THE GUN, THE SHIP AND THE PEN

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INTRODUCTION

It was in Istanbul that Kang Youwei witnessed the transformation at work. Sixty years old, a philosopher and a reformer, he had been exiled from his native China on account of his politics, and was persistently on the move. Crossing into the heartland of the Ottoman empire that summer in 1908, he found himself in the midst of turmoil. Rumours had been circulating of a Russian and British takeover of Macedonia, part of Sultan Abdülhamid II's dominions. Viewing this as further proof of the inadequacies of their government, sections of the Ottoman army had rebelled. They wanted a parliament. Even more, they wanted a reinstatement of the empire's first written constitution, which had been implemented in 1876, but then swiftly withdrawn. Kang Youwei arrived in Istanbul on 27 July, the day these army rebels succeeded in getting the constitution formally restored. Pushing his way through the crowds, cut off by language, but not from the excitement, he watched as 'Half-moon flags hung, people drink, hit drums, sung songs together and danced. People were chanting long live, it did not stop day and night, streets, parks and everywhere were the same ... it is astonishing.' Writing later, he set down the essence of the rebel leaders' ultimatum to the sultan: 'They all bent down respectively and told [him] ... "Every country has a constitution, only Turkey first declared and then abolished it, so people are not satisfied. The ideas of soldiers have changed."'[1]

This episode speaks to themes that are central to this book. There is the prominence of military men in this constitutional crisis. There is the fact that it was precipitated by threats and fears of foreign aggression; and there is the behaviour of Kang Youwei himself. Wanting constitutional change in China, he nonetheless saw it as essential to pay close attention as well to political experiments and ideas in other sectors of the world. 'On the run for sixteen years', proclaimed this man's favourite personal seal: 'circling the globe three times, traversing four continents'.[2] Like other activists who feature in these pages, though to an extreme degree, Youwei took it for granted that a viable political constitution could not be the introspective creation of a single polity. Learning and borrowing from others was indispensable, a position that by the early twentieth century had become the norm.

But it is his account of the arguments used by these military rebels to face down the Ottoman sultan that is most striking. As Youwei tells it, these men insisted that – even among the empire's common soldiery – 'ideas' had 'changed'. They made a still more arresting assertion: that, by now – in 1908 – 'every country has a constitution'. To an important degree, these claims were substantially correct. Since the mid eighteenth century, new written constitutions had spread at an increasing rate across countries and continents. This had worked to shape and re-forge multiple political and legal systems. It had also altered and disrupted patterns of thought, cultural practices and mass expectations.

Collections of rules of government were nothing new, of course, but went back a

long way. Some city states in ancient Greece had enacted them in the seventh century BCE. Codes of written laws emerged in different societies earlier still. Slabs of stone inscribed with the code of Hammurabi, ruler of Mesopotamia in what is now the Middle East, survive from before 1750 BCE. But such ancient texts were generally the work of single authors and potentates. Most were far more concerned to set out rules of conduct for subjects, and fearsome penalties for defying them, than to establish curbs on those in authority or provide for individual rights. Moreover, most early codes and collections were not produced in large numbers or designed for a wide audience. Even when law codes and charters began to be set down on parchment and paper, and levels of print and literacy expanded in some regions of the world, acute limits on circulation persisted. In 1759, the English jurist William Blackstone would complain of the continuing lack of a 'full and correct copy' of King John's Magna Carta, even though this was a celebrated charter and had emerged five centuries before.[3]

Yet, as this outburst of impatience on Blackstone's part suggests, by this stage, the situation was changing. From the 1750s, and in some particularly war-torn countries such as Sweden even before that, widely distributed iconic texts and single document constitutions aimed at constraining governments, and promising a variety of rights, became more numerous and more prominent. Thereafter, such documents proliferated exponentially and in connected waves across multiple frontiers. The quantum surge in the number of constitutions that followed the First World War, and still more the Second World War, lay in the future. Nonetheless, by 1914, devices of this sort were operating in parts of every continent barring Antarctica. In addition, and as emerges from Kang Youwei's account of the Young Turk revolution in Istanbul, a written constitution had come to be widely regarded as a trademark of a modern state and of the state of being modern. This book investigates these global transformations, and it connects them to shifting patterns of war and violence.

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This is not how the advance of written constitutions is usually understood. Because they are often looked at through the lens of particular legal systems, and because of patriotic pieties, constitutions are normally analysed only in regard to individual nations. Insofar as they *have* been viewed as a contagious political genre progressively crossing land and sea boundaries, this has generally been put down to the impact of revolutions, not war. In particular, the emergence of written constitutions has been credited to the success of the American Revolution after 1776, and to the impact of those other epic revolutions that swiftly followed: the French Revolution of 1789, what evolved into the Haitian Revolution shortly afterwards, and the revolts that erupted in the 1810s in one-time Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Central and South America. Since their onset is so strongly linked to these famous revolutions, the essential motive power of these new constitutions is often viewed in selective ways. Their genesis and growing popularity are seen as co-extensive with the rise of republicanism and the decline of monarchy, and associated with a relentless growth throughout the world of

nation states and the inexorable progress of democracy.[4]

These great Atlantic revolutions and the texts and ideas they generated remain an important part of the interpretation I advance here. But approaching constitutions as being quintessentially to do with certain major revolutions, and with republicanism, nation-building and democracy, is unduly narrowing and misleads. By 1914, written constitutions were already becoming the norm across continents. Yet, outside of the Americas, most states at this time were still monarchies (some of the most liberal still are). Few states anywhere in 1914, including in the Americas, were full democracies (many fail in that respect even today); while the most powerful players across the globe on the eve of the First World War were *not* nation states in fact. They were overland or maritime empires or both.

Looking at constitutions overwhelmingly through the lens of certain classic revolutions misleads in a further respect. We may like to feel that revolutions are inherently more attractive and constructive phenomena than wars. But the divide between these two expressions of mass human violence – revolution on the one hand, and warfare on the other – is often an unstable one, and this was increasingly so after 1750. The American and French revolutions, along with their successors in Haiti and South America, were all fuelled and precipitated by passages of transcontinental warfare. They were also further revolutionised as regards ideas, scale and consequences by yet more outbreaks of warfare.[5] War became itself revolution. Moreover, even before 1776 and the American Declaration of Independence, war and constitutional creativity were becoming more vitally and visibly intertwined. Why was this?

The primary and most persistent cause was a growth in the geographical range, frequency, intensity and demands of warfare and cross-border violence. Detailed information on some regions remains imperfect, but the broad outlines of what happened seem clear. In some parts of the world, there may have been a decrease in the early 1700s in *the total number* of armed conflicts. But, as Max Roser, Peter Brecke and others have meticulously charted, after 1700, *the regularity* with which large-scale wars erupted across the globe markedly increased. This pattern of a greater regularity of really large-scale warfare continued to obtain into the mid twentieth century.[6]

What have been styled 'umbrella wars' became more frequent. That is, there was a rise in the incidence of conflicts, such as the Seven Years' War (*c*.1756–63), the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (*c*.1792–1815), and the First World War (1914–18) which were not only hugely expensive in terms of lives and money, but also expanded across water and land into different regions of the world, incorporating and exacerbating multifarious local struggles in the process, and thereby becoming still more dangerous and disruptive.[7] The conventional westernised dates of these 'umbrella wars' – some of which I give above – are deceptive, because, for many of the protagonists involved, conflict began earlier than is suggested by such canonical dates, or lasted longer, or both. The rising pace and scale of armed conflict from the 1700s also helped to make technologies of war progressively more lethal. As far as maritime

warfare was concerned, this was already becoming more apparent by the 1650s. After 1800, and still more after 1850, overland warfare, too, became rapidly more mechanised and deadlier in its effects. This combination of more recurrent and elastic large-scale wars, and more lethal methods of warfare, continued into the mid twentieth century, by which time possessing or aiming for a written constitution had become the norm almost everywhere.



1. Estimated global death rate on account of warfare since 1400. Note the increased recurrence of high levels of combat casualties after 1700.

The impact of these changing patterns of warfare on constitution-making was at one level a structural one. Choosing to engage in, or being dragged into wars that were now, more habitually than before, extremely large, frequently involved substantial navies as well as land forces, often spread across continents, and – even for minor and reluctant players – could be acutely expensive in terms of lives and cash, put states under severe strains, often repeatedly so. As a result, some political regimes were seriously weakened and destabilised. Others fragmented and erupted into civil warfare and revolution. New regimes emerging from these war-bred crises progressively elected to experiment with written constitutions as a means to reorder government, mark out and lay claim to contested boundaries, and publicise and assert their position at home and on the world's stage.

But even states and regimes which proved more successful at war, and avoided collapse or serious fracture, frequently found themselves needing to reorder domestic government and raise their game. Accordingly, even for more resilient states – and not just in the West – the appeal of issuing a new legal and political instrument on paper tended to increase. Drafting and publishing a written constitution supplied

governments with a means to legitimise their systems of government anew. It made available a text by which to rally wider support and justify expanding fiscal and manpower demands. This was a vital part of the allure.

The new, more mass-produced constitutions functioned in effect and in part as bargains on paper. Male inhabitants of a state might be offered certain rights, including admission to the franchise, as a quid pro quo for accepting higher taxes and/or military conscription. As the great sociologist and jurist Max Weber recognised, this was increasingly what happened. Himself caught up in constitutional debates in his native Germany in the wake of the First World War, Weber would lecture his students on how the need to expand 'military discipline' over the years had inescapably brought about 'the triumph of democracy'. Different societies, he argued, had 'wished and ... [were] compelled to secure the cooperation of the non-aristocratic masses and hence put arms, and along with arms political power, into their hands'.[8] In return for a willingness to fire a gun or serve on a ship – something that, from the 1700s, became increasingly needful across continents – a man might secure the vote and more; and this deal might be outlined, put into law and publicised by means of a written and printed constitution.

Weber's brutal analysis supplies some of the answers. It explains why – especially after 1850 – polities in parts of Asia and Africa, as well as in Euro-America, were issuing constitutions that simultaneously made military service compulsory and enfranchised all, or sectors of, their adult male populations – but *only* men. Because this was a further outcome of the intimate connections between accelerating levels of warfare on the one hand, and the proliferation of constitutions on the other. Women's perceived incapacity for 'military discipline' helped to ensure that, at the outbreak of the First World War, the vast majority of these texts still explicitly excluded them from active citizenship.

There is another major respect in which mounting levels of violence influenced the spread and the quality of constitutions. As levels and scales of conflict accelerated from the 1700s, so, too, did rates of imperial competition and conquest. Every continent – including Europe itself – was exposed to heightened levels and threats of imperial invasion. Written constitutions have traditionally been examined in relation to the rise of nationalism and nation-making: and that is part of the story. Yet empire also played an essential role in their design and proliferation, unavoidably so. Of the twelve most populous political jurisdictions existing in the world by 1913, eleven were *not* nation states. They were empires: Britain, China, Russia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Habsburg monarchy, the Ottoman empire, Japan, Italy, and the United States, the last of these with its overland continental empire combined by now with control over the Philippines in South East Asia.[9]

All of these empires – not excluding Britain – experimented with written constitutions, and, in the process and for their own interests, contributed to their spread and diversity. Different empires used these pieces of official, mass-produced paper to legitimise their rule, and to regulate territories seized by their armies and

settlers. Some empires deployed new constitutions so as to disadvantage and discriminate against peoples who were in the way of their territorial expansion, especially those who were not white. On occasions, too, imperial actors issued new constitutions to try out political and social projects in subordinate territories they might have been unwilling to risk in their metropolitan core. Empires on the defensive, meanwhile (like many nation states under pressure), were increasingly drawn in the nineteenth century and beyond to adopt a new constitution as a means of reinventing themselves, and in the hope – as Kang Youwei witnessed in the Ottoman capital in 1908 – of keeping their subjects and lands together and intact in a hostile world.

Yet there was always more involved than this. By their very nature, written constitutions are protean and volatile pieces of political technology. They hold out the enticing promise that the words and clauses contained within them will bring into being a new, improved reality. New constitutions offer, or can appear to offer, the prospect of benign and exciting transformations. Consequently, there was far more to their widening circulation and attraction after 1750 than the top-down responses of hard-pressed politicians, states and ambitious empires. Other forces and lobbies were also powerfully attracted to the genre and progressively drawn into its making: and, yet again, changing patterns of war and violence were instrumental in this regard.

At one level, the same burdens, disruptions and dangers caused by expanding levels of conflict and aggression, which caused political elites progressively to turn their minds to new constitutions, could also agitate and sometimes activate those below – the ruled, the subaltern. Recurrent warfare drained away money while demanding more. It cost the lives of rising numbers of soldiers, sailors and civilians, often undermined livelihoods, and repeatedly disrupted trade and the normal workings of communities. All of this could foster more critical scrutiny and discussions of structures of power and authority, and spark anger and resentment. This, in turn, could – and did – prompt demands *from below* for enhanced rights embedded in new or renovated constitutions.

By the same token, the burgeoning scale of mainly Western imperial expansion caused some outside the West who were at risk and exposed to its force to experiment with their own defensive and distinctive constitutions. This trend was already becoming evident in some regions of the world by the 1810s, and it did not necessarily involve a close emulation of Western political and legal ideas and nostrums. Rather, as we shall see, adopting and adapting paper constitutions enabled some polities and Indigenous peoples outside the West, but pressured by rising Western power, to make adjustments and hopefully strengthen their systems of governments and defences. It gave them a chance to proclaim on paper and publicise that they were viable and modern, and therefore not fit targets for imperial takeover. It also provided an opportunity for advancing different and distinguishing interpretations of what was involved in being a state and a people, and what was involved in being modern.

The rising circulation of written constitutions after 1750 should not then be

understood only as a simple case of liberal and nationalist ideas and methods spreading inexorably outwards from the Atlantic world. To adapt Sebastian Conrad's interpretation of the Enlightenment (which is also part of this story), this other transformation – the global spread of constitutions – was rather 'the work of many different actors'. More often than not, these actors were people 'influenced by geopolitics and the uneven distribution of power'. Their ideas and actions were also often 'fed by high hopes and utopian promises'. But writers and advocates of constitutions were almost always influenced as well and at some level 'by threat and [by] violence'.[10]

It follows that paying close attention to the provisions and wording of different constitutions drafted across time and in multiple places is vital, because it is only by doing so that we can uncover, identify and unpick the many and various visions and ideas that were involved. Consequently, this book draws heavily throughout on the texts of multifarious constitutions that were written originally in many different languages, and that derive from locations in six continents. I have also been concerned to look at the ideas, personalities and actions of some of the writers and activists involved, those men (and, before 1914, it mainly though not invariably *was* men) who, as well as being often preoccupied with violence, the gun and the ship, also made studied use of the pen.

Since constitution-making was so interwoven with war and violence, these writers and thinkers are not necessarily those whom you might expect. Monarchs, politicians, lawyers and political theorists figure regularly in this book, to be sure. But so, too, do military, naval and imperial officers, along with one-time slaves, bankers, clergymen, medical doctors, intellectuals, journalists, and cultural figures of all kinds. Since my intention is to track and analyse changing attitudes and strategies over time and geographical space, I look not just at official and successful makers of constitutions, but also at some of the many private actors who attempted documents of this sort, out of anxiety, in the hope of advancing particular political, intellectual and social agendas, or because they were simply addicted to writing and to the written word.

I stress this point because constitutions are often compartmentalised: treated as a category that is separate and distinct from other modes of literature and creativity. Yet many of the constitution-drafters, thinkers and advocates who figure in this book were engaged as well in other literary and cultural activities, from Catherine the Great of Russia, through Rammohan Roy of Calcutta, to Andrés Bello of Venezuela and Chile, to Itō Hirobumi in Japan, to Pomare II of Tahiti and Africanus Horton from Sierra Leone. Kang Youwei himself, with whom we began, was fascinated by and adept at the art of calligraphy, as well as being a student and would-be writer of constitutions.[11]

It was not a coincidence moreover that this same post-1750 period, which saw the critical advance in the invention and take-up of written constitutions under heightened pressures of war and imperial violence, also witnessed an accelerating spread in large parts of the world in levels of literacy, an explosion in print and its transmission, a massive increase in the number and locations of newspapers, the

invention of myriad new written languages, a greater frequency in the issue of translations, and – too – the rising popularity of the novel. A constitution, after all, like a novel, invents and tells the story of a place and a people. These documents were – and are – always more than themselves, and more too than a matter of law and politics. They stand in need of reappraisal and rediscovery, and of being read across boundaries.

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No single book – and certainly no single author – can hope to address the extraordinary range of constitutional creativity, debates and outcomes that occurred across maritime and land frontiers from the eighteenth century to the First World War, and that continues to shape boundaries, politics and patterns of ideas today. There are many different histories of these developments that can and should be written. My own strategy has been to focus on a series of important themes and signal crises that impinge on, and that emerged from, the repeated inter-meshing of new constitutions and varieties of warfare and violence. Each of the following chapters, which are organised in rough chronological order, is built around one of these major themes and flash-points. Each begins with an evocation of a specific location and a particular episode of constitution-writing. Each chapter then moves on to explore the wider ramifications of the theme in question in other parts of the world.

One final point. I came to this subject as an outsider. Along with New Zealand and Israel, the United Kingdom, my place of birth, is one of very few states left in the world still without a codified constitution. Moving in the late twentieth century to live and work in the United States, a country which has made a cult of its own written constitutions, was therefore an arresting experience in political terms, as in other respects. It was also a call to curiosity. Because of where I came from, these documents seemed profoundly exotic. I was detached, but I also wanted to understand them better. I wondered why they were not treated more ambitiously and variously by historians and in global contexts. This book grew out of these early curiosities and questions.

In the course of writing it, I have become not so much a convert to these kinds of constitutions as a candid friend. They are the frail, paper creations of fallible human beings. Wherever they exist, they only function well to the degree that politicians, the law courts and the populations concerned are able and willing to put sustained effort into thinking about them, revising them when necessary, and making them work. These are also emphatically not innocent devices, and never have been. From the outset, as will become apparent, written constitutions have been as much to do with enabling varieties of power as they have been with restricting power.

But I have come to believe nonetheless that they can serve multiple, useful purposes. I also believe that while the manner in which constitutions evolved and spread still continues to influence ideas and polities across the globe, *some* of the forces that once helped these instruments to function and to command attention and

attachment are now weakening and coming under rising pressures. But that is a matter for the end of this book. For now, in order to begin, we need to go back to the 1700s, and to the world of the Mediterranean.

PART ONE

INTO AND OUT OF EUROPE

2. Pasquale Paoli by a Dutch artist in 1768.

One

THE MULTIPLE TRAJECTORIES OF WAR

Corsica

Small places sometimes generate events of wide historical importance. The man disembarking on this Mediterranean island on 16 April 1755, Pasquale Paoli, will briefly become a celebrity. He will figure in books, letters, newspapers, poetry, art, pamphlets and song as an exemplary combination of a 'soldier and a legislator', the sword and the pen. A British journalist will liken him to a 'planet of liberty, warming every soul in his progress'. Admirers on both sides of the Atlantic will compare him to Epaminondas, the legendary general who freed ancient Thebes from subjection to Sparta. In 1768, *An Account of Corsica*, a book by a louche, clever and ambitious Scot named James Boswell, will become a much-translated bestseller, and further propagate the notion that Paoli is 'something above' the normal run of humanity. Even an unflattering depiction by a Dutch artist at this time represents him as a formidable figure: tall and burly, with watchful eyes, a wide jaw and a cleft chin, and with two pistols tucked firmly into his waistband. Yet the hero worship that once surrounded Pasquale Paoli obscures not only the full nature of the man, but also some of the broader significance of what he did.[1]

Just months before taking ship for Corsica, his place of birth, Paoli had written of himself in terms not of strength, mission and certainty, but rather of weakness and doubt. He was too sickly for armed combat, he insisted in a letter, unfit for 'the least service in that capacity'. This, despite his possessing both formal military training and a family background in armed struggle. Back in 1728, his father, Giacinto Paoli, had joined an armed rebellion on Corsica against its long-time but declining imperial hegemon, the republic of Genoa, before ultimately becoming one of the rebel leaders. As a result, in 1739, he was forced into exile in the kingdom of Naples in southern Italy, taking with him his fourteen-year-old son, Pasquale. Like many young Corsicans seeking refuge here, the boy found employment in the Neapolitan army. But duties in dim garrison towns and time spent at an artillery academy seem to have interested Pasquale Paoli less than Freemasonry, avid reading and stray attempts to secure some further education at the city of Naples's pristine university.[2]

His decision to risk returning to Corsica emerged from a mix of motives, of which frustrated ambition was certainly one. By 1755, Paoli had reached the age of thirty, but did not anticipate receiving military promotion in Naples for several years. By contrast, his home island offered prospects. His family name counted for something there. Moreover, for reasons that extended well beyond Corsica itself, resistance to Genoese rule there was reviving again. Paoli did not view himself as temperamentally or physically well-equipped for warfare. But he possessed military and artillery skills, and a partially trained and intelligent mind. There was something else that persuaded

him to put aside his doubts and go back. He had devised a 'governmental plan that I would like to establish'.[3]

By July 1755, Paoli had succeeded in being elected *capo generale politico e economico* on Corsica, effectively its rebel commander-in-chief and head of its executive. Four months later, in Corte, a fortified town high in the granite heart of the island, he used his accomplished Italian to draft a ten-page constitution, a term (*costituzione)* he explicitly employed. No printing press seems to have operated on Corsica before 1760, so he was in no position to publish his text. At Corte itself, not even a supplier of stationery was available. To secure the necessary sheets of blank paper on which to set down his draft provisions, Paoli had to reuse pages from some old letters, using a razor to scrape away the inked words. As a result, this original, fragile document has long since disappeared. Only some early, imperfect manuscript copies survive to give us an indication of the audacity of his plans.

The preamble to Paoli's constitution went like this:

> The General Diet of the People of Corsica, legitimate masters of themselves, convoked according to the form [established by] the General [Paoli] in the city of Corte, the 16, 17, 18 November 1755. Having reconquered its liberty, wishing to give a durable and permanent form to its government by transforming it into a constitution suited to assure the well-being of the nation [the Diet] has ordained and decrees ...[4]

Contained within these fractured words were some radical political transformations and aspirations. In place of its customary sporadic *consulte* (assemblies), Corsica was now to have a parliament of sorts, the General Diet. This body, Paoli's text decreed, was to meet annually, as it duly did until 1769. The island was to shrug off its centuries-old subordination to Genoa and be restored to independence. As Paoli wrote, Corsicans had 'reconquered' their liberty. They were, he insisted, to regain – not simply lay claim to – their natural rights, and become again 'legitimate masters of themselves'. This new order was moreover to be anchored and celebrated in a written text, a constitution.

It bestowed on Pasquale Paoli a great deal of power. Confirmed as the island's general for life, he also became leader of its council of state, which was to consist of three chambers responsible respectively for political, military and economic affairs. Only Paoli could decide when and where the Corsican diet would assemble each year. Every petition sent to it and the council of state was initially to go to him. The direction of foreign affairs was also his, along with ultimate responsibility for war or peace. The constitution did not, however, give Paoli a seat in the diet. To this degree, and on frail paper at least, Corsica's executive was cordoned off from its legislature. Moreover, every year – and like every other significant Corsican official – Paoli was to give an 'exact account' of his actions to the members of the diet. He was then, the constitution ordered, to 'wait with submissiveness the judgment of the people'.

Because, as well as having responsibility for taxation and enacting legislation, this Corsican diet was to be widely representative. Paoli's constitution said little about electoral arrangements. In practice, though, and from 1766 by law, all of the island's male inhabitants over the age of twenty-five seem to have been eligible both to stand

for election to the diet and to vote for its members.[5] Potentially, this provided for a wider level of democracy on Corsica than existed anywhere else in the mid-eighteenth-century world. Even in Britain's American colonies, where the abundance of cheap land made it easy for settlers to qualify for enfranchisement, only about 70 per cent of adult white men could vote at this time, and fewer still bothered to do so. Yet what did it mean that these new initiatives and transformations in political technology should have occurred on a small island in the western Mediterranean? Why Corsica? And why at this point in time?

The Wider Reasons Why

Answers to these questions have often focused on Pasquale Paoli himself: on the man's undoubted charisma and gifts of leadership, and on his political ideas – though the evidence for these is patchy and blurred. Certainly, he grew to maturity in Naples during a period when its ancient university was a major incubator of Enlightenment political, economic and legal thought. Yet just how much time this struggling, itinerant and underpaid junior army officer was able to devote to academic study and intellectual exchange is far from clear. Nor, for all the analysis devoted to the subject, do we know the extent of Paoli's indebtedness to the French political philosopher Montesquieu and his masterwork *The Spirit of Laws* (1748). Yes, Paoli is known to have ordered a copy of Montesquieu's book in March 1755, but that was six months *after* he designed his own first scheme of government for Corsica.

As regards Paoli's evolving interest in political constitutions, it seems to have been his early exposure to the Greek and Roman classics that was more influential. He is known to have read works by Livy, Plutarch, Horace and Polybius, as well as volumes on ancient history, encouraged by his father, Giacinto Paoli, who had nurtured his own ambitions to be a lawmaker.[6] In 1735, twenty years before his son drafted *his* first constitution, Giacinto had worked alongside a lawyer, Sébastien Costa, to formulate a set of constitutional proposals for Corsica. They were never implemented. But these early projects by Paoli's father are significant in terms of the emphasis they place on the importance of military men and values, and in their insistence on the supreme virtue and utility of words set down on paper.[7]

Costa and Giacinto had wanted a reforming Office of War to be established on Corsica, staffed by six of 'the bravest soldiers of the kingdom'. They also advocated the appointment of a 'Captain General of the Armies', along with the election in each of the island's provinces of a lieutenant general who would be responsible for selecting the officers of the local militia. In addition, Paoli senior and Costa envisaged a literal bonfire of the island's existing alien political writings and laws. If its governance was ever to be successfully remodelled, they argued, old words of power deriving from Genoa's claims over Corsica since the thirteenth century must be systematically and ritually destroyed, and replaced by new texts:

> That all the laws and statutes made by the Genoese ... will be abolished, and that it will be ordered, by the publication of an edict, that all the people of Corsica bring the copies of

> the laws and statutes that they have in their homes to the Secretary of State, so that a public bonfire can be made of these laws and statutes as a sign of the eternal separation of the Corsicans from the Genoese and of Corsica from Genoa.[8]

As these abortive proposals illustrate, there were precedents for Pasquale Paoli's 1755 constitution. His father, Giacinto, had been sketching out plans for an independent, reorganised Corsica while Pasquale himself was still a child; and there had been other schemes devoted to changing the island's forms of government. Driving the production of these serial paper projects and making them more urgent was not only Corsica's continued subjugation to Genoa, but also the island's vulnerability to other, even harsher pressures from outside.

Corsica was a poor place. It possessed few minerals and only limited arable land, and in the 1750s its largely illiterate population totalled no more than 120,000. Cut across by vertiginous mountains, the island was split into hundreds of semi-autonomous communes and afflicted by competing jurisdictions and clan warfare. These internal divisions go some way to explaining why much of Paoli's 1755 constitution is given over to providing for more centralised control and improving domestic order. Hitting someone on the head with a stick, stipulated Paoli with all seriousness, was to land the guilty party in jail for at least fifteen days. As for committing murder in the course of a blood feud, the offender would:

> Not only be declared guilty of willful homicide, but on the site of his house, which shall be immediately destroyed, one will erect a column of infamy on which the name of the guilty one and the crime shall be indicated.[9]

Partly to root out such disorders, and as his father had sought to do earlier, Paoli provided for multiple layers of tough, essentially militarised authority. His 1755 constitution ordered that each Corsican commune was to have a military commissioner, and each parish a captain and a lieutenant at arms. 'Zealous patriots', these officers were to respond to any outbreaks of internal unrest and armed challenge by calling up the local males ('failure to report carries a fine of 20 soldi'), organising them into columns, and crushing opposition 'with armed force'. Paoli saw no contradiction whatsoever between these provisions and his constitution's support for mass male political engagement – very much the reverse. The reasoning he gives is telling. 'Every Corsican must have some political rights', he argued, since otherwise 'if the franchise of which he is so jealous is, in the end, but a laughable fiction, *what interest would he take in defending the country* [my italics]?'[10] War, the persistent threat of armed violence and written provisions for wider male democracy were all necessarily intertwined.

This commitment to forging an armed citizenry owed something to Paoli's love of the ancient classics. But it was also a response to the specific dangers confronting Corsica itself, not simply internally, but also from without. Even at the height of Paoli's power on Corsica, Genoese military and naval forces remained strung out along the island's coastlines. And there were other, larger foreign challenges. Vulnerably small,

Corsica was also strategically desirable. Situated in the western Mediterranean, where naval competition between the major European powers was intense, it was barely a hundred sea miles from France. As James Boswell noticed when he visited the island in 1765, grubbing for copy, Corsica possessed a range of useful harbours. But, as he also recorded, it lacked the economic resources and the skilled workforce necessary to construct an effective navy which might be able to repel attacks from the sea.[11]

To a substantial degree, then, Pasquale Paoli's determination in 1755 to remake Corsica's government in a 'durable and permanent form' stemmed from the fact that the island was doubly endangered. It was disorderly and subject to Genoa within, and it faced a potential threat from without of naval invasions by a great power. It was no accident at all that this first attempt at drafting a Corsican constitution on Paoli's part (he would try again in 1793) should have emerged in the early stages of what would later become known as the Seven Years' War (Americans call it the French and Indian War).

This huge, sprawling mid-eighteenth-century conflict, an aggregation of multiple struggles in different continents, worked to focus Paoli's mind. For a while, the scale of the fighting also worked to his advantage.[12] Although resistance to rule by Genoa had been on the rise in Corsica since the 1720s, these local struggles had regularly buckled in the face of French military interventions. France much preferred for a declining Italian republic to be nominally in control of the island than for it to be taken over by another, more formidable foreign power. In 1739, it had been a French army led by the marquis de Maillebois which had crushed Corsican rebels in a matter of weeks, and forced Giacinto Paoli and his young son into exile. French forces intervened again on Corsica in the 1740s. Tellingly, though, France did *not* intervene in 1755 to prevent Pasquale Paoli from landing and renewing the independence campaign. When some French troops did arrive on the island the following year, they confined themselves to keeping guard on its coastlines, while in the main staying studiously away from the political revolutions that were now underway in its interior.

The reasons for this unusual level of French restraint are clear. From the mid 1750s, the rulers of France had to focus the bulk of their attention, and their land and maritime forces, on the business of fighting and monitoring Britain and its allies, not just in continental Europe, but also in parts of Asia, coastal west Africa, the Caribbean and North America. It was this high level of French distraction on account of the Seven Years' War – the 'first world war', as Winston Churchill aptly styled it – that allowed Pasquale Paoli his brief window of opportunity, his few years of exploratory and momentous political time.[13]

For Paoli and for Corsica – as would be the case later on for many other peoples in many other places – it was in large part the threat of war, and the outbreak of war, that enabled, enforced and influenced innovative written constitutionalism. That outbreaks of armed conflict, and the fear of them, were to be increasingly formative in this respect was due to the fact that the nature and the demands of warfare were shifting. We need to understand why.

A More Expansive, More Expensive Warfare

War has always been a major contributor to the making of states and empires and their fortunes. As the American sociologist Charles Tilly famously remarked, states make war, and war in turn often works to make and strengthen (and also to unmake) states. But, by the mid eighteenth century, the impact of war in many regions of the world was changing and intensifying. These changes had little to do with the introduction of new technologies, especially as far as conflict on land was concerned. Gunpowder weaponry had long since already altered the quality of large-scale violence, not just in Euro-America, but also in China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Java, the Indian subcontinent, the Ottoman empire and west Africa.[14] Nor, although in parts of the world the number of men at arms was rising appreciably, were the signal changes in warfare that were becoming more evident by the mid 1700s *primarily* to do with the size of armies. The more critical shift in the quality of warfare at this stage was of a different sort. The geographical range of many major conflicts – and consequently the demands they posed in terms of men, money and machines – was expanding more dramatically and more rapidly than ever before.

The contest that facilitated Pasquale Paoli's brief constitutional experiment on Corsica was an extreme case in point. The Seven Years' War involved lethal levels of fighting within continental Europe itself. Between 1756 and 1763, the powerful German state of Prussia lost an estimated 500,000 troops and civilians out of a pre-war population of 4.5 million. But well before Europeans themselves began to suffer serious levels of destruction, mortality and ecological damage on account of this conflict, vicious fighting connected with one of its prime dynamics – the rivalry between Britain and France – was already affecting parts of Asia and North America. As early as 1754, areas of what is now Tamil Nadu in south-eastern India had 'been so long the seat of war' between British and French troops and their respective South Asian allies, it was reported, that 'scarce a tree was left standing for several miles'.[15]

As its transcontinental reach makes clear, the Seven Years' War was not fought out overwhelmingly on land. By contrast with most epic contests involving multiple powers during the seventeenth century – the Thirty Years' War, for instance – fighting in *this* mega-conflict embraced multiple seas and oceans. Three of the six biggest naval engagements in the Seven Years' War occurred, not in European waters, but on the Indian Ocean. This umbrella war also witnessed tens of thousands of European troops being shipped expensively across the Atlantic – a far greater number than in previous contests. The actions of these men, along with those of American colonists and indigenous warriors, altered political boundaries in North America from Upper Canada down to present-day Florida. In addition to these North American transformations, and along with its impact on the Indian subcontinent, the Seven Years' War also swept through different parts of the Caribbean and into coastal South America. It touched Senegal in west Africa; and, in its final stages, reached Manila in the Philippines, between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.[16]

The widening geographies and damage levels of warfare becoming more evident by

the middle decades of the eighteenth century were not, it should be stressed, only the result of Western aggression and ambitions. Markedly long-distance warfare was also conspicuously practised at this time by some Greater Asian powers. From the late 1720s, the Persian ruler Nādir Shāh Afshār, by origins a working herdsman though from a recognised family, had quickly evolved into both a brilliant recruiter of men and a ruthless tactician. He engaged in a succession of ferocious assaults on the Caucasus region and Mesopotamia, and on what is now Turkey, Afghanistan and northern India. Nādir was assassinated in 1747, on the verge of moving further into eastern Asia, but one of his former generals, Ahmad Shāh Durrānī, continued the onslaught. By 1757, he had already annexed Punjab, Kashmir and Lahore, sacking holy cities in his path and implementing mass killing on a terrible scale. The number of dead as a result of his armies' onslaughts was reputedly so great that barriers made up of rotting human bodies blocked the flow of the Yamuna river, a tributary of the Ganges.[17] And there was another, infinitely more established and mighty Asian power that was also ambitiously on the march at this time.

Ever since its conquest of China in the 1640s, the Qing dynasty had wanted to strengthen its Central Asian frontiers, and move against the Zunghar state of the western Mongols, a loose nomadic empire claiming control over what is now Xinjiang, Inner and Outer Mongolia and parts of Tibet and Kazakhstan. For a long time, as the historian Peter Purdue describes, Qing rulers were held back by the logistical difficulties involved in keeping their huge armies adequately supplied for protracted campaigns over such vast overland distances. But in the mid eighteenth century, under the sixth member of the Qing dynasty, the Qianlong emperor, there was a major breakthrough.[18]

A patron of different styles of art, a writer himself of poetry and political essays, and an unquestionably intelligent and thoughtful man, Qianlong was also a serial and effective warmonger. He ordered the construction of a new supply route into Xinjiang, and built a chain of military magazines. As a result of these preparations, in the 1750s he was able to dispatch three armies, each 50,000 men strong, into Zunghar territory, and keep them there for a protracted campaign. Covering greater overland distances than Napoleon's armies were to do in their march on Moscow in 1812, these Qing forces finally defeated the Zunghars. They wiped out virtually all of their young boys and able-bodied men. The women were taken as booty or killed, and the Zunghar–Mongolian empire was erased from the map. As Qianlong proclaimed in December 1759, it had been eliminated.

In terms of the rise in long-distance aggression, it is possible, then, to identify something of a 'great convergence' occurring by the middle decades of the eighteenth century.[19] Violent incursions into northern India on the part of some south-eastern and Central Asian powers were increasing in ruthlessness and range in this period; and while, in the 1750s, major Western powers were waging war over longer distances than before, the same was true of the Qing empire.

Yet for all these mid-century convergences in long-distance aggression between

financed warships, as distinct from specially adapted merchant vessels, had already become the norm in much of western and eastern Europe. But, over the course of the long eighteenth century, warships became progressively larger, more numerous, more intricate and far more expensive. In 1670, having thirty guns was sufficient for a vessel to qualify as a 'ship of the line', the most formidable and prestigious type of warship in European navies. By the time of the Seven Years' War, though, sixty guns were customary for ships in this category, and some vessels carried more than that.[22] The order for building the *Victory*, the first-rater that Horatio Nelson used as his flagship at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, was given in the midst of the Seven Years' War. This vessel was designed to carry at least one hundred guns.

Constructing, manning and maintaining these maritime behemoths was hideously expensive. In order to build a 74-gun warship – that is, not even the most lethal ship available – a shipbuilding yard might require close to 3,000 mature oak trees; and high-quality timber was only one of the necessary raw materials involved. In addition, a big ship like this easily absorbed over twenty miles of flax and hemp rope, acres of canvas for sails, huge amounts of iron for nails and cannon, yards of copper sheeting for the hulls, and – once finished – an unending supply of victuals. Specialised yards and expert craftsmen were also needed to construct such a ship in the first place, along with hundreds more men to sail it and naval bases to maintain it. Yet, in the 1780s alone, France built almost fifty of these monster and monstrously expensive 74-gun warships.[23]

As the scale of this French investment suggests, mega-navies were never the monopoly of a single state. To be sure, for much of the 1700s, and until the second half of the nineteenth century, access to this level of maritime firepower was usually confined to a small clique of mainly European powers. During the same period, it was also generally accepted that Britain's Royal Navy was unlikely to be surpassed in size by that of any other power. But, with the geographical range of warfare expanding so rapidly, *all* states with access to the sea faced growing pressure to acquire some sort of navy. Not to fight set-piece sea battles necessarily, but to defend coastlines and protect merchant fleets. There were periods of time, indeed, when the scale of naval expansion on the part of its competitors overtook the rate at which Britain itself was growing its sea power. By 1790, for instance, Britain's navy was still comfortably bigger than its rivals, but it was only twenty-one vessels larger than in 1750. By contrast, over this same period – 1750–90 – both France and Spain almost doubled the size of their respective fleets while simultaneously maintaining huge armies.[24]

Sea power, though, was never enough. Since the emphasis was now increasingly on hybrid warfare – more ships at sea, but also more troops on the ground – the British in turn were unable to rely only on having a dominant navy. They also had to bulk up their armies, and they did. During the War of the Austrian Succession of 1740–48, some 62,000 men served annually in the British army. During the Seven Years' War, the equivalent figure was 93,000. By the time of the American Revolutionary War of 1775–83, and as well as running over 220 ships of the line, the British state was needing to employ annually over 108,000 troops.[25]

In broad terms, then, it was not the case that 'naval warfare changed much less than land warfare during this period'. But neither was it ever a case of war at sea coming to subordinate overland warfare in significance.[26] The vital point is that, by the 1750s, ambitious Western powers – and ultimately some outside the West – had come to believe more strongly and actively than before that they needed to run substantial armies and substantial navies in tandem.

The global consequences of these developments were seismic and harsh. They were also, as I say, paradoxical. At one level – and as is widely recognised – the build-up on the part of *some* European powers of far more troops on the ground and far more warships at sea rendered these states ever more dangerous to those parts of the world that lacked the means or the will to respond in kind. 'I can defeat them on land', Haidar Ali, the self-made ruler of Mysore in southern India, is supposed to have remarked in the 1770s of incoming British forces; and he sometimes did exactly that. Haidar's well-armed and well-financed armies, variously estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000 men, forced the encroaching British East India Company to sue for peace in the late 1760s, and later inflicted a humiliating defeat upon the Company's legions at the battle of Pollilur in 1780. Haidar, along with his powerful and brilliant son and successor at Mysore, Tipu Sultan, also made attempts to construct a naval fleet. But, like other Indian rulers at this time, these Mysore sovereigns lacked the fiscal organisation and resources and the fixed plant necessary for staging and sustaining full-scale hybrid warfare. As Haidar Ali himself acknowledged, for all his formidable military strength on land, he could not 'swallow the sea'.[27]

To make these points is not, however, to advance yet another version of a 'rise of the West' thesis. To be sure, the combination of big, state-run navies and swollen, state-run armies allowed – for a while, at least – a small number of Western states to project power, people, information and goods across land and seas insolently and on a rising and terrible scale. But there was another, sometimes overlooked side to all of this. Engaging in and sustaining the business of large-scale hybrid warfare – not just *more* wars, but *changing qualities* of wars – indulging in this mode of conflict repeatedly, and making provision for the large numbers of men and machines that were necessarily involved, put those Western powers most deeply invested in these modes of warfare under extreme levels of stress.[28] These multiple stresses, which were becoming more evident by the mid eighteenth century, played a substantial and recurring role in fostering the emergence of new political ideas, and in provoking a series of major political and constitutional shocks and reconfigurations.

Hybrid Wars and Revolutions

Most dramatically, the pressures and irritants of increasing levels of hybrid warfare helped to give rise to a series of canonical revolutionary conflicts, each of which expanded the design and spread of written constitutions, and the ideas involved in them. All three of the world's prime practitioners of hybrid warfare in the 1700s and early 1800s – Britain, France and Spain – were mutilated by these serial revolutionary

conflicts, but in different ways. As far as Britain was concerned, the biggest crisis occurred not within its own domestic territory, but in one of its oldest and most emotive colonial outposts, mainland North America.

With some cause, historians of Britain tend to wax complacent about its growing capacity from the mid seventeenth century to raise taxes, fund its national debt and deploy its Westminster Parliament to legitimate these exactions. Yet the slide into ever-larger, wider-ranging hybrid warfare still took a heavy toll here. During the War of the Austrian Succession, Britain's annual expenditure was already running at two-thirds higher than in the previous, relatively peaceful decade. Over 40 per cent of this rising outflow of funds went on the Royal Navy. The rest, however, went on the army. Traditionally, this had been the less favoured of Britain's armed services, but it was now swelling in size so as to meet the demands of hybrid warfare. The Seven Years' War proved still more expensive, not just because of the unprecedented levels of transcontinental fighting involved, but also because of the scale of British victories.

Before the Seven Years' War, the British state had felt little need to maintain permanent military bases in any of its overseas colonies (Ireland, as so often, was an exception to the rule). But after sending an unprecedented 20,000 troops to North America to fight in the course of this war, London made the fateful decision at its formal end in 1763 to provide for 10,000 regular troops to be distributed throughout its Atlantic empire as a peacetime force. Of these, about 7,500 men were sent to British America, which now stretched from Hudson's Bay to the Florida Keys, and from the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi River.[29]

This distinctly modest force proved utterly insufficient for the mix of tasks and the vast geographies confronting it. To begin with, its men were expected to monitor Britain's newly won and often unimpressed Francophone subjects in Quebec. In addition, troops were needed to watch over the populous towns on America's eastern seaboard, and to put down smuggling there as well as growing outbursts of what London viewed as sedition. These sparse British army units were also supposed to regulate the rising numbers of settlers and speculators scrambling for a place on North America's western frontiers, and pacify and protect the angry Indigenous peoples whose lands these incomers were invading. Predictably, the overstretched redcoats failed substantially on all three counts. 'What did Britain gain by the most glorious and successful war on which she ever engaged,' remarked a one-time British colonial governor as he looked back on events in North America in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, but 'an extent of empire we [were] ... equally unable to maintain, defend or govern'.[30]

As whole libraries of books have been devoted to documenting, the post-war British soldiery in North America (some of whom were American-born in fact) were, however, highly effective as agents of political education and imperial division. Many civilian colonists viewed these soldiers, with some cause, as representatives of a more assertive and intrusive style of British imperial authority. Opposition to this, and to the taxes London levied to help pay for these men, forged bonds of sympathy and cooperation

between different American colonies that had previously tended to go their own separate ways.

The new imperial soldiery fostered opposition in other ways too. During the Seven Years' War, American colonists had been in a position to witness British redcoats in their localities as never before. Post-war, some colonists encountered yet more men in red uniforms: and they did not always like what they saw. In March 1770, the 'Boston Massacre', as American polemicists immediately and cunningly styled the affair, involved the killing of just five colonial rioters in this major east coast settlement of some 16,000 people. The critical point, however, was that influential American colonists in Boston (like educated Britons on the other side of the Atlantic) were primed by their readings of history and political thought to associate soldiers operating aggressively in civilian spaces with tyranny – and those firing the shots on this occasion were wearing British army uniforms.[31]

In turn, growing American resistance to taxation and questioning of the very limited armed official British presence in their midst provoked mutterings about colonial ingratitude on the other side of the Atlantic. Maintaining these regiments in the American colonies cost Britain itself about £400,000 a year, close to 4 per cent of its national budget. Coming on top of heavy post-Seven Years' War debt repayments, these extra tax burdens help to explain why agitation for political change – and rising interest in constitutional matters – also manifested itself in the 1760s in London and in other British towns and cities, and why politicians at Westminster persisted so stubbornly in trying to extract more money from the American colonists to cover at least some of their costs.[32]

If the American colonies expected 'our fleets' for their protection, thundered a British minister Charles Townshend in 1765 – making clear again the strains of having to combine unparalleled levels of naval power with big land armies – they 'must assist our revenue'.[33] As it was, financial pressures in the wake of the Seven Years' War forced cutbacks in the size and repair levels of the Royal Navy, something that arguably inhibited Britain's early performance when transcontinental war broke out again after 1775, this time with most of its mainland American colonies. Before the end of this contest in 1783, twelve of these one-time American colonies had adopted their own written state constitutions. Eventual American victory in this war also resulted, of course, in the drafting of a seminal constitution for the new United States as a whole in 1787.[34]

For France, too, participation in the Seven Years' War proved a tipping point, though for different reasons. Like their counterparts in London, politicians in Paris and Versailles had to contend with near bankruptcy after 1763. But whereas Britain also faced the challenge of learning how to govern, adjust to and pay for an overabundance of new territorial conquests, France, post-war, had to deal with the shocks and shame of wide-scale defeat and the loss of most of its overseas colonies. The French Crown had invested twice as much money in this conflict as it had in the previous War of the Austrian Succession. As a result, by the 1760s debt repayments

35. John Orlando Parry, *A London Street Scene*, watercolour, 1835. Stephen Crawley for the Alfred Dunhill Museum and Archive
36. Unknown artist, *Simón Bolívar*, oil on canvas, *c.*1823. Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library
37. François-Désiré Roulin, *Simón Bolívar*, a profile drawing made in Bogotá on 15 February 1828. Colección Bolivariana, Fundación John Boulton
38. Adam Buck, *Major [John] Cartwright*, etching, n.d. Courtesy of The Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University
39. William Lovett, *The people's charter: an act to provide for the just representation of the people of Great Britain & Ireland in the Commons' House of Parliament*, London, *c.*1839. Rare Book Division, Special Collections, Princeton University Library
40. John Shillibeer, *A view of Pitcairn's Island, South Seas*, watercolour, 1814. Dixson Library, State Library of New South Wales
41. Robert Batty, 'George Young & his wife (Hannah Adams) of Pitcairns [sic] Island', drawn and etched by Lieut. Col. Batty. from Sketches by Lieut. Smith of H. M. S. Blossom, in Sir John Barrow, *The eventful history of the mutiny and piratical seizure of H. M. S. Bounty, its causes and consequences, illustrated by six etchings from original drawings by Lieut.-Colonel Batty*, London, 1831. Rare Book Division, Special Collections, Princeton University Library
42. Nanine Vallain, *La Liberté (Liberty)*, oil on canvas, 1794. Inv. MRF D1986-4. © Coll. Musée de la Révolution française/Domaine de Vizille/Dépôt du Musée du Louvre
43. Jonathan Spilsbury after Katharine Read, *Catharine Macaulay*, mezzotint, 1764. British Prints Collection (GC106); Graphic Arts Collection, Special Collections, Princeton University Library
44. Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, 'Que valor!/What courage!', Plate 7 from *The Disasters of War*, etching, aquatint and drypoint, 1810, published in 1863. The Metropolitan Museum of Art
45. Thomas Crawford, *The Indian: The Dying Chief Contemplating the Progress of Civilisation*, white marble and wood, 1856. Photography © New-York Historical Society
46. Samuel Freeman, *His Majesty Pomarrè, King of Taheite*, stipple print, London, 1821. © Trustees of the British Museum
47. Charles Davidson Bell, *Education in the Early Days at The Cape*, watercolour, n.d. © National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London
48. Rev. Lorrin Andrews (but in fact produced by some of his Hawaiian pupils), *Hawaiian Costume*, engraving, printed in Hawaii, *c.*1837–40. © Trustees of the British Museum
49. Unknown photographer, *King Kalākaua*, glass negative, n.d. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ggbain-06548
50. Louis-Augustin Simil, *Portrait of His Highness The Mushir Mohammed Essadek, Bey of Tunis* [Sadok Bey], oil on canvas, 1859. The Diplomatic Reception Rooms, US Department of State, Washington DC
51. Gilbert Stuart, *George Washington (Lansdowne Portrait)*, oil on canvas, 1796. National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution; acquired as a gift to the nation through the generosity of the Donald W. Reynolds Foundation
52. 'Suspéndu d'une main entre le wagon de bagages ...,' Jules Verne, *Le tour du monde en quatre-vingts jours*, Paris, n.d., illustrations by Alphonse-Marie-Adolphe de Neuville and Léon Benett. General Research Division, The New York Public Library
53. Louis-Augustin Simil, *Le général Khaireddine/Khayr al-Dīn on Horseback*, oil on canvas, 1852. Adnan Louhichi, INP Tunis
54. 'The true defenders of the Constitution', wood engraving from a drawing by James Walker, in *Harper's Weekly*, vol. 9, no. 463 (11 November 1865). Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-138362