

THE POETICS OF PHILOSOPHY [A READING OF PLATO]

By

David A. Ross

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P U B L I S H I N G

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PROLOGUE

The Great Mystery of Being has two primary aspects, the High Priestess of my life tells me, love and death. Their intertwined aspects create one could say a text, and reading this text back to itself, with its twisting passageways, a veritable labyrinth inhabited by the Minotaur. Who is the hero? The Minotaur is half-man, half-beast, a totemic animal, perhaps, symbolizing the ancient Greek's puzzlement with their own violent impulses, their submergence within a lustful ferocity, a primal madness that drove them out of their familiar surroundings, impelling them to venture far upon the blue Aegean. There, paradoxically, they would meet themselves, monstrously familiar and unfamiliar, the strange attractor signifying the end of their predictable world. So, Theseus sets sail to meet the Minotaur, the all-devouring monster of the flower of Athens, sent to their doom because of the murder of the Cretan King's son some years previously. With the help of the king's daughter, Adriadne, smitten by him, Theseus retraces his path from out of the labyrinth after he has slain the monster. He is given a spool of thread that he unwinds. Is the rewinding of the one's travels the tale that is told, the text that becomes *written*?

Who are the characters here? Who is the monster and who is the hero? Or are they one and the same? Is the monster here is the man who would be a philosopher and Adriadne, the woman Febra, who would help him find his way back to himself? I share with the reader the words of my beloved, friend, companion, and wife: men should understand women less and love them more, and women should love men less and understand them more. Febra-Adriadne's thread is interwoven throughout the text. It is for the reader to pick up that thread and weave it back into the text that he or she is becoming.

INTRODUCTION

This work, *the poetics of philosophy*, attempts to rehear the *sound* buried under layers of accumulated interpretation. It is not a sound in the usual sense of the word, meaning, an audio signature formed by the vibration of air molecules. Rather it is what Heraclites suggested when he said:

Listening to the Logos rather than to me, it is wise to agree that all things are in reality one thing and one thing only.¹

This listening refers to the sound logic that pervades language and to which in the course of formal thought, we have become deaf. In attending to the Logos, we want to hear that most excellent sound that is no sound at all but the stillness which Plato would call the soul's *arête* (excellence, virtue, and perfection). The sound stillness of the Logos escapes the conventional ear bent only what is most audible. Rather, what is being recommended here is a hearkening, the sounding that would bend back the conventional (h)earing. In this bending back of the ear of conventional thought, we aim to recover the possibility of hearing buried under the accumulated layers of deafness – a primordial sound that abides and rests within the audio ground and whose *cultivation* is the hearing. In cultivating the grounds of thought, we attend to, to refer to that other great pre-Socratic icon of mind, Parmenides, 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth.' (Ἀληθείης εὐκκλέος ἀπρεμῆς ἦτορ)² In listening to the logic of well-rounded truth, we want to shake out the deafness of the ear – beginning with our own – re-hearing what stands still in the *motion* of thoughtfulness.

Our reading of some of Plato is the site of this attendance. In recalling the salient moments of the tradition to which we (re)-inscribe our membership, we cannot claim that this reading is complete, for we have not read all of the texts. But our intention is not to be an exegete of Plato's but to use his texts as a springboard for elaborating the theme entitling the work. Here, a word of caution. Our reading is non-linear, meaning that it operates more as one would expect musicians at a jam session to do. The

¹ <http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GREECE/HERAC.HTM>

² Ibid.

work is of a Dionysian soul with an analytic Apollonian bent. It is a melange of word play and exposition that defies categorizing. Its author has tried to say something of philosophical importance, which should not be taken for granted. To cite the words of Alan Bloom when discussing ‘analytic’ philosophy:

Professors of these schools simply would not and could not talk about anything important, and they themselves do not represent a philosophic life for the students.³

It remains an open question whether anything of philosophical importance has any scholarly value, at least as defined by mainstream academia and its funding agencies. In any case that is what this work attempts to do, and its adequacy must be judged in terms of its own stated objectives rather than the bureaucratic norms of organizations for which the act of thinking itself has quite possibly become, if Bloom is right, ‘academic.’

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allan_Bloom

PREFACE

The essence of thought, I claim, is musical, a thought with which Alan Bloom concurs who wrote:

Music is the medium of the *human* soul in its most ecstatic condition of wonder and terror. Nietzsche, who in large measure agrees with Plato's analysis, says...that a mixture of cruelty and coarse sensuality characterized this state... Music is the soul's primitive and primary speech... without articulate speech or reason. It is not only not reasonable, it is hostile to reason.¹

To state the parameters of our argument, I shall say with what I agree and disagree. I agree with Bloom and Nietzsche calling music 'the soul's primitive and primary speech' while disagree that it is 'hostile to reason.' Certainly, music is *other* to reason. What is other is not necessarily *hostile*, however. Artistically comprehended, music is the basic crude material out of which the more formally recognized strain called 'thought' or 'thinking' emerges. Thought's primal character is musical, as much as, say, a stone sculpture's character is stone. But the sculpture is not reducible to its substratum because of the intervening vision of the sculptor, the artist who has drawn forth the possibilities inherent within the stone in order to realize that vision. The primal music of the soul is the basic matter of thought, thought, in its cognitive form, being the carving of that matter to realize the artist's vision of Being (being itself) animating the work.

Music is arational vis-à-vis formal thought, which is rational and contradictory thought, which is irrational. The stone is the arational element for which the actual sculpture is the rational form. And it would be irrational to orient to stone as say wood, for the rationality of art consists in working out the possibilities of the matter at hand in light of some vision of Being. Both stone and wood are *not* the stone sculpture but in strikingly different ways: the first is non-rational, being other to the stone sculpture, an example of *non-being* while the second is what the stone sculpture is not and could never be. To orient to stone as wood is thus irrational, this action instantiating *not-being*.

¹*Closing of the American Mind*, p. 72 found in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Closing_of_the_American_Mind.

Aristotle speaks of the *material* cause: “that from which, <as a constituent> present in it, a thing comes to be ... e.g., the bronze and silver, and their genera, are causes of the statue and the bowl.”²In a certain sense one could speak of music being the material cause of thought. However, no definitive judgement can be made because of the need to gather, as Heidegger did in his analysis of Aristotle’s four causes in his well-publicized, even if not necessarily known and understood “The Question Concerning *Technê*.”

For purposes of this text, this gathering occurs through articulating the difference between non- and not-being – melodic lines whose harmonic progression requires the scaling of thought itself in accordance with the on-going rhythm of an unshakeable heart beating out its resistance to the denigration of thought by academic philosophy. The poetics of philosophy is this *pièce de résistance*. Its outstanding character is its systemic opposition to the vulgarization of the Platonic ideal that is of a piece with its *deafness* to the music. Here I can only point to the predisposition that makes such a project thinkable, namely, its musical tone, which I shall intone as ‘memory.

This work aims to remember what much of contemporary scholarship forgets, namely, the poetics of philosophy, the details of the argument to be given in the main text. To prepare the way for a reading, the work of an introduction, I point to themes of this work inspired by that of others, notably, Jacques Derrida and his notion of *differance* and Alan F. Blum’s *Theorizing*, which, inspired by Leo Strauss, argued for the Platonic dialogue as the paradigm of social inquiry, and, preceding and being a seminal influence, Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, with its notion of *Sein* and *Dasein*.

How might these distinctions apply to Plato’s work? In the *Sophist* Plato argued for *difference*, this italicization pointing not to the relations between things but between *Being* and *being*, so to speak. In particular Plato wanted to exorcise the ghost of Parmenides apparent logical straitjacketing of change. In the *Sophist*, Plato argued for the existence of *difference*, where this meant the logical possibility for non-Being, this not entailing, however, the existence of *not-Being*. Not and non-, obviously distinctions in English but applicable to a reading/translation of a Greek text, I submit, refer to the validity and reality of language. Language (*Dasein*) is non-Being (*Sein*). The categories of rest, motion, sameness, difference and being offered by Plato in that dialogue are moments of that distinction.

² <http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm>.

Non-Being is relatively real and not real. It is Being that has become other to itself by the action of the mind, the cognitive name for language body. Being is its most neutral form (neutral in relation to a host of versions which would insist upon it having definite characteristics) is nothing. The 'no-', however, leaves open the possibility for not and non. *Differance* (difference for Derrida) refers to the movement that Being makes *in mind such that its reality becomes intelligible or intellectuated*. With this intellectuation, which has a history of its own, Being becomes an social object and thus no longer, strictly speaking, itself. Before descending into the distinctions proffered by Hegel – the in-itself, for itself, and for Other, it is useful retracing this history for purposes of the present exposition. A significant moment was the transformation of thought from *phronesis*, from *breast, rib to noiesis*. The world is Homeric, the second, Platonic. In the course of which the former became reduced to practical reason. The mind (*nous*) identified with Platonic form, which Kant, under the influence of Christian metaphysics would call 'noumenal reality,' stood for a reality untouched by sensuality. Despite Plato's criticism of writing, his own forms could be conceived of as a theorization of writing, particularly its power of abstraction, its power to dislocate the appearance of reality, fixed by relations between actual things. While it was true that individual memory suffered, collective memory gained, the increase, to use a contemporary term, being quantum. Writing became the storehouse of accumulated cultural values that were less subject to individual recollection, or at least in the personal reciting manner of the Homeric Bard. Thought took a quantum leap with the new capacity for collective memory (and lest we forget) forgetfulness. The 'closed mind' of which Bloom spoke is a supreme example of the latter.

Staying with the root of phenomenon, namely showing, world reality became increasingly mediated by a host of exchange relations, under the auspices of 'writing' or, more precisely, 'the script.' That script is synonymous with exchange, at varying interpretive levels, is no accident. World reality became defined by the exchange relations fostering and reproduced by the script which, apparently, could serve as a repository for all things conceivable such that nothing became lost to *memory*. Memory, moreover, is complicit in thought and, moreover, perception. To think that something is real is to perceive it as having substance, an action that involves a host of interpretive mechanisms. To cite from one recent discussion in the literature:

Rather, it is by summarizing, constructing, interpreting, and condensing life experiences, often smoothing over the boundaries between different moments in our lives, that autobiographical memory produces any

coherent narrative sense of a personal past (compare Glover 1988, chapter 14; Engel 1999, chapter 4).³

Here the substance is the ‘self,’ and the ‘identity’ that becomes constructed and reconstructed through time. The ‘self’ is not a full-blown entity existing throughout time but a work in progress, the recollection through which that entity becomes *intelligible* as a self, meaning, the subject of a narrative. The broader term I shall use to summarize the workings of these mechanisms, which also remind me of Freud’s dream interpretive mechanisms and his mystic writing pad, suggesting that the ‘self’ is a dream image, a memory-trace. Indeed, Freud argued the repression of memory resulting in hysteria, which resulted in a definite type of ‘self’ or ‘personality’ being in the world. Memory-trace refers to the work of an entity inserting either itself or some other entity within a language system. To perceive something, for example, one’s own self, is to remember its place within a language system, an idea alluded to by Plato’s notion of *amnamsis*. Perception, in short, is not sensation, Plato’s point in the *Theaetetus*.

That perception is, in essence, memory work, and thought, the actualization of this memory, organized by a vast system of belief structures, has consequences, namely, that there are good grounds for orienting to reality as a phenomenon. Perception is never performed (as an action) in a vacuum but reproduces a system of beliefs. In classical language, reality is a blend of perception with belief, organized by the memory reposing within a language body, a heightened awareness of which marked the movement from Homeric *phronesis* to Platonic *noiesis*.

In that unuttered and hence inarticulate sense, reality was an incipient phenomenon, but which did not become an object of understanding except when the material conditions of production were sufficiently abstract as to permit the isolation of thought, this last determined by collective memory, which became further systemized as ‘written language.’ Here, I draw from one thinker, whose texts are not directly examined in this text, but who is present nevertheless throughout it, as a sort of benign presence. His texts have implications for the constructing of the phenomenon as a theoretical object.

Jacques Derrida argued in ways that at first scandalized (and possibly still do) fundamentalist philosophers or onto-theologians, for the primacy of writing, this reversing the normal manner of perceiving reality, which subordinated writing to oral culture. Notions such as the trace,⁷ the text, the supplement, and *la difference*, all promoted the idea of an *inscriptive*

³ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/>

and *descriptive* character to all fields of human activity reliance upon a difference that was not a difference, namely, *differance*, and which differed, delayed, (and even defaced in terms of logo-centric structures) the certainty of presence which systems that privileged oral over written form (and more generally one term of a conjugate pair over another) had previously possessed. The invention of writing, as Derrida re-wrote this phrase, is not writing as such but, echoing the Cabbalist story of the Infinite becoming reduced to the actual moment, which that tradition called *zimzum* reduction, but the reduction of writing to a particular script. It is this scriptural, if not scriptural interpretation of writing which lies at the basis of logo-centrism.

Reality-as-phenomenon is rooted in mediation, what Marx would later call a value-form, which joins memory-thought-perception. The classical name for this is *logos*. Reality is a phenomenon of the *logos* or, more plainly expressed. *Legein*, the verb whose noun is *logos*, means firstly to pick out and secondly, to speak. The perception of reality is mediated by the phenomenon of logic, and it is this mediation which gives reality its character of being-real or realness. Reality's realness is always a mediated proposition. And this not result necessarily in the reduction of reality to its mediation, even as it intelligibility is unthinkable, if not impossible outside of that mediation. The no-thingness of Being, in other words, is the *resonating* space between reality and its mediated realness. The reader will please note the italicized word *resonating*, this implying motion; a string has been plucked and set into motion, this being the basis of a musical play.

It is hearing the music from the ground up which is the overarching theme of this work, the horizon-line of its Day, and over which the blazing Logos rises and falls. Here, I return to the theme of writing. In the transition from oral to writing culture, one sense of 'music,' was displaced, music now being confined programmatically to 'what actual instruments produce.' That was the force of a definite inscription which defined writing according to the new phonetic alphabet. Those who previously 'spoke,' when speaking was synonymous with 'singing,' were the Bards, and it was the Bardic voice which became silenced by the new phonetic script. The music was not heard, in that former *acoustic* sense, although the Greeks did speak of 'the musical spheres.' But with the adaptation of the phonetic alphabet the eye became privileged over the ear, for the sake of greater collective memory, and the emphasis was placed on the 'script,' for this is what writing became.

The sort of writing which one hears, rather than reads (in this scripted way) is the music from the ground up. One can but *note* it, and in this

notion choreograph how one's own body moves to that *phenomenon*. This space resonates; it is in constant motion, this space which is the elusive Kantian 'noumenal' essence, which is no essence whatsoever in any way that is a thing, and it is the 'observation' of that space or the 'hearing' of that resonances, which is the basis of phenomenal reality and thus, possibly, the new basis for a phenomenology, that derives, however, from an ancient, if not *buried* conception passed over and ignored by the reductive writing of the phonetic script. Obviously, the meaning of 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal' would need to be re-inscribed within this re-conception of the Real.

The text as a whole elucidates these proposition, and I find myself in Hegel's position where his preface was in fact an afterthought. What to do? Let me do this by sharing with the reader this one example. As part of re-thinking the enterprise of thought, I have found it necessary to integrate the latest discoveries of science within my *corpus* of work, notably, fractal logic. Briefly stated, the details being in the text, fractal logic presents us with the generation of a fractal form based upon a reiteration of an algorithm ($x_n = (x_{n-1})^2 + c$). The generation of the form is a vibrating space, the generation being the plucking of the algorithmic string. The point here, whose plucking is the generation of this 'setting the note,' is that unity is being conceptualized as a fundamental frequency – the nothingness of Being, the algorithm – which is being plucked. Or, to show more pluck, its being is plucking, there *not* being any entity doing this. This raises interesting questions about the nature of phenomena and/or the phenomena of nature.

Traditional phenomenology, for which Hegel is the starting point, and which includes Husserl, and Pierce, no matter how much they differed between themselves, did not orient to the vibrating space of no-thingness. The space's vibrating and resonating characteristics were, in effect, *dampened* by the identity of writing with the phonetic script, the challenging (if not deconstruction) of that identity being Derrida's contribution to this debate. However, as notions of 'music of the spheres' and much more recently, string theory' have suggested, dampening was not elimination, but repression. In fact, the *Logos* was not simply the spoken word, but the *sung* word, and its meaning can only be comprehended by having an ear for its resonances. In a very ironic sense, Heraclites, he who advised us to 'not listen to him, but to the Logos,' re-incarnated the Homeric Bard. Or, he became the pre-Socratic Bard. But then there was (and is) Parmenides, whose strictures against 'the negation of Being' has had a profound, if not traumatic effect, if not resisted, upon all subsequent thinking.

I have spoken already of Plato's recuperative efforts. As much as he provided the means for a cure, however, he also aided the disease's progression. I refer to his lauding of sight in the *Republic* and elsewhere, as the noblest of senses. Intelligibility became synonymous with 'having insight.' That this occurred at the moment when seat of intelligence moved from breast (*phronesis*) to mind (*nous*) was no accident. The dampening, and subsequent muting of the resonances of vibrating space which was (and is) the context of the *sung* word, was co-terminus with the *creation* of noietic intelligence. *Logos* lost its musical character, preserved, nevertheless, by Heraclitus 'listening.' Or the word became the mute witness of its once vibrant hearing. It is noietic intelligence which is implied by the phenomenological project, and a mind complicit with the reduction of writing to script.

I but note the shibboleth whose utterance gains one entrance into the reductionist camp: *verba volant sed scripta manet*. This is a piece that belongs to the Christian middle ages, the age of scholastic philosophy dominated by Aristotelian logic, whose originating ground was repressed. The supposed authenticity of 'writing' and its superiority over the (unwritten) word lay in its ability to control exchange. The phonetic script became the organizing locus of a multitude of exchanges that defined, moreover, the range of 'knowing.' As the above phrase suggests, truth 'remains'; it does not fly away, a sentiment voiced, to be sure by Socrates in the *Meno*, where Socrates compared ill-grounded arguments to words that fly away and sound arguments to words that do not.

To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. What am I think of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge is different from correct opinion in being tied down (97e)⁴.

The word here is memory, the core of Socrates' doctrine of recollection (*anamnesis*). My own argument, and the implications for re-generating the phenomenological project, after suitably destroying its present form, is of that type. I am suggesting that Western metaphysics has become deaf to

⁴ <http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/meno.htm>

the resonances of the Word, a deafness caused by the reduction of writing to the phonetic script and the hierarchical privileging of differences that Derrida has much analyzed in his work, and which I shall not, therefore, do so here. The point here, however, which does concern me is this: the notion of ‘grounding.’ This is problematic, as this *could* refer to the ‘fixing’ of position that ‘*scripta manet*’ recommends.

To remove this confusion, let us ask this question: what does it mean to remain? The Latin *manere* signifies to remain, stay behind, to be what is left. That thought is in motion is undeniably, but that thought is not necessarily thinking is the difference that emerges when trying to ‘pin’ thought down. According to the Socratic hierarchy in the above: knowledge is higher (and different) from correct opinion because the first is tied down and the second not. What is the status of this ‘truth’ in relation to ‘one cannot cross the same river twice,’ which implies that everything is in flux? Is this hierarchy a part of what Adorno remarked in *Negative Dialectics* as the Western tendency to privilege unity over multiplicity? Didn’t Hegel say that universality (surely, not diversity) is the element of philosophy in the *Phenomenology*? One can see (if not hear) even more clearly why Derrida’s *differance* – the differentiating of difference – would be scandalous.

This ‘tying down,’ of which Socrates speaks, is linked to memory-work, which is the task of recollection. If truth is one, which is a proposition that I entertain for the moment, being in a welcoming mood, then recollection is the task of *overcoming* differences such that none remain. That move, however belongs to logo-centrism, to the form of phenomenological inquiry which identifies writing with the phonetic script and which must repress differences in order to state, if not re-find, the unity which would otherwise be lost. As Derrida remarked in *Writing and Difference*, Being is not the One or is the One necessarily itself, as Plato brilliantly exposed in the *Parmenides*. Socrates assumes in his telling of the *Logos*, some fixed properties to memory, which would guarantee the truth of the universal: ‘process of teaching rests on the permanent, innate powers of the human mind.’⁵ How can this be? How can we reconcile (if needed) Plato’s differences?

If one assumes that the one who wrote the *Meno* is the one who wrote the *Parmenides*, then we have, as Plato described in the *Theaetetus*, a conversation within the same soul. This is a theme, moreover, which has broader phenomenological implications. The mind’s permanent and innate

⁵ Ian Johnston of Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, BC, for Liberal Studies 111 students in November 2000.

power is, Socrates strongly implies, in the *Meno*, is recollection. However, memory is selective, the word selective, I note, deriving from the Greek *legein* to pick out. Memory, according to contemporary research, consists of neural pathways that change, moreover, in time. That phenomenon can be observed at the level of collective memory, where charges of 'revisionism' are often hurled at those who would re-write history. But that history is continually being re-written can be demonstrated by the continual battle over historical interpretation, which is also (and not extraneous to) the very process of historical reasoning (while avoiding historicism).

While I am prepared to grant Socrates' (implied) point that memory is the permanent and innate power of the mind, a point that one could further substantiate by pointing to the common root of memory and mind: Memory, the word, derives from the Latin *memoria*, from *memor* mindful; akin to Old English *gemimor* well-known, Greek *mermEra* care, Sanskrit *smarati* he remembers. To remember is to be reminded of something, memory being the second mind. Moreover, I recall mind to be a language body, which is different from the brain. Mind or culture or language body name the collected relations between brains-in-bodies modifying the expression of the electrical-somatic energy reverberating in each body. Memory and/or mind are neuronal and/or cultural pathways that shift over time, the shift not being capricious because of the existing network form. Issues of network, information, and communication are discussed in detail in the text, the stating of this proposition illuminating a major structural thematic.

Given my previous discussion of the above points, (see Ross, 2006, 2007), I shall limit myself to broad points of exposition. Pathways configure a system, specifically, the articulation defining its range of movement (one can think of the how the shoulder joints allowing for the articulating of the arm or language, allowing for the articulation of thought). A system, moreover, exists in relation to an environment, a relation organized by the entropic/negentropic differential detailing the degree of order and disorder present. Entropy is the measure of disorder and negentropy (information), that of order. The stronger the memory, the more able it is to integrate both greater quantities and kinds of data, enabling it to evolve new adaptive strategies to take advantage or exploit changing conditions. This will enable the entity to sustain its motion in an environment, a path marked, say, by a learning curve. In short, by maintaining itself within that environment, the entity is able to effectively sustain its reality; in human terms, we could talk about having a requisite set of skills enabling one to find employment.

In applying this to Plato, we note his boundary-definition of being, “whenever there is present the power to act or be acted upon, even in the slightest?” (*Sophist*)⁶ The boundary of being is the articulating defining the difference between that entity and its environment, and since both entities and environments will vary, both temporally and spatially, the difference cannot be fixed. The line implied is thus always in play, which is *other* than the entity and its character. This last statement takes us further into the text, I limiting myself to the general statement of this point.

The basic idea is this: each kind of being possesses a character or characteristics that effectively distinguish it from other beings, both of its kind and not of its kind. Obviously, in relation to its kind, the distinguishing differences will be more subtle. In any case, we now have a more grounded notion of *difference* which bears no analytical relationship between two things. Or, two things only *become* different in relation to a dynamic and hence changing mechanism, based upon communications theory. The two things are an entity and its environment, but an environment could include other entities. *Difference* then emerges out of conversation, specifically, the sending and receiving of signals that denote the being in communication, communication being effective community. Both communication and community have the root *communicare* to share. Actual differences, if we take them to be the multiplicity implied the unit, and up to a point the 20th, called nature. So, *difference* emerges out of conversation, meaning the relation between speakers. Difference, then, is not *something* which any speaker possesses outside of the conversation. Potentially, one can say that beings are different, but the difference gains intelligence – real purchase power – only through participation in conversation (social life).

The (fractal) whole becomes other than itself because it becomes other to itself, and can only do so in relation to the self that becomes projected onto the scale of measure that divides that whole from itself. The whole departs from itself in becoming a part. That is measurement, the movement which compliments Plato’s *anamnesis*. There the whole becomes re-associated with itself, its wholeness theoretically restored. The whole forgotten in the midst of its departure from itself, the departure called scale of measurement, and the whole re-becomes itself from out of the recollection provoked by the same scale. Or, more precisely, forgetfulness and recollection are separated by a relationship towards the scale of measurement in question, otherwise called the mind. Will the mind *take* mind of its own activities? Will it hear the resonating and

⁶ http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/trans_pl_sophist2.html

quivering movement of itself shaking with its end? This pertains, neutrally expressed, to musical appreciation. To musically appreciate means to be able to hear and hearing requires unblocking the ears. The blockage here, which became pronounced in the case of Parmenides, was the denial of the musicality of the *Logos*, of its character as a sung word. This prepared the word for the logo-centrism of later metaphysics (Platonism, Christianity, historicism). Plato's later dialogues were the best the classical age could do against its own creeping degeneration, the systemic means of this spreading disease being the phonetic script.

This regeneration and degeneration makes its first systemic appearance in the overtly dialectical form called Hegel. Hegelian phenomenology hears the music from the heavens down (Absolute Knowledge), it displaying a tone deafness that verges on the absurd. I cite the most blatant example to my ears: 'To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science-that goal where it can **lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge**-that is what I have set before me.'⁷ In the name of love, one hears the music of the spheres, a phenomenon resonating in the intimacy of 'making love' and 'making music.' Love making is music making as this denotes the concerted playing, this scaling of the Real through facing the no-thingness of Being in the form of one's own death.

These existential propositions allow me to emphasize the phenomenological point: the hearing of the music from the ground up is the truer form of the transcendence implied by dialectical thought and realised phenomenally through the exploration of the difference between being and language. This becomes centred in the phenomenon of the being-there (*Dasein*) who is able to experience the hair breath distinction between forgetfulness and recollection - my death is closer to me than my eyelid to my eye - as the governing rhythm of its proper existence. By contrast, these isolated moments are named, according to tradition, as 'animal' and 'god.' The animal can only forget (and never remember) what being is because it has no sense of self which would objectify that and the god can only remember (and never forget) what being is because its self is Being. However, neither moment is dialectically valid because each requires the exclusion of its opposite, dialectics, by contrast being the simultaneous holding of opposites, which thus is a moment experienced neither by animal nor god but by man alone.

Dialectical thought preserves the space for the simultaneous existence of opposites, and phenomenological inquiry would clarify the relationship between opposites, the traditional metaphysical terms being 'noumenal'

⁷ [www. Marxists.org./reference/archive/phindix/.htm](http://www.Marxists.org/reference/archive/phindix/.htm)

and ‘phenomenal.’ Indeed, a line can now be drawn that will summarize this discussion, ending the introduction and bringing the reader to the main text, from Plato to Hegel. In Plato thought became explored as a systemic phenomenon through the intersection of being and thought in the person of Socrates. In him the Word became Flesh. However, it was a rear-guard action, in effect, against the assault upon non-Being unleashed by Parmenides ‘Way of Truth,’ which stripped non-being of the implied phenomenological status it held under the former truth regime of Bardic orality. The Word no longer was sung, having become an object of science *at a distance* from the body that would *examine – eye – it*. That this was a response to and reflection of the revolution initiated by the phonetic alphabet could only be half-perceived by Plato was shown by his ambivalent reception of it.

Philosophy was split into Socrates, the one who did not write, and Plato, the Socratic alter-ego, who remembered the master, but could *not openly* hear the music from the ground up, where this indirect hearing became the Platonic Form. Hegel, the product of the rationalized Platonism of the Middle Ages, it is true, eliminated the privileged position of sight in favour, however, of a script, not directly linked with the phonetic, that required the existence of, as Derrida would say, a transcendental signifier upholding the coherence of the system against the chaos implied by Being’s no-thingness. Knowledge, in short, became absolute, the Platonic Form now transplanted upon the new grounds of the mind – convergence of reality of truth and phenomenon of consciousness. Hegel’s advance was to show through expanded dialectical form, the grounds of the mind, thereby re-laying those grounds for a new understanding, for which ordinary language philosophy, Heideggerian ‘destruction’ and Derridean ‘deconstruction,’ would become the operative moments.

The *poetics of philosophy* names the program nascent at the very inception of dialectical thought, and it does so through the reinventing of phenomenological form. This remembering energizes the reinvention, and whose performance is a hearing of the music from the ground up, a hearing that is a passage way carved through the ground of fractal logic, the time signature of reality. The carving is a path-breaking, a hearing of no-thing that moves in the stillness of the proverbial two hands, clapping and shaking to the music. What is the sound of two hands clapping?

The answer resonates with the Platonic Form. The One resonates with the Many to the degree that the latter are the integral variation of the former. The first corollary is that Platonic form resonates with this integrity, and this resonance is the logical kernel of Platonic thought that

remains obscure, if not opaque to a purely visual orientation to his text. Secondly, Platonic form, its rational kernel now illuminated, exhibits the properties of fractal self-similarity. Thus, I will show how resonance, integrity of form, and fractal self-similarity are intimately related – forming a conceptual family – in both classical and contemporary scientific and philosophical thought, bringing out thinking’s musicality. To explore this claim, I shall, in conjunction with insights of contemporary science, read Plato’s works, beginning with the *Parmenides*.

UNPACKING HYPOTHESIS: NUMBERS AND RESONANCE

To unpack this hypothesis, I consider the nature of number. There are actually five kinds of number: natural, rational, integral, real, or imaginary. In using one set of numbers, we are able to ‘scale’ ‘what is there,’ as this responds or corresponds to the character of the number. In Chart Form:

Type	Example	Function
Natural	1	counting things in a set
Rational	1/3	relationship between sets
Integral	-1	relative sizes of sets
Real	1 kilo	measurement of continuous properties
Imaginary	$-1^{1/2}$	measurements of field properties

Explanation

Each numeric class, of which integral numbers are but one class, possesses integrity, as evinced by the distinctive objects whose counting is subject to it. Each class is different from all other classes, and yet each is the same in being a numeric class. As shown by the unique objects which count for it and which it counts – natural numbers are not terribly useful for counting electrical fields nor imaginary numbers for counting whole entities – each class is numerically real. This further implies that Number, as the grand abstraction from the class of numbers, does not exist except to say this: that which counts. The necessary generality allows us to count these different classes as instances of Number; and equally, Number only makes sense when being ‘there’ as actual numbers. The numeric form of Number thus ‘counts’ ontologically (in terms of its intelligible being) without necessarily counting anything in particular. When the counting of an

actual thing occurs, then Number per se ceases to exist and only some determinate number, belonging to a class of number does.

The numeric truth (the One) is divided among the class of numbers (the Many). If the One *were to be* One then the partiality of the parts would have to cease to be. However, who or what would do that, if not another part? So, the One necessarily (at present) remains apart from itself, Number from the class of numbers. Numeric classes, moreover, are not arbitrary; they appear to capture and delineate features of reality such one class of things (whole entities) can best be counted by one class (natural numbers) than another (imaginary). However, as the numeric classes are scales of Number, and necessarily depend upon their intelligibility their existing in some world reality, they cannot be the Real. I shall give the name structure to describe this state of affairs.

Reality is structured if the fitting of definite objects to numeric classes by which they become counted is any evidence. If anything counts for anything, a numeric class is necessarily involved. However, accountability goes beyond actual numbers, but denotes 'responsibility.' We have observed how some classes of objects responded better to some classes of numbers than others. If objects are bodies, numbers, scale of measurement, then some objects respond better to – resonate more with – certain types of music. This responsiveness is akin to the vibrancy of the relationship between class of object and class of number. Whole entities vibrate well with natural but poorly with complex numbers and vice-versa in the case of electro-magnetic fields and natural numbers. The vibrant structure of reality becomes more clearly heard with the resonances exposed by the responsiveness of certain class of objects (whole entities, electro-magnetic fields) with numeric classes (natural, imaginary). Accordingly, structure becomes defined here as the vibration that becomes heard, that is, fitted to some form of reality or is accountable. For example, the structure of whole entities becomes heard in relation to natural numbers, the structure of electro-magnetic magnetic in relation to imaginary numbers. Since we have already established that each numeric class necessarily possesses integrity, without actually being the integral One, which is divisible only by itself, and so cannot be different from itself, whereas other integrals are divisible both one and non-one (which is its proper self), each structure thus responds to what possesses integrity, which implies it having its own integrity. Structure, in short, possesses integrity, without itself being an integral. This re-affirms our earlier conclusions: reality departs from itself integrally, each departure being, as we now more clearly see, a structure. So the scaling of the Real is hearing the unfolding structural integrity which, at each point, notes the presence of 'what is accountable.'


Other investigators have argued for ‘nested levels of integration.’ In the above, this is exemplified by the different dynamics of accountability found within the nested levels of number. As J.T. Fraser argues when discussing temporal levels, ‘each stable integrative level of the universe manifests a distinct temporality and that these temporalities coexist in a hierarchically nested, dynamic unity.’¹

A distinct temporality or *horizon line*, we can add, bounds each stable integrative level of the universe. Horizon, the word, derives from the Greek *horizon kyklos* "bounding circle," from *horizein* "bound, limit, divide, separate," from *horos* "boundary." The horizon line present at each level of integrated being divides that level from other levels, thereby creating a space for the ‘accountability’ of each level. The One departs from itself in integral spaces or *intervals*, these intervals spacing out these structures possessing a dynamic unity unique to themselves, these structures being *notes*. Intervals and notes, moreover, are moments of a musical vocabulary. To this vocabulary we add another word, resonance.

Resonance refers to wave patterns. There are two types of waves: traveling and standing still. A traveling wave is producing what a wave propagating through a given medium (whether air or water, for example). It vibrates continuously from high to low, the highs and lows being crest and valleys, show below by the sine wave pattern. Moreover, when a wave from point A travels to a given point B, the wave will upon reaching point B begin returning to point A, the reverse motion called the reflected wave. Furthermore, if another wave, called an incident wave, is started at the other end, from which the first wave originated, then an interference patterns resulting the meeting of the reflected and incident waves in the standing wave pattern occurs. These standing points called nodes are formed from the destruction of the two waves meeting each other where the crest of one is equal to the trough of the other resulting in zero amplitude. There are other points along the medium whose displacement changes over time, but in a regular manner, called anti-nodes. The nodes and anti-nodes form a standing wave system.² These points vibrate back and forth from a positive displacement to a negative displacement; the vibrations occur at regular time intervals such that the motion of the medium is regular and repeating - a pattern is readily observable.

¹ Fraser, 1982, p. 1


² <http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/waves/standw.html>




Resonance refers to the phenomenon of a system's gaining of energy due to its period being an even multiple or integral of the distance between its container's walls. Clearly, the phenomenon of resonance has implications for a notion of limits. The above illustration suggests that a sound wave is a string in motion. Accordingly, I call a resonating limit a *string* with a *characteristic mode of excitation*. In musical theory, the pitch is the subjective hearing of an objective characteristic frequency. For example, the frequency of the middle C note is approximately 261.626 Hz.

In hearing the above, I note that the horizon line is the audio container for which the many found within it are the variations upon a shared frequency, the containment having two dimensions, vertical expressing changing the amplitude, this resulting in a richer overlay of tones and horizon compression changing the frequency, this resulting in sharper pitch.

H=length of horizon line



Vertical expression of amplitude
(VEA)



Horizontal compression of frequency
(HCF)

The audio horizon line evenly contains the wave length, in the above instance the ratio of wave length period to horizon line is 1, the basic integral, the variations upon thematic unity being infinite or k , and which can be produced by vertical expression of amplitude, resulting in over and undertones detailing resonance for that periodic value or horizontal compression of frequency that raises pitch. In turn that occurrence creates the basis for a different set of over and undertones for that periodic value or wave length also integrally related to the horizon line, which in both instances remains constant. The phenomenon of resonance requires that the sound wave be integrally bound to its horizon line, otherwise, the phenomenon would cease to exist, the wave length not so bound becoming out of phase with its container and soon ceasing to exist. This is the bondage appertaining to sound and, in more detailed ways, to music, as we shall elaborate.

From the above exposition we may adduce an additional property, that of self-similarity. For each wave, whether in the case of VEA or HCF maintains the basic integrity of the sound wave but in varying form, the variation determined by the dimension. Self-similarity is, moreover, a property of fractals, and this intuitively suggests that the intervals separating one realm of space containing integrally related entities within it (sound wave period vis-à-vis container walls) are intervals of fractal expansion reiterating a basic rhythmic pattern, again a point that we shall elaborate in the course of inquiry.

On the *Parmenides*

We shall now test our hypothesis by turning to Plato's text. Dividing the *Parmenides* into three sections, each of them we shall show reiterates the

theme of the One and the many in ever more elaborate ways turning upon the examination of different dimensions of the question. This division takes the form of a table of contents, Plato's original text not possessing this feature (see Appendix A).

Table of Contents for Plato's Parmenides ³	
Section	Verses
Characters' Introduction	126a-d
Forms introduction	126e-128e
All is one	
All is not many	
Form and formed thing	129-131
From, itself by itself	

So, necessarily, our reading begins with a reading, a phenomenon not surprising if one considers that the part is found in the whole. To substantiate this point, we first describe fractals and return to the above text.

Graphically,




Fig. 1 The Mandelbrot set is plotted through the equation:

$$x_0 = 0$$

$$x_1 = z + c$$

$$x_2 = (z+c)^2 + c$$

$$x_n = (x_{n-1})^2 + c$$

where

$c = bi$, a complex

number.

*complex number is a set formed from a real and imaginary number.

If you look at the Mandelbrot Set's border through successively more powerful magnifications, each image would be similar to the previous, but not identical. This is called *self-similarity*. Self-similarity can be found in nature, from a single leaf to a mountain range. Indeed, unlike the 'straight

³ See appendix A for complete form.

line', it is 'the geometry of nature.' The Mandelbrot set M is defined by a family of complex quadratic polynomials.

$$P_c : \mathbb{C} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$$

given by

$$P_c : z \mapsto z^2 + c,$$

where c is a complex parameter. For each c , one considers the behavior of the *sequence*

$$(0, P_c(0), P_c(P_c(0)), P_c(P_c(P_c(0))), \dots)$$

obtained by *iterating* $P_c(z)$ starting at *critical point* $z = 0$, which either escapes to infinity or stays within a disk of some finite radius. The Mandelbrot set is defined as the set of all points c such that the above sequence does not escape to infinity.⁴

Consider now the One and the many. The fractal is the One whose multiplicity is reiteratively contained as shown above. A reiteration is a *repetition with a difference*. One can observe within the Parmenidean whole the Heraclitean truth where one cannot cross/iterate the same river/value twice. For no value (form) is repeated, only the general formula (the Form) that expresses itself through the particular. Also, we recall Heraclitus' saying, to paraphrase, 'listen not to me but to the logos,' where the logos *here* is the logarithm that is found in all (fractal) things. How can this be read in Plato' text?

To detail the division between the One and the many:

Chart 1: Explication of 125-128 b⁵

[1.i]	the One is \rightarrow the Many are not.	
[1.ii]	the Many are not \rightarrow the One is not many	

Note the binary character of the argument. The being of 'one' excludes the being of 'many'; the two are mutually exclusive. Plato then gives this general premise content by referring to a sail, arguing that while actual things may be one and many, the qualities ascribed to the things, such as size, cannot be. There are the forms proper. I summarize the passages from 131- 133 where Plato investigates the possibility of them and their relation

⁴ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractal>

⁵ <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html>

to “other things come to partake and so to be called after their names’ (130 e).⁶

The two different ways of reading the text, that young Socrates points out to Zeno who had defended his master’s Parmenides saying, signify how the same thing can be differently expressed, the difference turning on the oscillation between the negative and positive poles. This is relatively simple reiteration when compared to fractal reiteration where a logarithmic formula is involved entwined with different types of numbers (real and imaginary to complex). Nevertheless, the example is instructive because it displays self-similarity: ‘the One is’ and ‘the One is not many’ are similar to each other. So, Plato’s grammatical formula is a verbal logarithm, not as complex (at this stage) as Mandelbrot’s numeric logarithm; each is similar to the other and so, together, in their difference to each other, display self-similarity.

The One, to generalize, is the whole of everything that expands in intervals, spaced out entities displaying integrity of being. For example, if one considers animal reproduction, each produced unit is a whole being instantiating that species. Half a species member is not born or any other fraction; either a whole individual is born or, extraordinary life saving measures aside, not at all. These points have implications for order and disorder captured by Chaos Theory.

Fractal geometry and the insights of the science of Chaos are based on Complex Numbers. Unlike all other numbers, such as the natural numbers one through nine for instance 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9, the Complex Numbers do not exist on a horizontal number line. They exist only on an x-y coordinate time plane where regular numbers on the horizontal grid combine with so called "Imaginary Numbers" on the vertical grid.⁷

Posited now and to be developed later, the imaginary numbers on the vertical grid correspond to the metaphorical plane of language and the regular numbers to the literal.

Imaginary Numbers are simply numbers where a negative times a negative creates a negative, not a positive, like is the rule with all other numbers. In other words, with imaginary numbers $-2 \times -2 = -4$, not $+4$. The Complex Numbers when iterated - subject to constant feedback - produce Fractal Scaling as is shown by the Mandelbrot set: $z \rightarrow z^2 + c$ where $c =$ any complex number. \rightarrow means iteration, the feedback process where the end result of the last calculation becomes the beginning constant of the


⁶ See <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html>

⁷ <http://www.fractalwisdom.com/FractalWisdom/chaosmth.html>


next: $z^2 + c$ becomes the z in the next repetition. Like life it is a dynamic equation, existing in time, not a static equation.⁸

Consider how the above words could apply to Plato's *Parmenides* with a word about Plato's methodology. In order to discern more clearly the nature of reality, Plato will test the words used to describing one's thinking *about* reality. In what follows the claim is that 'one thing is/many things are not.' Summarizing the passages gives us the following result:

Chart 2: Explication of Verses 126-136



the Large as part will be smaller than the whole & the Small as whole will be larger than the part & thus the Equal (as the Large is small and the Small, large) will be



Explanation

Assume the existence of the forms themselves and the things that have a share in them. Consequently: (a) the whole becomes other than itself in the form of the part 2(a.i) this means there now exists two things, namely, the whole and the part 2(a.ii) the whole, in the form of the part, will be smaller than itself and the whole, in the form of its wholeness, will be larger than itself 2(a.iii) if the Form is largeness, then a thing large will be a thing

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html>

small in the case of the part vis-a-vis the whole; if the Form is the equalness, the whole will not be equal to itself and so the Equal will become unequal; and if the Form is smallness, then smallness will be large in the case of the whole vis-a-vis the part. The loss of identity is the loss of integrity and so of being when the Small becomes large or the Large, small or the Equal, unequal. So the metaphor fails.

In the above, Plato follows a given claim in order to test its logic, a claim consisting of several propositions that *together* must stand or fall. In this instance, they fall. This is the logic of contradiction, when a thing is proven not to be self-inconsistent. However, we have alluded to a different form of logic, which is similar to that of contradiction, namely, the phenomenon of resonance. We recall that one form of number resonates most strongly with one sort of thing and most weakly with anything else. So, while it is not a contradiction to use say natural numbers to account for electromagnetic field properties, given that former resonates weakly with the latter, the results would be well nigh unintelligible; nothing much would be accounted for. In short, the combination of the two is dissonant, which is this logic's equivalent of contradiction.

Resonance and self-consistence (or dissonance and lack of self-contradiction) are self-similar: what they share is the negation of the posited entity's nature and where they differ is the dimension of reality. A thing, when, resonant with the logic of its proper being, is self-consistent; and when not resonant or experiencing dissonance in regard to the same, is self-inconsistent. This synthesis of self-similar differences we shall call 'dialectical unity,' reserving a latter space for detailing Plato's pioneering concept of 'dialectic.'

Accordingly, we could conceive of imaginary numbers and electromagnetic field properties (the same logic applying to the other four numbers and the entities with which they most strongly resonate) as moments of the same nature that have been separated by number, and which appear to be two things (number and field), that human convention dissimulating its underlying unity. If that proposition is acceptable then the differences in logic, self-consistency/resonance, to speak positively, becomes dissolved back into a dialectical unity preserving their differences while exposing their similarity. This dialectical unity is, moreover, the logical complex organizing discernment of propositional cogency.

To elaborate, consider complexity in the case of fractal logic:

When iteration of a squaring process is applied to non-complex numbers the results are always known and predictable. For instance when any non-complex number greater than one is repeatedly squared, it quickly approaches infinity: $1.1 * 1.1 = 1.21 * 1.21 = 1.4641 * 1.4641 = 2.14358$

The metaphor is the difference between the whole (A) and the part (a). Metaphorically, the whole departs from itself and therefore actually remains itself: this is the matter of translation. To illustrate, consider the following translation of the Greek word polis, as it appears in the English derivatives of polity, politics, policy, police, and politeness. Polis is the whole while its English derivatives are its parts. Having stated this, I shall now consider the examples of the Large, the Equal and the Small.

The relationship between the whole and the parts, the One and the Many, is real-as-metaphoric rather than real-as-actual. The relationship between the whole and the part points to the varied expression of thematic unity: not to the existence of two things. The polis is the Large, as the unity comprehending the parts. Polis names the Greek polity, and the will of the polity, as played out in its politics, is its policy. Within the polity, member citizens are expected to behave politely toward each other, following the accepted rules of social conduct. Those who violate these rules call upon themselves the police: the power the polity has to enforce these rules.

The many parts are aspects of the whole. In each part the whole finds itself and so is small. Given, however, that the difference between whole and part is metaphorical, and so not actual, the whole actually retains its unity, becoming only metaphorically smaller. What of the Small? The Policeman is the Small, being the single unit of a polity's constabulary or the police. The Policeman metaphorically comprehends all policemen while retaining its actual smallness as the unit of the Police. The Small is metaphorically large and actually itself. What of the Equal? The polis is equal to itself as the actual political form of Greek life and both larger and smaller than itself metaphorically. It is the Large for its English derivatives, since they are the metaphorical parts for which it is the whole, and it is small because it is one of many words translated from Greek into English. The Greek derived euphony, well sounding, is another. Being metaphorically small, polis is metaphorically unequal to itself. Thus the polis as the Equal sounds well in being actually equal to the self while being metaphorically larger and smaller and so unequal. So sounds the chord of the first measure: the diapason of Being.

Table 1

Is	Is-Not
A is [1] [2] A and Is-Not are logically hostile or mutually or mutually. One cannot be if the other is. They are neither the same as nor different from each other.	[A is] v [Is-not]
Non-A [3] logically friendly and [4] A and non-A are different from each other and logically indifferent to each other. [Non-A is]	A and a are only metaphorically different from each other. [a is? A.]

What are chaos and order in fractal-dialectical terms? Earlier, we have deduced that a resonant logic, to paraphrase, because one can never step across the same river twice, is self-consistent and a dissonant logic, self-inconsistent. From the above it is clear that only case [4] fits the bill, that is, complies with the logical requirements. Note, however, the question marking the relationship that A with itself. A both is (literally) and is not (metaphorically) itself. What A exactly is remains an open question, and if A's identity signifies orderly and lawful behaviour such that A always corresponds to itself then the question mark signifies the opposite or, in other words, chaos. A's order is potentially chaotic, its identity unsettled, and hence the security of its being *what* it is question-like rather than a statement.

As noted earlier and to be elaborated here, imaginary numbers on the vertical grid correspond to the metaphorical plane of language and the regular numbers to the literal. The metaphor carries us across the plane of reality, for example, the snow blankets the ground. Literally, snow is not a blanket; it is certainly not warm. We imagine snow to be so metaphorically just as we imagine, in a self-similar way, the square root of negative one, which is an imaginary number, to be real. 'a is? A' is the imaginative horizon line, to summarize, of the metaphorical world plane of language. It can best be apprehended dialectically in keeping in mind the complex, that we shall later call 'consciousness,' formed by the

interpenetration of the imaginary and literal planes of socio-linguistic reality. Moreover,

In the Mandelbrot formula $z \rightarrow z^2 + c$, where you always start the iterative process with z equals zero, and c equalling any complex number, an endless series of seemingly random or chaotic numbers are produced. Like the weather, the stock market and other chaotic systems, negligible changes in quantities, coupled with feedback, can produce unexpected chaotic effects. The behaviour of the complex numbers thus mirrors the behaviour of the fourth dimension, the real world where Chaos is obvious or lurks behind the most ordered of systems.

With some values of c the iterative process immediately begins to exponentially increase or fall into infinity. These numbers are completely outside of the Mandelbrot set of "meso-cosmic" dynamics. With other values of c the iterative process is stable for a number of repetitions, and only later in the dynamic process are they attracted to infinity. These are the unstable strange attractor numbers just on the outside edge of the Mandelbrot set. They are shown on computer graphics with colors or shades of grey according to the number of stable iterations. The values of c which remain stable, repeating as a finite number forever, never attracted to infinity, and thus within the mesocosmic set, the Mandelbrot set, are plotted as black.¹¹

[a is? A.] is the verbal horizon line of the meso-cosmic set, the other realms (see above chart) detailed: 'A is,' '[A is] v [Is-not],' and '[Non-A is],' are non-dialectical moments indicating the inability to maintain the required tension. Thus,

Some reiterations of complex numbers like $1 - 1i$ run off into infinity from the start, just like all of the real numbers.¹²

This is the orientation that would deny completely the metaphorical character of human reality.

Other complex numbers are always stable like $-1 + 0i$. Other complex numbers stay stable for many iterations, and then only further into the process do they unpredictably begin to start to increase or decrease exponentially (for example, $.37 + 4i$ stays stable for 12 iterations).¹³

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

The failure to maintain the proper tension will result in at some point ignoring the dual character of thought that would, due to excessive strain, will either take up one moment to the exclusion of the other.

These are the numbers on the edge of inclusion of the stable numbers shown in black. Chaos enters into the iteration because out of the potentially infinite number of complex numbers in the window of -2.4 to .8 along the horizontal real number axis, and -1.2 to 1.2 along the vertical imaginary number axis, there are infinite subsets on the edge which are subject to the unpredictable strange attractor. All that we know about these edge numbers is that if the z produced by any iteration lies outside of a circle with a radius of 2 on the complex plane, then the subsequent z values will go to infinity, and there is no need to continue the process.¹⁴

Dialectical thought requires that the inquirer stay on the *leading* edge, holding to both the imaginary and literal planes of socio-linguistic reality. Staying there on the edge is the resistance to being overcome by either imagination or by literalness. In returning to Plato's text, we shall elaborate the structure of this resistance.

The Third Man Dilemma

To explicate further, consider Plato's next objection, summarized below, that follows immediately upon the heels of the above. As Taylor notes:

Assume that one associates A with things said to be a . Thus if the resemblance between A_1, A_2, A_3 , requires to be accounted for by saying that each of them is an "instance" of A , by parity of reasoning we must say that since A itself has a predicate in common with A_1, A_2, A_3 , there is a second Form—call it $A^{(1)}$ of which A, A_1, A_2, A_3 all "partake", and the same considerations will avail to establish in the place of every Form A postulated by the theory of Socrates, a simply infinite series of Forms $A, A^{(1)}, A^{(2)}, \dots, A^{(n)}, \dots, A^{(m)}$. And this, it is assumed, is an absurdity.¹⁵

Consider the logical form implied by the above. Firstly, it is assumed, from line 131 in the text of the *Parmenides*, that the 'Form A ' (the whole) and 'form a ' (the part) are actual things, and so exist apart from each other. The possibility of infinite regression occurs precisely because A and a are not metaphorically joined and thus are in like manner separated. Indeed, the third that does join them is the metaphor/translation that allows the

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Taylor (1934), p. 47.

carrying over of A into a. This is not obvious in Plato's text, if only because the Greek had not yet undergone the extensive translation that permits us now to read Plato.

We (the writer and those who would read this writing) have introduced the text to others after reading it. So the introduction comes after the reading (for the introducer) and before the reading (for those introduced to the text). The introduction is thus both before and after the text. This resolves the third man dilemma in this way: The Form comes after the text because it in-forms the text's reading, this last being the formed thing symbolized by the introduction. The Form assumes cognitive status, becoming an object of mind and thus separated from the formed thing, this separation being an abstraction from the thing itself. The introduction is an abstraction from the reading (for the introducer) and thus in this opening space the dilemma necessarily arises: how to bridge the space. The dilemma becomes resolved or resolves itself when folded back into its logical possibility, namely, the creation of the space between the Form and formed thing. When folded back into its space we hear again how the Form informs the text's reading, which means no space actually exists between the Form and formed thing, except as a mental abstraction.

Ironically, it is the possibility of dialectics that Plato is playing upon or equally working out. The Forms focus the play of the mind in addressing its own. The dialectic proper is the successive unfolding of different stages or, conversely expressed, the differentiated unfolding of the One; the degenerate dialectic is the infinite regression of the same or, conversely expressed, the undifferentiated unfolding of the One. In the first there is real difference expressed, in the second there is none. In the first, there is a creative reproducing of the whole that forces out – explicating what is implicitly present – the character of the whole; in the second, one merely reproduces or reiterates the question, shedding no light whatsoever on the answer. The metaphorical difference between the One and the many ones is implicitly present throughout the *Parmenides*, for example; it is dispersed there and so requires the gathering force of a reading for its explication. This is that reading's first moment.

Consider now the next moment: where Plato elaborates the consequences of positing the Forms as things in and of themselves and so apart from the actual world of perceptible things:

Chart 3: Explication of Verses 128-135:¹⁶

Subject X	is	Object Y
[4.i]	The One is	an Actual Thing
[4.ii]	The One is	an actual thing and the Form of the thing
[4.iii]	The One is	the Actual World and the World of Forms
[4.iv]	The One is	Many
[4.v]	the One is Many →	the One is not One
[4.vi]	the One is not →	the World is not intelligible
[4.vii]	((The One is One) & (the One is Many)) Contradiction of [1]	

This leads to the above state contradiction that becomes resolved below:

Chart 4: Explication of Verses 135-139b:¹⁷

[5.i]	((The One is One) v (the One is Many)) Resolution of [1]vii	
[5.ii]	-(the One is Many) {1}	
[5.iii]	The One is One	A Whole is → there are Parts
[5.iv]	The One is One→	-(W & P)(W & P) → (Beginning & End)
[5.v]	-(B & E)	(Beginning & End) → (Limits)
[5.vi]	-(L)	(Limits) → (Shape)
[5.vii]	-(R v S)	(Shape) → (Round or Straight)
[5.viii]	-(In A v In I)	Round → (In Another v In Itself)
[5.ix]	-(Somewhere)	In Another v In Itself→Somewhere
[5.x]	-(M & R)	(Somewhere) → (Motion v Rest)

Noteworthy is his implied conception of the One that his logic relies upon: the contents of the right side. That is the substantive constant of the dialogue as a whole. Note, as well, how the principle of mutual exclusiveness will doom this resolution [2] as one observes the grinding on of this deductive machinery.

¹⁶ See <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html>

¹⁷ Ibid.

Chart 5: Explication of Verses 139b-140b.¹⁸

[6.i] The One is → Not O. T. I	One is other than itself → It is not itself
[6.ii] The One is →-(Same as itself)	Sameness is not oneness
[6.iii] -(Not O. T. I & Same as itself)	Like thing → Is the same as itself Like thing → (Like s.thing else v like itself) -Like → Different, -(Like s.thing else v like itself) Different→More things than itself
[6.v] The One is→	Other than itself→ (More than itself)
[6.vi] -(More things than itself)	→-(Different)
[6.vii] -(One is not other than itself)	→-(the Same as Itself v Another)
[6.viii] the One is→	& (Like Itself or another))

and

Chart 6: Explication of Verses 140B –142:

[7.i] The One is →	Equal → same measures -(Equal to itself or another) {premise 3ii}
[7.ii] The One is → another	Same measure → greater or lesser to self or another
[7.iii] The One is →	Same measure→ (same age v older v younger-(same v older v youger)
[7.iv] Same age → aging	Aging→ Different than itself Different from itself →becoming older than its past age Present age→ becoming younger than its future age Aging→becoming both older and than oneself
[7.v] The One is→	→Occupying stretch of time -(occupying stretch of time)
[7.vi], 3xi, 3xii]	
[7.vii] The One is→-(is)	Occ. Str. Of Time→has become or is becoming or will become in the future→is
[7.viii] The One is→	is→object of knowledge or opinion or speech

The conclusion is absurd given that it is the One that has been the object of the above inquiry. I will now consider an alternative interpretation of [1]vii in order to avoid the binary-based shift that led to the argument's downfall. In other words, I shall argue that the One is both one and many. This is, as I will further prove, Plato's position as well.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Retracing the steps of the argument, I first consider the sense of being. If the mind worker states that something is, this need not preclude conceiving that what is other to it is not, necessarily, 'not.'¹⁹ In other words, there is a difference between the 'not' and the 'non-' allowing for a positive (indirect) affirmation of a negative. That which is not, to separate this from 'non' excludes the possibility of the nominated 'is.' As noted in Chart 3: 2&3, 'Non A is' as other than 'Is-not' which 'is not.' The explication of the implied difference between 'is-not' and 'is not' is useful here. Is-not refers to a predicate that renders logically impossible the existence of the noun that otherwise would be: language is not and there exists the Greek language. 'That language is not becomes itself 'is-not,' when affirming that the Greek language is by, for example, speaking it, as distinct from the 'is not' implied by the statement, English is not Greek. Is-not, thus, is not 'is not.'

The above has implications for the art of thinking²⁰ and the science of metaphysics, if one can call this so. To spell out those implications, I refer back to the tri-fold reality of language, metaphor, and essence, reducing this further down to the difference between duality and dualism, and then back down, again, to the oneness of the One, which is its difference.

The refusal of dialectic thought is the basis of dualism. On one hand, dualism conceives of the One as Two, by taking the metaphorical division of the One from itself as actual, and so conceiving of the One and the Many as two things, rather than the Many as the One's metaphorical

¹⁹ This is the point that Plato develops in the *Sophist* when deducing the logical possibility of other.

²⁰ Plato founded the science of logic and made it a useful instrument of reason in its conflict with eristic, which grew out of the Parmenidean formula: "Being is," and "let no one at any time impose the conviction on you that Non Being is." Such a logical demand would be entirely worthless if the unchanging concepts did not have an objective basis in an unchanging reality. (Alles and Constantin (1933)). The unchanging reality, according to contemporary science is the vacuum or, in my own terms, the Music, a field of infinitely rich energy. Thus the Unchanging is the Changing, this not being mere change, however. The paradox of this is the basis for my own explication of the difference between between 'non' and 'not.' It is Heraclitean: 'In order to make the attitude of these earliest Greek thinkers still more clear, we must return for a moment to Heraclitus, who instituted a polemic against the Eleatic doctrine of Being. He asserted that Being is no more than not-Being. Regarded in itself as an abstraction, Being turns out to be identical with nothing. The relation of Being to not-Being in Becoming formed the central point of his metaphysic, and was enunciated in the axiom, All is flowing, *πάντα ῥεῖ*. (Symonds (1880), p. 190) Being flows in the strange otherness of its differentiated motion.

multiplication – which now means the One is Many; and/or, on the other hand, there is no division whatsoever, and so no real basis for multiplicity – which now means that the Many is One. In neither case is the One, One nor the Many, Many. The One is the One becomes it becomes intelligibly so through multiplicity, and the Many is many because it is a multiplication of the One. Dialectical thought thus differentiates the One from the Many as the metaphorical moment of the One becoming intelligibly One. There are an infinite number of metaphors for the One because no one metaphor, any metaphor being a moment of multiplicity, is the One.

Without intelligence, the One is One. That ‘it becomes One and so is’ is the gathering motion of intelligence and hence the work of the mind. The mind at work produces the One being intelligently so out of its self. The One is not the creation of the mind, only that it is intelligently so. Because there is a difference between the One that is without intelligence (the animal brain) and the One that is with intelligence (the human mind), the One becomes One only through this difference. The One is thus itself when it becomes itself, and this exhibits the intelligence of the human mind. That the One is itself is inconceivable outside of the mind, for the One has no self. Or, in other words, the self of the One is the mind. So, the One becomes itself through the mind becoming mindful of its own contents, namely, the unity of the One. Equally, the epistemological name for the One is ‘mind,’ and the ontological naming of the mind is the One.

Because mind and the One are apparently different, the mind is apparently other than the One. So the identity of the One being One or its sameness, is an instance of a differentiated movement. The One is the same as itself only because it is other than itself in the form of the mind. That the One has a self is the mind at work, and the self of the One or oneness is worked out of this differentiation. Since we cannot say that the One and the mind are the same, for one is other to the other, then we must say that they are different. Difference is the non-identity of sameness. The sameness of identity (the One) is the differentiation of non-identity (the mind).

We identify the One being the One only through the mind without identifying the One with the mind. Or, we identify the mind with the self of the One. That is what the mind is, and yet the mind is what belongs to us, as what defines human intelligence. The mind thus both belongs to and does not belong to us. It is not our sole property because it belongs as well to the One. As the self of the One, the mind is its property, and as our selves, the mind, in this collective way, is our property. Proper to the mind being the mind, however, is mindfulness. Of what is the mind full in being

mindful, however? It is full of the gathering motion that aims to wrest/wrestle out of Many, the One. If the mind is the epistemological principle of the One, what we are really examining turns out to be the mind gathering from out of itself its mindfulness.

This is what we imagine the mind to be: mindful. The imaginative being of the mind is the motion of gathering what the One is. The mind, then, does not belong to us because it is a metaphor of the One. Rather, we belong to it as those who clarify through language, the oneness (self) of the One that is, otherwise expressed, its difference. For the self implies both sameness and difference. The self is the same (*selbst*) and yet is different as other to the One. That the One has a self means that its self is other to it, it being its alter ego. The alter ego of the One is the mind. While we identify the One through the mind, we do not identify the mind with the One precisely because the mind is the self of the One, and hence not the One itself. But the One itself is without self and thus exists in a mindless state. It is without intelligence and so of no mind or minding. The moment the One becomes minded is the moment when the mind is at work: the momentous moment of consciousness.

That moment in human terms is socio-linguistic reality. Language, Marx and Engels' said in the German Ideology, is as old as consciousness. Language displays consciousness. (See Ross, 2007 for details) It is when, for the first time, the One becomes 'minded,' that is, the object of mind, and so assumes the identity of 'having a self.' This 'first time' is not reducible to a historical date because, a point we shall later develop in our analysis of time, it is continually becoming first. It is a chronic difference. Chronically, as the persistent and insistent difference that the mind makes to the One as this last's very self the showing of intelligence raises the question of 'the oneness of the One.' It does so by pointing to the difference between itself (mind) and the One (what the mind minds). The identity of mind consists in its not identifying itself with the One.

This non-identity is the metaphor. The metaphoric difference between A and a – the phenomenon of no a – marks the movement from one set of symbols into another, for example, the translation from Greek to English. The Greek based word metaphor and its Latin equivalent translation mean to carry across; it is the action of bridging a gap. The gap here is the difference between the One and the Many, what would connect them and so avoid excluding one when positing the other. I have suggested that world reality is non-Being and so the symbolical negation of Being.²¹ As

²¹ This complete absence of historical sense shown in dealing with Parmenides is no good augury for the historical soundness of the interpretation of Plato with which it is connected. The proof that Plato recognized a 'triad' of principles, and

well, world reality is passing and so, in the course of time, many things. Thus non-Being is the staging ground of the Many, the symbolic and so not actual negation, of Being. Conversely, what is truly unthinkable is not-Being. Being is One, and not-Being would be the existence of the not-One. That illogic is the logic of self-contrary sophism.

Non-being is the symbolic negation of Being as embodied by actual world reality. This makes possible then the existence of the One or Being and the non-One or the Many. The relationship is not mutually exclusive but symbolic. The existence of world reality affirms indirectly the existence of Being. To live in a world is to be, but a world reality is not itself Being. As the symbolic negation of Being, a world reality is a metaphor for Being. It stands out that way. Here I note that the word existence, from the Latin stare ex- means to stand out. Existence, as the metaphoric stand –in for Being, makes Being stand out. Only through being in a world – a socio-linguistic reality – does Being become intelligible to a subject. World reality is how Being becomes interpreted and thus passed from animal muteness to the logos of human culture. World reality is thus an interpretive experience. Subjects in a world are those who inhabit it and through their habitation make sense of it. To be in a world is thus to interpret Being. Moreover, the horizon line of that world bounds its inhabitants' perception of Being. Being thus becomes symbolically differentiated through the appearance of world reality and so becomes 'many' at that instance. Being becomes 'present' through the instance of the world being there.

World reality is a metaphor for Being and this last's symbolic negation, as denoted by 'non-Being. Given that, I return to Plato's (interpreted) text. The contradiction between the One and the Many disappears when the Many is non-Being. If contradiction refers to mutual exclusivity – one cannot be if the other is – then metaphoric negation, the indirect affirmation of Being, is a differentiated space of mutual inclusiveness. The existence of world reality includes a conception of Being that lies within it, a conception that is defined by the horizon line of that world. But that conception is not necessarily clear, but lies dispersed throughout that world. For example, to take the world I am most familiar with, money and the commercial relations that it entails define 'value' and 'worth' both of people and things. There is no social rulebook that defines

that his triad, if he had one, was precisely that of Plotinus is found by Plotinus not in the *Parmenides*, or any other dialogue, but primarily in two passages of the *Epistles*. (Taylor, (1934), p. 149). The metaphoric character of the instantiation of the one should be kept in mind. A 'historical' understanding of a text is also an interpretive one. Historical soundness is, in its own way, metaphoric.

this, but that reality nevertheless exists. People act upon these implicit and dispersed assumptions when speaking about 'how much something is worth.' In my world, people do not judge, typically, things according to its soul-essence, but by its market value. To do the former would show that one existed in another world.

These implicit values of a world reality lie dispersed within that. It is the task of the mind worker (the philosopher) to 'pick out' or 'gather' these matters out of the obscure state in which they are typically found. By gathering I refer to the motion named by the Greek *legein* a word meaning to pick out, select as well as to speak; its verb is *logos* word. To give the *logos* of a thing is to give its word, reason or cause. That is the ancient conception of knowledge. In giving an account of a thing, the mind worker is making clear its reason; that is the act of *logike techne*, the art of reasoning.

Is this knowledge itself or but an aspect of it, an important one to be sure? I shall reserve judgment here for I intuit that I have come across an aspect, a part of the whole and not the whole itself. Accordingly, if knowledge is an act of reason, understood in this partial way, then it is the gathering space of making clear the conception of Being or Logos that lies otherwise dispersed and so opaque within a world reality. Knowing has the nature of a receding shoreline because in the very action of gathering that space, one modifies it. In the action of gathering, one becomes clearer as to 'what is there' and one's 'relationship' to it. The mind worker then can act differently, having a sharper understanding, and so modifies that reality. Reality assumes a different significance when its nature become clearer than when not as verified practically by experience. For example people will avoid danger if they are aware of it or if still inclined to risk life and limb will do with heightened awareness of the risks.

To be clearer, knowledge, or the part of it being discussed here, may not be an act of reason, but that of inspired intuition for which one cannot give an account as in the case of mystagogues and others claiming a direct connection to 'divinity' or some other 'higher source' or 'power.' It is not within the purview of this inquiry to judge those claims. The above definition of knowledge has validity only if knowledge is an act of reason, a claim that stands securely within the world reality of the text, namely, that of philosophy, and Greek philosophy at that. Outside of that world's horizon line, that definition makes no sense. So I thus acknowledge the limits of my definition of knowledge, an acknowledgement according with

the notion of a horizon line conditioning the mind's understanding of knowledge itself.²²

As an act of reason, this part of knowledge invites the cultivating of a metaphorical relationship between the mind worker and what the mind worker minds, between the subject inhabiting a world reality and that reality. This means the translating of what is there into the subject's own language in order to better 'digest' the otherwise foreign matter. I have 'digested' Plato's text in translating into my own words. This translation allowed me to isolate points of the argument that remained opaque in the original English translation. In thus becoming clearer about the argument, specifically, its key turning points, I have come to 'know' it better; I have become more intimate with its workings. It has become much more of my own flesh. This growing intimacy with Plato's text also resonates with the Biblical conception of 'knowing' as in 'Adam knew Eve.' Man and woman became one.

This part of knowledge I further call the cognitive aspect or understanding. This part of knowing is captured by the above definition, but the feeling implied by 'knowing' is not. This feeling concerns the action of having a mind or minding. Minding denotes an irritation and bothering as in the phrase, 'do you mind this?' At the very least, minding is the action of responding to an irritation; at its most intense moment, minding denotes the passion for truth. Out this passion, the mind works out the conception of reality that lies confused within it. It pushes out what is jumbled into ordered social form, thereby producing an object. This corresponds to knowledge as an art. I have yet to say why dialectics is the art of knowing, a matter that I shall return to in the conclusion.

In world socio-linguistic reality the One becomes reduced to an object, a recognizable whole that has parts, a beginning and an end, limits, shape, whether round or straight or some combination thereof, is either in another or in itself and is capable of motion and rest as Plato tells us in Parmenides 135-139b: This is literally a thing, the reality of, to use Descartes' word, extension. A literal thing exists in time whereas the metaphorical thing called the One is itself time. The One is eternal and so outside of all temporal-spatial limits. Or, it is the fabric of those limits and therefore

²² The reader familiar with Godel's work will also recognize at work the principle of incompleteness. A system cannot be both complete and consistent. Thus, in acknowledging the limits of my definition of knowledge, I enclose that definition within the world reality that supports me, showing that it is consistent with that and so relatively complete. It works within that world, the context of the present text, and may be considered a working definition; outside of that it does not. That is another text that would mark the end of this one.

cannot be limited by them anymore than an ocean is limited by its waves. Temporal-spatial distinctions, in this wave-like fashion, express the fabric, press out its characteristics.

The polyvalent simultaneous multiplicity of the One, once expressed, becomes a one-sided caricature of itself. The One is the beginning that has no ending whereas ‘one thing’ or ‘something’ begins here and ends there; the limit of the One is infinity and of ‘one thing’ an actual boundary line; the One is the whole signified by restful motion whereas ‘one thing’ or ‘something’ is either at rest or in motion. The One, nevertheless, is implied by these partial expressions since it is the possibility –the conceptual matrix – of the same. The space between the One and ‘one thing’ is the metaphoric space of the translation. In the translation, the One becomes reduced or contracted into a set of symbols that can only preserve some aspects of the One. But without such work, the One remains unintelligible. The paradoxical nature of this translation, that reveals and conceals, recovers and covers over, is the nature of truth seeking.

In the Greek, the difference between the two is signified by *aletheia* truth and *lethe* forgetfulness. Truth is the negation (a-) of forgetfulness. Negation, as discussed here, is of two kinds: ‘not’ and ‘non-’. The truth of world reality is that it is non-Being, never, ‘not’ being. Truth, then, is the ‘non’-being of Being. Those who would forget this, typically called nihilists, are those who would make nothing out of Being because of the symbolic negation of it implied by world reality. Thus, the passing reality of the world, in their minds, denotes the passing of being itself. Lost in forgetfulness, they fail to affirm the positive of the negative. The negation of Being, in so far as it is symbolic, preserves the ‘isness’ of ‘what is.’ A negation, thus, is something; it cannot itself be ‘nothing’, that is, lack being. The being of negation thus necessarily shows that something is; that is its truth. Paradoxically, the Greek truth is the negation of forgetfulness.

To emphasize this point, I consider the meaning of truth in the four other languages familiar to me: Hebrew, Latin, German and English. In Hebrew the word for truth is *emet*, a negation of the word *met* dead. The truth is a living thing, something that ‘is’ and so possesses ‘being.’ That which lacks truth is dead. Truth then, as denoted by both Greek and Hebrew, languages from two completely different language groups, both reference the resistance to death. There is a struggle here, a determined resistance that refuses to surrender to death. Forgetfulness is symbolic death. To forget to allow ‘what is’ to escape one’s notice; one has fallen asleep. Death and sleep in Greek are brothers; in Hebrew, one dies when one ceases to struggle for truth, a struggle that is the negation of death. In Latin the word for truth is *verus* from the Arayan base *wes-*to be. The

English ‘was’ is similar to this as is the German *wahr* true; *Wahrheit* is truth. Again, the mind worker observes the intimacy between ‘being’ and ‘truth.’ The power of truth is to preserve ‘what is’ against symbolic death or forgetfulness. Truth, in essence, is memory.

In English, the word truth stems from the Old Norse *treowth* belief, a root found also in trust and troth. To be true is to have faith in what one loves. This refers to the betrothal of the lover, called the fiancée, to his beloved. As part of this struggle, the fiancé pledges his troth, gives over part of his property that he will redeem upon marriage. At point of marriage, he will redeem his property, having demonstrated his faithfulness to his beloved. This struggle shows his determined resistance to forgetfulness. The unfaithful lover is no true lover at all. To love the truth with all thy might, with all thy soul and all thy heart – the words of the Schema, the central prayer in Jewish liturgy – is to exhibit faith. The lover of truth has faith in Being.²³ It is this faith that the true lover redeems through inquiry. To show the truth of Being is to show the difference between ‘not’ and ‘non-’. Being Is; it cannot be what is not. However, it can suffer symbolic cancellation, and this is world interpretive reality that forever passes in and out of existence as far as our species is concerned. When it ceases to do so, that would be the end of human species life and so beyond the horizon line of the present inquiry.

As a last note defining the notion of truth posited above, I consider the meaning of correctness, a word deriving from the Latin *regere* to rule. Correction, erection, direction and rectitude are offspring of this root. What they have in common is the idea of governing. That which is ruled or governed is measured, moreover, by a standard. A standard rule measures all things within its realm and so corrects it. There is some truth to this. It is true that standards are necessary in order to judge heterogeneous materials and thus discern what is common to all. Correctness, moreover, relies upon a form of reason called ratiocination, reason derived from the Latin *veri* to calculate. Correction judges matters

²³ In the Marxist tradition, the mind worker observes the same logic at work. The dead truth is ideology as opposed to the living truth of science. To be truly alive is to be ever playful, to be ever engaged by the question of Being. It is the negating of the solid, fixed and unchallenged assumptions that govern the typical perception of reality. It is for the mental worker to show his faith in Being through working out the conception of reality implied by the existence of the world he inhabits and thereby to push out its horizon line. Ideology is content to merely reproduce the existence of ‘what passes for reality,’ taking the unexamined assumptions of typical perception as truth itself. In Plato’s language, one merely reflects, in this mirror-like way, what is around oneself. (vide Republic, X).

according to a rule that is divided in equal lengths, each part being a definite proportion of the whole. So things measure up or they do not; they are correct or incorrect. This is the reasoning of the symbolic logic employed, for example, in my initial reading of the *Parmenides*.

Nevertheless there is a limit to correctness. For the standard rule participates in a world reality never fully reducible to the rules expressing it. For example, as is well known, Euclidian geometry with its rules is true only within flat space and untrue within curved. The line is the shortest distance between two points in flat space; in curved space it is an arc. In both spaces there are standard rules, but each standard is different. Thus each standard is not standard; 'what is' is 'what is not.' Correction thus contradicts itself and so becomes untrue when it fails to notice – forgets – the particular life-world space or dimension to which a standard applies. It falls 'outside' its truth (*aletheia*) into forgetfulness (*lethe*). As the word play of *aletheia* and *lethe* references, forgetfulness is lethal to the truth. Correctness becomes lethal when it becomes self-absorbed by its rules, forgetting that they apply only to specific realms. In its self-absorption, correctness becomes a tyrannical ruler, a ruler onto itself rather, more correctly and properly understood, as an expression of the dynamics of that space. Thus truth is not correctness; for truth is the gathering work of clarifying the dynamics of that space and not thus simply 'laying down the rules.'

In summa: correctness concerns itself with standard rules and is indifferent to the dynamics of the space for which those rules are, at best, the compact expression (Euclidian geometry rules flat space, for example). Truth, however, concerns the intelligibility of those rules, the intelligibility that it 'renders visible' through inquiring into the 'being' of the space-time governed by those rules. It asks for what rules the rules and so rules out the rules as things onto themselves. Correctness possesses truth only when it is itself governed by the larger concern with 'being,' and this last is not a rule. Dialectically expressed, the concern with what is not a rule governs the truth of what is concerned with rules.

Fractal Logic of World Reality

Consider now, deducing from the *Parmenides*, notions of sameness, difference and otherness. That which is the same is identical to something, but this is not to be 'one with.' In my reading of this text, I have differentiated 'non' from not. The principal implication of that is this: world reality is like Being, that it bears some resemblance to it, but that it is not 'at one' with it. World reality bespeaks a symbolic differentiation of

Being allowing for the latter to become an intelligible object. The identity of Being is given by this symbolic differentiation or metaphor. Thus the world is the metaphoric stand in for Being and thereby possesses intelligible identity. The essence of the matter may be summarized by this proposition: the unity of sameness is mediated by difference. To illustrate these differences, I present a table of forms that shows the metaphorical relationship of difference (the many, non-being) to the One:

Table Two: the Same and the Different	
The One Is (polis)	The One Is-Not: Language is not. Is-not is logically hostile to Is. Is-not cannot be if 'Greek' is. They are neither the same nor different.
Non-One Is: The finite number of things logically friendly organised by the rule of different: Number [a one is many.]	Not One: A and a are and are only metaphorically the case of politics and police in English. [A one is? One]

The polis is the symbolic one, governed by rules expressing relations between its parts. The identity of the polis becomes (more) intelligible with its metaphorical loss of substance signified by translation. It looks its 'look,' the specific character of Greek letters and becomes written in another language. Nevertheless, the translation preserves the meaning of the original: to be polite is to be in human society as opposed to an anthill or beehive, *polis* capturing that in Greek; a society is political, referring to relations of power and governance; and there are means to enforce social rules, typically called 'police force'. The different aspects of the One, implied but not stated in the original, become uttered and so objects of inquiry through the translation/metaphor resulting in the preserving of the old in the new. The unity of the One is mediated by the symbolic differentiation – translation – that preserves what is the same within a different world reality (non-being). Difference thus mediates the sameness of the One. Unity is not sameness (or identity) precisely because the former is joined to the latter by difference. The One becomes the

intelligible One through this linking of sameness and difference resulting in the identity of the non-One called the number one.

Scaling produces the self-similarity of the One, and the number of points on the scale is infinite. To clarify this last point: non-one is not the One, but is the infinite number of things other than that. Such is the number of things, rather than number itself. Non-One exists infinitely, as shown by number, and as pointed out earlier that Non-A could differ from A in an infinite number of ways. A numeric system belongs to a world reality, as shown, for example, by the invention of zero by the Arab world and its later incorporation by the West, but not number, and which belongs originally, using Heidegger's term, to the possibility of the world becoming a world. It belongs to the world at its root. That the entire world now operates according to this more integrated numeric system reflects the more integrated world reality that gave birth to it.

Here, to further clarify, I briefly enter upon the debate between those who hold that number is an ideal form and those who hold that it is a purely human invention. Number as a Platonic form presents us again with the question of the Form. According to the system of classification advanced here, number is the basic possibility that a world reality must possess at its root in order to give an account of its self. It can no more have a self and not possess a means for giving an account of it, as evinced by the existence of the digits at the extremities of the human body. The first number system arose as the counting of hands and feet.

Number is the non-accountable form of accounting. It is the soul of infinity and hence Other to the One, that is the Infinite. The One is infinitely Many, as these last are the variations upon the theme. So, I call number the great non-one, as any one number is infinitely divisible into an endless number of parts ($1/1$, $1/2$, $1/3$... $1/n$). But these divisions do not pertain to the One itself, which is, in itself, indivisible, except metaphorically. There is no logical connection between the division of the One into symbolic parts and any one thing and its parts. That a body has parts called arms and legs is other than anything else that has its divisions: the rake has teeth at its end used to till the earth. Each thing that has parts has so because of its structures particular to it – a rake is not a human body is not a refrigerator, with its shelf parts, for example. The endless string of these logically indifferent divisions (to each other) forms the infinite chain of non-being that in no way precludes being, as exposed by the concept of whole/part. Each one thing, in its oneness, is other than the One.

Number rules the general class of non-one, specifically, the translation of it into a one which is. No one is the One. Non-one can become no one only by 'entering into relationship' with the One to which it is otherwise

logically indifferent: that is the broad meaning of *mathesis*, learning, from which the word mathematics derives. The difference between the One and a one that is, thus, is mathematical, in this broader sense. That mathematics has become reduced to number obscures the entire question, as ‘being’ becomes no more than a numerical unit. That is the case for the herd of animals metaphorically identified here as ‘animal life.’ Animal intelligence is non-mind, that is, the intelligence unable to go beyond itself: its intelligence does not carry over beyond itself. In other words, it is wordless because of its distinctly non-metaphorical character. Non-being is indifferent to being, and hence not metaphorical, because it lacks the means to go beyond itself and hence to put itself in relation to what is other than itself. This is the import of the formula ‘a is? A.’

‘Is?’, an apparently whimsical and capricious title of an obscure text, turns out to be crucial in defining the difference between non-one and no one. What turns non-one into no one is the metaphorical inversion that permits ‘a’ to become A, and yet remains questionable as A: hence ‘a is? A.’ More precisely, the mind as mind is named by the metaphorical character of its intelligence. For, while the animal possesses intelligence, it is without mind, or, rather, limited to mind as denoted by the mere ‘irritation.’ The animal can and is irritated by things, but never by the question of being. This last defines the specific character of human intelligence or ‘mind.’ The response of the mind is essentially metaphoric. ‘Is?’ preserves the impulse centered by the phenomenon of the metaphor, and this symbolically destroys the otherwise dumb silence of contained animal being, dumb because it cannot release the sound of itself being Itself.

Preliminary Analysis of Time

Consider now time, touched upon in table three, a theme that I can only touch upon in this chapter if he is to stay within the parameters of Plato’s thought. For Plato, the reality of the world is governed by time; the reality of the One is infinity. Time is the moving image of eternity that corresponds to the passing of world reality (see *Timaeus* 37 d)²⁴. The infinite is outside of time, as an ocean is outside of its wave, even as the infinite is time eternal. In considering the question of Being (and Time, with apologies to Heidegger), it is useful to consider the relations of identity, difference and other developed thus far in the argument. Here, I

²⁴ Plato (1961), p. 1167.

dwell upon the particular thorny passage in which Plato deduces how a thing is both older and younger than itself:

If one thing is already different from another, there is no question of its becoming different; either they both are now, or they both have been, or they both will, different. (141b)²⁵

Plato is comparing two different things. Here it is important to note that in Greek there is a difference between different things of the same kind and different things of different kinds. For example, there were enemies that were non-Greeks and hence barbarians upon which all manner of treatment was allowed, and enemies that were fellow Greeks upon which limits were set to the treatment meted out.²⁶ My suggestion is that Plato is referring to different things of the same kind. In the METAPHORIC TABLE, the reader can observe this phenomenon wherein there are differences are within sameness – the difference between polis and its derivatives or the One and non-one – and where differences are not – the difference between the One and the not-One. It is this common element or sameness that allows him to play with the idea of the same thing becoming different from its own self.

But if one is in the process of becoming different, you cannot say that the other has been, or will be, or as yet is, different; it can only be in process of becoming different. (141b)²⁷

The thing here is of the same kind that becomes different from another thing of the same kind.

Now the difference signified by ‘older’ is always a difference from something younger. Consequently, what is becoming older than itself must also at the same time be becoming younger than itself. (141b)²⁸

Plato is shifting perspective within the differences exhibited by things that are of the same kind. Thus, from the perspective of the same thing that is becoming older from a different thing of the same kind, the former is becoming older than itself. However, from the perspective of the same thing that is ‘left behind’ because it is not becoming older, it is becoming

²⁵ *The Collected Dialogues of Plato* (1961), p. 935.

²⁶ In the *Republic* Plato urges the Greeks to treat all enemies as they now treat Greek enemies thereby considering all enemies to be of the same kind.

²⁷ See <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html>.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

younger than its aging self. This passage is a remarkable foreshadowing, as should now be evident, of Einstein's theory of Relativity.

To illustrate I use a standard example. Take two clocks, two different things of the same kind. If one clock (A) is traveling at the speed of light and the other (B) not, then the first clock is slowing down in time and is becoming younger than its earth bound self. Conversely, the earth bound clock is, relative to the other, becoming older than its own self. In both examples it is logically possible to deduce the paradox first posited by Plato on the basis of Greek grammar and then seconded by Einstein with the aid of facts not known to Plato, such as the speed of light. The logic is the same; only the language differs. The logical One or Logos becomes intelligible through the socio-linguistic differences mediating its achieved (world) identity.

The intelligibility of the Logos depends upon the mental worker's ability to translate – treat as metaphor – actual differences. In this translation, the reader of a language carries across the meaning of the words from one set of symbols (Greek, English, symbolic logic) to another. This bridges the river of time. In this intuitive way, the metaphor is the bridge building exercise across which the mental worker conveys the meaning of the text, thereby resisting the decay of meaning, the falling of the text's truth into forgetfulness. More metaphorically grasped, the text is becoming older than itself as its truth decays because of the reader's forgetfulness; and the text becomes younger than itself as a result of the reader's remembrance.²⁹ In recalling the text's memorable character, the reader rejuvenates it, restoring the clarity of its logic. In the examples given in the above, picking out the logic of the polis with reference to its derivatives and the grammatical construction that Plato plays upon in deriving his paradoxes, clarified the meaning of those examples. One thus remembered the truth pertaining to them.

As deduced earlier, the essence of truth is memory. To resist forgetfulness is the determined struggle to remind oneself of the abiding presence of what is there, namely, the logic of the thing in question. To stay with and linger alongside this, as Heidegger recommends in *Being and Time*, is to exhibit care (*Sorgen*) as distinct from curiosity (*Neugier*). In caring for the truth, the mind worker attends to the being of the matter there, dwelling alongside of it in order to preserve, against the forgetfulness occasioned by swift-flowing time, the memorable logic of its existence. Thereby does the mental worker dissolve the paradoxes,

²⁹ This is *anamnesis* as Plato recommends in the *Timaeus*.

unblocks the blockages and permits his own energies to flow unceasingly onward.

Conclusion

I shall now summarize my findings in concluding the reading of this section. Knowledge is the gathering of the dispersed instances of a world reality's truth, the truth that a world reality, in becoming present at hand, forgets. In this gathering and clarifying action, the mental worker – the conceptual artist – transforms the brain into mind, the non-thinking into the thinking matter, through focusing his mental-physical energies upon the matter of Being, an action that results in the formation of metaphors denoting the rise in abstract thinking power. The metaphor is the art-object belonging to this practice that both reveals and conceals the grounds upon which it conceivably stands. To free himself from his metaphors therefore belongs to this art as much as the creation of them. The process of creation and destruction is at the heart of artistic practice. In conceiving of thinking as an art, I have been led to distinguish non- from not. This has allowed me to discern the logic of Plato's paradoxes, in the section from the Parmenides read, and to thus 'destroy' the blockages to their clear comprehension. For example, I showed that the thorniest of Plato's paradoxes, to my mind, namely, that the same thing becomes both older and younger than itself. The worker can readily understand as Plato's adumbration of Einstein's discoveries from within his own grammar.

I have thereby pulled out the thorn sticking in my own flesh, to speak metaphorically, in clarifying the logic of Plato's argument. There remains one last piece of reasoning however to consider, in order to finish this section. Plato's conclusion at the end of the section examined (see chart 5) was that the One, given that it could not occupy time could not be a subject of inquiry. This was outrageous given that it has been the subject of inquiry from the outset. However, that paradox can now be dissolved in the light of the preceding examination. The One is both the object of inquiry and not the object of inquiry. It is the object of inquiry in so far as it becomes intelligible as the object of the mind, as the thing conceived through the standing existence of a world reality. The One, however, is not that reality because of the mediating differences – the horizon line – circumscribing that reality as a reality and so symbolically separating it from the Real. In short, the One is not the object of inquiry because the One is not an object.

Nevertheless, the mind worker can only conceive of the nature of Being through examining the nature of the world reality he finds himself

in. Thus the paradox: Being both is and is not. However, it is not only symbolically, as non-being. It is this play of being and non-being as simultaneous aspects of the One that is the object of the dialectical art. The play, nevertheless, is performed against a backdrop, the rules that form a method or approach to the material.

Earlier, I defined knowledge as a gathering, a definition that I now modify in clarifying aspects of that gathering or picking out. The rule oriented character of the gathering whose standard is correctness – the correct deducing of a conclusion from a premise – concerns the rectitude of knowledge; that is the backbone of thinking. However, to a body there is an articulation of the bones that makes movement possible. Dialectics is the play to the rules that the mind worker seizes upon in articulating the deeper significance of the method. Plato's Parmenides is thus a supreme example of the dialectical art in taking Plato's own method of inquiry – the Forms – as the object of discussion.

That gathering that is concerned primarily with the rules and cannot rise above (or delve below) the rules, is 'science,' a science, in Nietzsche's words, without gaiety. The gay science is the dialectics of knowing that both creates and destroys in order to reveal the underlying grounds or community of that opposition. Dialectics is knowledge having become an art form in dancing out the logic of being. The One, as the intelligible whole, is the object of inquiry, as it has become bound to a world reality, and yet, because it has become bound, is not an object of inquiry. It is itself and so reasonably preserves its mystery.

RELATIONSHIP OF PART TO WHOLE

In this section, I will focus on the relationship of the part to the whole, specifically the relationship of world reality to Being.¹ As detailed in the previous chapter, if the One is One then an entire series of negations ensue leading to the conclusion that the One cannot be the object of inquiry. In this chapter I shall build upon that conclusion beginning with a notion of difference.

In reading Parmenides: 143a-145, Plato distinguishes between being and unity, the point the following elucidates. X is an integral or a fraction, and that defines its 'being'; that it equals itself defines its unity. The two aspects depart from each other and so are distinct parts, for a fraction is equal to itself and not an integral while an integral is not a fraction and equal to itself. At every point where there is number, and this is infinite, there exists both unity and being, and since neither one is the other, difference. Difference, in short, is infinitely present.²

Underpinning a complex ontology, number is the soul of infinity. It is the basis of reason, understood here in the Latin sense as calculation. In giving an account of the One, the mind worker numbers its instances.

¹ 'The dialogue progresses, I shall argue, from the discussion of views which are particular to the protagonists to a discussion which is entirely general; and it does so in three stages – the Socratic debate of the first part, the discussion of the first hypothesis, 'if one is', and the discussion of the second hypothesis, 'if one is not'. Each stage reflects on the theoretical conditions of its predecessor; each stage of the dialogue is of a higher order of abstraction than its predecessor' (Gill and McCabe, (1996)). As a theoretical caveat, one should not confuse higher with verticality. Higher order of abstraction, as a dialectical proposition, refers as well to a deepening – the explication of the principles of exposition guiding the arriving at those first conclusions. The phrase, 'if one is,' explicates the conceptual possibility of the 'One that is a One.'

² Instead of monism, therefore, Socrates offers a complex ontology. There are particulars, which are one and many, and there are Forms, which are each just one, simple, and 'separate, themselves by themselves'. Just so, in the *Phaedo*, Socrates supposed there to be particulars, which are ones that are also many, composite, and therefore perishable, and Forms, each of which is just one, simple, incomposite, and imperishable. Both Forms and particulars, therefore, are in some way one: each is countable as one because each has some principle of unity. They are items in Socrates' ontology just because they are individuals. (Gill and McCabe (1996))

Numerically infinite, the One has no end or beginning, understood transcendently. A thing without difference has no identity (sameness). Difference, however, is neither ‘oneness’ nor ‘being.’ It is the instantiation of Being by a world reality. Every world reality both is and is a one, and each world reality is different from another. There are theoretically an infinite number of world realities that are possible, each corresponding to a particular instantiation of Being. Each world contains Being by means of a horizon line that marks it as a distinct or different instantiation – hence Being is contained and limited – and yet each world reality is not Being but an instantiation of it – hence Being is uncontained and unlimited. In Plato’s words:

‘Therefore, a ‘one which is’ is both one and many, whole and parts, limited as well indefinitely numerous.’ (*Parmenides* 145).³

Thus instantiated and so present as a world reality, Being then possesses all the characteristics that were previously denied it (see chart 3). One example from Plato will illustrate this:

Therefore, the one, being always both in itself and in another must always be both in motion and at rest. (*Parmenides* 146 a)⁴

The ‘one in itself’ is the unintelligible whole; unintelligible because it has not parted from the mute state in which it resides, and so has yet to ‘speak’ to man. The ‘one in itself,’ becomes intelligible in so far as it does speak, and here I note that the root of the world intelligent is the Greek *legein*, to pick out whose secondary meaning is to speak. The One speaks only when spoken to, a metaphoric way of addressing the human labour power that is required in creating a language (a set of symbols) through which the One (nature, the cosmos) reveals itself and so ‘utters’ its essence.⁵ This utterance is the making out of what is inner in Plato’s language⁶. World reality displays the differentiation of the One from the One, the parting of the ‘in itself’ from ‘itself.’ But this departure is symbolic; it is the negation of One by language. Through this speaking the subject in a world ‘picks out’ what Being is.

³ See <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ This is built upon the biophysical sensory apparatus given by Nature. More precisely, each set of apparatus that humankind applies to the perceiving of reality is an extension of the self or media as McLuhan noted.

⁶ This will have implications for the later development of dialectics, notably Hegel’s use of ‘in itself’ as the starting point of a thing’s ‘being.’

The subject in a world is subject to that world. To elucidate, I note the dialectic of subject and object implicit to the Parmenides. Firstly, as noted in my last essay, the One is both the object of inquiry and not the object of inquiry. It becomes the object of inquiry for a subject in a world reality when bound by that world, and the sign of that binding is the horizon line separating one world reality from another. This horizon line lies implicit within that world reality, as to say obscure and scattered among the many moments of that reality. The task of thinking is to pick out the horizon line that the typical subject or mind of that world reality passes over and takes for granted or, in a word, forgets. The struggle of thinking, as focused by the subject-object relationship, is to recover the (fluid) grounds upon which the world, in its reality, stands. This is the resistance to forgetfulness (*lethe*) that the Greeks called truth (*aletheia*).

The subject in a world reality, being subject to that reality, struggles to clarify the nature of that reality, that is, to put into objective form. That is also the nature of art, and dialectics, as I argued earlier, is the art of thinking. The purpose of art is to render objective the hitherto dispersed instances of world reality. However, the One or Being, while being an object of inquiry because it has been bound – tied and held in place – by a horizon line, is not an object of inquiry. It has become so and thus stands outside the world reality to which it has become bound. The dialectic of subject and object then personifies the struggle to at once make the One an object of world reality and to release the One from being such (*Verlassenheit* in Heidegger's words). This is to 'let go' of the One, this letting go thus being a form of 'grasping,' albeit a most paradoxical one.

In this paradoxical way, 'to grasp' means to 'let go' and hence 'not to grasp.' I note as well the preponderance of 'grasping' and 'seizing' in the traditional epistemology of Western thought as in the words 'comprehension' and 'apprehension,' both of which are formed from the Latin *prehendere* to seize and perception, from the Latin *capere* to take. Seizing, taking hold of, even grabbing are the traditional ways of 'knowing.' Certainly, in art there is notion of 'control' implied by 'handling' the material. In terms of thought, this is the calculative part of reason, that part ruled by number. The comparing of things, most strikingly exemplified by numeric ratios, is the essence of ratiocination or calculation. To calculate means to follow standard rules (arithmetic laws) that result in testable answers, that is, answers capable of being proven right or wrong. Number, in short, is the unity of calculation.

Unity of calculation is a moment of the One. The One is forever in motion through its moments. Yet, in so far as these instantiations are symbolic negations, they actually do not negate the One. The purpose of

the moment or its momentousness is to render the One as an object of inquiry, but the One is not an object unless contained within a world, and that reality is the passing instance that has no ultimate or final standing. So the One remains standing forever outside a world, but being outside it is mute and unintelligible. No account can be given of that which does not participate in a world. There it stands motionless. When becoming the object of that world reality, the One, however, rests in that world. But since that resting is symbolic, so is the motion. Or, the One both rests and is in motion, being both within a world reality as its captured object and outside of it as that world's infinite stillness.⁷

Consider the role of sameness and difference:

Sameness itself and difference are contrary to one another. So sameness will never be in what is different, nor difference in what is the same. And if difference will never be in what is the same, there is nothing that is in which difference is present for any length of time, for if it were in something for any length of time whatsoever, during that time difference would be in what is the same. And since it is never in what is the same, difference can never be in anything that is, and consequently neither in the 'not-ones; nor in the one. There for it is not difference that could make the one different from the 'not-ones,' or the 'not-ones' different from the one.

⁷ Stillness denotes both motion and motionlessness, the simultaneous opposition that Plato exploits in pointing out the play of the concept. Out of great disaster (destruction) comes possibly the renewal of life (creation), a theme that appears throughout Western ontology and/or epistemology as Lukacher writes: 'Nietzsche's return to Heraclitus and to the ancient mystery cults was an effort to inaugurate a new beginning. It was Parmenides, of course, whom Nietzsche called "the counter-image" of Heraclitus: "likewise expressing a type of truth-teller but one formed of ice rather than fire, pouring cold piercing light all around" (69). The Parmenidean refusal of Heraclitean eternal becoming is for Nietzsche the great disaster of Western philosophy. This is the primal scene of the oblivion of the Being-question, for in "deriv[ing] absolute being from a forever subjective concept" (83) Parmenides severed the meaning of *eón/aion* from the temporal horizon of Being. In fragment 8, for example, we read: "Being is close to Being. But it is motionless in the limits of mighty bonds, without beginning [anarchon], without cease [apauston], since Becoming and Destruction have been driven very far away, and true conviction has rejected them" (line 5, trans. Freeman, Ancilla). Michael Theunissen reads Parmenides in precisely Nietzsche's sense when he writes: "The intrinsic not-being of Being manifests itself as not-living. Being, which also does not exist insofar as it is neither the world in its diversity nor God in his fullness, sinks into the nothingness of death; its perfection is the stillness of paralysis.' At least in its initial form, metaphysics was actually what Nietzsche makes it out to be: nihilism." (Theunissen, "Metaphysics' Forgetfulness of Time," 23). (Lukacher (1998). p. 13)

Nor yet will they be different from one another by virtue of being themselves, if they do not possess difference. Therefore, if neither their own character nor difference can make them different, every possibility of their being different escapes us. (*Parmenides* 147)

How are the terms ‘difference itself’ and ‘sameness itself’ in relation to the above conception of the One? When captured as an object, the forms are ‘within another’ and are ‘within themselves’ when not. But this distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ obscures the main point. Each instance of Being is the actual reality of a world. There cannot be an instantiation of Being outside that because instantiation implies instance, a moment of time, and thus a giving an account of Being. Being is symbolically made to stand in ‘another’ when instantiated, the root of the word being the Latin stare to stand. Difference therefore, when remembered as an actual moment of Being participates in sameness. Every world is the same in being an instantiation of Being, but as an instantiation differs from another instance. These ‘not-ones’ (or non-ones in my terminology) actually differ from each other in being individual instantiations of Being, and are the same in being that. Plato’s conclusion follows from his implicit separation of Being from actual world reality, a difficulty inherent in the Forms.

This separation reflects the abstract power of thinking or thinking as developed under definite socio-linguistics conditions enabling that mind to posit a notion of Being that can ‘escape’ itself as an actual instance of world reality. The identity of the instantiation of Being and actual world reality presumes that difference and sameness, conceived of ‘in themselves’ as opposites, are the necessary moments of that identity. Each world reality is the same as a differentiated instantiation of Being, the differentiated instantiation forming its identity. Only outside of that are the two ‘things in themselves’ and so Platonic and later Hegelian forms.

World reality is the non-being of Being and stands as a ‘not one’ in Plato’s terms:

Further, things which are ‘not one’ do not possess unity either; if they did, they would not be ‘not one,’ but in a sense one. So things which are ‘not one’ cannot be a number; if they had number, once more they would not be ‘not one’ in every sense. (*Parmenides* 147 a)

Captured numerically, difference refers to the infinity unity of the One; each numbering of the One is different, there is one in every number, and number in infinite. Those things that lack unity are without number; they are outside of world reality. To be numbered means to be accounted for and accounting systems are sub-systems of world reality. When becoming an accounted for object and hence numbered, a thing becomes part of a world

reality and hence no longer a 'pure being' or 'form.' The Platonic form is thus an abstraction from a world reality from the perspective of those within that world and a 'descended idea' from the perspective of those outside of it. The Platonic form descends to the earth or, equally (idealist), the Platonic form is the generalization of actual forms (materialist).

I note, in a brief return to earlier sections of the *Parmenides*, Plato's remark that:

Are you also puzzled, Socrates, about cases that might be thought absurd, such as air or mud or dirt or any other trivial and undignified object? Are you doubtful whether or not to assert that each of these has a separate form distinct from things like those we handle?

Not at all, said Socrates. In these cases, the things are just the things we see; it would surely be too absurd to suppose that they have a form.
(*Parmenides* 130 d)

The things referred to are purely natural phenomena, that is, phenomena without art. The Platonic form thus betrays its edges, itself as the generalization of the Greek social or art forms. Purely natural forms have no forms because they are artless and hence incapable of being ascribed a social origin. A thing's form is thus the thing's belonging to an art. It is their belonging to an art, moreover, that renders them accountable as 'one,' to link the above passage with the more recent argument. Artless, they are 'just the things we see'. To be clear, I am using 'objects of an art' in the Greek rather than in the modern sense, that is, as 'art objects.' Broadly speaking, all things socially produced are objects of an art: they are products of human labour, the realization of an idea in mind requiring the working with some material at hand.⁸

To further elucidate, consider the Platonic form in relation to the above-mentioned dialectic of subject and object. The Platonic form is the generalization of the collective human labour required to produce society. That is the non-One other to the One, the former symbolically capturing the latter. Plato's earlier remark reveals the limit of the Form and hence its character by identifying objects incapable of being ascribed 'form' or

⁸ Plato tends to suppose that things in this world strive to be like the Forms, and that it is a good thing that they do. Even the equal sticks and stones Socrates talks about in the *Phaedo* are said to 'strive to be like the Equal', though they fall short of this goal (75a). One supposes it would be ludicrous to him that anything might strive to be like ideal hair, or ideal mud, let alone ideal filth, and even more ridiculous that it should be good that things so strive. (Matthews, (1999) pp. 81-82) The lack of imagination is rooted in the artful character of the form, a limit that Matthew ignores.

method in that its results are verifiable leading to the judgment of right or wrong. Rather, what dialectics aims to produce is the judgment that a proposition is right and wrong. For example, as produced so far, the mental worker conceives of the One as both an object of inquiry – because it is bound by the horizon line of a world reality – and as not an object of inquiry – because it is not an object and has only become bound. The dialectical holding of simultaneous opposites then reflects the paradoxical nature of this ‘conceiving of the One.’

The One in its Self-Similarity is the transcendent grounds of thought. Is ‘the One’ the transcendent grounds of dialectic thought or of thought in general? The question turns about on the meaning of transcendence and immanence.¹⁵ To offer some hints as to how one could dialectically approach this question, I return to the idea of world reality and both its identity and difference from the Real. World reality is the collective artwork of human beings and thus is both real and not real. Plato alludes to that, as noted earlier, when he suggests that purely natural things have no forms, meaning that they are not translatable as art objects and thus things that one could see for ‘more’ than their physical substance allows. The ‘beyond’ or ‘more’ is the art whose theoretical expression is the Platonic form. That which is beyond ‘physical form’ is the artful/social identity of the physical, this separating world reality from the Real.

World reality is not real because it is an instantiation of the Real, which is also why it is real. As instantiation, it thus makes real ‘what is’, and thus shows itself to be an instance of that. The instance is what ‘stands in’ for what ‘stands.’ This ‘standing action’ is the root of existence, from the Latin to stand stare out ex-. World reality is actual human existence and a stand-in for the Real. The Real, however, does it then ‘stand outside’

¹⁵ Collingwood lays down the general principles of this couplet. ‘First, it must be understood that immanence and transcendence are not mutually exclusive conceptions. I have already pointed out, in connexion with the contrast between the transcendent magician-god of Thales and the immanent worldgod of Anaximander (see p.34, footnote 1), that a theology of pure transcendence is a thing as hard to find in the history of thought as a theology of pure immanence. All theologies have in fact both immanent and transcendent elements in them, though in this or that case this or that element may be obscured or suppressed. What is true in theology is equally true in the case of a metaphysical conception like form. The suggestion we are considering, therefore, is not that a purely immanent conception of form was replaced by a purely transcendent one, but that a conception in which immanence was emphasized gave way to one in which transcendence was emphasized: the relatively unemphasized element never being denied, or at least never being denied except by quite incompetent and muddle-headed persons.’ (Collingwood (1945), p. 59)

the world, thereby lending credence to a notion of a world beyond this one? Is that the meaning of transcendence?

To have standing is to have substance or being – the Greek *ousia* having both meanings. The substance of being is having standing, and this is to exist. Existence is a standing out, and in this ‘being out’ there is implied something ‘out’ of which the standing itself is. These are grounds upon which a thing stands. However, is the ground solid? Existence is hardly solid, as the passing nature of world reality indicates. The ground of existence is of a fluid nature. Nothing actually rests there; it is all in motion. Nevertheless, does not the standing point to solidity, to a persistence of ‘something’? Persistence comes from the same root as existence as does the word resistance. Something that is true persists, possesses being, and so resists going out of existence. It persists in memory.

Truth, in ancient Greek, is *aletheia*, the negation of (*a-*) forgetfulness (*lethe*). In this manner and from this ground the truth *stands out* or ex-ists. As detailed in previous works, the truth does not exist, it ex-ists. That truth ex-ists points to the persistence struggle for a thing to emerge from out of a ground, a hiding, what conceals the thing, such that the thing’s coming out breaks the ground and thus allows it to stand. To have standing, moreover, is to have existence. Existence is standing in being; something is there, present, and thus a thing in the world. That a thing persists in being points to its being grounded, a ground to which it points in its own coming forth. A thing comes forth onto its truth through the grounded action of resisting its own forgetfulness, to put truth into a reflective context.

Reflectively, the truth stands out of its own forgetfulness, thereby revealing the ground against which it stands. Also, paradoxically, the truth, in its coming to ex-ist, stands *for* that ground. In coming onto itself, in reaching the stage of existence – both stage and existence being progeny of the Latin *stare* – the thing has taken in that ground’s nutritive value. Incorporating and thus embodying the ground, the truth breaks forth, carrying the ground with it in its new and singular form. The force of its own becoming thus requires it to break the surface of the ground, which we may also call a tradition, the surface appearance of that tradition being its *present form*. That which is present at hand (Heidegger) is the surface appearance that the living truth necessarily must break through in standing out for itself. The struggle for truth is the embodying of nutritive ground while breaking with the surface appearance. Preserving the ground, the struggle to say what the truth is, breaks *with* it. *Differance* is the ground

breaking news – how that tradition becomes re-grounded within the *space* – the *stage* – of that *upstart*.

Startling those for whom the tradition is a secured thing, the ground unquestionably secure, this upstart makes his mark. Is this news startling? That which startles and so upsets is the struggle from out of one's own forgetfulness. Saying what the truth is stands (*stat*) out (*ex-*) of reflection upon forgetfulness. In that way the true-saying (verdict) continually remembers its fluid motion or movement. The ground's fluidity, moreover, pertains to a persistent movement, and is not merely flux and fluid. This standing ground is the movement, to employ the Greek form, of ecstatic existence or ex-istence. The fluidity is structured – built out of – the embodying of the ground's nutritive value *and* the breaking with that tradition's present form. So, in speaking of the grounds of existence commonly called 'being,' the mind worker is led to the conclusion that the grounds are both solid and fluid. The ground's solidity is what allows for the standing upon even as that 'standing' needs to be continually re-achieved through posing the question of how that ground 'grounds.'

To rise and lift oneself out of the ground, implying by the process of becoming, is named by the tradition of Western philosophy as *Aufgehoben*, from the German *heben*, meaning to lift. In the Latin tongue one speaks of transcendence. The 'transcendent' names the possibility for a thing to rise out of at ground and so lift itself up. In this rising and coming forth, the thing stands out. This standing out receives another name from ancient Greek, namely, *ecstasy*, the equivalent of the Latin based existence. The 'transcendent' is the ecstatic possibility that persists throughout actual existence as its primordial possibility. Primordial refers to what is first *primus* in Latin. That which is first is fundamental and first; it is the archon or leading principle at the bottom of things. In the context of truth-seeking, that which is fundamental is the remembering of one's own forgetfulness. That the truth ex-ists means that it breaks with the ground of that forgetfulness, while preserving its power for life in new form. This new life form, this upstart, is the startling news that arises out of posing the question of what is first.

What is fundamental? In speaking of what is fundamental, the mind worker does so as part of his reflection upon the relationship between world reality and the Real. How is that possible? Is not the Real One? In speaking this difference – *la differance* – the mind worker identifies the world as other than the Real. Yet fundamental to the world being the world is that it is the instantiation of the One (for humankind), and hence what passes for the One. In this passing for, the world passes away, as the present becomes no longer what is there. In the passing of the (actual)

object of the mind gathering itself from out of its non-mind state. As transcendent object, the Truth is the object pushed out of the movement of its seeking. Truth, in short, is in world reality but not of it.

Does that mean the transcendent object has no objective reality? In no way; but the objectiveness of the transcendent object is rooted in the reality of the subject climbing over that self. The subject of the truth movement is the one ecstatically climbing over the self in pushing from out of the self the object. There is thus no standard object, as correctness might think, but the object that is intimately related to the seeker himself. The transcendent object is not standard – it is not a rule – but it is not unruly either. Ecstasy rules the seeker leading the true life, the life that is ‘being’ for the one living it. Thus, the carpenter is ecstatically living when ‘doing’ carpentry and the plumber when ‘doing’ plumbing. When the doer in question is practicing the art that best becomes that person’s character, the present becomes ecstatic; existence, ex-istence. Thereby does the actor ‘come’ onto being and so ‘is’ One. For, ‘what the actor is,’ his character qua actor now stands out. That is the qua-lity of the actor being what an actor is. Such a performance is a quality act.

The ‘other’ touched upon earlier – the mind worker makes room for the other in letting go of his present conception of reality – is none other than the Platonic Form, the classical icon of the theoretic art. This permits the mind worker to not ‘just’ see the thing – the problematic hair or dirt in Plato’s Parmenides – but the potential for the thing to become a metaphor for its physical reality and thus to climb over itself in the mind’s eye.

To put the relationship between social reality and reality in general in sharper relief, I consider art. This is the vehicle of transcendence. It is the means whereby the physical reality of a thing becomes translated into a metaphor for itself, and so a creature of human art. The mind worker then sees the thing not ‘just’ as it is but as what points to an art; the purely natural thing as an art ‘moment,’ has become significant. At the most abstract and general level, this is the movement signified by the One that is One becoming ‘a one which is.’

In the Parmenides, the bend in the road at 142 b, the movement from the One to a ‘one that is’ occurs. The One exists untouched by human hands and existing mutely and dumbly (relative to us) within itself. It becomes (for us) an intelligible thing when captured as a moment of socio-linguistic reality. It thereby assumes intelligible or rational existence as a thing for which we are able to give an account of and so account for. So we ‘grasp’ its meaning, ‘perceive/take’ it as ‘something’ and ‘capture’ it with attributes, categories and schemas. It is now a socialized ‘object,’ its strangeness tamed or domesticated. However, it is not an object precisely

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- 37) Socrates compares the philosophical and sophistical life to show the superiority of the former over the latter.

The sophist's definition (31) displays great cynicism towards all qualities, presuming that it can turn bad into good by the manipulation of words. Can qualities be so easily turned? Or is that not but slight-of-hand, a prestidigitation that is at root a fraud? As Socrates comments: 'he cannot meet these (crooked things) by just and honest practice, and so resorts to lies and to the policy of repaying one wrong with another; thus he is constantly being bent and distorted, and in the end grows up to manhood with a mind that has no health in it, having now become – in his own eyes – a man of ability and wisdom.' (173a-b)⁶

By comparison, when discussing the philosopher: 'His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these things are of little or no account, spurns them and pursues its winged way, as Pindar says, throughout the universe, 'in the deeps below the earth' and 'in the heights above the heaven'; geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing in the heavens; tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, and never condescending to what lies near at hand.'⁷ Socrates illustrates this idea by the well known story of Thales, an early pre-Socratic thinker, who fell into a well because his wild desire to know what was in the heavens blinded him to the more mundane reality about him (see 173c-174b)⁸

How can one decide between these two images? The resolution will come in the *Sophist* where Plato will give sophistry its philosophical due, namely, as a means to induce the *aporia*. I shall dwell upon this point in greater detail when examining the *Sophist* and will say here the following: the *aporia* means no way literally and generally means confusion. The sophist's cleverness is able through a deft manipulation of words able to cast doubt upon the facile and unquestioned veracity of a position, inducing those who have yet to reflect upon their understanding of reality to do so. Having been forced to face contradictions within their speaking, the naïve suffer the loss of their native state of mind and have become wiser as a result. Cleverness' place is to induce the loss of naïve certainty. It thus has a place in wisdom precisely because it is not wisdom and could aid the achievement of wisdom. Sophistry is not wisdom however because suffering confounding is not the aim of inquiry; but the greater appreciation of the limit with which all the approximations of it resound and whose final understanding resides at infinity. To grow straight and

⁶ Plato, 1997, p. 192.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 193.

⁸ See op. cit., p. 193.

tall, which bespeaks philosophical stature and thus avoid becoming crooked and bent, the sophistic fate, is to always aim for the infinite from out of the finite. That is the Good.

Sophistry exceeds cleverness' limit and thus becomes unwise – a smart-Alex who becomes the most deceived by his pseudo-wisdom. The height of cleverness which tends to *hubris*, arrogance, is its presumption in turning a thing so easily into its opposite, this supposing god-like powers denying the very being of the thing. So, the sophistic as opposed to the philosophical good, is the much narrower and cramped material and actual goods that are but approximations, shadows on the cave wall, rather than the Good, which is infinite. This is why the sophist sells his wisdom, his good being a commodity, a thing easily alienated from his person and exchanged for money, the external value form. The sophist is the merchant of wisdom who exchanges wisdom for cleverness, a superior for an inferior good, because of the crooked growth of his mind, no longer oriented to the Good but its external and alienated counterparts. In becoming inferior to his own possible (philosophical) self the sophist displays thus the greatest lack of wisdom.

The above comments indicate a relationship between wisdom and knowledge. Firstly, wisdom is not knowledge or inquiry, the infinite value not the finite. Wisdom is unbounded and knowledge bounded. Wisdom is what those who desire to know approach, and that is knowledge's end, through continually returning to the source of inquiry, wonder. Knowledge begins in wonder and ends in wisdom. Knowledge can degenerate into cleverness, thus the smart-Alex, if the motion is interfered with, the straight becoming warped because of great stress placed upon its vulnerable growth. Knowledge is the totality of approximations according to the fractal conception of reality; wisdom is knowledge qua knowledge, the spirit of enquiry that keeps faith with the infinite end implicit in finite form. It is thus not determined by a particular set of propositions, not even those of fractal logic, but by this more general idea. Fractal logic, if I am to avoid becoming sophistic, is a *metaphor* or image on the cave wall whose utility lies in pointing the mind to this more general idea.

Returning to the formal argument (177d) I summarize its next stage:

- 38) Being is forever in motion.
- 39) What is right can seem right only to one and not necessarily to anyone else.
- 40) There is none heroic enough to challenge a community (the many's) sense of goodness.
- 41) The implication is that what is good is a matter of majority opinion.

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