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The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition

Edited by John Sellars

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of titles of ancient texts generally follow those listed in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edn). For the sake of convenience those most commonly used in this volume are listed below, along with a few other general abbreviations. Some chapters make use of further abbreviations specific to their content, and these are explained in their notes.

Ancient Authors

Cicero

Acad.	*Academica* (*On Academic Scepticism*)
Div.	*De divinatione* (*On Divination*)
Fat.	*De fato* (*On Fate*)
Fin.	*De finibus* (*On Moral Ends*)
Nat. D	*De natura deorum* (*On the Nature of the Gods*)
Off.	*De officiis* (*On Duties*)
Parad.	*Paradoxa Stoicorum* (*Paradoxes of the Stoics*)
Tusc.	*Tusculanae disputationes* (*Tusculan Disputations*)

Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius

Epictetus

Diss.	*Dissertationes* (*Discourses*)
Ench.	*Enchiridion* (*Handbook*)

Plutarch

Comm. not.	*De communibus notitiis* (*On Common Conceptions*)
Stoic. rep.	*De Stoicorum repugnantiis* (*On Stoic Self-Contraditions*)
Virt. mor.	*De virtute morali* (*On Moral Virtue*)

Seneca

Ben.	*De beneficiis* (*On Benefits*)
Clem.	*De clementia* (*On Clemency*)

Constant.	*De constantia sapientis* (*On the Constancy of the Sage*)
Ep.	*Epistulae* (*Letters*)
Ira	*De ira* (*On Anger*)
Prov.	*De providentia* (*On Providence*)
QNat.	*Quaestiones naturales* (*Natural Questions*)

Sextus Empiricus

Math.	*Adversus mathematicos* (*Against the Professors*)
Pyr.	*Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes* (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*)
Stob.	Stobaeus (where references are followed by WH they refer to the volume, page,line numbers of the edition by Wachsmuth and Hense; where they do not, they refer to book.chapter.section)

Other Abbreviations

IG	Inwood, B., and Gerson, L. P., *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997)
LS	Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. N., *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
SVF	*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–24)

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INTRODUCTION

John Sellars

This volume is devoted to the reception and influence of the ancient philosophy of Stoicism in Western thought from antiquity to the present. For want of a better title and for the sake of convenience we have called it a handbook to "the Stoic tradition," although it would be a mistake to suggest that there existed any kind of continuous tradition of Stoic thought any time after the second century CE. Instead we find a variety of appropriations and resurrections of Stoic ideas along with numerous critical engagements with the ancient Stoic texts that survived beyond the end of antiquity. While each of these encounters with Stoicism may seem isolated and limited when taken on its own, what is striking is just how many of these encounters there have been, primarily in philosophy but also in theology, political theory, and literature. Taken together they show just how widespread the influence of Stoic ideas has been on Western thought. The aim of this volume is to offer a map outlining this impact, drawing on and pointing to a wide range of existing work but also offering some new discussions along the way. The hope is that this volume really will be a *handbook* to the Stoic tradition, giving readers a guide with which to orientate themselves in this complex and multidisciplinary topic.[1]

Planning and preparing this volume has also brought home the fact that it is a handbook in another sense too, for it certainly cannot claim to offer encyclopedic coverage of the impact of Stoic ideas from antiquity to the present. Even if the volume were twice its current size, it would still be foolhardy to claim that every aspect of the topic might have been covered. In short, this is simply a *handbook* to the Stoic tradition, and not an encyclopedia. Nevertheless, the hope is that it contains enough to give the reader the broad contours of the reception of Stoicism and perhaps even prompts further work on aspects not fully covered here.

Readers turning to this volume are (I suspect) likely to fall into two broad groups: students of ancient philosophy curious to learn more about the afterlife of Stoicism; and students of some later author or period who have encountered references to Stoicism and are keen to learn more about the impact of Stoic ideas. For the sake of the second group in particular it may be helpful to open with a few comments on both the doctrines and history of Hellenistic Stoicism.[2]

The Stoics were materialists or physicalists: only bodies exist. In contrast to Plato, they rejected the existence of universal concepts and embraced a form of nominalism. They identified the cosmos with God. God is characterized as either Nature, or the *pneuma*

("breath") within Nature, or the Reason (*logos*) within Nature. Everything that happens within the cosmos is determined by previous causes, yet at the same time God providentially orders events. Periodically the whole cosmos is destroyed by fire and then reborn, creating an eternal cycle. Just as God is the *pneuma* pervading the cosmos as a whole, so a human's soul is the *pneuma* pervading its body. This *pneuma* can be in varying degrees of tension. The *pneuma* in a physical object gives it its cohesion. The tenser *pneuma* in a plant gives it its life. Even tenser *pneuma* in animals gives them perception, and in humans higher levels of tension give consciousness and rationality. Thus the Stoics were able to give completely physical accounts of virtue, wisdom, and reason, all of which are simply *pneuma* in the soul disposed in a certain state.[3]

Stoic ethics begins with the idea that every animal desires its own self-preservation and strives always to preserve its own physical constitution. Consequently an animal will always pursue whatever is good for it (or in accord with its own nature) and reject whatever is harmful. For an irrational animal these goods will be things such as food and shelter; for a rational animal, however, pursuing those things that preserve rationality will also become important, things such as wisdom and virtue. For the Stoics only virtue (*aretê*) is properly speaking good and only vice is properly speaking bad. Virtue may be characterized as an excellent state of mind. Everything else – including wealth, health, and other externals – is strictly speaking an "indifferent" (*adiaphoron*). However, the Stoics acknowledge that while wealth may not be intrinsically good, it is often better to be rich than poor, just as it is better to be healthy rather than ill. Thus they classify wealth and health as "preferred indifferents" (*adiaphora proêgmena*), and call poverty (along with illness) "non-preferred indifferents" (*adiaphora apoproêgmena*). While there is nothing wrong with choosing wealth rather than poverty (indeed, it is perfectly natural to the extent that it contributes to one's self-preservation), it is not necessary in order to live well, and pursuing it should never get in the way of one's pursuit of virtue, which is sufficient on its own to secure happiness (*eudaimonia*). A virtuous life is identified with a rational life and a life in harmony with Nature. Harmful emotions (*pathê*), which hamper our ability to live well and compromise our rationality, are the product of value judgements. They result from judging that external entities or states of affairs are really good or bad, rather than being merely "indifferents."[4]

These are some of the central ideas of Stoic philosophy as we understand them today. However it is important to stress that, even in its original incarnation in Athens, Stoicism was not a fixed set of doctrines adopted by unthinking disciples. The Hellenistic Stoics were philosophers and, like all philosophers, were prone to argue among themselves. The Roman Stoic Seneca famously said "we Stoics are not subjects of a despot; each of us lays claim to his own freedom" (*Ep.* 33.4). Some commentators have tried to downplay this remark, suggesting that as a rule members of all the Hellenistic schools had a strong sense of loyalty to the school's founder, in this case Zeno of Citium (Sedley 1989: 97–9). Zeno founded the "school" in Athens around 300 BCE,[5] after having studied with the Cynic Crates, the Megarian Stilpo, and Polemo in Plato's Academy (Diog. Laert. 7.2). It was not Zeno but, so the story goes, the school's third head Chrysippus of Soli who really developed Stoicism into the systematic body of thought that was to prove so influential. A gifted logician, Chrysippus is reported to have written some 705 books.[6] As Diogenes Laertius put it, "if there had been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa" (7.183). However the idea of a philosophy as an abstract system of thought is very much a modern one, gaining currency in the eighteenth century (see Catana 2008), even if the Stoics did emphasize the unity of their own philosophy (see e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.41–3). In the ancient world and for a long time after, histories of philosophy were written as histories made up of philosophers, not philosophies, with those

philosophers grouped into schools. Thus the story of the Hellenistic Stoa is above all a story about a series of individual philosophers who self-identified as "Stoics." Initially this reflected the fact that the founding members of the school met at a particular place, the Painted Stoa on the northern edge of the Agora in Athens, but over time came to reflect a commitment to a shared set of philosophical views.[7] Even so, as Seneca's comment highlights, the Hellenistic Stoics did not agree upon everything and we have numerous reports of later Stoics disagreeing with the supposedly orthodox Stoic view on one topic or another.[8] We might wonder whether there was indeed a core set of philosophical views to which all Stoics subscribed, or simply a set of philosophical family resemblances that meant no one doctrine was sacrosanct, or perhaps just an ever-developing tradition of thought that happened to be able to trace a line of succession back to Zeno's gatherings at the Painted Stoa. However we might prefer to answer that question, the point worth emphasizing here is that the Hellenistic Stoa was itself a developing tradition of thought, founded by Zeno, strongly identified with Chrysippus, but embracing a wide range of other philosophers too, from Aristo and Cleanthes to Panaetius and Posidonius.[9] Although originally associated with the Painted Stoa in Athens, even in the Hellenistic period we find Stoics active in other parts of the ancient Mediterranean world, most notably Posidonius at Rhodes and Athenodorus in Pergamum.[10] Even in the Hellenistic period, then, Stoicism was a rich and diverse movement, a living tradition as complex as its reception in the periods since antiquity discussed in the chapters that follow. The significant difference of course is that few since antiquity have explicitly described themselves as Stoics.[11]

The living tradition of masters and pupils who could trace their lineage back to Zeno was over by the end of the Hellenistic period.[12] Cicero, who wrote our earliest and in some ways most important accounts of Stoicism, visited Athens at a time when the Athenian schools were more or less at an end, but he did manage to attend the lectures of Posidonius in Rhodes, making him one of the last people to have first-hand knowledge of the Athenian Stoic tradition.[13] The first few centuries of our era saw many philosophers who explicitly identified themselves as Stoics but they now depended on texts for their knowledge of Athenian Stoic philosophy. Even so new Stoic communities developed. Seneca was in close contact with a number of others who embraced Stoicism,[14] including his nephew Lucan, Cornutus, and the poet Persius who is reported to have owned a collection of more or less all of Chrysippus's works.[15] Around the same time, Musonius Rufus lectured on Stoicism in Rome and his lectures were attended by a slave called Epictetus, who would go on to found his own school in Nicopolis on the western coast of Greece after gaining his freedom. Students at Epictetus's school studied works by Chrysippus, while continually being reminded to apply Stoicism to their daily lives (see e.g. *Diss.* 1.4.14; 1.17.13–18). Reports of Epictetus's lectures were recorded by one of his students, the historian Arrian, and these proved to be a decisive influence on the young Marcus Aurelius, who wrote his own notes "to himself" towards the end of his life. Other Stoics from this period for whom we have texts include Cleomedes (on astronomy) and Hierocles (on ethics).[16] Throughout this period the texts of Chrysippus were still readily available, as we can see from the frequent quotations in authors such as Plutarch and Galen; by late antiquity these were seemingly all lost.[17] Since then the reception of Stoic ideas has been closely bound up with the transmission of texts either by later Stoics or by other, often hostile authors reporting Stoic views.[18]

What did these texts say? What were the ideas that came to define Stoicism for later generations, including us? The doctrines that probably had the biggest impact on later generations were the claims that virtue (*aretê*) is the highest good and is sufficient for happiness (*eudaimonia*), that the soul is undivided and rational, meaning that emotions (*pathê*) are

the product of judgments under one's control, and that the cosmos is a single living being, identified with God, of which we are all parts.[19] However, precisely what "Stoicism" meant to later readers is especially complex, for it changed throughout its long and varied reception. As we have just seen, in the first two centuries CE Athenian Stoic texts seem to have circulated widely and a range of authors from this period quote from works by Chrysippus, in the process becoming our main sources of knowledge for his ideas.[20] However, the number of direct quotations from his works by authors in late antiquity is much lower. The late Neoplatonist Simplicius records a variety of pieces of information about Stoicism in his commentaries on Aristotle but he himself admits that in many cases he is drawing on the reports of now lost works by Porphyry (see *in Categorias* 2,5–9; 334,1–3). Simplicius also wrote a commentary on the *Handbook* of Epictetus, co-opting it into the Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum as a guide to preparatory moral training (Hadot 1996). His teacher Damascius mentions members of the "school of Epictetus" in his *Historia philosophia* (Athanassiadi 1999: 136–7), while Olympiodorus engages with Epictetus in his commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* (Jackson et al. 1998: 146–9).

This late ancient interest in Epictetus in the Greek-speaking Eastern Mediterranean appears to have influenced the Byzantine and Arabic traditions. The Byzantine scholar, book collector, and sometime archbishop Arethas of Caesarea owned copies of both the *Discourses* of Epictetus and the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius during a period that was crucial in the history of the transmission of ancient Greek texts.[21] It was possibly around this time, or perhaps earlier, that some of the Christian adaptations of Epictetus's *Handbook* were made (texts in Boter 1999). The *Handbook* was revised for Christian use by the replacement of pagan references with Christian ones. In one of the three Christian adaptations that survive references to Socrates are replaced by ones to St Paul (Boter 1999: 387). This same version, the *Paraphrasis Christiana*, also attracted an anonymous Greek commentary, which has been dated to the ninth or tenth century (Spanneut 2007: 82–4). In the next century another Stoic author, Cleomedes, also attracted attention and was referred to in a number of works by the philosopher Michael Psellus, including his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Todd 1992: 2).

In the Arabic tradition Epictetus may have also exerted his influence. It has been suggested that the first Arabic philosopher of note, al-Kindi, quoted from Epictetus's *Handbook* a number of times in his *On the Art of Averting Sorrows* (Boter 1999: 117). As al-Kindi did not read Greek himself, this suggests that either Epictetus's *Handbook* was translated into Arabic, or that extracts from it were included in a collection of wisdom literature translated into Arabic (see Adamson and Pormann 2012: 245–8). Al-Kindi's text went on to influence later Arabic philosophers, including al-Razi and Miskawayh (see Fakhry 1994: 68).

Beyond that, it is difficult to know how much Arabic philosophers might have known about Stoicism. Many texts that we know were translated into Arabic contained Stoic material. These include works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Galen, and Simplicius (Badawi 1987). It is not unreasonable to assume, then, that some knowledge of Stoicism made its way to Arabic students of Greek philosophy, who would have known it as *Riwaqiyah* (from *riwaq*, meaning "arcade" or "portico"). However, whether these fragmentary bits of information made any great philosophical impact is much harder to assess. While some scholars have claimed a clear Stoic influence on Arabic philosophy (e.g. Jadaane 1968), others have remained far more cautious about claiming any great Stoic impact on Arabic philosophy (e.g. Gutas 1993). The general consensus among scholars of Arabic philosophy seems to be that in the current state of scholarship it is simply too early to make any substantive claims about a Stoic influence. As Dimitri Gutas has commented, "the Arabic counterparts to both von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* and Marcia Colish's *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* remain to be written" (Gutas 1993: 4961; cf. Riet 1974).

In the Latin West the picture is a bit clearer. The principal sources of knowledge in the early Middle Ages were the works of Cicero and Seneca, supplemented with others such as Boethius, Calcidius and, of course, Augustine. Cicero in particular was a vital source. The young Augustine read his philosophical works and his teacher, Ambrose, modeled his *On Duties* on Cicero's work of the same name, which in turn was drawing on the Stoic Panaetius (Colish 1990: II 58ff.). Manuscript evidence shows that Cicero's works were transmitted together and were circulating in France in the ninth century (Reynolds 1983: 124–5). They were known in the circle surrounding Charlemagne, and Charlemagne's biographer, Einhard, quotes from the *Tusculan Disputations* (ibid.: 132–3).

Seneca, by contrast, appears to have been somewhat neglected until the twelfth century, at which point his *Letters* started to circulate more widely, with his *Dialogues* gaining renewed attention in the thirteenth century (ibid.: 359; see also Reynolds 1965, 1968). The *Natural Questions* also started to receive attention around this time (Hine 1995: 207–8). Seneca's reception among Christian readers was shaped in no small part by the existence of a series of letters purporting to be between Seneca and St Paul, along with the judgements of various church fathers (see Ross 1974). Jerome's brief biography of Seneca in his *On Illustrious Men* was especially influential (Ker 2009: 182–5). It was also helped by the fact that Martin of Braga's *Rules for an Honest Life*, perhaps based on a lost work by Seneca, was mistakenly attributed to him (Colish 1990: II 297–302). Indeed, church fathers such as Tertullian, Lactantius, Jerome, and Augustine would prove to be important sources for both explicit judgements about Stoicism as well as implicit reworkings of Stoic ideas (Spanneut 1957; Colish 1990). Augustine's attitude towards Stoicism was especially complex, developed during his life, and varied depending upon the issue at hand. Unsurprisingly his views carried significant authority for later readers (see Sellars 2013).

The Renaissance saw the rediscovery of a wide range of texts that are now central to our knowledge of Stoicism, not least the *Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius (see further Palmer, Chapter 8 in this volume). Some of the foremost personalities of the Italian Renaissance played their part in preserving and disseminating Stoic texts. Cardinal Bessarion made a copy of Cleomedes (Todd 1992: 3), while Niccolò Perotti and Angelo Poliziano both translated Epictetus into Latin (Oliver 1954; Kraye, Chapter 9 in this volume). This period also saw the loss of some "Stoic" texts, such as when Lorenzo Valla questioned the authenticity of the correspondence between Seneca and St Paul that had done so much to make Seneca an acceptable author for Christian readers (Pfeiffer 1976: 40; Palmer, Chapter 8 in this volume).

The birth of printing transformed the availability of a wide range of texts. Among the earliest texts to be printed were Cicero's *Paradoxes of the Stoics* and *On Duties*, in 1465, by the famous Mainz printers Johann Fust and Peter Schoeffer (Stillwell 1972: 27). These were followed not long after by the *Tusculan Disputations*, printed in Rome in 1469 (ibid.: 50). Further works by Cicero followed in the 1470s, along with the *Lives* of Diogenes Laertius in the Latin translation of Ambrosius Traversarius and the philosophical works of Seneca.[22] By the end of the fifteenth century over seventy editions of works by Seneca had been printed (Goff 1964: 555–8). By contrast the works of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius had to wait until the sixteenth century to make their first appearances in print: the *Handbook* was first printed in 1529 (but also appeared the year before embedded within the first edition of Simplicius's commentary); the *Discourses* were printed in 1533; Marcus Aurelius in 1558. Cleomedes was printed for the first time in 1539.[23]

The sixteenth century saw not only the remainder of the most important sources for Stoicism appear in print but also the beginnings of a modern commentary tradition on Stoic

texts. Unsurprisingly the first Stoic to receive close attention was Seneca. Erasmus prepared an annotated edition of Seneca's prose works in 1515 and, ultimately dissatisfied with the result, another edition in 1529 (Papy 2002). A young Calvin wrote a commentary on Seneca's *On Clemency*, published in 1532 (Battles and Hugo 1969). Other annotated editions of the period worth noting include Muret's of 1585 (Kraye 2005).

For the most part the reception of Stoicism in the Middle Ages and up to the end of the Renaissance was dominated by ethical ideas found in the works of Seneca and Cicero. It was perhaps only in the seventeenth century that the full range of Stoic doctrines in logic, physics, and ethics came to light in the wake of a number of major publications connected to Stoicism that heralded the birth of modern Stoic scholarship.[24] Foremost among these were the pair of handbooks devoted to Stoic philosophy by Justus Lipsius (Lipsius 1604a, 1604b). These volumes tried for the first time to gather together systematically the *fragmenta* and *testimonia* for the Stoics from ancient authors. They were conceived as supplements to his monumental edition of Seneca published the following year (Morford 2006; Papy 2002), which was reprinted in a variety of formats throughout the century.

While Lipsius attended to Seneca, in France Guillaume du Vair focused attention on Epictetus, translating the *Handbook* into French for the first time (1585) and writing treatises on Stoic moral philosophy, including his *La philosophie morale des stoïques*, largely based on Epictetus (Michaut 1945). Around the same time the German humanist Caspar Scioppius (Kaspar Schoppe) published his *Elementa philosophiae Stoicae moralis* (Scioppius 1606). Scioppius was a close friend of Lipsius and shared his desire to present a new Christianized version of Stoicism. Whereas Lipsius's two works were primarily scholarly in intent, Scioppius's book was part of an attempt to promote the teaching of Stoicism in Catholic schools (Kraye 2008). Later authors such as Leibniz cited Lipsius and Scioppius together as modern champions of Stoicism (*Theodicy* §353, in Leibniz 1951: 337).

To these we can also add Daniel Heinsius's oration *De Stoica philosophia* (in Heinsius 1612), an exhortation to embrace Stoicism,[25] and Isaac Casaubon's celebrated edition of the satires of Seneca's nephew, Persius (Casaubon 1605). The brief text of Persius (23 pages) is followed by a massive commentary (558 pages) full of information about Stoicism. The scale of the commentary famously led Joseph Scaliger to comment that the sauce was better than the meat (Sandys 1903–8: II 209). Although not as systematic as Lipsius's two works printed a year earlier, Casaubon's efforts also make an important contribution to early scholarship on Stoicism.[26]

In the next generation, Isaac's son, Meric Casaubon, would go on to translate Marcus Aurelius into English (1634), coining the title *Meditations* in the process, and then editing the text as well (1643). He also edited for the first time one of the Christian paraphrases of the *Handbook* of Epictetus (1659). At the same time Thomas Gataker was working on his own edition of Marcus Aurelius, with a substantial commentary filling over 400 pages (1652). It has been said that there is little in von Arnim's modern collection of fragments for the early Stoics that is not already cited somewhere in Gataker's commentary (Kraye 2000: 117).

On the continent there was a flurry of scholarly work on Stoicism towards the end of the century that continued into the next, with theses and other essays published in Jena, Halle, Leipzig, Uppsala, and elsewhere (see the bibliographical guide in Heumann 1716). Among these the works of Jakob Thomasius (1676, 1682) stand out.[27] Around the same time André and Anne Dacier translated and annotated Marcus Aurelius (1690–91), and André also worked on Epictetus (1715). Stoicism also benefited from the development of the history of philosophy as a discipline, culminating in the publication of Johann Jakob Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae*, first published in 1742–44. These scholarly accounts of Stoicism were all

written in Latin but the eighteenth century also saw the continuing advancement of vernacular languages as media for philosophical work. Those Stoic texts that had not yet been translated into the principal European vernaculars were translated for the first time.[28] For readers of English, Elizabeth Carter translated the *Discourses* of Epictetus, published in 1758.[29]

The early nineteenth century saw the publication of a number of significant scholarly editions of Stoic texts. The year 1800 saw the completion of Johann Schweighäuser's major edition of Epictetus, the five volume *Epicteteae philosophiae monumenta*. A few years later Jan Bake published the first collection of fragments for Posidonius in 1810 (Bake 1810), followed by an edition of Cleomedes in 1820. The evidence for Musonius Rufus was also gathered together for the first time (Peerlkamp 1822). These textual efforts were supplemented by further specialist studies.[30] In general, however, the early nineteenth century was a period of relative decline for the study of Stoicism, with German classical scholars and historians of philosophy more interested in Plato and Aristotle than the Hellenistic schools (see Ierodiakonou 1999). There were exceptions, of course, and in particular one might note the work of the French philosopher Félix Ravaisson (1856).

Towards the end of the century there was a fresh flurry of interest, with new scholarly works by Brochard (1879), Weygoldt (1883), Ogereau (1885), Stein (1886–88), Schmekel (1892), Dyroff (1897), and, on Epictetus, Bonhöffer (1890, 1894), among others. Around the same time Pearson produced an edition of the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes (Pearson 1891), only to be trumped in the next decade when Hans von Arnim published his three volume collection of the fragments of the early Stoics in 1903 and 1905 (Arnim 1903–5; the fourth volume of indices was issued later, in 1924). Despite its limitations and a number of attempts to replace it, von Arnim's collection remains an essential point of reference for the study of the early Stoa (for Stoic logic there is now Hülser 1987). By this date, students of Stoicism had access not only to von Arnim's major collection but also to a fairly full set of critical editions of the later Stoic authors, all issued by the German publishing firm Teubner.[31]

The publication of von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* seems in many ways an appropriate place to end this brief survey. However von Arnim's collection itself highlights the fact that the body of extant ancient Stoic literature was far from static even then, for it included a number of Stoic texts and *testimonia* that had only recently been discovered in papyri. These included fragments of treatises by Chrysippus that had been recovered from the scrolls found at Herculaneum, notably parts of his work *Logical Questions*.[32] Von Arnim had edited one of these finds himself a few years before the publication of his collection (Arnim 1890). An equally important find used by von Arnim was Philodemus's history of the Stoa, the *Index Stoicorum Herculanensis*.[33]

Beyond his work on the evidence for the early Stoa, von Arnim also edited another significant Stoic find on papyrus: the *Elements of Ethics* of Hierocles (Arnim 1906), a theoretical ethical treatise the rediscovery of which has done much to change the way in which we think about Stoicism in the Roman period.[34] A less significant but still noteworthy discovery was a papyrus fragment from the diatribes of Musonius Rufus, edited and published by Enoch Powell in 1936 (Enoch Powell 1936).

Since then further new Stoic texts have been recovered from the Herculaneum scrolls (see Marrone 1987, 1988; Dorandi 2005). These include further fragments from Chrysippus (Marrone 1997) and a second work by Philodemus devoted to Stoicism (Dorandi 1982). Whether there will be more finds it is hard to say. Marcello Gigante, director of the Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi in Naples for many years, commented that he thought it highly likely that there would be further Stoic discoveries (Gigante 1995: 3), but we shall have to wait and see.

The availability of Stoic texts and sources for otherwise lost Stoic texts has inevitably had its impact on the story of the reception of Stoic ideas, although naturally it is far from being the only factor at play. It is one of a number of factors that have contributed to the ways in which "Stoicism" has meant different things at different times to different readers. We saw earlier that Stoicism was very much a living tradition in the Hellenistic period and the meaning of "Stoicism" has been equally fluid ever since. Now the situation is perhaps a bit more settled, for the last half-century or so has seen a flourish of academic scholarship on Stoicism, putting our knowledge of Stoic philosophy on a much firmer footing.[35]

I shall not attempt to summarize the contents of each chapter that follows, as some introductions to edited volumes try to do; each contribution is very capable of speaking for itself. The contributors have backgrounds in a variety of disciplines and approach their topics in a number of different ways. This variation in approach reflects the wide range of subjects, authors, and periods that the volume as a whole addresses, and it would have been too restrictive to try to impose uniformity of approach. I hope that this variety will be welcome for those brave souls who hope to tackle the entire volume from start to finish, and not just dip in and out for particular chapters of interest. Taken together, the chapters that follow do not say everything there is to be said about the impact of Stoicism on Western thought, but hopefully they offer the reader a fairly full introduction to what we are here calling the Stoic tradition.

Notes

1 Understandably there have been few attempts to map such a large terrain in a single volume and none so far as I am aware in English (except Wenley 1924, a relatively brief essay aimed at a general audience). Spanneut 1973 offers a survey in French, while Neymeyr et al. 2008 offers more substantial coverage in German by multiple hands, filling forty-three chapters in two volumes. Strange and Zupko 2004 offers a smaller collection of studies, based on a conference. There have been more attempts to cover just parts of the story: for example, for late antiquity see Colish 1990; for the Middle Ages see Verbeke 1983 and Ingham 2007; for the Renaissance onwards see Zanta 1914 (now dated), Abel 1978, and Moreau 1999 (a collection of papers). The reception of Stoicism has also been examined alongside that of the other Hellenistic schools in Osler 1991 and Miller and Inwood 2003.

2 Readers looking for an overview might consult Sellars 2006 and, in more detail, Inwood 2003.

3 For the doctrines mentioned in this paragraph see the texts in LS 27B, 45A–H, 46A, 55J–N, 46H–K, 47P, with Sellars 2006: 81–106.

4 For the doctrines mentioned in this paragraph see the texts in LS 57A, 58A–B, 63A–C, 65G–K, with Sellars 2006: 107–34.

5 On the meaning of "school" in this context see Dorandi 1999.

6 The figure of 705 is provided by Diogenes Laertius at 7.180, who also records a substantial list of titles at 7.189–202. That list is examined and annotated in Goulet 1989–: II 336–61.

7 It is worth noting that Zeno's earliest followers called themselves "Zenonians," only adopting the name "Stoics" later on (see Diog. Laert. 7.5). The change perhaps reflected a desire not to be bound by the doctrines of the founder.

8 Well-known examples include Aristo of Chios on the distinction between different types of "indifferents" (Diog. Laert. 7.160) and Boethus of Sidon on the cosmos being a living being (Diog. Laert. 7.143).

9 The early Stoics included in von Arnim's *SVF* (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*) are Zeno, Aristo, Apollophanes, Herillus, Dionysius of Heraclea, Persaeus, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Archedemus, Boethus of Sidon, Basilides, Eudromus, and Crinis. To these we might add Panaetius, Hecato, Posidonius, and (the last heads of the Athenain Stoa) Mnesarchus and Dardanus. For detailed information on all these figures see the entries in Goulet 1989–.

10 For a list of Stoics (and other philosophers) associated with Rhodes see Mygind 1999: 253–9. On the Stoics at Pergamum, including Crates of Mallos and Athenodorus of Tarsus, see Sandys 1903–8: I 144–64 and Pfeiffer 1968: 234–51.

11 The person who comes closest to describing himself as a Stoic is probably Justus Lipsius. The person whom many would point to as coming closest to Stoicism, Benedictus Spinoza, explicitly distanced himself from the title. See chapters by Lagrée (Chapter 11) and Miller (Chapter 15) in this volume.

12 The last recorded heads of the school were Mnesarchus and Dardanus (see Cicero, *Acad.* 2.69). The activity of all the Athenian schools was probably curtailed by the siege of Athens in 86 BCE (see Plutarch, *Sulla* 12.1–13.4 and Appian, *Mith.* 30–45).

13 Cicero refers to Posidonius throughout his works as his teacher and friend: *Fat.* 5–7; *Nat. D.* 1.6, 1.123, 2.88; *Fin.* 1.6; *Tusc.* 2.61 (see Edelstein and Kidd 1972: T30–34); note also Plutarch, *Cicero* 4.5 (Edelstein and Kidd 1972: T29).

14 On Seneca's philosophical contemporaries see Sellars 2014. Another Stoic of this period worth noting is Chaeremon who, like Seneca, is said to have been one of Nero's tutors (although Seneca does not mention him). See further Horst 1984.

15 The ancient biography of Persius (attributed to Suetonius but now credited to Valerius Probus) reports that in his will Persius left around 700 volumes of Chrysippus to Cornutus. On the circulation of Stoic texts in Rome see further Snyder 2000: 14–44 and Grafton and Williams 2006: 41–6.

16 Cleomedes and Hierocles are translated and discussed in Bowen and Todd 2004 and Ramelli 2009 respectively.

17 The authors who quote from Chrysippus's works the most are Plutarch (97 times) and Galen (57, of which 50 derive from two works, *Peri pathôn* (21) and *Peri psukhês* (29)), followed by Diogenes Laertius (43) and Athenaeus (20, of which 14 derive from one work, *Peri tou kalou kai tês hêdonês*). The only late ancient authors to quote him are Stobaeus (5) and Simplicius (4). These figures are based on the indexes in *SVF*.

18 Of these texts the works of Seneca proved especially influential and their reception is discussed in Ross 1974, Dionigi 1999 (by multiple hands), and Trovato 2005. See also Ker 2009: 179–244 and the chapters on Seneca's reception in Bartsch and Schiesaro 2015. For the reception of Epictetus see Boter 2011.

19 For more on the doctrines mentioned here see Sellars 2006: 110–14, 104–6, 114–20, and 91–5.

20 The most important sources of direct quotations from Chysippus are Plutarch and Galen; see note 17 above.

21 Wilson (1996: 42) suggests that Arethas probably played a key role in the transmission of the *Discourses*, while Hadot (1998: 24) suggests that we owe the preservation of the *Meditations* to Arethas.

22 Cicero's *De finibus* was first printed in 1470 and a collection of his philosophical works was printed in 1471 by Sweynheym and Pannartz in Rome (Goff 1964: 177). Traversarius's Diogenes Laertius was first printed in 1472 (Goff 1964: 213). Seneca's *Opera philosophica* were printed in 1475 (Goff 1964: 555).

23 The editions of the Greek text of Epictetus's *Handbook* in 1529 and (with Simplicius) 1528 were preceded by the publication of Poliziano's Latin translation in 1497. For the printing history of Epictetus see Oldfather 1927, 1952; for Marcus see Wickham Legg 1910. For an illustrated guide to early editions of Seneca see Niutta and Santucci 1999.

24 One earlier work *on* Stoicism also worth noting is Barlaam of Seminara's *Ethica secundum Stoicos*, probably written in the 1340s (Migne, *PG* 151, cols 1341–64). Divided into two parts, the first deals with the nature of happiness while the second focuses on the emotions. The text makes no reference to its sources and does not name any individual Stoics, although it may have drawn on Stoic material now lost (see Hogg 1997: 7). Barlaam, a monk from southern Italy, is best remembered as a friend of Petrarch, from whom Petrarch had hoped to learn Greek, but he was also an important intellectual in his own right.

25 Heinsius's oration is discussed in Santinello 1993: 131, where Heinsius is discussed alongside Lipsius (124–9) as part of a wider examination of the study of ancient philosophy in the early modern period.

26 Alongside Lipsius, Scioppius, Heinsius, and Casaubson we might also note Adam Bursius (Burski), a Polish philosopher who defended Stoicism in his *Dialectica Ciceronis* of 1604 (see Heumann 1716: 746).

27 On Thomasius, including his work on Stoicism, see Santinello 1993: 409–42.

28 For Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius see the bibliographies in Oldfather 1927, 1952 and Wickham Legg 1910 respectively.

29 By this date readers of English had Lodge's Seneca (1614), Casaubon's Marcus Aurelius (1634), Diogenes Laertius (1688), Plutarch's *Moralia* (1603, 1683–4). Epictetus's *Handbook* had already been translated multiple times (1567, 1610, 1670, 1692). Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* were first translated in 1561; *On the Nature of the Gods* in 1741; but *On Moral Ends* not until 1812. See further Moss 1837.

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PART I

Antiquity and the Middle Ages

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1

STOICISM IN ROME

Gretchen Reydams-Schils

The extent to which one should treat Stoicism in Rome as the first wave of its reception history depends largely on how one sees the relation between the two main phases in the history of the school, that is, between the founding generations and the Roman tradition. In one common narrative, in its transition from Greece to Rome, Stoicism lost much of its original critical edge and, in adapting itself to Roman sociocultural realities, became greatly diluted. This narrative is in itself a variation of a larger theme going back at least to the nineteenth century that views Latin culture as a weaker derivative of its Greek counterpart. Such a stance has also contributed to the creation of a category typically referred to as middle Stoicism, which consists mostly of Panaetius and Posidonius, prominent Stoics who came in contact with leading Romans of their day. In 155 BCE, the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon was one of three philosophers sent by Athens on a diplomatic mission to Rome (the other two were the Academic Carneades and the Peripatetic Critolaus). Panaetius (*c.*185–110 BCE) spent part of his life in Rome and belonged to the entourage of Scipio Africanus the Younger, while Posidonius (135–50 BCE) was part of a later delegation to Rome. Thus, these Stoics came to be seen as having paved the way in this process of cultural co-optation, allegedly helping to produce a variation of Stoicism that would be more palatable to Roman audiences, such as that which would emerge in Cicero's use of Panaetius as his main source in his *On Duties*. But the narrative of a Stoicism that gradually lost its innovative character can no longer be maintained, on many levels, and for many reasons.

The one Roman who wrote on Stoicism who can also reasonably be said to have endorsed a predominantly Roman sociocultural framework is Cicero. But Cicero was not a Stoic and claimed an Academic-skeptical allegiance for himself (although of which kind is a matter of ongoing debate), even if he turned out to be a very useful source for many central Stoic notions. Indeed, Cicero had an ambivalent attitude toward Stoicism. On the one hand, he was more favorably disposed toward certain aspects of their ethics (such as their handling of the passions in the *Tusculan Disputations* or Panaetius's theory of duties/*officia*) and their theology (their notion of Providence, as in his *On the Nature of the Gods*). On the other, he was very critical of their style of discourse (which he considered crabby, dry, and full of abstruse technical terminology); their ethical notion of preferred indifferents (things such as health and sustenance that are according to nature and do not fall under the good, strictly speaking); their epistemological notion of cognitive (*katalêptic*) impressions (impressions

ultimately, if not always, directly derived from sense perception that are supposed to yield truth); and their notions of fate and human responsibility.

Moreover, even if one can say that Cicero was writing from a distinctly Roman perspective and with his own political agenda, it is a fallacy to assume a priori that these two features would preclude him from being an original thinker and making significant contributions. On the contrary, one can make the case (as, for instance, in the essays collected in Nicgorski 2012) that Cicero had one of the most developed and distinctive views of practical philosophy and the so-called active life available to us from Antiquity.

Just as we cannot treat Cicero as a transparent window onto Stoicism, we also need to be cautious in assuming that Panaetius and Posidonius radically changed the course of Stoicism. Although these Stoics appear to have shown a greater interest also in Plato and Aristotle than their predecessors, we now know, for instance, that the traditional claim that Posidonius made major concessions to Plato, especially in his psychology, has to be taken with a considerable grain of salt, not the least because reports that make him appear to make such concessions, such as Galen's, tend to be polemical attempts to pit the views of different Stoics against one another (Gill 2006; Tieleman 1998, 2007). In reality, the fragmentary state of the extant evidence for the early Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus) makes it difficult to discern to what extent the later Stoics deviated from their line of thought. Moreover, one has to take into account how inner-school authority was construed (see below). One can, however, make the case that many of the distinctive features of later Stoicism are a matter of a different emphasis rather than a radical departure from the original Stoic views.

The Stoics of the Roman imperial era, for their part, do not constitute a homogeneous group. There is evidence of teaching activity on the part of Cornutus (*c.*60 CE) and Musonius Rufus (*c.*30–100 CE), but not much information about its structure. Cornutus, for instance, appears to have taught topics pertaining to grammar as well as philosophy. We know that Epictetus directed a school in Epirus, and other Stoics were engaged in a wide range of practices. Whereas Seneca devoted more time to philosophy as he grew older, addressed others who had similar interests and concerns, and also wrote tragedies, Marcus Aurelius's writings were addressed to himself, and it is not clear whether he intended his reflections for a wider audience. Manilius's work (first century CE) belongs within the tradition of didactic poetry, and Cleomedes's astronomical treatise on the heavens is a rare example of a Stoic technical treatise from this period (*c.*200 CE), as is a work called the *Elements of Ethics* by a certain Hierocles (*fl.* 100 CE). Moreover, a significant strand of Stoic thought shows up in the works of poets such as Persius and Lucan, and Dio Chrysostom, who is an early representative of the Second Sophistic, and was a pupil of Musonius Rufus.

As with the views attested for Panaetius, most writings by the later Stoics tend to focus on ethics in action – on how to lead the good life and face challenges – and put great emphasis on the social dimension of ethics. Rather than endorsing an unreflective conformism, however, these accounts are hermeneutically complex, represent a conscious choice and very specific mode of doing philosophy, and engage critically with prevailing norms, a point to which I will return below. This mode of philosophy by no means indicates that knowledge of the more technical and theoretical aspects of Stoicism was no longer available in this era or that the later Stoics no longer cared about it. The technical aspects of Stoicism were still present in doxographies, compilations of the views of different schools of thought and philosophers, such as the work by Diogenes Laertius (probably early third century CE), which offer insights into the circulation of Stoic works and ideas in all three areas of physics, logic, and ethics. In addition, such critics of the Stoics as Plutarch (*c.*46–120 CE), Galen (129–199/

217 CE), and Alexander of Aphrodisias (*fl.* late second to early third century CE) reveal that the debate about core Stoic tenets, and Chrysippus's teachings in particular, was very much alive in this period.

So, as mentioned already, the apparent differences between earlier and later Stoic discourse appear to be mostly a matter of focus. Cleomedes's exposition on astronomy, Manilius's didactic poem, and Seneca's own *Natural Questions* attest to a continued interest in advanced Stoic physics. In Seneca's other writings (see also Wildberger 2006), he occasionally also likes to demonstrate his knowledge of the Stoic tradition and key technical distinctions in it and other currents of thought (as in *Ep.* 58, 65, 94, and 95; see below). But these expositions may have been little more than finger exercises, just as a skilled orator may occasionally reveal the tools of his trade.

The writings of the Stoic Hierocles (*fl.* 100 CE) demonstrate how misleading the common scholarly view can be that represents the Stoics of the Roman imperial era as engaging in merely popular moralizing. His treatise on ethics (*Elements of Ethics*) now constitutes our best evidence of the highly sophisticated Stoic notion of appropriation (*oikeiôsis*), which stipulates that by nature and from birth, animals and human beings are equipped with a self-awareness and self-love that guides them toward self-preservation (see below). This notion combines insights from both physics (how nature works) and ethics (how human beings should lead their lives), and clearly demonstrates that later Stoics such as Hierocles still had a good grasp of the technical aspects of Stoicism.

These Stoics also apparently still had access to extensive writings by their predecessors, notably Chrysippus. According to the *Life of Persius* (32.35–33.40 Clausen), Cornutus inherited about 700 scrolls of Chrysippus's works from Persius's library. And although sessions of reading Stoic texts are not recorded in the extant evidence of Epictetus's teachings, the expositions do mention that Epictetus's approach partly relied on the writings of his Stoic predecessors, especially those of the prolific and systematic Chrysippus. Epictetus thus practiced commentary as a pedagogical method by reading philosophical works together with his pupils (*sunanagnôsis*, as this was called).

Yet it is very striking that whenever Epictetus mentions this pedagogical method, he more often than not sounds a cautionary note, claiming that it does one no good to be able to interpret and understand Chrysippus's works (or those of other thinkers, for that matter) unless one can also put those insights into practice and show how one has changed for the better as a result of one's reading. According to Epictetus, merely interpreting philosophical expositions and showing off one's erudition is no different from the preoccupation of a scholar of literature with trivial details that are meant to dazzle (*Diss.* 2.19.5–15; *Ench.* 49). Presumably Epictetus would measure his own success as a teacher by the actual moral progress of his pupils, not by their ability to parrot his teachings. There is similarly a right and wrong way of engaging in logic and physics, these authors make clear; the wrong way entails studying them for their own sake and indulging in technical details and prowess (see, for instance, Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.7.32–3; see also *Ench.* 52; Marcus Aurelius 10.9).

In the final analysis, according to the later Stoics, it is not just logic or physics in the philosophical curriculum that are subservient to the correct way of life. So, too, is talking about rather than practicing ethics. As Musonius Rufus (fr. 5 Hense) and Epictetus claim, one can hold discussions and write extensively about the good life, but anyone with philosophical interests is ultimately judged by the same standard as a physician, a sailor, or a musician: it is what one accomplishes that matters.

To understand this point more fully, we need to see how theory and practice relate to each other in Stoicism, and especially in the later accounts. "Philosophy," Musonius Rufus

claims, "is nothing else than to search out by reason what is right and proper, and by deeds to put it into practice" (fr. 14 Hense; see also fr. 4, on philosophy as the art of becoming a good human being). What especially sets later Stoicism apart from other schools of thought is the view that all theory, including what we would call theory or philosophizing about ethics, must serve an ethics in action. Theory and practice are inextricably intertwined in this point of view, but with an emphasis on practice. To the Stoics, positing pure thought (or even a higher state) as the goal of life and as practice (cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1325b) would make little sense, not in the least because they do not recognize a transcendent intelligible and noetic dimension to reality. For them, with their unified view of virtue in which all virtues entail one another, wisdom as the excellence of reason always constitutes *moral* virtue and being engaged *in the world* and a *web of social relations*.

Small wonder, then, that the later Stoics put so much emphasis on training (*meletê-askêsis*, as in Musonius Rufus fr. 6 Hense) as the indispensable bridge between theoretical insights and practice. This notion, which has connections with the Socratic and Cynic traditions, encompasses much more than Aristotle's habituation, which is meant to shape the lower, irrational aspects of the soul (as in *Eth. Nic.* 2). The Stoics, with the potential and debated exception of Posidonius (see above), do not accept irrational aspects of the soul as existing independently from reason. Hence, they argue, training and habituation involve a human being's entire disposition, including the process of learning to use one's reason correctly. Like that of its Platonic and Peripatetic counterparts, the Stoic notion of the good is a radical departure from ordinary conceptions of happiness, and thus it is not easy to implement against prevailing practices, weaknesses in one's own disposition, and bad habits. Therefore, according to this view, pupils need all the help they can get to make these insights sufficiently their own or to acquire the right disposition (*ethos*, as in Musonius Rufus fr. 5 Hense) for putting them into practice under all circumstances.

For the later Stoics, ethics in action means showing one's mettle in ordinary, everyday life circumstances and in one's given socio-political obligations. For this reason, students are not meant to form settled attachments to a school, as increasingly happened, for instance, with the inner circles of the schools of Platonism. Instead, the knowledge and training acquired through education has to be portable and to become fully interiorized, or digested as it were (Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.21.1–3; *Ench.* 46; Seneca, *Ep.* 2.2–4, 84; *Ben.* 7.2.1). Thus Seneca and Epictetus show their own independence toward their Stoic predecessors and do not extol a Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus above all others. "We Stoics," Seneca famously claimed, "are not subjects of a despot: each of us lays claim to his own freedom" (*Ep.* 33.4). If Chrysippus took the liberty to disagree with his teacher Cleanthes, "why, then, following the example of Chrysippus himself, should not every man claim his own freedom?" (*Ep.* 113.23).

Epictetus and Musonius Rufus also downplay their own importance as philosophers (on Epictetus, see Long 2002 and Bénatouïl 2009; see also Reydams-Schils 2011) – even though they do, on occasion, mention the benefits of studying under their guidance. Students are told sternly not to show off their philosophical knowledge (e.g. Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.26.9) and that external trappings, such as a certain dress code, do not make the philosopher.

In the long run, and over the course of an entire lifetime, according to this view, teachers are there only to point the way (as Seneca and Epictetus indicate that Chrysippus had done for them). Self-education and monitoring one's own progress as one goes through different situations in life are to do the bulk of the work of imbuing philosophical teachings. Modes of such ongoing training include reading and excerpting philosophical works, refreshing one's memory of key tenets so as to have these ready at hand (as the etymology of *manual* or Epictetus's *Enchiridion* implies), engaging in conversations with

others, witnessing one's conversations with oneself, contemplating the order of the universe, and writing.

Although Seneca was not a teacher in the same sense as Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, he increasingly focused on philosophical writings toward the end of his life and mapped out his own moral progress and challenges, along with summaries and advice for his addressees and audience. Marcus Aurelius's reflections, many of which were jotted down during military campaigns, are the clearest example of writing as ongoing training, especially if originally intended primarily for himself and not for a broader audience. (Epictetus attributed this kind of writing even to Socrates allegedly training himself in the art of refutation, raising objections and coming up with and counter-arguments, *Diss.* 2.1.32–3; 2.6.26–7). In those reflections, we find the period's most powerful man, as measured by conventional standards, warning himself against completely identifying himself with his public role. "Make sure," he tells himself, "that you are not turned into a Caesar" (6.30) without leaving space for the self to continue groping for that which truly matters.

Because the later Stoics do not constitute a homogenous group, and because this chapter deals with self-proclaimed Stoics, we next turn to some of the more distinctive views of the main figures in this tradition: Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Hierocles.

Seneca

Seneca (4 BCE/1 CE to 65 CE), unlike his teacher Sextius and most of the Stoics of the Roman imperial era, wrote in Latin, and in contrast to Cicero, he saw his role not primarily as one of a translator and transmitter of Greek thought, but rather as someone who "thought" in Latin and extended its linguistic range for writing philosophy (Inwood 2005). This approach in itself gives him a distinct voice.

The *Letters*, addressed to a certain Lucilius, provide perhaps the best window onto Seneca's philosophical writings. Even if Lucilius is also a historical figure, it is clear that he is meant to represent a type (and thus the letters, in all likelihood, are fictionalized at least to some extent): a person who is on the verge of turning away from a life governed by traditional ambition and concerns and whose progress the reader can follow throughout the letters (and presumably compare to their own). But Seneca himself is the second party on this trajectory: he presents himself not as a sage, but as someone who might be ahead of people like Lucilius in terms of his moral development (or of some of the addressees in his other writings), but who still is also merely making progress. And thus he tells Lucilius that in their correspondence, his friend is a witness to Seneca's conversation with himself (*Ep.* 27.1; see also 75.1).

Letter 104 captures a number of central themes in Seneca's philosophical writings. It renders in both philosophical content and literary form how Seneca sees one's relation to both the universe and other human beings. In a series of expanding concentric circles, Seneca begins with his rapport with his spouse and a journey he undertook to improve his health. In a second movement, he broadens this theme to a reflection on the futility of travelling as an attempt at escape and on the threat to one's inner tranquility that can be posed by a wrong kind of attachment to things and people, the latter's mortality posing a particular challenge. And he ends with the realization that only philosophical inquiry undertaken in the correct manner (see above) can truly enlarge our horizon to keep the world and others always present in our thought and lead us to true freedom.

Among these letters, the two most famous, and most influential in the later Stoic tradition because they also sum up major strands of reasoning that include Platonic and Peripatetic

views, are *Letter* 58, on the different modes of being, and *Letter* 65, on causes. *Letter* 58 distinguishes six Platonic modes of being (but which also show Peripatetic and Stoic influences): (a) being in thought (*cogitabile*); (b) being *per excellentiam* (god); (c) being, in the strict sense (*quae proprie sunt*), the Platonic forms; (d) being as form and structure inherent in the things themselves as imitations of Platonic forms; (e) common being (*quae communiter sunt*), as in "human being"; and (f) quasi-being (*quae quasi sunt*), such as time and the void. In *Letter* 65, Seneca contrasts the Stoic explanatory parsimony that relies on only one cause – the active divine principle interacting with matter – with the over-abundance of causes (*turba causarum*, 65.11) posited by Aristotle (i.e. four: matter, the divine maker as origin-cause, the form in things, and the goal) and Plato (who added a fifth cause, the form as model; Seneca here also attributes a so-called metaphysics of prepositions to Plato, with god, for example, being rendered as *a quo*).

Also highly influential are *Letters* 94 and 95, which deal with a debate within the Stoic camp about the relation between doctrine, or general principles derived thereof, and precepts, or advice applicable in specific circumstances (for example, on how a son should behave towards his father; see below on Hierocles). Seneca argues that a combination of doctrine and precepts is most effective, a stance that also means that forms of discourse that are related to precepts, such as consolation (*consolatio*), encouragement (*exhortatio*), admonition (*monitio*), persuasion (*suasio*), and reproach (*exprobratio*), are crucial to the philosophical undertaking.

In a famous passage from his *On Anger* (3.36), Seneca mentions that every evening he submits himself to self-examination to assess how his day has gone and how he is doing in terms of moral progress. As in the writings of other Roman Stoics, a very distinctive notion of self is at work here, one that permeates all of Seneca's writings (Guillemin 1952–4; Edwards 1997; Reydams-Schils 2005). Located in reason or the governing principle of the soul (the *hêgemonikon*), this notion of self functions primarily as a mediator between the values recommended by philosophy and the exigencies of ordinary, everyday demands. As such, it is a unified self (unlike a Platonic or Peripatetic part or power-based view of the soul) that differs radically from any Cartesian or post-Cartesian notion in that it relies on a unity of soul and body and is embedded in an objective normative framework that also encompasses the rational order of the universe. The first-person voice in Seneca's writings does have some of his traits (such as his ongoing struggle with his health or his disillusionment about his involvement in politics toward the end of his life), but they are not autobiographical in our usual understanding of that term: these personal details are phrased as general challenges any human being could face. His focus on the fear of mortality has also to be understood from this angle: it does not entail a morbid obsession, but rather the realization that death poses one of the main threats to humans' inner peace.

Seneca's writings in general aim at reinforcing this self, as defined in Stoic terms. He enjoins his reader repeatedly to "withdraw into yourself" (*Ep.* 5, 22.1 seq. and 9 seq.). True freedom, inner security, and magnanimity all reside in this self, which "does not submit itself to anything, but on the contrary subordinates all things to itself" (*Ep.* 124.12), and it has voluntarist features without representing a full-fledged will (Inwood 2005: 132–56). In his *On Anger* (see also *Ep.* 113.18), Seneca, given his strong emphasis on the freedom of the self, also lays out one of the most developed extant accounts of the so-called pre-emotions, that is, the soul and body's primary responses to external occurrences (such as, for instance, the face turning pale when one is confronted with a dangerous situation) that do not qualify as passions; they are pre-rational because they do not involve a mistaken judgement of reason (Sorabji 2000: 55–65; Graver 2007).

As with the other Roman Stoics, the social dimension of ethics is essential to Seneca. Seneca, however, also dwells at great length on the theme of the general moral corruption of his contemporaries. The bad influence of others who adhere to wrong values is one of the two factors of corruption generally recognized by the Stoics (the other being attraction inherent in things themselves, such as wealth and food). One of the distinctive themes of Seneca's approach to social ethics is his rapport with his spouse Paulina, which he himself contrasts with that of Socrates and Xanthippe (*Ep.* 104) and which the historian Tacitus brings to the fore in his account of Seneca's suicide (*Ann.* 15.62 seq.). In Seneca's own assessment of the legitimacy of suicide, he emphasizes social responsibility: as long as one can still be of use to one's community and close circle, one should postpone suicide, even if other factors such as a failing health would indicate such a course of action (*Ep.* 78.2; 98.15 seq.; 104.2–5).

Much scholarly attention has been devoted to Seneca's ambivalence about political power and wealth (as in his *On Leisure* and *On the Happy Life*), but here two important points should be kept in mind. The first is that, according to standard Stoic doctrine, what most matters is not involvement or detachment, poverty, or wealth (even though wealth is a so-called preferred indifferent, meaning that if circumstances allow, one can opt for wealth), but rather the motivation and reasoning behind one's choices. (Withdrawal out of fear, for instance, is not to be condoned, any more than unbridled ambition for power.) Second, according to a line of thinking also common to many Roman Stoics, involvement and detachment always go together. Even when one is most in the thick of things, one should maintain some inner distance, precisely in the space of the self where the value mediation takes place; similarly, even when one finds oneself removed from traditional social interaction (during exile on a remote island, for instance), one should maintain one's connection to the community of gods and men, the so-called cosmopolis, and maintain one's moral responsibility to others.

The theme of the cosmopolis brings us to Seneca's view of the role of the study of nature in philosophy. In his *On Benefits* (7.1), for instance, Seneca does not leave any doubt that it is much preferable to have a few maxims of practical philosophy at hand that will make one better and happier than a vast storehouse of recondite knowledge about nature and its hidden causes. But it is in the preface to the third book of his *Natural Questions* that he solves the riddle of this quasi-skeptical approach to the study of nature. According to Seneca, physics and moral self-improvement are meant to reinforce each other, and only a physics that serves this mutual relation is worth pursuing. Understanding ourselves correctly implies understanding our place and role in the universe, how we relate to the divine principle, and, in the universal community, to other human beings (Williams 2012).

Musonius Rufus

Judging by the extant reports of his teaching activity, Musonius Rufus (*c.*30–100 CE), Epictetus's teacher, appears to have been the Roman Stoic who most strongly emphasized the importance of an ethics in action. Thus, as mentioned already, he claims without further ado that "philosophy is *nothing else* than to search out by reason what is right and proper, and by deeds to put it into practice" (fr. 14 Hense). The biographical anecdotes told about him in Antiquity thereby acquire extra significance in that they portray Musonius as the ideal philosopher according to his own criteria. A cluster of anecdotes about his exile to the proverbially arid island of Gyara, for instance, tell us that he accepted his lot without hatred for Rome as his fatherland (Favorinus, *On Exile* 76.17–20 Barigazzo), that he continued to attract pupils

wherever he found himself, and that he benefited the island community by the discovery of a well (Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 7.16). In other words, he never lost sight of the social dimension of ethics, which is so central to the Stoic tradition of this period.

Musonius Rufus perhaps stands out the most because of his views on women and marriage, which have points in common with positions that are also attested for Antipater of Tarsos (*SVF* 3.62–3) and Hierocles (Stob. 4,502–7 WH; see below). According to Musonius, women have all principal human features in common with men (fr. 3 Hense): reason, sense perception, body parts, and a disposition toward virtue. Given that all human beings strive toward being virtuous, he held, women too should study philosophy to enhance their rational decision-making, justice, moderation, and courage. (Musonius uses the template of the four so-called cardinal virtues throughout the extant expositions.)

At first blush, Musonius combines the injunction that women should study philosophy with concessions to traditional viewpoints. To forestall the criticism that studying philosophy would make women shirk their traditional responsibilities, he claims that, on the contrary, such a study would make them better at these tasks and turn them into tireless defenders of their children and helpmates of their husbands. Yet Musonius also introduces two points that greatly nuance this more traditional perspective. First, he encourages not just women, but men, too, to work with their own hands (fr. 3 Hense; *autourgia*). The best occupation for a philosopher, he holds, would be that of a shepherd or a farmer (fr. 11 Hense), as pupils would see their teacher modeling the good life and the leisure it affords would leave enough opportunity for learning and discussion. For all human beings, philosophy, as pointed out earlier, is to serve practice (fr. 3 Hense). Second (fr. 4 Hense), Musonius does not insist on an absolute division of labor between men and women. Although he notes that certain tasks appear to be more suited to men than to women because of differences in physical strength, Musonius is also willing to entertain the possibility that all human tasks constitute a common obligation and that sometimes roles can be switched.

The cluster of texts about marriage (fr. 13a–b, and 14) shows that Musonius posited an ideal marriage as a reciprocal relation between equals, based on virtue and genuine mutual affection. Even though he limits the role of sex to procreation (fr. 12 and 15), producing offspring is not what primarily makes a marriage for him, but rather the quality of the bond between the spouses (fr. 13a). And he firmly rejects double standards in sexual morality (fr. 12; see also Seneca, *Ep.* 94.26).

Epictetus

As already mentioned, in the case of Epictetus (*c.*50–125 CE) we see more clearly than in the testimonies about Musonius Rufus's teaching that logic, physics, and the exposition of Chrysippus's works were part of his curriculum. Yet he certainly also emphasizes that these forms of inquiry should always serve the correct way of leading one's life and not be studied merely for their own sake. Hence he too underscores the importance of effort (*meletê*) and training (*askêsis*; see *Diss.* 2.9.13 seq.). Even more than other Stoics, Epictetus uses Socrates as a role model, borrowing from him (a) certain "Socratic" theses such as the claim that no one errs willingly; (b) examples from the manner in which he conducted himself, especially in the face of the charges leveled against him that led to his death; and (c) a method of inquiry (Long 2002). The other model on which Epictetus relies is that of the ideal Cynic, who displays none of the shocking behaviors described in our other sources for Cynicism (see esp. *Diss.* 3.22). Indeed, the extent to which Epictetus diverts attention from himself as a potential role model is quite striking.

Epictetus's Zeus, whose primary role, in line with early Stoicism, is to act as Providence, would have put our body and external goods entirely under our control if he could have. But because these are only parts of the universe as a whole and as such are subordinated to this overall order, they are not "up to us" or under our control (*Diss.* 1.1.7–13, 4.1.99–110). Our reason, on the other hand, because of its close affinity with divine reason, can overcome these limitations and is the only thing that is truly up to us (see also *Ench.* 1). Making full use of our reason, as human beings, entails making a rational use of our representations (*phantasiai*), and the latter in turn entails that we apply correctly the general notions (*prolêpseis*) with which nature has equipped us, such as the moral categories of good and evil.

How does one learn to use one's representations rationally and to apply one's general notions correctly? Epictetus recommends three types of exercises to reach this double goal: the first focuses on desire (*orexis*) and aversion (*ekklisis*), the second on impulse (*hormê*) and rejection (*aphormê*), and the third on assent (*sunkatathesis*) and suspension of judgement (*epochê*). Pierre Hadot (1998) has connected these three types of exercises with the three branches of philosophy – physics, ethics, and logic, respectively – and this hypothesis still provides a fruitful hermeneutical key to Epictetus's thought.

The first exercise asks us to structure our desires and aversions, so that in general we strive for what is truly good, namely virtue as the optimization of reason, and experience aversion only from what is truly evil, vice. The connection with physics becomes relevant when one realizes that the proper structure of human desire enjoins one to align one's own reason with the divine reason that permeates the entire *kosmos* and manifests itself as Providence. This exercise, therefore, allows one to look at ethics from the angle of its connection with physics. While developing this broader philosophical perspective, Epictetus recommends, pupils should suspend their desires and aversions for the time being.

The second exercise deals with concrete actions and focuses on the so-called appropriate actions (*kathêkonta*, sometimes also called duties) – that is, actions that one should engage in according to nature and one's position in life. In this context, as is the case with the other later Stoics, Epictetus devotes a lot of attention to social duties: how one should behave as a son, a father, a brother, etc. Even though one should avoid being too dependent on others and others can exert a bad influence on one's value judgements, human nature has an intrinsic social aspect that manifests itself in a certain reliability (*ti piston*), affection (*sterktikon*), readiness to help (*ôfelêtikon*), and tolerance (*anektikon*; *Diss.* 2.10.23). Although it is true that the good should win out over our social relations if a conflict between the two arises (see also Musonius Rufus fr. 16 Hense), it is also the case that a proper disposition toward others is part and parcel of virtue and the good (*Diss.* 3.3.5–10).

Finally, the exercise that covers assent and suspension of judgement deals with how we arrive at correct judgements, namely with logic. But the proper mode of engaging in logic is not for the sake of technical prowess, but in the context of a normative framework. In other words, one hones one's skill in distinguishing between the true and the false for the sake of the good and the bad, so that in the case of this type of exercise, the connection with ethics again remains paramount.

Epictetus uses the term *prohairesis*, which he sometimes also identifies with the self (*Diss.* 1.1.23 seq.; 1.17.26; 2.22.20), to denote rationally informed intentionality. This *prohairesis* does not represent some novel and distinct entity over and above reason as the ruling principle (*hêgemonikon*) in human beings, but rather, in light of Epictetus's category of that which is up to us, those aspects of psychology that emphasize a human being's independent ability to have his or her actions informed by the correct disposition and judgements in the chain of reason, desire, representation, assent, impulse, and action (*Diss.* 1.17.21 seq.; Asmis 2001;

Long 2002: 210–20). Hence, *prohairesis* in Epictetus also carries some connotations of what at a later stage in intellectual history would come to be known as the will.

Marcus Aurelius

As Hadot has claimed (Hadot 1998: 85ff.), the three types of exercises that Epictetus recommended also apply to the work of Marcus Aurelius (121–80 CE), who tells us himself that one of his teachers had given him a copy of the lectures of Epictetus (1.7). If logic is not the dominant topic in his writings (but on this topic, see now Giavatto 2008), physics does appear to play a much more important role than in the extant evidence for Musonius Rufus, especially as the foundation for human sociability.

Using a line of argumentation that we find also in Seneca (*Ep.* 16.4–6) and Epictetus (fr. 1 Schenkl = fr. 175 Schweighäuser) – a similarity often overlooked in the secondary literature – Marcus Aurelius tends to apply an either-or reasoning to physics: either the world is a random agglomeration of atoms (in a clear echo of the Epicurean position) or it is governed by a Providence that has given it a rational order. Such statements should not be interpreted as a weak commitment on Marcus Aurelius' part to Stoic physics, but rather as serving a double function. On the one hand, they underscore the right disposition: in either alternative, we should face what happens around us with equanimity. But on the other, they also clearly function as an a fortiori claim. If even an atomist who does not believe that the *kosmos* has a rational order can display such equanimity, how much more does such an attitude recommend itself to someone who believes that the world is good and rational through and through?

Sociability (*koinônia*) in the guise of justice, defined as working for the common good, is a central theme in Marcus Aurelius' writing (see also van Ackeren 2011 and Gill 2013). He anchors human sociability in the connection between human and divine reason, resulting in the formulaic claim that for gods and human beings, to be rational is to be social. This perspective governs the first book of the *Meditations*, in which Marcus Aurelius describes all the social relations that made him who he is.

In the field of politics, Marcus Aurelius displays a strong realism. Though he hints at times at his role as emperor (11.18), he emphasizes that one should not hope for Plato's *Republic* (9.29) and clearly also distances himself from his imperial role (6.30). The concept of reservation (*hupexairesis*) permits Marcus Aurelius to have realistic expectations, especially in dealing with others: whenever we plan to undertake an action, he asserts, we should remind ourselves that the outcome could be different from what we had intended. Yet the same concept also allows him to pursue the philosophical ideal of the good, especially through the function of turning around (*peritropê*), in which even obstacles can be turned into opportunities for exercising virtue.

Hierocles

Although we know next to nothing about this Stoic, Hierocles (second century CE) provides an invaluable glimpse of the kind of ethical theory that underlies much of the later Stoics' approach to philosophy. An account preserved on papyrus called *Elements of Ethics* gives us some of our best information about how the notion of Stoic appropriation (*oikeiôsis*) is supposed to work, and a number of passages preserved in Stobaeus examine how to conduct oneself in a range of social relations toward the fatherland or the gods (Ramelli 2009).

Appropriation entails that all animals, including human beings, are born with an awareness of, as well as an affective disposition toward, themselves that makes them pursue self-preservation.

Hierocles wants to demonstrate (a) that appropriation exists, (b) that it is continuous, and (c) and that it starts from the moment of birth. The last part of the extant text is important because it lists several forms of appropriation; he terms one of these affectionate appropriation (*sterktikê oikeiôsis*), as expressed towards others, and the last lines deal with human beings' sociability.

These final parts of the text can be interpreted as a natural bridge to a listing of the appropriate functions (*kathêkonta*) of specific social relations, so that it is possible that both accounts may have belonged to one and the same work. The most famous passage from the second group of texts, the ones preserved in Stobaeus, contains the injunction that we should think of our relationships with others in terms of concentric circles (Stob. 4,671,7–673,11 WH). In the center is an individual's mind, surrounded in ever-widening circles by his or her body, close relatives, and further relations, all the way out to the community of all human beings. If we keep pulling the outer circles inward, the end result is that we will be equally well-disposed to all human beings, though different modalities of relationships would presumably continue to exist.

Coda

Tacitus reports that Musonius Rufus, in his commitment to philosophy, mingled with an army of soldiers and admonished them about the benefits of peace and the risks of war, trying to talk them into peace, only to be met with boredom, ridicule, and even aggression (*Hist.* 3.81). If he had not given up his attempt at "untimely wisdom" (*intempestiva sapientia*) by heeding the advice of more temperate bystanders and yielding to threats by others, Tacitus claims, he would have been attacked and trampled under foot.

That this kind of anecdote became a stock theme is proven by a similar story about Musonius's student, Dio Chrysostom (40 CE to *c.*120 CE) in Philostratus (*Life of the Sophists* 1.23.1; 488 Olearius). Unlike Musonius Rufus, however, Dio was successful. Even after his alleged conversion to philosophy, his formidable rhetorical training apparently served him well. According to Philostratus, Dio presented himself as a sage, a *sophos*, and adopted the role of Odysseus. His persuasiveness was such that he cast a spell, like Circe in the *Odyssey* (10.213), even on men who did not understand Greek well.

All we hear about Musonius Rufus from Tacitus is that he was a Stoic and devoted to philosophy; Philostratus, however, carefully stages Dio's intervention and self-presentation. (This may also point to a difference in perspective between Tacitus and Philostratus as authors.) Musonius Rufus mingles with the troops, holds forth, and comes across as inept, to put it mildly. Dio, in a histrionic gesture, tears off his rags, climbs naked onto an altar to deliver his speech, captures his audience with a startling opening line in which he assumes the role of Odysseus (see also his *Or.* 13, 33), and comes across as a masterful manipulator of crowds, a sorcerer of some sort.

But it is also the case that in these accounts, Musonius wants his audience to reflect about the advantages of peace over those of war, whereas Dio merely convinces the soldiers that it would be better to go along with the Romans. Musonius, in other words, wants his listeners to reach a deeper level of understanding, whereas Dio wants to win the day. This contrast captures almost all of the main features that make up the later Stoics' conscious attempt to set themselves apart from common cultural expectations and social success as measured by traditional standards and embraced by figures such as Dio. (This contrast is perhaps all the more interesting because Musonius Rufus taught both Epictetus and Dio.) Such anecdotes can serve as a final reminder that later Stoics such as Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and