Sessions version, but there are also some differences. He tried to make his version accessible to an even wider audience by presenting the basic points in simpler words with a more obvious structure. Readers can decide which best describes their sense of the movement.

8. Critiques of the Deep Ecology Movement

As deep ecology (both identified with Naess' philosophy and as a movement) became more widely known and frequently referred to, various critiques emerged on the issues of science, anthropocentrism (versus ecocentrism), androcentrism (or patriarchal values), population control, and human liberty. Some of these critiques represent an emotional reaction based on a misinterpretation of the main tenets of the deep ecology movement, and as a result fail to be intellectually productive. However, others have helped supporters of the movement to clarify their own position and further develop ecocentric paradigms.

One interesting critique, for example, comes from the radical left wing of the ecology movement. Simply put, their criticism is that the deep ecology supporters' critique of the dichotomy between humans and the nonhuman world—represented by the industrial paradigm—results in lack of sufficient attention to such critical issues as the domination of humans by other human beings and also the exploitation of women by men: both of these, it is claimed, are located at the very root of today's ecological (environmental and social) crisis. Hence, these critics say that the deep ecology movement should give explicit priority to deep questioning about the roles of capital, the nation-state system, and sociocultural institutions based on traditional patriarchal values, in creating the crisis. They say this must precede deep questioning about human relationships to nature. For example, unlimited population growth logically results in ecological disaster, but, they argue, it is inappropriate to talk about population control before addressing such critical social/political issues

as the tremendous inequity in resource distribution between the poor and the rich, and between the nations of the South and those of the North, and women's right to control their reproduction. It needs to be stressed that these positions are not incompatible with the broad deep ecology movement. Moreover, many supporters of the movement have explicitly acknowledged the importance of these issues. They might differ with respect to priorities needed to achieve the *radical* ecological transformation required of human beings living in the late twentieth century, if global and local environmental disasters are to be avoided. These critiques contain many rich insights that supporters of the deep ecology movement have incorporated into their views and activities.

9. Various Concerns in the Deep Ecology Movement

Section III of this anthology contains discussions of some of the major themes of the deep ecology movement. Michael Zimmerman's paper responds to the main ecofeminist criticisms of the movement. He looks at the essentially complementary character of these two ecocentric approaches. Patsy Hallen gives a feminist critique of science and reveals the psychosexual roots of the current ecological crisis. She also emphasizes the complementarity of ecofeminism and the deep ecology movement.

Dolores LaChapelle explores the meaning of rituals as activities that focus on the relationship of human beings to the land as sacred. She observes that rituals are sophisticated methods for communication essential to a sustainable culture. Pat Fleming and Joanna Macy outline the structure of an experiential workshop/ritual, which helps people to identify with other life-forms and speak for them, so that they can express their awareness of the current ecological crisis, while deepening their motivation to act.

Gary Snyder represents the bioregional approach and the spiritual dimension of the deep ecology movement, as influenced by Zen and wilderness experience. His poetic essay invites us to explore the "old" ways, the ways of the spiritual traditions rooted in primal sacredness found through compassion in specific places.

John Rodman presents a useful typology for understanding con-

temporary environmentalism, which helps to clarify the details of the deep/reform continuum. He advocates an environmental ethic based on an ecological sensibility from which environmental and social issues are perceived as *essentially* interrelated.

Finally, Andrew McLaughlin emphasizes the necessity of achieving a fundamental unity between the social justice and the nature preservation traditions in radical environmentalism. Together they should challenge industrialism and prepare the ground for an ecocentric future. His paper concludes *Section III* by describing the future of ecocentric movements and the opportunities for radical cultural changes.

10. Future Prospects

As we have explained above, the deep ecology movement unites a variety of interests, concerns and a diversity of religions and philosophies. As the movement continues to develop, there will be more diversity in activism, theory, and culture. Both specialization (working on a specific matter) and convergence (linking individual efforts into a unitary vision) will continue to be required.

Recently, foundations supporting the deep ecology movement have been established for specific purposes. In North America, for example, the *Ecoforestry Institute* (PO Box 12543, Portland, OR 97212, USA; and PO Box 5783, Stn. B, Victoria, BC V8R 6S8, Canada) has been incorporated both in the United States and Canada on the platform principles of the deep ecology movement, so as to promote ecologically responsible forestry and forest use. The Institute put a full-page educational statement in *The New York Times*, in which it advocated departure from the conventional "industrial" forestry to a new ecocentric forestry that respects forests for their own intrinsic worth and uses them on a sustainable basis. The text of this advertisement is in the appendix of this anthology. The Ecoforestry Institute also publishes the *International Journal of Ecoforestry* (PO Box 5885, Stn. B., Victoria, BC V8R 6S8, Canada), which started in 1994 to focus on the practices, science and philosophies of ecologically responsible forest use. The *Foundation for Deep Ecology* (950 Lombard Street, San Francisco, CA 94133, USA) was

established in 1990 to provide financial support for projects and activities in the deep ecology movement. The *Institute for Deep Ecology Education* (IDEE) (A Project of the TIDES Foundation: Box 2290, Boulder, CO 80306, USA) sponsors training programs and workshops, and does consulting on deep ecology curricula and education. *The Ecostery Foundation of North America* (A Project of TIDES): PO Box 5885, Stn. B, Victoria, BC V8R 6S8, Canada) was founded in 1989 to promote ecosophy and establish "ecosteries" [a new word formed by combining "eco-" from "ecology" and "-stery" from "monastery"] as places where ecological wisdom is learned, practiced, and taught, under rural, suburban, and urban settings. The *Wildlands Project* (PO Box 5365, Tucson, AZ 85703, USA) has put forth a comprehensive wildlands recovery proposal for preserving biological diversity and wilderness values. The project inspired a Wildlands Anthology project, the first book (called *Place of the Wild*) was published at the end of 1994 by Island Press. They also help to publish the journal *Wild Earth* (PO Box 455, Richmond, VT 05477, USA). Finally, there is the *Arne Naess Selected Works Project* (Harold Glasser, Coordinator ANSWP, Applied Science, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA). This project's aim is to publish Professor Naess' major works in up-to-date English translations. Several of the volumes will be of critical importance to ecophilosophy and the deep ecology movement. These foundations, institutions, and projects are just a few examples of the many promising developments of the deep ecology movement as part of a transition to diverse ecocentric cultures and lifestyles.

Section I

Arne Naess

I

The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary

Arne Naess

Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.

The emergence of ecologists from their former relative obscurity marks a turning point in our scientific communities. But their message is twisted and misused. A shallow, but presently rather powerful movement, and a deep, but less influential movement, compete for our attention. I shall make an effort to characterize the two.

1. The Shallow Ecology movement:

Fight against pollution and resource depletion. Central objective: the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.

2. The Deep Ecology movement:

(1) Rejection of the human-in-environment image in favor of *the relational, total-field image*. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things *A* and *B* is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of *A* and *B*, so that without the relation, *A* and *B* are no longer the same things. The total-field model dissolves not only the human-in-environment concept, but every compact thing-

in-milieu concept—except when talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication.

(2) *Biospherical egalitarianism*—in principle. The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression. The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow humans and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, *the equal right to live and blossom* is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of humans from themselves.

Ecological egalitarianism implies the reinterpretation of the future-research variable, 'level of crowding,' so that *general* mammalian crowding and loss of life-equality is taken seriously, not only human crowding. (Research on the high requirements of free space of certain mammals has, incidentally, suggested that theorists of human urbanism have largely underestimated human life-space requirements. Behavioral crowding symptoms [neuroses, aggressiveness, loss of traditions . . .] are largely the same among mammals.)

(3) *Principles of diversity and of symbiosis*. Diversity enhances the potentialities of survival, the chances of new modes of life, the richness of forms. And the so-called struggle of life, and survival of the fittest, should be interpreted in the sense of ability to coexist and cooperate in complex relationships, rather than ability to kill, exploit, and suppress. 'Live and let live' is a more powerful ecological principle than 'Either you or me.'

The latter tends to reduce the multiplicity of kinds of forms of life, and also to create destruction within the communities of the same species. Ecologically inspired attitudes therefore favor diversity of human ways of life, of cultures, of occupations, of economies. They support the fight against economic and cultural, as much as

military invasion and domination, and they are opposed to the annihilation of seals and whales as much as to that of human tribes or cultures.

(4) *Anti-class posture*. Diversity of human ways of life is in part due to (intended or unintended) exploitation and suppression on the part of certain groups. The exploiter lives differently from the exploited, but both are adversely affected in their potentialities of self-realization. The principle of diversity does not cover differences due merely to certain attitudes or behaviors forcibly blocked or restrained. The principles of ecological egalitarianism and of symbiosis support the same anti-class posture. The ecological attitude favors the extension of all three principles to any group conflicts, including those of today between developing and developed nations. The three principles also favor extreme caution towards any overall plans for the future, except those consistent with wide and widening classless diversity.

(5) Fight against *pollution and resource depletion*. In this fight ecologists have found powerful supporters, but sometimes to the detriment of their total stand. This happens when attention is focused on pollution and resource depletion rather than on the other points, or when projects are implemented which reduce pollution but increase evils of the other kinds. Thus, if prices of life necessities increase because of the installation of anti-pollution devices, class differences increase too. An ethics of responsibility implies that ecologists do not serve the shallow, but the deep ecological movement. That is, not only point (5), but all seven points must be considered together.

Ecologists are irreplaceable informants in any society, whatever their political color. If well organized, they have the power to reject jobs in which they submit themselves to institutions or to planners with limited ecological perspectives. As it is now, ecologists sometimes serve masters who deliberately ignore the wider perspectives.

(6) *Complexity, not complication*. The theory of ecosystems contains an important distinction between what is complicated without any Gestalt or unifying principles—we may think of finding our way through a chaotic city—and what is complex. A multiplicity of more or less lawful, interacting factors may operate together to form a

unity, a system. We make a shoe or use a map or integrate a variety of activities into a workaday pattern. Organisms, ways of life, and interactions in the biosphere in general exhibit complexity of such an astoundingly high level as to color the general outlook of ecologists. Such complexity makes thinking in terms of vast systems inevitable. It also makes for a keen, steady perception of the profound *human ignorance* of biospherical relationships and therefore of the effect of disturbances. Applied to humans, the complexity-not-complication principle favors division of labor, *not fragmentation of labor*. It favors integrated actions in which the whole person is active, not mere reactions. It favors complex economies, an integrated variety of means of living. (Combinations of industrial and agricultural activity, of intellectual and manual work, of specialized and non-specialized occupations, of urban and non-urban activity, of work in city and recreation in nature with recreation in city and work in nature. . . .)

It favors soft technique and 'soft future-research,' less prognosis, more clarification of possibilities. More sensitivity towards continuity and live traditions, and—most importantly—towards our state of ignorance.

The implementation of ecologically responsible policies requires in this century an exponential growth of technical skill and invention—but in new directions, directions which today are not consistently and liberally supported by the research policy organs of our nation-states.

(7) *Local autonomy and decentralization*. The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained all ecological equilibrium. This lends support to our efforts to strengthen local self-government and material and mental self-sufficiency. But these efforts presuppose an impetus towards decentralization. Pollution problems, including those of thermal pollution and recirculation of materials, also lead us in this direction, because increased local autonomy, if we are able to keep other factors constant, reduces energy consumption. (Compare an approximately self-sufficient locality with one requiring the importation of foodstuff,

materials for house construction, fuel and skilled labor from other continents. The former may use only five percent of the energy used by the latter.) Local autonomy is strengthened by a reduction in the number of links in the hierarchical chains of decision. (For example, a chain consisting of local board, municipal council, highest subnational decision-maker, a state-wide institution in a state federation, a federal national government institution, a coalition of nations, and of institutions, e.g., E.E.C. top levels, and a global institution, can be reduced to one made up of local board, nation-wide institution, and global institution.) Even if a decision follows majority rules at each step, many local interests may be dropped along the line, if it is too long.

Summing up, then, it should, first of all, be borne in mind that the norms and tendencies of the Deep Ecology Movement are not derived from ecology by logic or induction. Ecological knowledge and the life-style of the ecological field-worker have *suggested, inspired, and fortified* the perspectives of the Deep Ecology Movement. Many of the formulations in the above seven-point survey are rather vague generalizations, only tenable if made more precise in certain directions. But all over the world the inspiration from ecology has shown remarkable convergencies. The survey does not pretend to be more than one of the possible condensed codifications of these convergencies.

Secondly, it should be fully appreciated that the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology Movement are clearly and forcefully *normative*. They express a value priority system only in part based on results (or lack of results, cf. point [6]) of scientific research. Today, ecologists try to influence policy-making bodies largely through threats, through predictions concerning pollutants and resource depletion, knowing that policy-makers accept at least certain minimum *norms* concerning health and just distribution. But it is clear that there is a vast number of people in all countries, and even a considerable number of people in power, who accept as valid the wider norms and values characteristic of the Deep Ecology Movement. There are political potentials in this movement which should not be overlooked and which have little to do with pollution and resource depletion. In plotting

possible futures, the norms should be freely used and elaborated.

Thirdly, insofar as ecology movements deserve our attention, they are *ecophilosophical* rather than ecological. Ecology is a *limited* science which makes *use* of scientific methods. Philosophy is the most general forum of debate on fundamentals, descriptive as well as prescriptive, and political philosophy is one of its subsections. By an *ecosophy* I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of *sofia* [or] wisdom, is openly normative, it contains *both* norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements *and* hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction.

The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only 'facts' of pollution, resources, population, etc., but also value priorities. Today, however, the seven points listed provide one unified framework for ecosophical systems.

In general system theory, systems are mostly conceived in terms of causally or functionally interacting or interrelated items. An ecosophy, however, is more like a system of the kind constructed by Aristotle or Spinoza. It is expressed verbally as a set of sentences with a variety of functions, descriptive and prescriptive. The basic relation is that between subsets of premises and subsets of conclusions, that is, the relation of derivability. The relevant notions of derivability may be classed according to rigor, with logical and mathematical deductions topping the list, but also according to how much is implicitly taken for granted. An exposition of an ecosophy must necessarily be only moderately precise considering the vast scope of relevant ecological and normative (social, political, ethical) material. At the moment, ecosophy might profitably use models of systems, rough approximations of global systematizations. It is the global character, not preciseness in detail, which distinguishes an ecosophy. It articulates and integrates the efforts of an ideal ecological team, a team comprising not only scientists from an extreme variety of disciplines, but also students of politics and active policy-makers.

Under the name of *ecologism*, various deviations from the deep movement have been championed—primarily with a one-sided stress

on pollution and resource depletion, but also with a neglect of the great differences between under- and over-developed countries in favor of a vague global approach. The global approach is essential, but regional differences must largely determine policies in the coming years.

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The Apron



2

The Apron Diagram

Arne Naess

I see the Deep Ecology Movement as a total view comprising many levels in close contact with each other. To illustrate this I use a diagram. The "Apron Diagram" illustrates logical, as distinct from genetic, relations between views. By "logical relations," I mean verbally articulated relations between the premises and the conclusions. They move down the diagram in stages: some conclusions become premises for new conclusions. By "genetic relations," I refer to influences, motivations, inspirations and cause/effect relations. They are not indicated anywhere in the Apron Diagram. They may move up and down or anywhere, and they involve time.

The platform of the deep ecology movement is grounded in religion or philosophy. In a loose sense it may be said to be derived from the fundamentals. The situation only reminds us that a set of very similar or even identical conclusions may be drawn from divergent premises. The platform is the same, the fundamental premises differ. One must avoid looking for one definite philosophy or religion among the supporters of the deep ecology movement. Fortunately there is a rich manifold of fundamental views compatible with the platform of the deep ecology movement. Furthermore, there is a manifold of kinds of consequences derived from the platform.

We must take four levels into account: (1) verbalized fundamental philosophical and religious ideas and intuitions; (2) the platform of the deep ecology movement; (3) more or less general consequences

derived from the platform—lifestyles and general policies of every kind; and (4) concrete situations and practical decisions made in them.

The possibility of the platform principles being derived from a plurality of mutually inconsistent premises—A-set and the B-set—is illustrated in the upper part of the Apron Diagram. A can be Buddhism, and B can be Christianity: or A may be Spinoza's philosophy, and B may be Ecosophy T. Similarly, the lower part of the diagram illustrates how, with one or more of the eight principles as part of a set of premises, mutually inconsistent conclusions may logically be derived, leading to the C-set and D-set of concrete decisions. C may be inspired by a sort of Christianity, and D by a sort of Buddhism: or, again, C may be Spinoza-inspired whilst D follows a certain ecological philosophy. (Unfortunately, the relation of deepness in the Apron Diagram leads upwards. To avoid mixing metaphors, the apron should be turned upside down.)

A distinction between the four levels is important. Supporters of the deep ecology movement have ultimate views from which they derive their acceptance of the platform, but those views may be very different from person to person, and from group to group. Likewise, supporters may disagree about what follows from the eight points, partly because they interpret them differently, partly because what follows does not follow from those eight points alone, but from a wider set of premises, and these may be in conflict.

The deep ecology movement thus can manifest both plurality and unity: unity at Level 2, and plurality at the other levels.

3

Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World

Arne Naess

For about 2500 years humankind has struggled with basic questions about who we are, what we are heading for, and what kind of reality we are part of. Two thousand, five hundred years is a short period in the lifetime of a species, and still less in the lifetime of the Earth, to whose surface we belong as mobile parts. I am not capable of saying very new things, but I can look at things from a *somewhat* different angle, using somewhat different conceptual tools and images.

What I am going to say more or less in my own way and that of my friends may roughly be condensed into the following six points:

1. We under-estimate ourselves. I emphasize 'self.' We tend to confuse it with the narrow ego.

2. Human nature is such that with sufficient allsided maturity we cannot avoid 'identifying' our self with all living beings, beautiful or ugly, big or small, sentient or not. I need of course to elucidate my concept of identifying. I'll come back to that.

The adjective 'allsided' in 'allsided maturity' deserves note: Descartes seemed to be rather immature in his relation to animals, Schopenhauer was not much advanced in his relation to family (kicking his mother down a staircase?), Heidegger was amateurish—to say the least—in his political behavior. Weak identification with nonhumans is compatible with maturity in some major sets of relations, such as those towards family or friends. I use the qualification 'allsided,' that is, 'in all major relations.'

3. Traditionally the *maturity of self* has been considered to develop through three stages, from ego to social self, comprising the ego, and from there to the metaphysical self, comprising the social self. But Nature is then largely left out in the conception of this process. Our home, our immediate environment, where we belong as children, and the identification with human living beings, are largely ignored. I therefore tentatively introduce, perhaps for the first time ever, a concept of *ecological self*. We may be said to be in, of and for Nature from our very beginning. Society and human relations are important, but our self is richer in its constitutive relations. These relations are not only relations we have to other humans and the human community. (I have introduced the term 'mixed community' for communities where we consciously and deliberately live closely together with certain animals.)

4. Joy of life and meaning of life is increased through increased self-realization. That is, through the fulfillment of potentials each has, but which never are exactly the same for any pair of living beings. Whatever the differences, increased self-realization implies broadening and deepening of self.

5. Because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with growing maturity, the self is widened and deepened. We 'see ourselves in others.' Self-realization is hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered. Love of our self will fight this obstacle by assisting in the self-realization of others according to the formula 'live and let live!' Thus, all that can be achieved by altruism—the *dutiful, moral* consideration of others—can be achieved—and much more—through widening and deepening our self. Following Kant we then act beautifully, but neither morally nor immorally.

6. A great challenge of today is to save the planet from further devastation that violates both the enlightened self-interest of humans and non-humans, and decreases the potential of joyful existence for all.

Now, proceeding to elaborate these points, I shall start with the peculiar and fascinating terms 'ego,' 'self.'

The simplest answer to who and what I am is to point to my

body, using my finger. But clearly I cannot identify my self or even my ego with my body. Example: Compare "I know Mr. Smith" with "My body knows Mr. Smith"; "I like poetry" with "My body likes poetry"; "The only difference between us is that you are a Presbyterian and I am a Baptist," with "the only difference between our bodies is that your body is Presbyterian whereas mine is Baptist."

In the above sentences we cannot substitute 'my body' for 'I.' Nor can we substitute 'my mind' or 'my mind and body' for 'I.' More adequately we may substitute 'I as a person' for 'I,' but of course this does not tell us what the ego or self is.

A couple of thousand years of philosophical, psychological and social-psychological thinking has not brought us to any stable conception of the I, ego, or the self. In modern psychotherapy these notions play an indispensable role, but, of course, the practical goal of therapy does not necessitate philosophical clarification of the terms. It is for the purpose of this paper important to remind ourselves about the strange and marvelous phenomena we are dealing with. They are extremely close. Perhaps the very nearness of these objects of thought and reflection adds to our difficulties. I shall only offer one single sentence resembling a definition of the ecological self. The ecological self of a person is that with which this person identifies.

This key sentence (rather than definition) about the self shifts the burden of clarification from the term 'self' to that of identification, or rather 'process of identification.'

What would be a paradigm situation of identification? It is a situation in which identification elicits intense empathy. My standard example has to do with a non-human being I met 40 years ago. I looked through an old-fashioned microscope at the dramatic meeting of two drops of different chemicals. A flea jumped from a lemming strolling along the table and landed in the middle of the acid chemicals. To save it was impossible. It took many minutes for the flea to die. Its movements were dreadfully expressive. What I felt was, naturally, a painful compassion and empathy. But the empathy was not basic, it was the process of identification, that "I see myself in the flea." If I was alienated from the flea, not seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the death struggle would have left

me indifferent. So there must be identification in order for there to be compassion and, among humans, solidarity.

One of the authors contributing admirably to clarification of the study of self is Erich Fromm.

> The doctrine that love for oneself is identical with 'selfishness' and an alternative to love for others has pervaded theology, philosophy, and popular thought; the same doctrine has been rationalized in scientific language in Freud's theory of narcissism. Freud's concept presupposes a fixed amount of libido. In the infant, all of the libido has the child's own person as its objective, the stage of 'primary narcissism,' as Freud calls it. During the individual's development, the libido is shifted from one's own person toward other objects. If a person is blocked in his 'object-relationships,' the libido is withdrawn from the objects and returned to his or her own person; this is called 'secondary narcissism.' According to Freud, the more love I turn toward the outside world the less love is left for myself, and vice versa. He thus describes the phenomenon of love as an impoverishment of one's self-love because all libido is turned to an object outside oneself.[1]

What Erich Fromm attributes here to Freud, we today attribute to the shrinkage of self-perception implied in the ego-trip fascination. Fromm opposes such shrinkage. The following quotation concerns love of persons, but as 'ecosophers' we find the notions of 'care, respect, responsibility, knowledge' applicable to living beings in the wide sense.

> Love of others and love for ourselves are not alternatives. On the contrary, an attitude of love toward themselves will be found in all those who are capable of loving others. Love, in principle, is indivisible as far as the connection between 'objects' and one's own self is concerned. Genuine love is an expression of productiveness and implies care, respect, responsibility, and knowledge. It is not an 'effect' in the sense of being effected by somebody, but an active striving for the growth and happiness of the loved person, rooted in one's own capacity to love.[2]

Fromm is very instructive about unselfishness—diametrically opposite to selfishness, but still based upon alienation and narrow

perceptions of self. We might add that what he says applies also to persons experiencing sacrifice of themselves.

> The nature of unselfishness becomes particularly apparent in its effect on others and most frequently, in our culture, in the effect the 'unselfish' mother has on her children. She believes that by her unselfishness her children will experience what it means to be loved and to learn, in turn, what it means to love. The effect of her unselfishness, however, does not at all correspond to her expectations. The children do not show the happiness of persons who are convinced that they are loved; they are anxious, tense, afraid of the mother's disapproval, and anxious to live up to her expectations. Usually, they are affected by their mother's hidden hostility against life, which they sense rather than recognize, and eventually become imbued with it themselves. . . .
>
> If one has a chance to study the effect of a mother with genuine self-love, one can see that there is nothing more conducive to giving a child the experience of what love, joy, and happiness are than being loved by a mother who loves herself.[3]

We need an environmental ethics, but when people feel they unselfishly give up, even sacrifice, their interest in order to show love for Nature, this is probably in the long run a treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification they may come to see their own interest served by conservation, through genuine self-love, love of a widened and deepened self.

At this point the notion of a being's interest furnishes a bridge from self-love to self-realization. It should not surprise us that Erich Fromm, influenced as he is by Spinoza and William James, makes use of that bridge. What is considered to constitute self-interest, he asks, and he answers:

> There are two fundamentally different approaches to this problem. One is the objectivistic approach most clearly formulated by Spinoza. To him self-interest or the interest 'to seek one's profit' is identical with virtue.
>
> The more each person strives and is able to seek his profit, that is to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit

he is impotent. According to this view, the interest of humans is to preserve their existence, which is the same as realizing their inherent potentialities. This concept of self-interest is objectivistic inasmuch as 'interest' is not conceived in terms of the subjective feeling of what one's interest is but in terms of what the nature of a human is, 'objectively.'[4]

'Realizing inherent potentialities' is one of the good less-than-ten-word clarifications of 'self-realization.' The questions "Which are the inherent potentialities of the beings of species x?" and "Which are the inherent potentialities of this specimen y of species x?" obviously lead to reflections about and studies of x and y.

As humans we cannot just follow the impulses of the moment when asking for our inherent potentialities. It is something like this which Fromm means when calling an approach 'objectivistic,' opposing it to an approach 'in terms of subjective feeling.' Because of the high estimation of feeling and low estimate of so-called 'objectivization' (*Berdinglichung*, reification) within deep ecology, the terminology of Fromm is not adequate today, but what he means to say is appropriate. And it is obviously relevant when we deal with other species than humans: animals and plants have interests in the sense of ways of realizing inherent potentialities which we can only study interacting with them. We cannot rely on our momentary impulses, however important they are in general.

The expression 'preserve his being' in the quotation from Spinoza is better than 'preserve his existence' because the latter is often associated with physical survival and 'struggle for survival.' A still better translation is perhaps 'persevere in his being' *(perseverare in suo esse)*. It has to do with acting out one's own nature. To survive is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition.

The conception of self-realization as dependent upon our insight into our own potentialities makes it easy to see the possibility of ignorance and misunderstanding as to which are these potentialities. The ego-trip interpretation of the potentialities of humans presupposes a marked underestimation of the richness and broadness of our potentialities. In Fromm's terms, "man can deceive himself about his real self-interest if he is ignorant of his self and its real needs. . . ."[5]

The 'everything hangs together' maxim of ecology applies to the self and its relation to other living beings, ecosystems, the ecosphere, and the Earth with its long history.

The scattered human habitation along the arctic coast of Norway is uneconomic, unprofitable, from the point of view of the current economic policy of our welfare state. The welfare norms require that every family should have a connection by telephone (in case of illness). This costs a considerable amount of money. The same holds for mail and other services. Local fisheries are largely uneconomic perhaps because a foreign armada of big trawlers of immense capacity is fishing just outside the fjords. The availability of jobs is crumbling.

The government, therefore, heavily subsidized the resettlement of people from the arctic wildernesses, concentrating them in so-called centers of development, that is, small areas with a town at the center. But the people, as persons, are clearly not the same when their bodies have been thus transported. The social, economic *and natural setting* is now vastly different. The objects with which they work and live are completely different. There is a consequent loss of personal identity. "Who am I?" they ask. Their self-respect, self-esteem is impaired. What is adequate in the so-called periphery of the country is different from what counts at the so-called centers.

If people are relocated or, rather, transplanted, from a steep mountainous place to a plain, they also realize, but too late, that their home-place has been part of themselves, they have identified with features of the place. And the way of life in the tiny locality, the density of social relations has formed their persons. Again, 'they are not the same as they were.'

Tragic cases can be seen in other parts of the Arctic. We all regret the fate of the Eskimos, their difficulties in finding *a new identity*, a new social and a new, more comprehensive ecological self. The Lapps of Arctic Norway have been hurt by interference with a river for the purpose of hydroelectricity. In court, accused of illegal demonstration at the river, one Lapp said that the part of the river in question was 'part of himself.' This kind of spontaneous answer is not uncommon among people. They have not heard about the philosophy of the wider and deeper self, but they talk spontaneously as if they had.

The sentence "This place is part of myself" we may try to make intellectually more understandable by reformulations, for example 'My relation to this place is part of myself.' 'If this place is destroyed something in me is destroyed.' 'My relation to this place is such that if the place is changed I am changed.'...

One drawback with these reformulations is that they make it easy to continue thinking of two completely separable, real entities, a self and the place, joined by an external relation. The original sentence, rather, conveys the impression that there is an internal relation of sorts. 'Of sorts' because we must take into account that it may not be reciprocal. If I am changed, even destroyed, the place would be destroyed according to one usual interpretation of 'internal relation.' From the point of phenomenology and the 'concrete content' view the reciprocity holds, but that is a special interpretation. We may use an interpretation such that if we are changed, the river need not be changed.

The reformulation 'If this place is destroyed something in me is killed' perhaps articulates some of the feelings usually felt when people see the destruction of places they deeply love or to which they have the intense feeling of belonging. Today more space is violently transformed per human being than ever, at the same time as their number increases. The kind of 'killing' referred to occurs all over the globe, but very rarely does it lead to strong counter-reaction. Resignation prevails. 'You cannot stop progress.'

The newborn lacks, of course, any conceptions, however rudimentary, corresponding to the tripartition—subject, object, medium. Probably the conception (not the concept) of one's own ego comes rather late, say after the first year. A vague net of relations comes first. This network of perceived and conceived relations is neutral, fitting what in British philosophy was called 'neutral monism.' The whole, their universe altogether, lacks the tripartition at this early stage. In a sense, it is this basic sort of crude monism we are working out anew, not by trying to be babies again, but by better understanding our ecological self. It has not had favorable conditions of development since before the time the Renaissance glorified our ego by putting it in some kind of opposition to what else there is.

What is now the practical importance of this conception of a wide and deep ecological self?

Defending Nature in our rich, industrial society, the argument of the opponent often is that we are doing it in order to secure beauty, recreation, sport, and other non-vital interests for us. It makes for strength if we, after honest reflection, find that we feel threatened in our innermost self. If so, we more convincingly defend a vital interest, not only something out there. We are engaged in self-defense. And to defend fundamental *human* rights is vital self-defense.

The best introduction to the psychology of the self is still to be found in the excellent and superbly readable book *Principles of Psychology*, published in 1890 by the American psychologist and philosopher William James. His 100-page chapter on the consciousness of self stresses the plurality of components of the wide and deep self as a complex entity. (Unfortunately he prefers to talk about the plurality of selves. I think it may be better to talk about the plurality of the components of the wide self.)

The plurality of components can be easily illustrated by reference to the dramatic phenomenon of alternating personality.

> Any man becomes, as we say *inconsistent* with himself if he forgets his engagements, pledges, knowledge and habits. . . . In the hypnotic trance we can easily produce an alternation of personality, . . . by telling him he is an altogether imaginary personage.[6]

If we say about someone that he or she is not him or her self today, we may refer to a great many different *relations* to other people, to material things and certainly, I maintain, to what we call his or her environment, the home, the garden, the neighborhood. . . .

When James says that these relations *belong* to the self, it is of course not in the sense that the self has eaten the home, the environment, etc. Such an interpretation testifies that the self is still identified with the body. Nor does it mean that an *image* of the house inside the consciousness of the person belongs to the self. When somebody says about a part of a river-landscape that it is part of himself, we intuitively grasp roughly what he means. But it is of course difficult to elucidate the meaning in philosophical or psycho-

logical terminology.

A last example taken from William James: We understand what is meant when somebody says "As a man I pity you, but as an official I must show you no mercy." Obviously the self of an official cannot empirically be defined except as relations in a complex social setting. Thus, the self cannot possibly be inside the body, or inside a consciousness. Enough! The main point is that we do not hesitate *today,* being inspired by ecology and a revived intimate relation to Nature, to recognize and accept wholeheartedly our ecological self.

The next section is rather metaphysical. I do not *defend* all the views presented in this part of my paper. I wish primarily to inform you about them. As a student and admirer since 1930 of Gandhi's non-violent direct actions in bloody conflict, I am inevitably influenced by his metaphysics, which to him personally furnished tremendously powerful motivation and which contributed to keeping him going until his death. His supreme aim was not India's *political* liberation. He led a crusade against extreme poverty, caste suppression, and against terror in the name of religion. This crusade was necessary, but the liberation of the individual human being was his supreme aim. It is strange for many to listen to what he himself said about this ultimate goal:[7]

> What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain *Muksha* (Liberation). I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end.

This sounds individualistic to the Western mind. A common misunderstanding. If the self Gandhi is speaking about were the ego or the 'narrow' self ('jiva') of egocentric interest, the 'ego-trips,' why then work for the poor? It is for him the supreme or universal Self—the *atman*—that is to be realized. Paradoxically, it seems, he tries to reach self-realization through 'selfless action,' that is, through reduction of the dominance of the narrow self or the ego. Through the wider Self every living being is connected intimately, and from this

intimacy follows the capacity of *identification* and as its natural consequences, the practice of non-violence. No moralizing is needed, just as we need no morals to make us breathe. We need to cultivate our insight:

> The rockbottom foundation of the technique for achieving the power of non-violence is belief in the essential oneness of all life.

Historically we have seen how Nature conservation is non-violent at its very core. Gandhi says:

> I believe in *advaita* (non-duality), I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore I believe that if one man gains spirituality, the whole world gains with him and, if one man fails, the whole world fails to that extent.

Surprisingly enough, Gandhi was extreme in his personal consideration for the self-realization of other living beings than humans. When travelling he brought a goat with him to satisfy his need for milk. This was part of a non-violent demonstration against certain cruel features in Hindu ways of milking cows. Furthermore, some European companions who lived with Gandhi in his ashrams were taken aback that he let snakes, scorpions and spiders move unhindered into their bedrooms—animals fulfilling their lives. He even prohibited people from having a stock of medicines against poisonous bites. He believed in the possibility of satisfactory coexistence and he proved right. There were no accidents. Ashram people would naturally look into their shoes for scorpions before using them. Even when moving over the floor in darkness one could easily avoid trampling on one's fellow beings. Thus, Gandhi recognized a basic, common right to live and blossom, to self-realization in a wide sense applicable to any being that can be said to have interests or needs.

Gandhi made manifest the internal relations between self-realization, non-violence and what sometimes has been called biospherical egalitarianism.

In the environment in which I grew up, I heard that what is serious in life is to get to be somebody—to outdo others in something, being victorious in comparison of abilities. What today makes this

conception of the meaning and goal of life especially dangerous is the vast international economic competition. Free market, perhaps, yes, but the law of demand and supply of separate, isolatable 'goods and services,' independent of needs, must not be made to reign over increasing areas of our life.

Ability to cooperate, to work with people, making them feel good *pays*, of course, in a fiercely individualist society, and high positions may require that; but only as long as ultimately it is subordinated to career, to the basic norms of the ego-trip, not to a self-realization worth the name.

To identify self-realization with the ego-trip manifests a vast underestimation of the human self.

According to the usual translation of Pali or Sanskrit texts, Buddha taught his disciples that the human mind should embrace all living things as a mother cares for her son, her only son. Some of you who never would feel it meaningful or possible that a human *self* could embrace all living things might stick to the usual translation. We shall then only ask that your *mind* embrace all living beings, and that you realize your good intention to care and feel with compassion.

If the Sanskrit word is *atman*, it is instructive to note that this term has the basic meaning of 'self,' rather than 'mind' or 'spirit,' as you see in translations. The superiority of the translation using the word 'self' stems from the consideration that if your 'self' in the wide sense embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care. Surely you care for yourself without feeling any moral pressure to do it—provided you have not succumbed to a neurosis of some kind, developing self-destructive tendencies, or hating yourself.

Incidentally, the Australian ecological feminist Patsy Hallen [see her article in this anthology, eds.] uses a formula close to that of Buddha: We are here to embrace rather than conquer the world. It is of interest to notice that the term 'world' is here used rather than 'living beings.' I suspect that our thinking need not proceed from the notion of living being to that of the world, but we will conceive reality or the world we live in as alive in a wide, not easily defined sense. There will then be no non-living beings to care for.

If self-realization or self-fulfillment is today habitually associated

with life-long ego-trips, isn't it stupid to use this term for self-realization in the widely different sense of Gandhi, or, less religiously loaded, as a term for widening and deepening your 'self' so it embraces all life forms? Perhaps it is. But I think the very popularity of the term makes people listen for a moment, feeling safe. In that moment the notion of a greater 'self' should be introduced, contending that if they equate self-realization with ego-trips, they seriously *underesti-mate* themselves. "You are much greater, deeper, more generous and capable of more dignity and joy than you think! A wealth of non-competitive joys is open to you!"

But I have another important reason for inviting people to think in terms of deepening and widening their selves, *starting* with the ego-trip as a crudest, but inescapable point zero. It has to do with a notion usually placed as the opposite of the egoism of the ego-trip, namely the notion of *altruism*. The Latin term *ego* has as its opposite the *alter*. Altruism implies that *ego* sacrifices its interest in favor of the other, the *alter*. The motivation is primarily that of duty: it is said that we *ought* to love others as strongly as we love our self.

It is, unfortunately, very limited what humankind is capable of loving from mere duty, or, more generally, from moral exhortation. From the Renaissance to the Second World War about 400 cruel wars were fought by Christian nations for the flimsiest of reasons. It seems to me that in the future more emphasis has to be given to the conditions under which we most naturally widen and deepen our 'self.' With a sufficiently wide and deep 'self,' ego and alter as opposites are stage by stage eliminated. The distinction is in a way transcended.

Early in life, the social 'self' is sufficiently developed so that we do not prefer to eat a big cake alone. We share the cake with our friends and nearest relations. We identify with these people sufficiently to see our joy in their joy, and see our disappointment in theirs.

Now it is the time *to share* with all life on our maltreated Earth through the deepening identification with life forms and the greater units, the ecosystems, and Gaia, the fabulous, old planet of ours.

Immanuel Kant introduced a pair of contrasting concepts which

deserve to be extensively used in our effort to live harmoniously in, for and of Nature: The concept of 'moral act' and that of 'beautiful act.'

Moral acts are acts motivated by the intention to follow the moral laws, at whatever the cost, that is, to do our moral duty solely out of respect for that duty. Therefore, the supreme *test* of our success in performing a pure, moral act is that we do it completely against our inclination; that we, so to say, hate to do it, but are compelled by our respect for the moral law. Kant was deeply awed by two phenomena, "the heaven with its stars above me and the moral law within me."

But if we do something we should do according to a moral law, but do it out of inclination and with pleasure—what then? Should we then abstain or try to work up some displeasure? Not at all, according to Kant. If we do what morals say is right because of positive inclination, then we perform a *beautiful* act. Now, my point is that perhaps we should in environmental affairs primarily try to influence people towards beautiful acts. Work on their inclinations rather than morals. Unhappily, the extensive moralizing within environmentalism has given the public the false impression that we primarily ask them to sacrifice, to show more responsibility, more concern, better morals. As I see it we need the immense variety of sources of joy opened through increased sensitivity towards the richness and diversity of life, landscapes of free Nature. We all can contribute to this individually, but it is also a question of politics, local and global. Part of the joy stems from the consciousness of our intimate relation to something bigger than our ego, something which has endured through millions of years and is worth continued life for millions of years. The requisite care flows naturally if the 'self' is widened and deepened so that protection of free Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves.

Academically speaking, what I suggest is the supremacy of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics as a means of invigorating the environmental movement in the years to come. If reality is like it is experienced by the ecological self, our behavior *naturally* and beautifully follows norms of strict environmental ethics.

We certainly need to hear about our ethical shortcomings from time to time, but we more easily change through encouragement and through deepened perception of reality and our self. That is, deepened realism. How is that to be brought about? The question needs to be treated in another paper! It is more a question of community therapy than community science: Healing our relations to the widest community, that of all living beings.

The subtitle of this paper is "An Ecological Approach to Being in the World." I am now going to speak a little about 'Nature' with all the qualities we spontaneously experience, as identical with the reality we live in. That means a movement from being in the world to being in Nature. Then, at last, I shall ask for the goal or purpose of being in the world.

Is joy in the subject? I would say "no." It is just as much or little in the object. The joy of a joyful tree is primarily "in" the tree, we should say—if we are pressed to make a choice between the two possibilities. But we should not be pressed. There is a third position. The joy is a feature of the *indivisible*, concrete unit of subject, object and medium. In a sense self-realization involves experiences of the infinitely rich joyful aspect of reality. It is misleading, according to my intuitions, to locate joys inside my consciousness. What is joyful is something that is not 'subjective,' it is an attribute of a reality wider than a conscious ego. This is philosophically how I contribute to the explanation of the internal relation between joy, happiness, and human self-realization. But this conceptual exercise is mainly of interest to an academic philosopher. What I am driving at is probably something that may be suggested with less conceptual gymnastics: It is unwarranted to believe that how we feel Nature to be is not how Nature really is. It is rather that reality is so rich that we cannot see everything at once, but separate parts or aspects of separate moods. The joyful tree I see in the morning light is not the sorrowful one I see in the night, even if they in abstract structure (physically) are the same.

It is very human to ask for the ultimate goal or purpose for being in the world. This may be a misleading way of putting a question. It may seem to suggest that the goal or purpose must be somehow

outside or beyond the world. Perhaps this can be avoided by living out "in the world." It is characteristic for our time that we subjectivize and individualize the question asked of each one of us: What do *you* consider to be the ultimate goal or purpose of *your* life? Or, we leave out the question of priorities and ask simply for goals and purposes.

The main title of this paper is partly motivated by the conviction that 'self-realization' is an adequate key-term expression one uses to answer the question of ultimate goal. It is of course only a key-term. An answer by a philosopher can scarcely be shorter than the little book *Ethics* by Spinoza.

In order to understand the function of the term 'self-realization' in this capacity, it is useful to compare it to two others, 'pleasure' and 'happiness.' The first suggests hedonism, the second eudaemonism in a professional philosophical, but just as vague and ambiguous jargon. Both terms connote states of feeling in a broad sense of the term. Having pleasure or being happy is to *feel* well. One may of course find the term happiness to connote something different from this, but in the way I use 'happiness,' one standard set of replies to the question "How do you feel?" is "I feel happy" or "I feel unhappy." This set of answers would be rather awkward: "I feel self-realized" or "I do not feel self-realized."

The most important feature of self-realization as compared to pleasure and happiness is its dependence upon a view of human capacities, better potentialities. This again implies a view of what is human nature. In practice it does not imply a general doctrine of human nature. That is the work of philosophical fields of research. An individual whose attitudes are such that I would say that he or she takes self-realization as the ultimate or fundamental goal has to have a view of his or her nature and potentialities. The more they are realized the more there is self-realization. The question "How do you feel?" may be honestly answered in the positive or negative whatever the level of self-realization. The question may, in principle, be answered in the negative, but at the point following Spinoza I take the valid way of answering to be positive. The realization of fulfillment—using a somewhat less philosophical jargon—of the

potentialities of oneself is *internally* related to happiness, but not in such a way that *looking* for happiness you realize yourself. This is a clear point, incidentally, in John Stuart Mill's philosophy. You should not look hard for happiness. That is a bad way even if you take, as Mill does, happiness as the ultimate or fundamental goal in life. I think that to look for self-realization is a better way. That is, to develop your capacities—using a rather dangerous word because it is easily interpreted in the direction of interpersonal, not intrapersonal, competition. But even the striving implied in the latter term may mislead. Dwelling in situations of intrinsic value, spontaneous non-directed awareness, relaxing from striving, is conducive to self-realization as I understand it. But there are, of course, infinite variations among humans according to cultural, social, individual differences. This makes the key-term self-realization abstract in its generality. But nothing more can be expected when the question is posed like it is: What might deserve the name of ultimate or fundamental goal? We may reject the meaningfulness of such a question—I don't—but for us for whom it has meaning, the answer using few words is bound to be abstract and general.

Going back to the triple key-terms pleasure, happiness, self-realization, the third has the merit of being clearly and forcefully applicable to any beings with a specific range of potentialities. I limit the range to living beings, using 'living' in a rather broad sense. The terms 'pleasure' and 'happiness' I do not feel are so easily generalized. With the rather general concept of 'ecological self' already introduced, the concept of self-realization naturally follows. Let us consider the praying mantis, the formidable group of voracious insects. They have a nature fascinating to many people. Mating is part of their self-realization, but some males are eaten when performing the act of copulation. Is he happy, is he having pleasure? We don't know. Well done if he does! Actually he feeds his partner so that she gets strong offspring. But it does not make sense to me to attribute happiness to these males. Self-realization yes, happiness no. I maintain the internal relation between self-realization and happiness among people and among some animal groups. As a professional philosopher I am tempted to add a point where I am inspired by Zen Buddhism and

Spinoza: Happiness is a feeling yes, but the act of realizing a potential is always an interaction involving as one single concrete unit, one gestalt as I would say, three abstract aspects, subject, object, medium. What I said about joyfulness in Nature holds of happiness in Nature. We should not conceive them as mere subjective feelings.

The rich reality is getting even richer through our specific human endowments; we are the first kind of living beings we know of which have the potentialities of living in community with all other living beings. It is our hope that all those potentialities will be realized—if not in the near future, at least in the somewhat more remote future.

Notes

1. Clark E. Moustakas, ed., *The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth*, New York, Harper Books, 1956, p. 58. This and the following quotations are from Fromm's contribution "Selfishness, Self-love, and Self-interest."

2. Ibid., p. 59.

3. Ibid., p. 62.

4. Ibid., p. 63.

5. Ibid.

6. James, Vol. 1, p. 379.

7. This and other quotations from Gandhi are taken from my *Gandhi and Group Conflict*, Oslo, 1974, p. 35, where the metaphysics of self-realization is treated more thoroughly.

4

The Systematization of the Logically Ultimate Norms and Hypotheses of Ecosophy T

Arne Naess

(a) The idea of models of logical relations

The complete formulation of an ecosophy is out of the question: the complexity and flexibility of such a living structure make that impossible, perhaps even meaningless. There may also be logical reasons for the impossibility of the formulating of a total view: it would be like a gestalt without a background, an absurdity. One may, however, simulate such a system. One may make a model of parts of it, isolating certain patterns and aspects of it for close scrutiny, implicitly pretending that the rest somehow exists in the realm of pure thought.

In what follows I shall work out such a model. It expresses the vision of an ecosophy in the form of a pyramid or tree.

The direction from top to bottom, from theory to praxis, is one of logical, not genetic or historical, derivation. It is not a ranking order. It does not indicate value priorities. At the top levels there is a small number of general and abstract formulations, at the bottom singular and concrete ones, adapted to special situations, communities, time intervals, and actions.

The direction from the bottom up offers the genetic and historical derivation—including all the motivations and impulses resulting in formulations of norms and hypotheses.

What is modeled is a moving, ever-changing phenomenon: norms and hypotheses being derived more or less logically, applied in praxis, and the outcome motivating changes. The tree can be arranged to

form a triangle or parallelogram with a wide horizontal base line and a narrow top line. The difference in breadth expresses the fact that from the abstract and general norms and hypotheses indefinitely many more specialized norms and hypotheses follow, giving rise to indefinitely many decisions in concrete situations.

If we decide to reject a low-level norm, this implies that we will have to modify some hypotheses or norms at higher levels. The whole upper pyramid gets to be shaky. However, a rejection tends, in practice, to cause only slight modification, or simply the adoption of a somewhat different precisation [a technical term introduced by Naess] of a higher norm or hypothesis *formulation*.

A sentence like 'Seek Self-realization!' will be interpreted within social science as a sentence in the imperative mood, and from a social point of view it is pertinent to ask: who are the 'senders' and who are the 'receivers'? Not necessarily so in T_o-expositions of models of normative systems. [T_o stands for the least precise and most general level of articulation. A T_o-level sentence allows all the possible interpretations and directions of precisation. A sentence T_1 is more precise than T_o in that T_o permits all the interpretations of T_1, while T_1 does not admit all the interpretations of T_o.] The question of how to understand the function of a one-word sentence like 'Self-realization!' is a large and deep one which I am not going to attack. Let it suffice to say that there are examples of the use of the exclamation mark with a sender, but no definite receiver. When terrible things happen, like the collapsing of a bridge, or the loss of one's keys down a drain, we may meaningfully say 'No!,' but at least some of us have in such cases no definite receiver group in mind. The function of the sentence is clear enough without. An archetype of this function appears in the Bible when God says 'Let there be light!' To ask who are the intended receivers of the exclamation is in this case rather intriguing if we suppose there is not yet anything created. But to ask the question is itself questionable.

In short I find it to be my duty to point out that there are questions concerning the function of norm-sentences in the exposition at hand which one should acknowledge but not necessarily engage in 'solving.'

What follows is only one particular exposition of Ecosophy T. Other versions may be cognitively equivalent, expressing the same concrete content in a different abstract structure.

(b) Formulation of the most basic norms and hypotheses

N1: Self-realization!
H1: The higher the Self-realization attained by anyone, the broader and deeper the identification with others.
H2: The higher the level of Self-realization attained by anyone, the more its further increase depends upon the Self-realization of others.
H3: Complete Self-realization of anyone depends on that of all.
N2: Self-realization for all living beings!

Comments:

The four formulations N1, H1, H2, and H3 make up the first level of the survey. N1 and H1 are ultimates in the sense of not being derivable from the others within the chosen version of the logical systematization of Ecosophy T. H2, H3, and N2 are supposed to be logically derivable from the ultimates. Formal rigor would of course require us to add some premises which would be of greater interest to the logician than to the ecosopher. (For instance: if A identifies with B, and both are beings such that it is meaningful to talk about their higher Self-realization levels, complete Self-realization of A requires complete Self-realization of B. Our consolation: the formal logical derivation of the theorems of the first part of Spinoza's *Ethics* seems to require about 160 additional premises—but with them at hand consistency is achieved.)

All norm- and hypothesis-formulations are T_0-formulations, that is, at the most primitive level from the point of view of preciseness. The decrease of egocentricity is inevitably linked to an increase of identification and care for others. Which 'others'? One good answer is to draw circles of interest and care, corresponding to stages of development: family, clan, tribe, humanity. But obviously animals, especially the tamed or domestic, often enjoy interest, care, and respect (at times status of divinity) before humanity at large. The

series of circles will differ in different cultures. In any case higher levels of realization of potentials of the self favor the Self-realization of others.

Considering the widening scope of identification as internally related to increased Self-realization, this increase depends on the Self-realization of others. This gives us H1. It implies that 'the others' do not lose their individuality. Here we stumble upon the old metaphysical set of problems of 'unity in diversity.' When the human being A identifies with B, and the wider self of A comes to comprise B, A is not supposed to reject the individuality of B. Thus, if B and A are persons, the self of A comprises that of B and vice versa.

The importance of H1 for the whole *conceptual* development of Ecosophy T stems from the way those who think it is a tenable hypothesis—those who feel at home with it—are apt to view nature and what is going on in nature. They see a lonely, desperately hungry wolf attacking an elk, wounding it mortally but being incapable of killing it. The elk dies after protracted, severe pains, while the wolf dies slowly of hunger. Impossible not to identify with and somehow feel the pains of both! But the nature of the conditions of life at least in our time is such that nothing can be done about the 'cruel' fate of both. The general situation elicits sorrow and the search for means to interfere with natural processes on behalf of any being in a state of panic and desperation, protracted pain, severe suppression or abject slavery. But this attitude implies that we deplore much that actually goes on in nature, that we deplore much that seems essential to life on Earth. In short, the assertion of H1 reflects an attitude opposed to any unconditional *Verherrlichung* [glorification] of life, and therefore of nature in general.

For H3, a somewhat more precise formulation would be 'Complete Self-realization of anyone depends on that of all beings which *in principle are capable of Self-realization*.' For the sake of brevity in the survey these beings are in what follows called 'living beings.' We define 'living beings' in this way.

The fact that N2 is derivable from N1 through the aforementioned hypotheses does not automatically make it into a purely instrumental norm in Ecosophy T. It is only instrumental *in relation* to

N1. A norm is purely instrumental only if its definition excludes it from being non-instrumental in any single relation. Example: it may pay in the long run to be honest, but this does not exclude the possibility that honesty can be a valid non-instrumental norm, independent of profits.

Saying unconditionally yes to N1 implies a yes to the question of whether Self-realization is something and something of value. Since there is nothing which could make Self-realization a purely instrumental norm, the yes is announcing its intrinsic value. Saying yes to N2 implies the intrinsic valuation of all living beings. From these two norms, and norms derived from them (plus hypotheses), the proposed formulations of the platform of the deep ecological movement are derivable. In a common philosophical terminology, the platform is expressing an axiology whereas Ecosophy T expresses a deontology. The latter classification is suspicious, however, because the exclamation mark of N1 does not imply that what is expressed is a communication to somebody. N1 rather expresses an ontology than deontology. It is, however, not the aim here to go far into professional philosophy.

(c) Norms and hypotheses originating in ecology

H4: Diversity of life increases Self-realization potentials.
N3: Diversity of life!
H5: Complexity of life increases Self-realization potentials.
N4: Complexity!
H6: Life resources of the Earth are limited.
H7: Symbiosis maximizes Self-realization potentials under conditions of limited resources.
N5: Symbiosis!

Comments:

These seven formulations make up the second part of the survey. Whereas the first level is squarely metaphysical, the second level is biologically colored, but still metaphysical because of the use of capital S in 'Self-realization.' More precise formulations would refer to general ecology and conservation biology rather than human ecology.

H4 introduces the central term of 'Self-realization *potential*.' In psychology and sociology there is much discussion of the potentials, potentialities, or possibilities which an individual, group, or institution has in life, including the life of nations. There is within ethics talk about talents and capacities and how to develop them. The term 'Self-realization' is a kind of generalization of this, except that, in using the capital letter S, certain norms are proclaimed which narrow down the range of what constitutes an increase of Self-realization.

H4 has a metaphysical background. Life is viewed as a kind of vast whole. The variety of forms of life, with their different capacities, realize, that is, bring into actuality, something which adds to that whole. They realize the Self-realization *potentials*. Each individual contains indefinitely many of these, not only one. An increase in qualitative diversity of life forms increases the possibility of potentials. From H4 and N1 therefore follows N3.

(d) The meaning of diversity, complexity, and symbiosis in the context of Self-realization

'Self-realization!' with a capital S is a norm formulation inspired by the part of philosophy traditionally called metaphysics. The terms diversity, complexity, and symbiosis are all borrowed from ecology. There is a resulting kind of terminological tension between the first two levels of the survey, as well as a general tension between 'the one and the many.'

The conceptual bridge from Self-realization to a positive evaluation of diversity, complexity, and symbiosis is furnished by a concept of Self-realization potentials, and the idea that the overall Self-realization in our world is increased by the realization of such potentials. (The realization is analogous to negative entropy.) No single being can completely realize the goal. The plural of potentials is crucial: it introduces plurality into unity. The intuition pushing us towards the 'Self' does not immediately acknowledge this.

A closely related idea is that of microcosm mirroring macrocosm, an idea especially potent during the Renaissance and now partly revived in hologram thinking. Each flower, each natural entity with

the character of a whole (a gestalt) *somehow* mirrors or expresses the supreme whole. I say 'somehow' because I do not know of any good analysis of what is called mirroring here. The microcosm is not apart from the whole; the relation is not like that between a big elephant and a small mouse. Microcosm is essential for the existence of macrocosm. Spinoza was influenced by the idea when demanding an immanent God, not a God apart. The door is open for positive evaluation of an increase of the realization of potentialities, that is, of the possibility that more potentialities will be realized. This is meant to imply *continued evolution at all levels*, including protozoans, landscapes, and human cultures.

The realizations should be *qualitatively different*. Numerical abundance as such does not count. One way of emphasizing this distinction is to distinguish diversity from (mere) plurality. The term 'diversity' is well established in biology, mostly used in talking about diversity of species or of other qualitatively different living beings.

Further elaboration of the conception of diversity and the introduction of the concepts of complexity and symbiosis clearly require the support of hypotheses about the kind of universe we live in. Such support was, strictly speaking, necessary even when starting to talk about Self-realization, but only now is explicit mention of such support clearly needed. The universe which we shall limit ourselves to mentioning is our planet, the Earth, which we may also call 'Gaia' to emphasize its status as a living being in the widest sense.

I make a lot of implicit assumptions about the life conditions of Earth, especially its limitations. Any total view requires that.

Diversity may be defined so as to be only a *necessary* condition in the growth of realizing Self-realization potentialities. Then 'maximum diversity!' does not make sense, because many differences may not involve Self-realization and may be inconsistent with symbiosis. Better to imply qualitative difference as mentioned above to introduce concepts of difference which distinguish it from mere plurality. The ambivalence of plurality stems from finiteness—not only of our planet as a whole. However, the adjective 'maximum' is added to some expressions of Ecosophy T when diversity is introduced. The intention is to proclaim that there is no inherent limit to the

positive character of growth of diversity. It is not intended that an increase is good even if it reduces the conditions for realizing other norms. If the adjective 'maximum' is to be retained, it must, at a more precise (T_I) level, be taken as an abbreviation for 'maximum, without hindering the realization of other norms in the system.' The presence of a norm of 'symbiosis!' in the system should re-emphasize this—it knits the bond between complexity and diversity.

Now let us turn to complexity.

If we are permitted to vary three factors a, b, c in spatial horizontal arrangements, we can only realize six different patterns: abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba. If we add one more basic factor, d, the number of arrangements increases to 'four factorial,' 24. This illustrates the *intimate relation between complexity and diversity*. When the number of elements increases linearly, the number of possible relationships increases factorially.

Let us then think that abc is a pattern of life, conceived as a kind of organismic or personal life. The pattern is characterized by three main functions or dimensions, a, b, c working together as a highly integrated system abc. Let the other five arrangements of a, b and c symbolize five other systems with the same number of dimensions.

The principle of self-preservation now may be said to consist minimally in an internal mechanism such that the system defends itself against reduction to 2-, 1-, or zero-dimensional ones, and also against transitions to systems symbolized through the other five patterns, *and* tends positively to develop into systems with more dimensions, thus more diversity and more complexity.

Complexity as opposed to complication is in Ecosophy T a quality of organisms and their relation to their environment. It is characterized by intimate interrelations, deep interdependence of a manifold of factors or elements. After death a rhinoceros as a breathing entity is no more, but it remains a tremendously complicated part of nature inhabited and invaded by millions of other, less complex organisms. A human victim of African sleeping sickness manifests the intimate interrelations between a human individual and colonies of the flagellate *Trypanosoma gambiensis*. Each of the flagellates has an unfathomable complexity of structure, but we recognize the human

being as a still higher order of complexity.

If complexity is defined in the biological direction of the opposite of simplicity, 'maximum complexity!' cannot support Self-realization. Only if, as in the case of 'diversity!,' some restraining clause is inserted, could maximizing make sense.

Since the great time of the reptiles, limbs much more complex than the human hand have developed. The simplicity of the human hand is from this point of view a combined victory of simplicity and effectiveness over complexity. There should be no cult of complexity.

In biological texts colored by the conception of lower and higher animals, the term complexity nearly always is used in descriptions of *advantageous* cases of increases in complexity. 'Higher' functions are made possible through certain more complex differentiations of tissues. Eyes are developed from an earlier homogenous surface of skin. Less is said about unsuccessful increase of complexity, presumably because only species of great stability through millions of years have left fossils for us to study. I think it is most fruitful to use the term complexity as a rather general term covering also cases of no obvious advantage of any kind.

A simple biological example of increasing complexity of 'advanced' forms: the least complex type of sponge is similar to a sac. At one end there is an opening through which water and waste are thrown out. Through small openings in the walls water is drawn in. More complex forms have folded walls so that their surface is greater compared to the volume of the sac. This is thought to be an advance because it is a plus to have more surface cells compared to the number of other cells. A higher level of complexity is reached when special structures insure that waste is thrown out further away so that the sponge does not risk inhaling some of the waste again and again. On the whole zoologists are sure that increases of complexity have functions that could not be realized without those increases. There is no positive value to be attached to complexity as such, for instance walls of unequal thickness satisfying a certain rhythm, but of neither positive nor negative value for any discernible function of the organism.

In a diabolic world, evolution might have proceeded in many ways as in ours, except that parasitism might have made every being capable of conscious pain, suffering from birth to death. The increase of the amount and the intimacy of interrelations and interdependencies might, in the hypothetical world of diabolic parasitism, have resulted in a hellish level of intensity of suffering. Therefore complexity of organisms as such and complexity of interdependencies cannot in Ecosophy T be good in themselves.

From the point of view of biology, complexity comprises behavior and gestalt processes whereby increasing complexity of consciously experienced wholes can be realized. But also here mere complexity as such cannot yield an increase of Self-realization. The concept of symbiosis—life together—enters the framework. The existence of interdependencies in which all partners in a relationship are enriched furnishes a crucial idea in addition to diversity and complexity.

Proceeding from non-human to human ecology, the symbiosis idea may be illustrated in relation to various ways of realizing a caste system. When Gandhi sometimes spoke positively about a caste system, he had an ideal system in mind. Parents were to instruct children and work together with them as they grew up. No schools. The useful occupation of each family would be interrelated with and interdependent with families specializing in other kinds of services in the total community. Interaction between castes of this kind was to be encouraged, not prohibited. The status of each in the sense of dignity, respect, material standard of living, should be the same—an egalitarianism among castes, an illustration of symbiosis between groups in a community. Gandhi detested the actual state of affairs in the existing caste system in India. It certainly violated the norm of symbiosis.

In any kind of community we know of, there have been conflict and strife, in varying degrees. The norms of Ecosophy T are guidelines, and if elaborated into a comprehensive system would have to include norms for conflict solution. It is unrealistic to foresee full termination of deep group conflicts or even to wish such termination. The conditions of life on Earth are such that increase of Self-

realization is dependent upon conflicts. What counts is the gradual increase of the status and application of nonviolence in group conflicts.

The *codification* of Ecosophy T is an action within the context of a conflict; it is my belief that many of the regrettable decisions in environmental conflicts in Norway and other places are made in a state of philosophical stupor. In that state people in power confuse narrow, superficial goals with fundamental broad goals derived from fundamental norms.

(e) Derivation of the norms of the local community

The next ecosophical principles to be incorporated are those of self-sufficiency, decentralization, and autonomy. These social principles are first to be linked to their biological counterparts.

The maximum success of Self-realization is realized through a certain balance of interactions between organisms and environment. The stimuli are not to be too erratic and not too monotonous. The organs of control must not completely dominate influences from the outside nor get overwhelmed. The limited possibilities of control make it, on the whole, important to have a fairly high degree of control of the spatially (personal) near environment, or the environment in which the basic needs are satisfied. If a basic need is only met through a many-stage interaction with remote areas, there are likely to be more forms of erratic obstacles, more dangers of being cut out through processes of chance character.

Let this be illustrated with the life-space models of the kind gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin made use of (Figure 1).

Let A represent a living being in a two-dimensional space having four vital needs to satisfy. If the immediate environment furnishes, at least normally, satisfaction of the four needs, A can limit itself to try to control remote areas *only* if something unusual happens to the nearest. The quadruple a1/1 to a1/4 symbolizes the four sources of need satisfaction.

If the sources are a2/1, a2/3, a2/5, a2/7 and separated from A by interposed, qualitatively different parts a1/1 to a1/4 of the environment, the organism is vitally and normally dependent upon control



Figure 1

of these parts and also of a2/2, a2/4, a2/6, a2/8, the parts adjacent to the sources with another set of qualitatively different properties.

The illustration shows how the requirement of control increases with the remoteness of sources of satisfaction of needs—remoteness being measured in terms of distances in life space, not in kilometers. Making the supposition of limited means of control, the increase of remoteness correlates with increase of dangers, of inadequacy of powers of self-preservation and therefore with decrease of Self-realization potentials. By the degree of local self-sufficiency and autonomy we shall understand the degree to which the living being has its sources of basic need satisfactions, or more generally sources of Self-realization, nearby in the life space and, secondly, to what degree the organism has adequate control of this area to satisfy its needs.

The above model has been introduced with single living beings, especially persons, as units of life. This is didactically sound as long as it has no scientific pretensions. The same model is useful if taking collectives, communities, neighborhoods, societies, tribes—as units of life. But in that case we clearly need a model illustrating the relations within the collectives as well. Here we will not go into this.

By definition, single persons have less than maximum control over decisions of centralized authority, possibilities of control approach zero. The greater the manifold of persons and situations to be controlled, the greater the number of levels needed. Further, the greater the number of qualitatively different functions which are controlled, the more rapidly will the control by single persons tend towards zero. Centralization is here intended to be defined through the above factors.

Using the reasoning suggested above, a set of hypotheses and norms is proposed for Ecosophy T:

H8: Local self-sufficiency and cooperation favors increase of Self-realization.

H9: Local autonomy increases the chances of maintaining local self-sufficiency.

H10: Centralization decreases local self-sufficiency and autonomy.

N6: Local self-sufficiency and cooperation!

N7: Local autonomy!

N8: No centralization!

Comments:

Doubt No. 1: Does not the realization beyond a certain point of the three norms N6, N7, and N8 interpreted individualistically lead to strange conditions of life, in some ways similar to the famous terrifying 'state of nature' in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes?

Doubt No. 2: Do the lessons of ecology really support the norms? Rejecting the individualistic interpretation, we are therefore confronted with the difficult task of making them more precise with the help of other justifications, taking into account a serious concern of both individuals and collectives.

(f) Minimum conditions and justice: classes; exploitation

Human beings have needs. Any global policy of ecological harmony must distinguish the needs from mere wishes, that is to say from wishes that do not directly relate to a need.

Biological are those needs which must be unconditionally satisfied in order for an individual or species to survive. A minimum formula runs 'food, water, territory.' Then there are needs which are not necessary for all species. Clothing and some kind of shelter are necessary for most human groups, but not other species.

Further: we have needs necessary according to basic social organizations. We now approach needs which can only be separated from mere wishes on the basis of a system of values. Most societies are class societies in which the upper classes are said to need to live on a much higher material standard than the lowest, in order to avoid degradation (a major social calamity!). But are these wishes or needs?

The so-called basic needs, those necessary for survival, are only made fixed magnitudes through verbal magic. And 'survival' is a term of little use if restricted to mere 'not dying.' Remember the final words of Chief Seattle on the great change the White Man would bring to the land: 'the end of living and the beginning of survival.'

The transition from the discussion of such ethically basic norms to more political norms may be formulated in many ways. Here is one.

(1) The requirement of minimum conditions of Self-realization should have priority before others.

(2) This requirement implies that of minimum satisfaction of biological, environmental, and social needs.

(3) Under present conditions many individuals and collectivities have unsatisfied biological, environmental, and social needs, whereas others live in abundance.

(4) To the extent that it is objectively possible, resources now used for keeping some at a considerably higher level than the minimum should be relocated so as to maximally and permanently reduce the number of those living at or below the minimum level.

One can say that the derivation of basic norms in Ecosophy T

splits in two different directions. The last level we have outlined presents the norms and hypotheses of the local community, a characteristic ideal of many utopian systems. Now we are ready to follow an argument towards politics to justify the norms and hypotheses against exploitation, as developed through debates with the Marxists in Norway in the early 1970s.

H11: Self-realization requires realization of all potentials.
H12: Exploitation reduces or eliminates potentials.
N9: No exploitation!
H13: Subjection reduces potentials.
N10: No subjection!
N11: All have equal rights to Self-realization!
H14: Class societies deny equal rights to Self-realization.
N12: No class societies!
H15: Self-determination favors Self-realization.
N13: Self-determination!

Comments:

The above formulations are put forth mainly to show that the fundamental norms of Self-realization do not collide with norms of increasing the reign of justice on Earth. On the contrary, the class differences inside societies and between nations are clearly differences in conditions of Self-realization. Exploitation may be defined in terms of semi-permanent or permanent reducing of the possibilities of some groups in favor of others. Furthermore, calculations showing differences in the use of energy and other resources support an ecological approach in the fight against exploitation in class societies. The value of the model consists partly in the derivation of a general political attitude or posture without the use of certain terms such as 'communism,' 'socialism,' 'private enterprise,' and 'democracy' which elicit more or less automatic positive or negative reactions.

(g) The overview of Ecosophy T in diagram form

All these formulations (N1 to N13, H1 to H15) contain key terms from social, political, and life philosophy. They do no more than